IR 05000498/1988018

Insp Repts 50-498/88-18 & 50-499/88-18 on 880301-0404.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Action on Previously Identified Items,Initial Criticality & Low Power Testing Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 & Labor Problems

ML20154H467
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/10/1988
From:	Bess J, Carpenter D, Constable G, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154H464	List: IR 05000498/1988018 ML20154H461
References
50-498-88-18, 50-499-88-18, NUDOCS 8805250344
Download: ML20154H467 (12)

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._ APPENDIX-

! U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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NRC' Inspection Report: 50-498/88-18 Operating License: NFF-71(NPF-76)

50-499/88-18 Construction Permit (CP): CPPR-129 Dockets: 50-498 CP Expiration Date:. December 1989 50-499-Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: March 1 through' April 4,'1988 Inspectors: . Ldv< W#-%

D. R. Carpentff, StaidFResident Inspector Date Project Section 9, Division of Reactor Projects 0.6. Am

1. . E. Bess, Resident Inspector, Project Section D 5/1o/88 Date'

Division of Reactor Projects

'b ?M MA D. .M. Hunnicutt, Senior Project Engineer 5//o/88 Da'te '

P:mject Section D, Division of Reactor Projects Accompanying .

Personnel: T. O. McKernon, Reactor Inspector, Divhion of Reactor Projects g=5};

Approved:

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.G. L. Constable, Chief, Project Section D Date Division of Reactor Projects

l 8805250344 880517 PDR ADOCK 05000498

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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted March 1 through Aoril 4,1988 (Report 50-498/88-18;-

50-499/88-18)-

Areat Inspected:' Routine, unannounced inspection including licensee action on LKfGviouslyidentified' items,initialcriticalityandlowpower.testingNo.14

' turbine driven auxilia'ry feedwater pump - Unit 1, labor problems, monthly s s'urveillance observations, engineered safety feature -system walkdown,

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1 - operational safety ' verification, security observations, and Unit 1.significant

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. plant event J 4 Resul ts_: Within the-areas inspected, no violations were identifie L i

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance

• W. C. Parish, Radiation Support Supervisor / Health Physics

• P. L. Walker, Senior Licensing Engineer

• L. Giles, Unit 2, Operations Manager

• S. H. Head, Supervisor Licensing Engineer

• J. W. .Loesch, Plant Operations Manager

• M. R. Wisenburg, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1

• D. A. Leazar, Reactor Support Manager

• S. L. Rosen, General Manager, Operations Support

• S. M. Dew, Manager, Operations Support

• J. J. Nesrsta, Plant Engineer Department Manager

• M. A. McBurnett, Manager, Operations Support Licensing In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor and other contractor personnel during this inspectio * Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on April 4, 198 . Initial Criticality and Low Power Test'ing On February 27, 1988, the initial approach to criticality ended before criticality was achieved when a reactor trip occurred due to a spurious j signal (See NRC Inspection Report 50.498/88-10 fordetails).

The second approach to initial criticali'y was started from a boron concentration of 1182 parts per million (ppm)- The control rods were

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stepped out to the pre-trip positions. Initial criticality activities were resumed at a boron dilution rate of 60 gallons per minute per Plant Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZX-0002, Revision 5, "Initial Criticality."

At 5:08 (CST), on March 8, 1988, Unit 1 achieved initial criticality. All shutdown and control rods were fully withdrawn (259 steps) except Control Bank "D" which was at 170 steps. Criticality was achieved by boron dilution to a concentrat u 1 of 956 ppm. Equilibrium boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant mem (RCS) was 949 ppm, which was within the expected value of 917 plus or minus 50 ppm. Tavg. for the RCS was 565 The NRC inspectors provided around-the-clock coverage of the licensee's activities. The NRC inspectors observed an orderly, well controlled, and professional process that was being directed by the shift supervisor in I

consultation with the test director and shift advisor .

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Subsequent to criticality, the )lant was stabilized for base line data taking. Testing witnessed by-tle NRC inspectors included:

. IPEP04-ZX-0004, Revision 3, "Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement." See Section 5 for detail . 1 PSP 03-EW-0010, Revision 5, "Essential Cooling Water Pump 1C Inservice Testing."

. 1 PEP 04-ZX-0003, Revision 2, "Boron Endpoint Measurement."

