IR 05000483/1984005

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IE Physical Protection Insp Rept 50-483/84-05 on 840130- 0203.No Noncompliance Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Security Plan & Implementing Procedures,Security Program Audit & Records.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)
ML20244C859
Person / Time
Site: Callaway Ameren icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1984
From: Creed J, Pirtle G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20086Q117 List:
References
50-483-84-05, 50-483-84-5, NUDOCS 8402270444
Download: ML20244C859 (6)


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U. S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 REGION III .

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Report No. 50-483/84-05(DRMSP) License No. CPPR-139 Docket No. 50-483 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway County Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway County, MO

Inspection Conducted: January 30-February 3, 1984 Type of Inspection: Pre-Operational Physical Protection. Inspection Date of Previous Physical Protection Inspection: November 28-December'2,'1983 Inspector: N* " "

b > b G. L. Pirtle Date Physical Protection Specialist  ;

Approved By: 8,U 8[

. R. Creed, Chief Date Safeguards Section Inspection on January 30-February 3, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-05(DRMSP))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of the status of implementation, installa-tion, and operability of the security program and acceptance testing for security-related equipinen Specifically, the inspection addressed: Security Plan and Implementing Procedures; Security Organization-Management-Personnel-Response; Security Program Audit; Records and Reports; Locks, Keys, and Combi-  !

nations; Physical Barriers-Protected and Vital Areas; Security System Power -

Supply; Lighting; AssessLent Aids; Access Control-Personnel-Packages-Vehicles; )

Alarm Stations; Communications; Training and Qualification Plan Requirements; Safeguards Contingency Plan; and Licensee's Actions on Previous Inspection Findings. The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Eight of the 48 inspector-hours were conducted during off-shift period '

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Results: Two of_the three areas of. concern identified in Pardgraph 2 of Inspec-tion Report No. 50-483/83-24(DRMSP) remain open. These areas pertain to the personnel screening program and acceptance testing of security-related, equip-men Progress in both areas has been noted since the previous inspectio !

-Twenty-four additional findings were identified during this inspection. The concerns and findings do not represent noncompliance with NRC requirements due to the pre-operational status of the plan However, the items.must be corrected and/or resolved prior to fuel load. Eight of'17 findings identified in previous inspection reports were close Extensive discussions were held with the Superintendent of Security pertaining'to security / plant safety issue (Details - UNCLASSIFIED )

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4 (2) ' Implementation of the Personnel Screening and B'adging Program i for unescorted access to the site was also identified as a major {

area of concern in both previous inspection reports. It continues 1 to be a major concer I Screening contractors have been identified and screening and badge l issue is progressing, although in a fragmented manner. All )

personnel will not complete badging requirements by March 1, 198 .j However, there may be sufficient personnel badged to allow unbadged personnel to be escorted. Required badging of all per-sonnel by April 1,1984 appears feasible if contractor personnel 4 cooperate with the initial application paperwor j r i

"This program still warrants senior management oversight, particu- ]

larly as it pertains to contractor personne j l

(3) Adherence to the Security System Implementation Schedule continues 1 to be "the" critical issue for the security program, particularly the equipment acceptance test portion and integration / operation of the security computer system on a day-to-day basis. This may constitute the major determination if the recurity system can perform as required by the Security plan. The planned implementa-tion of the entire security program by March 2, 1984 will demon-strate that capability and allow time to resolve technical problems and let personnel become familiar with the security system requirements. The inspector noted that acceptance testing for the perimeter alarm system, CCTV camera system, some VA doors, j and the cocnputer consoles still had to be complete The inspector also advised the personnel present that another concern had been developed during this inspection. The concern pertained to the reliability of the security computer system. During this inspec-tion, the computers had been out of service at least on two occasion The inspector requested that a log be maintained on planned / unplanned computer outages (refer to paragraph 19g for further information). The licensee representatives were advised that the following find-ings must be corrected or resolved prior to issuance of an operating license. Although each finding was not discussed at the formal exit meeting, they were discussed with the Superintendent of Security or identified by the licensee's staff during the course of the inspectio /(1) Test sources for explosive detectors are require /(2) Netal detectors require modification to compensate for lack of detection capability due to installed metal toe-guard p (3) Five openings in the protected area fence need to be close <(4) All duress alarms need to be verified as functiona /

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k{23)Psychologicalevaluationdeterminationsforsec'rityforce u members need to be signe '

,(24) The proposed number and locatior. of VA keys within the plant warrant reconsideration by site management personne Additional information pertaining to the above findings is contained in the below report detail . Security Plan and Implementing Procedures (MC 81118B) (483/83-24-01): I The licensee formally submitted revision 3 to the Physical Security Plan to NRC, HQ on February 1,198 The revision appeared to address i deficiencies in the plan which were noted in previous inspection i report l During this inspection, the inspector noted that the Security Plan did not contain provisions for testing of duress alarms or tamper alarms. The licensee did not want to include these provisions in the Security Plan prior to fuel load because the inclusion may delay formal approval of the plan beyond the scheduled fuel load date. The licensee agreed to commit to testing of tamper alarms on an annual basis and testing of duress alarms on a daily basis when the facilities equipped with such alarms are occupie The licensee further agreed to include the above testing criteria in a 10 CFR 50.54(p) change to the security plan within two months after issuance of an operating licens The following administrative changes to the Security Plan were also identified as required to be included in the 10 CFR 50.54(p) change to the Security Plan:

(1) Figure 5.1-2 needs to be corrected to show the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and valve house as vital area (2) Figure 5.1-4 needs to be corrected to show the roof level of the diesel generator intake and exhaust areas (penthouse) as a Vital Are (3) The legend on figures 5.1-1 through 5.1-5 need to be corrected to eliminate Type II vital area designation Most security procedures required to effectively implement provisions -

of the Security Plan had been published. However, the following security procedures require forraal approval and implementation prior to fuel load:

_ (1) Revision I to SDP-ZZ-PP004, " Security Screening Program."

