IR 05000498/1988010
| ML20151X340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1988 |
| From: | Bess J, Carpenter D, Constable G, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151X312 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-88-10, 50-499-88-10, NUDOCS 8805040118 | |
| Download: ML20151X340 (19) | |
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APPENDIX'
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/88-10 Operating License:
NPF-71 50-499/88-10 Construction Permit: CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 Expiration Date: December 1989 50-499 Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texac Project (STP), Units 1 and 2
Inspection at:
STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted:
Fe 1988 m
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/ rN Inspectors:
...r;C.GW, Senior Resident Inspector, Project D8te "
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects hA'}
razi-s, f SkS7h?
J. E. Bess, Resident Inspector, Project Section D Wate '
Division of Reactor Projects
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D. M. Hunnicutt, Senior Project Engineer, Project __ Wate /
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects r
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[9s Approved:
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G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section D, Division D6te of Reactor Projects
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'8805040118'380429 PDR ADOCS 05000498 DCD'
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V Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 1-29, 1988 (Report 50-498/88-10)
l Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including initial criticality activities; failure of No.14 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump; licensee
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action on previous inspection findings; control room evacuation drill; monthly
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surveillance; engineered safety features system walkdown; operational safety; E
significant plant events; and allegation review.
Results: Within the creas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified Inspection Conducted February 1-29, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-10)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection and witnessing of the hydrostatic testing of the secondary side of the four steam generators.
Resulis: Within the one area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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-Licensee Personnel
- W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer
- W. H. Kinsey,-Plant Manager
~*H.LR. Wisenburg,-Unit 1 Superintendent
- J. T. Westermeier, General Manager
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- S. M. Head, Supervising Licensing Engineer In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various other licensee.' architect engineer (AE), constructor, and contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending the-exit-interview conducted on February 29,-1988.
2.
Initial Criticality Witnessing Activities - Unit 1 (Criticality Not Achieved)
On February 25,.1988, the NRC staff commenced around-the-clock coverage of-the licensee's conduct of operations prior to and during the initial approach to criticality. ~ Initial criticality was nat achieved due to a reactor trip and resulting safety injection (SI) at 5:44 a.m. (CST) on February 28,;1988.
Prior to the trip, the. plant had all control and shutdown rods fully withdrawn (259 steps) except for Control Bank "D" which was withdrawn to 170 steps.
Boron dilution was in progress with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)-concentration at about 1050 parts per million (ppm), which was down from an initial concentration of 2650 ppm.
The NRC inspectors red ewed the STP Technical Specifications (TSs) and license conditions (NPF-71) to insure all applicable requirements were met prior.to entering Mode 2.
Additionally, selected TS requirements were independently verified by the 14RC inspectors.
These independent verifications included such safety-related items as pump, valve, and breaker alignments; selected surveillance test completed with valid acceptance criteria; and valve line ups in the plant and control room board walk downs.
No discrepancies were identified during these reviews.
During the initial criticality shift coverage, the NRC inspectors witnessed the performance of startup and intermediate range nuclear instrumentation calibrations and verified them as being performed by current approved procedures and within the acceptance criteria.
Selected required reactor trip checks (surveillance tests) were witnessed and veriffed.
Selected prerequisites were verified to be satisfactorily completed prior to test performance.
Special instrumentation required by procedures were verified as being in place and calibrated.
Selected
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inverse count rate plots were witnessed by the inspectors and four were independently performed by NRC inspectors from raw data.
Results similar to the licensee's were achieved.
During the shift coverage, the NRC inspectors talked with licensed operators, shift / unit supervisors, shift technical assistant:,. shift advisors, core performance engineers / technicians, Westinghnuse representatives, I&C technicians, nonlicensed operators, ch mical og ators/ analysts, and plant management.
These discussions included such appropriate topics as:
duties and responsibilities, plant status, test status, precautions and limitations, significance of observations, understanding of plant / procedures, plant / equipment status and requirements, and specific job assignments.
The NRC inspectors concluded the staff at STP were knowledgeable, trained, and fully prepared for the activities associated with initial criticality.
Minimum crew requirements were continuously met.
In fact, control room (CR) attendance was usually in excess of eight people. They were, however, all involved in plant / test activities and were not detramental to plant operations.