Procedure 1 PSP 03-EW-0010 could not be perfonned as written due to a broken system instrument. The NRC inspector verified that the maintenance work request (MWR) was written, the MWR tag installed, and the procedure was changed by a one time only field change request (FCR) 88-0479 to allow testing to proceed. Continuous NRC inspector coverage was terminated March 11,198 On March 22, 1988, the South Texas Project, Unit I received a full power license, NPF-76. During the period from initial criticality to full power license, the licensee's operating crews were observed as becoming more familiar with plant operation and-more comfortable with the plant and plant programs. During this inspection period, the number of Licensee Event Reports (LER) has decreased significantly over the monthly rates that were observed since low power license issuance (August 1987). Also, to date only one reactor trip has been received, and it was due to maintenance on the secondary system. The licensee's familiarity and compliance to Technical Specifications (TS) and surveillance requirements has also been observed as improvin No violations or deviations were identifie . No.14 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump - Unit 1 The failed No. 14 AFW pump (see NRC IR 498/88-10, Section 3) was replaced with the' No. 24 turbine driven AFW pump (pump only) from Unit Surveillance and functional testing was completed and the pump declared operation 6 . All four AFW pumps were required operational for mode changes leading to the resumption of testing. Additionally, the licensee significantly reduced the number of steam / water packing leaks in the Isolation Valve Cubicles (IVC) and refurbished the local indicating panel for the No.14 AFW pump turbin With the replacement and testing of the No. 14 AFW pump, the cause of the No.14 AFW pump's erratic behavior and failure of surveillance testing may have been resolved. The licensee is, however, continuing with the verbal and subsequent written commitment (Letter ST-HL-AE-2540, "Auxiliary

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I Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Operability Consideration") regarding

' increased surveillance testing intervals for the No.14 AFW pump.

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The NRC inspector monitored the repair / replacement and testing activities associated with this event. The licensee proceeded in a positive, systematic manner in the problem investigation, repair and restoration of this system. The activities were well documented, controlled by procedures, monitored b* senior management, and communicated to appropriate Unit 2 stat f for consideration in Unit 2 preoperational testin During followup activities for the No. 14 AFW pump, the NRC inspector noted the control handles for the dogs on the four watertight doors in the IVCs would core off if used to pull open or close the heavy watertight doors. If this were to happen during an off normal condition, the shear key that holds the handle on the operating shaft could be dislodged and possibly lost, thus preventing egress or ingress to the AFW pump cubicl This condition was noted to the licensee previously and repaired; however, the repairs, to date, do not prevent the hand wheel from working loose and coming off. A permanent fix to this problem should be identifie .

No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item (499/8816-03)

This open item concerned the observation of Post-Hydro Preservice nondestructive examination (NDE) inspection for weld joints described per l

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI, IWB-2200(b)(1). The inspection required the observation of Penetrant l

' Test (PT) inspection for welded ferritic material. On March 8, 1988, the NRC inspectors observed PT inspections accomplished on pressurizer heat affected welds. The NRC inspectors found the NDE examiner knowledgeable of criteria and noted that no surface indications were observed for the weld joint inspections witnesse Electrical Panel Bolting The NRC had expressed a concern over possible cross-threaded bolts, bolts with only lock washer or flat washer on the back panels of the 480 V Load Center 3E1S1ES60E18. Inspection of this_ concern by the licensee revealed that the appearance of cross-threading was due to bolts with lock washers only being pulled through the bolt holes. These bolts were removed and inspected showing no thread damage to either bolts or nuts. The bolts were replaced using an appropriate flat washer and lock washer. This condition appeared to be limited to isolated cases. The NRC inspector confirmed the correct reinstallation of the bolts and washer I Isothermal and Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) Determination

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Unit 1 During the inspection, the NRC inspectors verified the licensee's

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determination of MTC and the Isothermal Temperature Coefficient (ITC) per l

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Station Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZX-0004, Revision 3, "Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Measurement," dated February 25, 1988. The following attributes were observed during the procedure:

. The RCS was in hot zero power. condition with the reactor critica . Neutron Flux level was established per the initial criticality Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZX-0002, Revision 5, dated February 25, 1988, approximately 2E-7 or 2X10 7 amps local indication on Intermediate Range Meters NI-35 and NI-3 . RCS temperature was being maintained constant between 566 and 567 degrees Fahrenheit; actual 566.9 degrees Fahrenhei . RCS pressure was maintained between 2210 and 2260 psig; actual approximately 2232 psi . Boron concentration was being maintained constant at 953 pp . RCS heatup and cooldown rates were less than specified in the procedur . Values obtained for the ITC and MTC were within the acceptance criteria of the T A subsequent detailed review of test records revealed that a mistake was made in performing the ITC that was not identified during the review process. (See NRC Inspection Report 50-498/88-24 for details.) Although test results remained within the acceptance criteria, the NRC is concerned that the inspection finding may represent a significant weakness in your review orocess. This issue will be discussed at an enforcement conference in the 'near futur . Labor Problems On March 1, 1988, labor problems occurred at the South Texas Projec The local business agents (bas) for the construction electricians (local 716)

and pipefitters (local 211) stopped the supervision of field work in Unit 2 by ordering the general foremen and foremen to step down to the craftjourneymanlevel. Subsequently, the constructor provided nonmanual and supervisory personnel to supervise the crafts. There were sufficient craftsmen on site to perferm critical construction activitie Local law enforcement authorities were contacted because some fights occurred in the parking lots and some company vehicle tires were slashe The licensee placed a hold on all the affected construction crafts badges for Unit 1 to preclude illegal work activities pending resolution of the work stoppage issues.

