IR 05000498/1988040

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Insp Repts 50-498/88-40 & 50-499/88-40 on 880613-15 & 27-29. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Findings,Licensee Responses to IE Bulletin 85-003 & Licensee Sys for Installation of Pipe Supports & Restraints
ML20151G082
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/14/1988
From: Ireland R, Clay Johnson
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151G080 List:
References
50-498-88-40, 50-499-88-40, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8807280122
Download: ML20151G082 (6)


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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report.

50-498/88-40 Operating License:

NPF-76 50-499/88-40 Construction Permit:

CPPR-129 Dockets:

50-498

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50-499 Licensee:

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700 llouston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)

Inspection At:

STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: June 13-15 and 27-29, 1988 Inspectors:

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.'E.~Johnsdn, Reactor Inspector ' Plant Date Systems Section, Division of actor Safety r

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. r Tre'lW,~ Acting C ie, TTant systems Date Section, Division of Reactor Safety

Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted June 13-15 and 27-y,, 19_88 (Rep _ ort _ 50-498/88-40)

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Areas Inspected:

No inspection of Unit I was conducted.

Results:

Not applicable.

Inspection Conducted June 13-15 and 27-29, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-40)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection including followup of previcus identified findings, review of licensee responses to Inspection and Enforcement Eulletin 85-03 concerning motor operated valve switch settings, and review of the licensee's system for installation of pipe supports and restraints.

Results: Within the three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

8807280122 880718 PDR ADOCK 05000498

PDC

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L-2-DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted HL&P

  • U. T. Westermeier, Project Manager S. D. Phillips, Project Compliance Engineer
  • D. C. King, Construction Manager M. Duke, Engineering W. Trujillo, Nuclear Assurance Supervisor
  • M. Pollishak, Project Compliance Supervisor
  • K. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer R. Whittey, Quality Assurance
  • J. Johnson, Quality Assurance Lead
  • M. E. Powell, Project Compliance / Licensing Supervisor Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

R. Parekk, Principal Engineer A. Franco, Engineering E. Folley, Engineering Group Supervisor

R. Yelamouchi Engineering Group Lead Ebasco Service Inc. (Ebasco)

B. Higby, Quality Control, Supervisor J. Elliott, Quality Control

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NRC

  • C. L. Garrison, Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (0 pen)UnresolvedItem 499/8826-01 - The concern was identified during the

review o' Standard Site Procedure (SSP) 9. Revision 4, "Pipe Support Installation."

It was noticed that paragraph 5.6.6.8 had been modified by Interim Change Notice (ICN) No. 31, dated April 7, 1988. The original

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paragraph for liquid filled piping, after hydrotesting, required that all travel stops "shall" remain installed when the system was to be crained.

ICN No. 31 modified the "shall be installed" to "should be installed" prior to draining.

l The concern was that if quality control (QC) on startup failed to install these travel stops prior to draining the system, would these supports be j

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damaged, and would there be any additional stresses added to the piping system? ICN 34 was issued on May 23, 1988, by the licensee to reflect the original wording This item is considered open until the NRC' inspector can verify that no supports were damaged, or pipe overstressed, while ICN No. 31 was in effect.

3.

IE Bulletin 85-03 (Closed)

IEB 85-03, "Motor Operated Valve Comon Mode Failure During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," was issued as a result of two-events in 1985, and a number of earlier events, during which motor-operated valves failed on demand, in a common mode, due to improper switch settings.

IEB 85-03 requested licensees to develo) and implement a program to ensure the operability of valve operator switcies on motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant injection, core spray and emergency feedwater systems for pressurized water reactors that are required to be tested for operational readiness in accordance with 10CFR50.55a(g). The licensee had made several submittals on this subject to the NRC. The latest submittal was dated June 10, 1988.

The purpose of this inspection was to perform a followup on the licensee's action taken in response to IEB 85-03 for Unit 2.

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/73 was used by the NRC inspector as a guide _in reviewing the licensee's pro 3 ram, a.

Procedure Review The licensee's program in response to IEB 85-03 included 24 valves

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for Unit 2.

These valves are in the Safety Injection (SI) and Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) systems. The STP program was implemented by procedures, elementary diagrams, and manufacturer's instruction manuals for valves and valve operators.

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee Procedure SG-E-09, Revision 5,

"Generic Prereqcisite Test Procedure for Motor Operated Valves and Dampers." This procedure gave instructions on statically adjusting valve operator switches, and on properly documenting the as-found, specified, and actual torque switch settings. The procodure required that a check for excessive valve backseating be made during the verification of limit switch settings.

The procedure also specified that the opening and closing torque switch settings be adjusted to the index setting specified by both the operator and valve manufacturers. Tnis setting is related to thrust required to close, or open, the respective valves at the design pressure.