Control room conduct was considered by NRC inspector during frequent observations as quiet and professional.
At 9:52 a.m. (CST) on February 27, 1988, withdrawal of Control Rod Bank "A" commenced.
By 12:33 p.m. Control Rod Bank "D" was at 170 steps.
- Boron dilution commenced at the rate of 60 gallons per minute (gpm) from the reactor makeup water storage tank.
The NRC inspector observed boron sampling and subsequent analysis performed in the Chemical Analysis Laboratory.
Analytical results were provided to the CR within the L
allotted time required by procedure.
The technicians displayed a good l
working knowledge about the activities they were performing and a good working relationship between CR and operations personnel was observed.
At 5:44 a.m. (CST) on February 27, 1988, the reactor received a trip signal and safety injection signal.
Dilution at the time was 60 gpm with a boron concentration about 1098 ppm and all rods at 259 steps (fully withdrawn) except Control Rod Bank "D" which was withdrawn to 170 steps.
Source range Channel A and B counts were 65 and 100 counts per second, respectively.
The reactor trip and SI signal occurred when a Loop 3, Lo-Lo, T-cold, 2-out-of-3 logic signal was received.
The 2-out-of-3 logic signal occurred because a surveillance test which was being performed on the Loop 3, Channel 1, Lo-Lo, T-cold required a trip condition.
Concurrently, a spurious spike was received on the Loop 3, Channel 2, Lo-Lo, T-cold circuit which satisfied the 2-out of-3 trip logic.
The CR crew promptly responded and utilized the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures.
All safety equipment functioned as designed.
All control rods dropped into the reactor core, the standby diesels started, but the loading sequence did not initiate.
The low head and high head safety injection pumps started but did not inject.
The shift supervisors declared a Notification of Unusual Event (N0VE) at 5:51 a.m. because this was the initial criticality atte.npt for the reactor and the uncertainty existed regarding the cause for the reactor trip and SI.
The plant exited
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the NOUE at 6:30 a.m.
The NRC inspector in the~CR observed that the CR staff conducted themselves in a calm, deliberate manner during the event.
The initial criticality attempt was terminated by the licensee.
During the initial criticality coverage, CR log books, log sheets, data sheets and charts, surveillance. procedures, and operating procedures were routinely ~ reviewed and found acceptable.
The'following tests were witnessed or' reviewed during this initial criticality attempt.
IPEP04-ZX-0001, "Test Sequencer for Initial Criticality and Low Power
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Testing," Revision 4, 5 and 6 1 PEP 04-ZX-C002, "Initial Criticality," Revision 4 and 5
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IPEP02-ZX-0003, "Reactor Trip Recovery During Initial Criticality,"
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Revision 0 IPEP04-ZL-0063, "Precritical Alignment of Process Temperature
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Instrumentation," Revision 1 IPSP02-NI-0042, "Power Range Neutron Flux Channel II," Revision 2
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IPSP02-NI-0035, "Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Channel I,"
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Revision 1 IPSP02-NI-0044, "Power Range Neutron Flux Channel IV," Revision 2
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1 PSP 02-NI-0041, "Power Range Neutron Flux Channel I," Revision 2
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OPCP02-ZB-0037, "Determination of Boron, Potentiometric Method Using
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the Auto-Titrator," Revision 1 1 PSP 02-MS-0514, "Steam Pressure, Loop 1, Set 1 ACOT," Revision 2
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Failure of No.14 furbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump, Unit 1 On February 21, 1988, the licensee conducted testing to verify operability of the turbine driven AFW pump af ter entry into Mode 3 in accordance with TS Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.a.2.
During performance of the test, the turbine tripped on overspeed and the pump was declared inoperable by the licenso.
Troubleshooting and evaluation by licensee and vendor personnel concluded that the most probable cause of the turbine overspeed trip was excessive buildup of condensate in the steam supply line.
A procedure revision was made that called for blowing down the steam supply line prior to putting the turbine driven AF pump into service from the cold condition.
A satisfactory operability test (cold start) was performed on February 24, 1988.
A second satisfactory operability test (cold start) was performed
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on February 25, 1988, approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the previous test. The pump was declared operable on February 25, 1988, after the second test.