l On March 2, 1988, the local bas instructed the general foremen and foremen l to return to their positions while talks were underwa The issues appear

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to be centered around the pay scale for crafts after a plant system is turned over to the licensee. The work is covered by two~ separate contracts with the work on plant systems under construction being paid at a higher rate-per hour than work on plant systems that have been turned over to the license . Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC inspector observed selected portions of surveillance testing and reviewed completed data packages to verify that TS requirements are being met for safety-related systems and components. The following surveillance tests were observed:

. IPSP03-DG-0002, Revision 5, "Standby Diesel 12 Operability Test"

. IPSP03-DG-0003, Revision 4, "Standby Diesel 13 Operability Test"

. 1 PSP 03-EW-0010, Revision 5, "Essential Cooling Water Pump 1C Inservice Test"

. 1 PSP 02-EH-6328, Revision 1, "Turbine Throttle Valve Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TACOT)"

. 1P$905-EH-6328, Revision 0, "Turbine Throttle Valve t.imit Switch Calibration" The NRC inspectors verified the following items during the inspection:

. Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the persons directing the test.

l . The surveillance testing was completed at the required frequency per l TS requirements.

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l . Testing was perfonned by qualified personnel using approved procedures, j . Systems that were tested were restored to their correct alignmen During the performance of Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0003, the NRC inspector l noticed that after the diesel generator was loaded to approximately l 5500 kw in accordance with the procedure, the reactor operator adjusted the generator load using the governor switch on the main control boar The procedure did not instruct the operator to operate the governor switch. When questioned about this, the reactor operator stated that this step was being performed in accordance w*th Procedure 1P0P02-DG-0003, Revision 5, "Emergency Diesel Generator No. 13." Step 7.1.12 of the referenced procedure allows the reactor operatcr to adjust the generator i

load using the governor switch. Even though both procedures are used to

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the need for the attachment of both procedures to the surveillance tes The acceptance criteria was met for the test and all data was recorded and reviewed in accordance with requirements of the procedur Also, during the performance of Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0003, the NRC inspector noticed that when the diesel generator start button was depressed the "Diesel Generator (DG) No.13 Trouble Alarm" annunciator on the main control board illuminated. The annunciator renmined illuminated for approximately 40 minutes of the 1-hour DG run before the auxiliary operator stationed at the local control panel was instructed to reset the alar The procedures, as they are written, do not instruct the operators to acknowledge and reset the annunciator. The NRC inspector questioned the reactor operator about his justification for continuing to run and load the diesel generator without acknowledging the alarm and verifying if the diesel was indeed experiencing troubles. The reactor operator stated he had reset the alarm on the main control board but the auxiliary operator must also reset this alarm on the local control panel to extinguish the annunciator lamp on the main control board. This was not done because the auxiliary operator did not notice the alarm on the local panel. The-reactor operator further stated that he would have let the diesel continue to run for its 1-hour run even if- the annunciator had remained illuminated but would have issued a MWR to identify and correct the problem if one had existed. The NRC inspector discussed this concern with licensee management. The acceptance criteria of the~ test was met and documente No violations or deviations were identifie . Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems to verify system operability. A review was performed to confirm that the licensee's system operating procedure matched plant drawing and the as-built configuration. Equipnent condition, valve position, breaker position, housekeeping, labeling and support subsystems essential to actuation of the ESF system were note The systems were walked down using the drawings and procedures as follows:

. Containment Spray System, Train "A" Procedure IP0P02-CS-0001, Revision 0, Drawing SN109F05037, Revision 12

. Containment Spray System, Train "B", Procedure 1 POP 02-CS-0001, Revision 0, Drawing 5H109F05037, Revision 12

. Containment Spray System, Train "C", Procedure 1 POP 02-CS-0002, Revision 0, Drawing SN109F05037 The NRC inspector noted the following observations pertaining to the containment spray system:

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9 Evidence of boron crystallization was observed on the flange which housed flow element FE-813 and the swagelock fittings for Valve CS0030A. Since the system was not operating at the time of the

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inspection, leakage from'the referenced sources were not observe However, the presence of boron crystals indicates leakage has

. occurred. This observation was noted to the shift _ supervisor, There were some physical difference between the plant as-built conditions and the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID)