Standard Site Procedure (SSP) 47, Revision 0, "Inspection and Rework of Class 1E MOVs," listed pertinent repair and maintenance instructions for MOVs.

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-4-Procedure 0FMP05-2E-0300, Revision 3, "Limitorque MOV Motor Inspection and Lube," included those valves in the plant periodic maintenance (PM) program which ensured that switch settings are set and n'aintained correctly. All licensee procedures reviewed by the-NRC inspector were adequate, b.

Observation The NRC insp e tor selected four motor operated valves for examination. Attributes reviewed included:

Rust / moisture in the operator housing.

Visible damage Excess lubricat!on

7he torque switch settings were as specified by the manufacturers'

instructions.

No visual damage or deterioration was observed during tH s inspection.

Valves inspected included:

A2SIM0V0012A Safety Injection (SI)

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A2SIM0VG004A SI

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A2AFMOV0048 Auxiliary Feed (AFW)

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A2AFFV7325 AFW

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Data Review Test records and data of the static test were reviewed by the MC inspector, and results were found to be in compliance with applicable licenste procedures. The NRC inspector also reviewed preoperational test No. 2-SI-P-04.

The test included valve checks in the "B" train of the SI system. Op-and close times for valves were verified in j

this test.

Five of the valves included in IEF 85-03 were checked in the test, d.

Summary The licensee's program is irrplemented an6 appears to meet the rciairements of IE8 85-03. Procedures and is tructions were issued.

P 1 valves included in IEB 85-03 had been statically and p 1 operationally tested in Unit 2, except for the AFW valves which had not been preoperationally tested.

The 'icensee had submitted a final response to IEB 85-03 dated Jur:e 10, 1988, for review and approval by NRC.

4.

Pipe Supports o.:d Restraint Systems (50090)

The objective of this iaspection was to determine through direct observation and independent evaluation of work, that the licensee's work

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control system was functioning properly and that installation of safety-related pipe support and iestic'nts was in compliance with NRC requirenents, licensee coninitments, and applicable codes, a.

Observation of Work The NRC inspector selected nine final des _i drawings for the Safety Injection Systen. (gn pipe support structural SI) for examination and comparison with as-built conditions in the field.

The followi.ng inspection attributes were examined:

Location and orientation of the support

Type of support

Support material

Identification of support

Clearances and allowable tolerances

Pin to pin-dimensions

Rust and excessive damage

Weld size and visual acceptance of welds

Bolting material and size During the inspection, the NRC Inspector noted an additional pipe support, No. SI-9106-HL5013, that was not M,own on an. isometric drawing.

The licensee was informed of this finding. The licensee

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told the NRC inspector that isometric drawings, which he had used, did not always reflect deletion or ;odition of pipe supports.

The licensee indicated that the stress isometric drawings, and Stress

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Calculation No. RC0Q08, reflected the addition of Support j

No. SI-9106-HL5013. Review of the stress calculations and the stress i

isometric by the NRC inspector showed the addition of the extra pipe support.

It appeared that the licensee's inspection program in the area of pipe supports was functioning properly.

Discrepancies identified by

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the licensee's QA/QC organization were documented by nonconformance l

reports (NCRs), or some other appropriate method was utilized. All i

field changes were reviewed by engineering and incorporated into the final design drawings.

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The NRC inspector also selected pipe anchor locations on the final design drawings for inspection.

These anchor locations were visually examined and compared to the design drawings to ensure agreement as to their location and function. The specific items examined are listed below:

Pipe Support jnchorLocation g

SI-2106-RR12 MS-2003-HL-5006 SI-2106-SH10 SI-2143-HF-5004 SI-2106-RH0008 SI-2143-HF-5002

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SI-2106-RR09 SI-2143-HF-5003

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.SI-2106-RH06 CS-2107-HF-5012 SI-2106-HL5011 CS-2106-HF-5010 SI-2106-RR0004 CH-2135-HS-5001 SI-2106-RH05 CS-2101-HL-5003 No violations or deviations were identified.

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Records Review The NRC inspector reviewed the records of the pipe supports and anchor locations identified in the previous paragraphs.

  • Weld identification and location corresponded to respective weld data card.
  • The required scope of QA/QC inspections were tet.

Type and classification of pipe support complied with design

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i drawings, specifications,- and vendor catalog.

Location, spacing, and critical clearances met licensee's

specifications and had been verified by QC inspections.

Records reviewed were retrievable, accurate and complete.

Recorded

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information met documentation requirements.

i No violations or deviations were identified.

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5.

Exit Interview

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The NRC inspector met with the licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph 1)

on June 29, 1988, and sumarized the scope and findings,of this

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inspection.

No informttion was identified as proprietary, i

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