The licensee had committed to the NRC verbally (by followup letter, ST-HL-AE-2540, "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Operability Consideration," dated March 9, 1988) to an increased frequency in the surveillance testing for No.14 AFW pump in order to ensure operability of this train of the AFW system. On February 28, 1988, the No. 14 turbine driven AFW pump again failed to pass its surveillance test due to being unable to provide the required discharge pressure. A subsequent retest was performed with the discharge pressure acceptance criteria being satisfied. After the pump / turbine had cooled, a third test was perfonned and overheating was noted on the bearing housing of the thrust end of the pump.
Testing was terminated by the licensee.
Disassembly of the pump indicated that the throttle bush bo and '.ne shaft sleeve-throttle had seized and were rotating with the pump shaft. The heat generated created a heat affected zone in both halves of the pump casing about 1-inch deep around the throttle bushings.
Also, the center shaft sleeve had experienced some deterioration.
During the observations of the AFW pump work and testing, the NRC inspector informed the licensee of numerous valve picking leaks associated with the AFW system. These leaks ranged from stead,' drips to a steady stream. One large packing leak was on Valve AF0281 located above the No. 14 AFW pump. A plastic runoff system was improt ised to direct water away from the testing / repair activities.
Some of these leaks had been identified with MWR tags and some had not.
Those ijentified with MWR tags were 4 to 6 months old. The licensee should review their leak reduction program to insure that leaks with high potential fcr degradation of safety-related systems or components are addressed in a timely manner.
The NRC inspector also noted on February 29, 1988 that the loce.1 indicating panel for the No. 14 AFW pump was not being maintained.
"Bearing Header Oil Pressure Nonnal" and "Main Oil Pump Pressure Nonnal" indicating lights had no bulbs. The "Lube Oil Pressure" alerm light fixture was burned out and MWR Tag No. 53950, dated October 31, 1987, was in place. The tcchometer case and glass were broken (top of case missing).
During testing the tachometer was noted to have erratic movement and was accurate to only 400 rpm when compared to a hand-held strobe tachometer.
The licensee acknowledged the poor condition of this panel and undertook imediate actions to refurbish the panel. However, the NRC inspector was concerned that the degraded status of this indicating panel had not been previously recognized by the licensee, particularly since the turbine driven AFW pump had been the subject of considerable management attention due to the hot bearing problem.
It is ackncwledged that this panel is not safety-related nor is it relied upon for local operation of the AFW pump, however, the NRC staff believes that if equipment is installed and available for use by the operators then that equipment should be maintained.
Failure to maintain such equipment could hamper the safe operation of safety-related equipment by misleading an operator during an emergenc *
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4.
Licensee Action on Previous Tnspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 498/8629-16:
Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)
Mechanical Joints - This open item concerned the use of mechanical joints (mostly Swagelok type fittings) of the PASS sample inlet and recirculation lines which could pose a potential leakage path for radioactively contaminated fluid.
The licensee has replaced the mechanical joints in the lines with socket welded joints.
Additionally, the licensee is evaluating the relocation of and/or adding of additional area radiation monitors to the PASS facility.
This item is considered
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(Closed) Open Item 498/8635-16:
PASS System - This open item concerned the operability of the PASS and the associated analysis systems.
Demonstration of the capability to collect and analyze a sample within the required 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> was a concern.
The NRC inspector witnessed a sample i
collection and analysis of the RCS per Procedure IPCP08-AP-0003,
"Post-Accident Sampling of Liquids and RCB Atmosphere at PASS,"
Revision 3, dated January 28, 1988.
The sample collection and analysis was accomplished in an adequate and timely manner.
The total time l
required for sample collection and analysis of a diluted sample was
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 30 minutes.
The NRC inspector noted that the boron concentration
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meter had been temporarily removed for maintenance.
The applicable
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temporary alteration tags were installed.
The boron concentration was
determined using an approved bench top titration process.
The NRC
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inspector interviewed the chemical technicians performing the procedure
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and found the individuals knowledgeable of the PASS facility equipment and procedures.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8739-04:
Generic Letter (GL) 33-28, Item 2.2,
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"Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface" - The NRC inspector
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reviewed the licensee's response to NRR letter dated May 4, 1987.