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(2) SDP-ZZ-P005, " Protected and Vital Area Entry / Exit."

(3) Revision 1 to SDP-ZZ-PP005, " Lock and Key Control Procedures."

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DELETED - Not within the scope of this reques DELETED - Not within the scope of this reques DELETED - Not within the scope of this reques a Some progress in access control has been noted since the previous inspection. However, the bulk of the training, screening, and badging of persoun'el for unescorted access to the plant still needs to be implemented. Screening contractors have been selected by the licensee and screening of licensee personnel has been initiated. Processing of contractor personnel to be screened by the licensee was also initiate The access control program is being' implemented in a fragmented manne Personnel photographed for a security badge may or may not have com-pleted training and screening required by the security plan. This process of implementation is contrary to earlier scheduled sequences

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t for badaing and will require verification of screening and training requirements prior to fuel load and withdrawal of security badges for those personnel who have not completed the required screening and train-I ing. Delays in meeting previous scheduled goals in selecting contractors for screening have contributed to the situation. All personnel will not be screened for unescorted access to the plant by the planned security program implementation date of March 2, 198 They may be screened by the planned fuel load date of April 2, 1984 if senior management per-sonnel adequately support the screening program, particularly as it applies to contractor personnel. Discussions with the Assistant Superintendent of Security indicated that approximately personnel and craft licensee personnel may require unescorte afcess to the plaat after el load. These figures were estimates and may be lower, depending on construction activities required after icel loa The screening program remainz e major segment of the security program which has not been fully implen.ented and warrants continued senior management support and oversigh DELETED - Not within the scope of this reques ,

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. DELETED tot wi, thin the se pe of this reques DELETt_D - Not within the scope of this reques DELETED - Not within the scope of this reques Information in thls record was deleied in accordance wit Freedom 0f information Act, exem tions _

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Cellaway C.ounty Sh'eriff's Office. Each on-duty arme'd security officer was equipped with portable radio communication equipment. During a test of the portable communication equipment on February 1, 1984, all equipment functioned as designe The Jollowing communication deficiencies were noted during this inspection:

(1) The public address system (Gaitronics) installed in the Central

, Alarm Station (CAS) was inoperativ (2) The " hot line" direct line between the CAS and SAS, required by Section 7.1.2 of the Security Plan, had not been installe (3) The radio consoles described in Section 7.3.1.1 of the Security Plan were installed in the CAS and SAS during this inspection period. However, the 125V battery system and two battery chargers were not installe An alternate source of power was being use Interviews with the Superintendent of Security indicated that the 4

above deficiencies would be corrected prior to the planned implementa- I tion of the security program. Twenty additional portable radios have I been ordered by the license . General Requirements - Training and Qualification Plan (MC 81503.B)

(483/83-29-04): The licensee formally submitted revision 3 to the Security Force  ;

Training and Qualification Plan to NRC, HQ on February 1,198 Lesson plans or training material for the critical tasks identified in the Training and Qualification (T&Q) have been prepared and 1 certification of security force personnel is progressing. All armed security force personnel are required to be certified in accordance with T and Q criteria by fuel load. The contract 1 security force supervisor has scheduled required training to  !

complete certification by March 1, 1984, The inspector reviewed approximately 40 security force screening records. Deficiencies noted in paragraph 8b of Inspection Report 50-483/83-29(DRMSP) had been correcte During this inspection, the inspector noted that psychological qualification documentation provided to the licencee consisted of an unsigned form letter with -

the individual's name and social security number entered on the letter. After discussions with the licensee, they agreed to include psychological evaluation certifications signed by the psychologist that determined that the psychological evaluations were satisfactory for unescorted access to the sit The inspector also reviewed approximately 23 security force training records. Deficiencies noted in paragraph 11.b of Inspection Report ,

50-483/23-29(DRMSP) had been correcte Documentation within the l training records included certifications of some completed critical  !

tasks identified in the T and Q Pla I i

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l 5 2 8 TV" Docket No. 50-483 Union Electric Company .

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ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell )

Vice President - Nucicar {

Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 -

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St. Louis, MO 63166 l

l Gentlemen: 1 This refers to the pre-operational physical protection inspection conducted by Mr. G. L. Pirtle of this office on March 5-6, 1984, of activities at the _

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'Callaway County Nuclear Station, Unit 1, authorized by NRC Construction Permit-No. CPPR-139, and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services and other mem'cers of your staff at the ,

conclusion of the inspectio l The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective  !

examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and ]

interviews with personne '

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the

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course of this inspectio i Adherence to your security system implementation schedule continuee to be a concern. If our understanding of the implementation schedule, described in Paragraph 4.b. of the report details is incorrect, please advise us immediately by telephone and in writing within five days after telephene notificatio Areas. examined during this inspection concern a subject matter which is exempt from disclosure according to Section 73.21(c)(2) of the NRC's " Rules of Practice,"

Part 73, Title 10, code of Federal Regulations. This information must be hand 3ed and protected in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21. Consequently, our report of this inspection will not be placed in the Public Document Roo l

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Union Electric Company 2 M 2 81984 We will g hily discuss any questions you'have concerning this inspectio

Sincerely,

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. A. Hind, Director Division of Radiological and i Materials Safety Program

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Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 50-483/84-07(DRMSP)

(UNCLASSIFIED )

cc w/ encl:

W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear Construction S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager IE Files NMSS/SGPL

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NRR/DL/SSPB IE/DRP/ORPB '

ACRS cc w/o encl:

DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII Region IV K. Drey Chris R. Rogers, Utility Divison, Missouri Public Service Commission

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