SN109F05037 used to walkdown the system Several permanently installed _ valves on the spray additive tanks were not identified on the P& ids. Bechtel engineering personnel stated that the valves were identified on Installation Detail Drawing 5Z489Z45037, sheet 2, Revision 0, for the spray. additive tanks. The NRC. inspector reviewed the detail drawings and verified that the valves were identified and shown to reflect as-built conditions-of the tanks. Also, Bechtel Design Standard M, J 2.4.4 Revision 3, identified the valves in question as root valves. Steps 3.3 of the referenced standard states that root valves are not identified on P& ids. A system is in place to track and identify these valves installed in safety-related system No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that the plant is being operated in a safe manner and in conformance with regulatory requirements, the licensee's management controls are effective in discharging their responsibilities, and that selected activities of the radiological protection programs are performed in accordance with plant policies and procedure The NRC inspector observed the activities in the control room on a daily basis to verify if:

. Proper control room staffing was being maintaine . Operators were adhering to approved procedures and TS requirement . Logs, recorder traces, panel indications, switch positions and annunciators complied with appropriate requirement The NRC inspector observed on several occasions during certain plant evolution (such as mode changes) tha area identified by the licensee as

"At-The-Controls Area" becomes extremely congested. As many as 14 people have been cbserved in the At-The-Controls Area. Discussion with several of these individuals indicated that they were there out of curiosity or were auxiliary operators and technicians awaiting instruction to perform a certain task. Also, there were occasions when the NRC inspector noticed that drawings and other documentation not in use were

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not in their designated location During one visit to the control room, the NRC inspector noticed items such as a hammer and test instruments.were lying on tables inside the designated At-The-Controls Area. This concern

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was brought to the attention of the shift supervisor and subsequent visits to the control room indicated that these conditions had been rectifie The'NRC inspector conducted tours throughout the plant to observe work in progres The use of personnel dosimetry, barriers, and radiological work habits were observed.. Housekeeping practices and physical conditions of safety-related equipment was observed. Observations that were minor in nature were discussed with the licensee and resolved in a timely manne No violations or deviations were identifie . Security Observations The NRC inspectors verified the physical' security plan was being implemented by selected observation of the following items:

. The security organization was properly staffe . Packages and personnel were properly checked before entry into the Protected Area (PA) was permitte . Vital area barriers were maintained and not compromised by breaches or weaknes . Security monitors in the control and secondary alarm stations were functioning properl . 'The PA barrier was maintained and the isolation zone was free of openings that could be used to penetrate the barrie . Illumination in the PA was adequate to observe all areas during hours of darknes On two occasions, the NRC inspector witnessed the posting of compensatory guards. Once was when the roof access to the IVC was rernaved for No.14 AFW pump replacement and the other was when the main equipment door on the 65-foot level of the Machinery Auxiliary Building was opened for removal of material. These postings were prompt and the patrol officers were observed as being attentive to their pos No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 1 Significant Plant Events The following events which resulted in a licensee notification to the NRC occurred during this inspection period. They have been evaluated for immediate safety concerns and the licensee actions are being followed by

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'the resident. inspectors. These events will be addressed in future inspection reports as the required corrective action is completed by the license This' event involved the licensee's identification of nonperformance of a TS surveillance test for Train "C" Essential Cooling Water Screen

, Wash Booster Pom . Occurred March 11, 1988

. Reported to NRC March 11, 1988

. LER No.88-023 A quarterly surveillance test conducted in December 1987 resulted in the pump being placed on the "altert" list due to higher than predicted flow. By ASME,Section XI requirements, the testing frequency of this pump was to be docbled. The communication chain for the change in testing frequency niled and the test was not scheduled as required. The licensee hcs previously missed surveillance frequency requirement This event identified a design error that cculd block a safety injection actuation during specific plant cor,iition . Occurred March 17, 1988

. Reported to NRC March 17, 1988

. LER No.-88-024 During testing, the licensee identified that operating the safeguards

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test cabinet master reset switch with the reactor trip breaker open would reset and block safety injection actuation on the associated trai All trains of control room envelope heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) went into recirculation (an ESF mode) on a high radiation signa . Occurred on March 3, 1988

. Reported to NRC March 3, 1988

. LER No.88-025 This event occurred during maintenance. No high radiation signal was ,

recorded on the plant computer. Diagnostic tests and attempts to  !

duplicate the event were unsuccessfu Reactor trip and safety injectio . Occurred on March 30, 1988

. Reported to NRC March 30, 1988 )

. LER No.88-026

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The event occurred as a result of troubleshooting on the nonsafety-related main generator trip relay wiring problems. This event appears to be an operator (I&C technician) error involving an inadequate review of drawings prior to beginning troubleshootin These events and the details of their occurrence have been reviewed and no violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on April 4,1988, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss identified concerns.