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licensee response discussed how the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee / Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (NUTAC/VETIP) is implemented at STP and the quality assurance controls over vendor-supplied
service on safety-related equipment, a.
The licensee prepared seven procedures to provide HL&P (STP) with a method of communicating with NRC, INP0, other utilities, and vendors regarding equipment technical information.
b.
The licensee committed to establish and incorporate in the next revision of IP-1.8Q, "Control of Vendor Documants," by June 30, 1988, a program to include a periodic contact (interface) with vendors of safety-related components.
The licensee has identified and classified the vendor manuals for the key components referenced in the NRR letter dated May 4, 1987.
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The licensee's QA program requires vendors performing services on safety-related equipment to be listed on the Approved Vendors List (AVL).
Vendors performing maintenance services under an MWR are
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under the direct responsibility of the HL&P Maintenance Department.
The MWR requires that maintenance activities on quality-related equipment or systems be performed in accordance with existing procedures and requirements, instruction and procedure control, and rel e ed quality requirements, including specifications, as necessary.
These approved procedures and the licensee's commitment to establish and incorperate in the next revision of IP-1.8Q by June 30, 1988, a program to include pe-iodic contact with vendors of safety-related components supplied the additional information required by NRR letter dated May 4, 1987.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8755-02:
Public Address System Could Not Be Heard In a Specified Area - The NRC inspector reviewed the records and verified that the licensee has modified the public address system in the 35-foot to 45-foot elevation of
..e Mechanical Auxiliary Building (MEAB) by adding and rewiring two 4-it i speakers in the stairway between elevations 29 feet and 41 feet.
This corrective action was documented in Field Change Request (FCR) HBE 02784. The NRC inspector verified that the public address system can now be heard plainly in the referenced location.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8635-17:
PASS Air Sample Requirements.
This open item concerned the capability of the licensee to collect and analyze a post-accident containment air sample within the required time.
The NRC inspector witnessed the sampling procedure from the Liquid and Gas Sampling Room (LGSR) and verified the licensee's capability to collect and analyze a containment air sample within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> as required by procedure.
The licensee demonstrated this capability by completing the evolution within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 30 minutes.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Items 498/8635-38 and 498/8635-19:
PASS Gas and Sample Requirements - The liquid eff!uent collection and analysis was demonstrated by the licensee within the required time period.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation 498/8739-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure For Performing Preoperational Test - The NRC inspector identified six examples where the dual verification of preoperational test steps were incorrectly or improperly performed.
The NRC inspector reviewed licensee records which indicated that these six failures to follow procedures were discovered and commented on during the post test review.
The joint test group (JTG) evaluated each failure to follow procedure and resolved the discrepancies on the comments sheets, which are a part of the JTG minutes; specific corrective action was completed on each of the six examples and the post test review process now includes provisions to make comment resolution a part of the Preoperational Test Procedure.
Startup personnel involved in testing have been counselled on the proper methodology for dual verification.
The startup test engineers who will conduct Unit 2 preoperational testing have been trained to assure that proper dual verification is performed; Unit 2 preoperational test procedures will be
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modified before these preoperational test procedures are used; all'startup test engineers involved in preoperational testing have been retrained as
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y part of the recertification program..This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation 498/8750-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure For Maintenance - The NRC' inspector reviewed the records specifying corrective action taken by the licensee subsequent to use of an emergel.cy.
classification to remove and replace the fuel handling system transfer
cart shear pin without the use of an MWR when there was no emergency
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condition present.
The licensee initiated an appropriate MWR when the failure to follow approved procedure was identified by the NRC inspector.
The licensee has instructed all shift supervisors concerning the intent and proper use of an emergency MWR. MWR Procedure OPGP03-AM-0003,
"Maintenance Work Request Program," Revision 15, dated January 4,1988, includes a more explicit definition of when an emergency MWR can be initiated.
Tnese licensee actions had been reviewed by the NRC inspector
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and are considered acceptable.
This item is considered closed.
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l (Closed) Open Itea 498/8766-02:
Potential Incore Instrumentation Tube Leakage and Thinning - The NRC inspector reviewed the records specifying corrective actions taken by the licensee.
Prior to the initial criticality, the licensee performed an eddy current inspection to the thirrble tubes (December 18-26, 1987) and no degradation was observed.
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This verification occurred after approximately 4 weeks of full flow reactor coolant pump operation.
In response to NRC concerns, the licensee in January 5 and February 3,
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1988, meetings specified the following corrective actions and modifications which will be or have been taken:
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After 12 weeks of full flow operation, eddy current testing will be reperformed.
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An action plan has been defined in the event of an excessive wear of the thimble tubes.
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A crimping procedure is available in the event of a thimble tube
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failure.
j Based on this information, it appears that the licensee has taken
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appropriate action to monitor the potential thimble tube problem.
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!!owever, the NRC inspectors will continue to followup future licensee action.
This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Violation 498/8764-01:
Failure to Follow the Approved Procedure
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for Performing Plant.0peration - This violacion addressed the failure to follow an approved chemical operations procedure.
Specifically, an NRC
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inspector observed that a chemical operator was not following all
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procedural steps for the mixing of boric acid.
Additionally, the boric
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acid mixing procedure required a system lineup checklist to be completed
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prior to perfonning mixing operations.
Investigation revealed no objective evidence to show that the lineup checklist had been completed.
The licensee's: response to the Notice of Violation addressed generic inadequacies in the plant operations department in addition to the chemical operations department as elements in the corrective action to prevent recurrence. Specifically, a review of chemical operations and plant operations procedures was performed to establish a better method to identify what steps have been perfonned during a procedure controlled j-activity.
- The licensee's corrective actions are summarized as follows:
The boric acid batching lineup checklist was performed as required
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and filed.
l.ineup checklist files were updated for all chem! cal operations
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department systems.
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All chemical operations quality related system lineups were
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l reperformed and filed, l
All chemical operations procedures were reevaluated to determine
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whether they need to be on station during performance.
All chemical operators received training regarding conduct of plant
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operations. The training records were reviewed by the NRC inspector and they adequately addressed verbatir; compliance with procedures and other aspects of reactor plant conduct of operations.
The NRC inspector deteruined through record review and interviews that the licensee's corrective actions were complete and thorough in addressing this violation.
This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Open Item 498/8775-02:
Failure to Completely Test an Undervoltage Relay - The NRC inspector reviewed applicable plant records to determine that corrective action had been completed subsequent to identification that the Trip Actuation Device Operational Test (TADOT) for
"degraded undervoltage coincident with safety injection" had not been tested as required. The records show that the plant entered TS 3.0.3 on December 12, 1987, after this failure to test an undervoltage relay had been identified. A plant cooldown to Mode 5 was initiated. The licensee detennined that the cause of the failure to properly test this relay was a deficient surveillance procedure that resulted in a personnel error in interpreting the requirements of the monthly TAD 0T. The licensee prepared and approved a new procedure. This procedure, 1 PSP 06-DG-0005/00,
"Degraded Undervoltage Coincident with Safety Injection Relay TAD 0T,"
Revision 0, dated January 1,1988, was used to satisfactorily perform the test on each Engineered Safety Features (ESF) bus.
This testing was completed on December 13, 1987.
In addition, comprehensive reviews of I,
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instrumentation and controls and electrical surveillance procedures were
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conducted by the licensee to assure that all testing requirements were
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included in the surveillance procedures.
This item is considered closed.
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5.
Control Room Evacuation Drill During the January 1988 NRC operational readiness inspection (NRC f
Inspection Report-50-498/88-01, Section 7.3), the NRC team evaluated a
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drill and concluded that the control room evacuation and safe shutdown drill was not fully successful.
The licensee has revised Procedure IP0P04-ZO-0000, "Control Room Evacuation," conducted training for each crew assigned to Unit 1 on the revised procedure and conducted procedures and plant walkthroughs with operators by watchstation.
Their walkthroughs included identifying
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equipment and demonstrating the actions that the various watchstations might be called on to perform.
A training CR evacuation drill was given i
to each crew.
The onsite NRC inspectors reviewed the procedure, interviewed selected watchstanders of different crews, and witnessed a drill.
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Drill Observations:
On February 19, 1988, a drill on CR evacuation and safe shutdown was performed with the NRC observing to determine if the concerns in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/88-01, Section 7.3 had been
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adequately resolved.
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The heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system had been I
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modified to. reduce the noise levels in the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP) area.
Voice communications were clear at normal
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conversational levels.
The ASP communications were monitored by the NRC inspector and
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determined to be clear and free of static noise.
There were three headsets and a handset available for ASP use.
The turbine building plant operator understood his responsibilities
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during this drill.
Several public announcements (PA) were made from the ASP and were determined to be audible from various turbine
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building locations.
The MEAB reactor plant operator was slow in establishing sound
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powered phone communication.
He did respond to the PA system and
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established communications as required, r
The MEAB operator understood the procedure and demonstrated
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satisfactory knowledge of the equipment and its required operation.
All equipment necessary for response to this event is now properly
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staged at various required plant locations in specially marked boxes
that are lock-wire sealed.
After the drill, thase boxes were inventoried and resealed.
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The manual manipulation of control relays was demonstrated by several
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operators.
Procedure IPOP04-Z0-0001, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 3, was
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reviewed by the NRC inspectors.
Several minor "typos" were
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The licensee, as a result of this drill, did identify some procedure enhancements that they intend to include in the next revision.
In conclusion, the CR evacuation drill was acceptable and those concerns identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/88-01, Section 7.3 are satisfactorily resolved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Hydrostatic Testing (Unit II) (73053B)
Inspection and witnessing of the hydrostatic testing of the secondary side of the four steam generators (SG) was performed.
This testing appeared to satisfy the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code.
The hydrostatic test results were considered acceptable to Westinghouse and the licensee.
a.
Procedures The NRC inspector reviewed and used the following base documents in assessing the performance of the preparation, testing, and recording of teat results.
Startup Administrative Instruction (SAI) 17 "Prerequisite
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Testing," Revision 14 Procedure 2-SH-MS-01, "Specific Prerequisite Test Procedure for
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SG Secondary Hydrostatic Test," Revision 0 Standard Site Procedure (SSP) 2, "Project Generic Pressure Test
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Procedure" Westinghouse Procedures:
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W.E.P. 220, "Tube to Tubesheet Welding," Revision 0 W.P.S. 8943, "Welding Parameters," Revision 0 TGX-A-10.01, "Visual Examination," Revision 1 TGX-Q-10.02, "Liquid Penetrant Testing," Revision 3 Related drawings for main steam and feedwater:
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SS109F00016 No. 2, Revision 9 SS139F00062 No. 2, Revision 8
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SS139F00063 No. 2, Revision 9 SS149F00024 No. 2, Revision 9 SS199F00020 No. 2, Revision 11 6T180F00015, Revision 12 Westinghouse Inspection Traveler T-THX-467, Revision 0
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Other related documents were reviewed for applicability to the test.
From the review, it was concluded that the procedures were adequate to cover all aspects of the testing.
b.
Work Observation The testing consisted basically of scoping the system, performing a valve line up to establish pressure boundaries, installing safety and relief valves, installing test gauges and temperature instrumentation, verifying structural supports, filling and venting the system using the auxiliary feed pumps, connecting the system to high pressure positive displacement pumps, adjusting water chemistry and temperature, checking hydro boundary valve alignment, ensuring communications and beginning the test.
Each of the four systems were tested separately.
The system under test was taken in steps to 214 psig, 820 psig, and to the maximum test pressure of 1630 psig; at each plateau the system was checked for leaks.
The pressure was then reduced to the design pressure of 1285 psig.
The inspection required by the test packages were performed.
The NRC inspector performed six inspections over the course of testing and retesting the main steam system.
It was observed that the tests were adequately staffed and executed with personnel from Westinghouse, licensee startup, and contractor quality. Westinghouse and Ebasco furnished the authorized nuclear inspectors who were responsible for accepting the systems and signing the code data reports.
It was noted that the testing satisfied the requirements of the ASME-B&PV Code; however, two leaks were found in the tube to tubesheet welds in Generator "B" and one leak was found in SG "D";
these leaks were acceptable because they were classified as seal welds and not the primary means of preventing a leak path.
On completion of the hydrotesting, the generators were emptied and dried, the seal welds ground down, and new seal welds installed by Westinghouse.
During the repair of the "0" generator, the welder's grinder touched another tube weld and during the rehydro (850 psig)
the accidentally touched tube began to leak.
This required a drain down, reweld, and second rehydro.
The four systems have passed the required tests for conformance to the specifications and codes and have been put in a dry lay up condition.
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Records The NRC inspector verified that the test package sign-off for the tests, valve line up, leak log, and chronological log was made.
The Westinghouse traveler package was in order and properly annotated.
During the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC inspectnrs observed the surveillance testing listed below to verify that the activities were being perforned in accordance with the TS and surveillance procedures.
The applicable procedures were reviewed for adequacy, test results were verified to meet TS requirements, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness, a.
Procedure 1 PSP 03-SI-0017, "Containment Spray Valve Checklist,"
Revision 2.
The NRC inspector witnessed the verification of the valve lineup for the containment spray system as required by TS 4.6.2.1.a and 4.6.2.2.a.
The NRC inspector verified that the test data was complete and the individual performing the test appeared to be very knowledgeable and conscientious of his responsibilities.
No deficiencies were identified.
b.
Procedure 1 PSP 03-AI-0013, "Accumulator Isolation Valve Verification,"
Revision 1.
The NRC inspector witnessed the verification that power was removed from the accumulator isolation valve operators in accordance with T5 surveillance requirement 4.5.1.1.c.
No deficiencies were identified.
c.
Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZL-0052, "Pressurizer Spray and Heat Capability,"
Revision 2.
The NRC inspector verified that the pressurizer heaters were operable as required by the referenced procedure.
Data was reviewed for accuracy and legibility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
ESF System Walkdown The NRC inspectors conducted a walkdown on portions of the following systems te verify their operability:
Main Steam Isolations lines
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Standby Diesel Generator No. 13
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Containment Spray Train "A"
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The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's system operating procedure and confirmed that the licensee's system operating procedure matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
General plant conditions such as housekeeping were looked at.
Also observed and verified was equipment condition, valve positions, labeling, instrumentation operability, and
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local and remote position indications.
Included in this inspection was the operability of support systems essential to the actuation of the ESF
system.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification
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The purpose of this inspection was to ensure that the facility is being
operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, the licensee's management controls are effective in discharging the licensee's responsibilities for safe operation, selected activities of the licensee's t
radiological protection programs are implemented in conformance with plant
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policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements,
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and to inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved physical
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security plan.
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The NRC inspectors performed inspections in the CR on a daily basis and verified that CR staffing, CR access, shift turnover, adherence to approved procedures, and adherence to TS limiting conditions for operation were being conducted in accordance with NRC requirements. No problems
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were identified,
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The NRC inspector toured various areas of the plant to observe work in i
progress.
Posting of radiation work permits (RWPs), the proper use of personnel dosimetry, and the correct methods for frisking when exiting a
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radiation controlled area were observed.
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Generil housekeeping and physical condition of safety-related equipment
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The NRC inspectors verified that the licensee security plans were
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J functioring and in compliance with their security program. The NRC
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inspecto s observed that personnel inside the protected area had proper
identific, tion badges; search equipment such as metal detectors and
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i explosive u tectors were operational.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Unit 1 Signifi ant Plant Events il The following evats which resulted in a licensee notification to the NRC
i occurred during thic inspection period. They have been evaluated for i
intnediate safety conerns and the licensee actions are being followed by
j the resident inspectors.
Further revew of these events is needed by the NRC to detemine if enforcenent action may be required. Additionally,
each of these events will be addressed in future inspection reports as the
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required corrective action is completed by the licensee.
LER 88-016 is of
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particular concern because the causes appear to identify multiple
weaknesses in your ability to control plant status auring system turnover.
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Relay tests were not performed as required:
Occurred on February 4, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 4, 1988
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Licensee Event Report (LER) No.88-013
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The licensee identified during an engineering review that two relays that are part of the feedwater isolation and turbine trip automatic actuation logic were not identified in the TS for surveillance testing, b.
Reactor protection system trip:
Occurred on February 4, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 4, 1988
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LER No.88-014
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The reactor had not been critical when this event occurred.
The event was the result of a software design error in the Qualified Display Processing System (QDPS) which resulted in an Overtemperature/ Delta-Temperature trip.
One channel had been tripped due to maintenance.
The QDPS then gave an invalid signal for average hot leg temperature which gave another channel a trip signal causing a 2 of 4 reactor trip signal.
c.
Packing adjustments were made to a main steam isolation valve without performing the required reverification of surveillance stroke time.
Occurred on February 7, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 7, 1988
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LER No.88-015
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d.
Seven of 12 main feedwater flow transmitters were found valved out of service when they were supposed to be on line.
Occurred on February 9, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 9, 1988
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LER No.88-016
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This event occurred because the seven transmitters were left valved out of service by startup testing and were never checked by operations personnel during a valve line up because instrumentation and control maintenance has jurisdiction over transmitter isolation valves.
The event is being evaluated for enforcement action.
e.
Four solenoid valves associated with the containment personnel air lock failed to meet the requirements of General Design Criteria 57 for containment isolation valves.
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Occurred on February 11, 1988
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Reported.to NRC February -11,1988
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.LER No.88-017
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This was' identified by the licensee.
The four solenoid valves did not appear in the TS as containment isolation valves.
Enforcement discussion was granted by Region IV.
The licensee is in the process of system modification to' bring the system into full compliance.
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A Loop 4, Lo-Lo, T-cold excessive cooldown protection safety injection occurred when Reactor Coolant Pump "D" was started.
Occurred on February 12, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 12, 1988
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LER No.88-018
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This event'was caused by a slug of cold water that flowed by the T-cold instrumentation on restart of the reactor coolant pumps subsequent to flow coastdown testing, g.
When the Essential Cooling Water System (ECWS) and essential chillers portion of the "C" train were restored to operability, TS 3.0.3 was
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improperly exited.
Occurred on February 13, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 13, 1988
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LER No.88-019
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This was a personnel error in that a Limiting Condition for Operation was exited inappropriately.
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b.
Essential cooling water (ECW) Screen Wash Booster Pump differential pressure outside the high acceptable range for required action:
Occurred on February 15, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 16, 1988
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LER No.88-020
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The booster pump had been mistakenly declared operable when the pump surveillance test data was outside the acceptable range.
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Class 1E inverter (DP-001) failed resulting in ESF actuation of CR, fuel handling building, and containment building HVAC in the ESF mode.
Occurred on February 24, 1988
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Reported to NRC February 24, 1988
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LER No.88-021
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This event was caused by a blown fuse.
No reason for fuse failing was identified.
The fuse was replaced and the system returned to normal operations.
Licensee engineering is evaluating cause of i
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failure.
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Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occurred during initial approach to f
criticality.
NOVE declared.
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Occurred on February 29, 1988
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Report to NRC February 29, 1988
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LER No.88-022
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See paragraph 2 of this report for details.
11.
(Technically Closed) Allegations 4-86-A-034 and 4-86-A-040 This inspection effort was conducted in 1986 and was originally intended
to be published in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-30.
Publication of these results was withheld pending completion of other agency actions.
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Two allegations stated that a copy of the QC inspector Level II certification was sent from Ebasco headquarters as a "study guide." The copy of the "study guide" provided by the alleger was compared to the
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master site copy.
Format, type style, and typos were common to the "study
guide" provided and the master site copy of the exam
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The NRC inspector interviewed the training and qualification group of Ebasco.
It was established that copies of 4 certification exams are kept secured and had a limited distribution for site testing only. = Testings were proctored to prevent removal of exams from exam rooms.
c The alleger was tested in four inspection disciplines.
His lowest grade
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was on the ASME welding which was the area covered by the "study guide."
Two of the four people tested at the same time were interviewed.
The i
others had left the site.
They reported that they had not received a
"rtudy guide."
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The exam in question was voided by Ebasco at the titae they became aware of l
this incident and subsequent personnel were tested with a new exam.
The l
exact source of the "study guide" could not be established, however, the l
allegation, if substantiated, has little impact on safety because the
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individual was not responsible for the actual welding and the l
qualifications of the individual to inspect welds were only valid frr a j
very short period of time before he left the project.
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12.
Exit Interview i
I The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on February 29, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings
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of the inspection.
Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee
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management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss identified concerns.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of i
the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during this
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inspection.
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