IR 05000483/1984045

Forwards Insp Rept 50-483/84-45 Re Gap Allegations

ML20128P974
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	03/01/1985
From:	Weil C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Pawlik E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20128P933	List: IA-85-214, Forwards Insp Rept for Transmittal to Gap.Rept Includes Results of Allegations Followup IR 05000483/1984045 ML20128P927 ML20128P949
References
FOIA-85-214 NUDOCS 8507130347
Download: ML20128P974 (50)

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UNITED STATES l ,

,o p* 88 Cg,'c., NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON

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j REGION lil 5 s "/ . j 799 moostvELT NOAD o, c cLes ettym. s'.Limoss soist g, s [f

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March 1, 1985 5 i. .

ME ORANDUM FOR: E. T. Pawlik, Director, Office of' Investigations Field Office, RIII FROM: Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist SUBJECT: GAP ALLEGATIONS AT CALLAWAY (50-433)

(ATS N0. RIII-84-A-0138) (01 N0. 3-84-022)

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Enclosed is a copy of Inspection Report No. 50-483/84-45 in which the GAP allegations at Callaway were reviewed by the' Region III Staff. The report is forwarded for you use in conjunction with the ongoing 01 investigation ut Callawa A Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist

Enclosure:

2/25/85 Memo, .

J. G. Keppler to T. A. Rehm '

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with Inspection Report -

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8507130347 850515 PDR FOIA CARDE85-214 PDR A/7

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wnus? 6 ALLtu4TiuN NUMnths Hill-No-A-013d tACILiff/UUCatis CALLawaY ! US000AuJ PUNCilONAL Awt48 UNSilE MFaLTH AND S4ttTV L ON5 I Htst T I(JN S AP t utl Apts5 btSCwipfl0Ns A tt AL L t ei A l l t>NS : wtLOINbl s t Lt)t H UUALSI Slit SCHt tN I Ns.1 TLu MUNifuMINi.I CONCHtit HtPA!Hdi tLECINICAL.

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Ptwsom HLLtiviense pH ettnt UFFILt HELtlWINbt HJ Atil0N UFFICE CONIACis tf Pawl!M

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F2 inc f olio. rg is the n" story r,f int action; taker by tne NRL F.egier 1:1 sta'f wnile nepetiating with Gc0 tc c:tair afficenti and backup informe-tier s;pporting allegatier.! regard'np concerns a. ut the Callawny nuclear p i a r.t :

T,e ta il s Late v.cy 1". , '. R a GAD informe: i.'illian. Torney , Eecion III that GAF r.ad e: pre >inatcly 25 allegatic.ns ' row five al'.egte v.hd hed te.cerns about the Callaway r.uci t ar : ~. a r. t . The GAP rer.resentative statec that tr.e cliegatieit were being revie.e P.ay 14, 19E William 'e c.rr.ey, Ecgion lij was i: Headqucrters, He stated en nt 6.e- businets when he talled 248 that he woulc stop oy thc GAP off.se or have some-ene r.eet the GAP represer.tative at or neer the Callaway sitt to pick up cor.ies of the allegation The G1F repretert'ative stated the information would be prcvided on May 18, 1984 May 15, 1954 Ecbert War'nict, Regior. II:

REGION III==

Report No. 50-483/84-45(DRP) License No. NPF-30 Docket No. 50-483

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Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, MO 65077 Inspection Conducted: October 1 through November 23, 1984 Inspector: J. H. Neisler Approved By: W. L. Forney, Chief Projects Section 1A Date

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Inspection Summary Inspection on October 1 throuch November 23, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-45(ORP))

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the Senior Resident Inspector of allegations; 10 CFR 50.55(e) items; and followup operating license condition The inspection involved 248 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 62 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

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W. Weber, Manager Nuclear Construction R. Powers, Assistant Manager, QA M. Doyne, General Superintendent, Nuclear Construction R. Veatch, Supervisory Engineer, QA Construction J. Laux, Supervisory Engineer, QA Startup C. Plows, QA Consultant H. Millwood, QA Consultant L. Kanuckel, QA Engineer S. Hogan, QA Engineer B. Stanfield, QA Engineer W. Norton, QA Engineer J. Patterson, Operations Superintendent G. Pattrissi, Consultant, Fire Protection

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l Contractor and Other Personnel

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G. Wilson, QA Engineer, Daniel International l

! W. Reilly, SNUPPS l

l M. Majors, Level II Quality Inspector, Daniel International

! R. Ruggles, NDE Level II, Daniel International

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l In addition to the above, the inspector contacted other personnel in the ,

crafts, engineering and quality area . Allegations Whh U N *

(Closed) ATSOn N October 2, 1984, the NRC received a request from the Government Accountability Project (GAP) to suspend the Callaway low power license. The request cited 48 examples of allegations of deficiencies during the construction at Callawa The inspector investigated the GAP allegations by physically inspecting alleged deficient items interviewing site personnel and by review of documentation pertaining to the allegations. The allegations either were not substantiated, did not pertain to nuclear safety-related issues or had been previously addressed by the NR (Closed) Painters at Callaway have prepared thousands of welds in the Reactor Building for painting by removing the rust proofing from the weld The rust proofing was removed with grinders from these welds that had already been Quality Control inspected and approve No measurements were made of the remaining weld metal or base metal.

l Since no re-inspection has been done, the quality and safety of thousands of welds in the Reactor Building is now indeterminat The inspector examined accessible welds in the Reactor Building on October 1, 198 No indications of questionable wall thickness was observed during the examinatio .

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! Approximately 2000. w elds were prepared for inservice inspectio ; pip,t ,

j preparation included grinding the weld smooth to permit ultrasonic inspection of the weld area during preservice and inservice inspectio These welds were inspected using approved NDE techniques prior to beinq l placed in service and will be periodically inspected to Section XI of hp 'y a ,( ,

the ASME Code throughout the life of the plan't. yuk- MAny Oeldments that ,.

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had questionable wall thicknesses were identified as nonconformances and dispositioned by completing the necessary corrective action to meet Code requirement Based on MM inspection of structural and pipe welds and examinatio of preservice inspection results, this allegation was not substantiated, and is considered to be close (Closed) Welders have ground smooth the horizontal, the vertical and the floor panel welds of the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal and Cask Loading Poo In the process, negligent welders removed weld metal and base metal. As a result of this overgrinding, certain areas of these pools no longer meet thickness requirement The integrity of the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal and Cask Loading Pool is

, questionabl The inspector performed a visual inspection of welds in the spent fuel pool, transfer canal and cask loading pool on October 1,198 The welds

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! had not been ground smoot Each weld had a crown that appeared to have

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been smoothed with a polishing or flap wheel. The inspector did not

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observe indications that base metal had been removed from the one-fourt l inch thick stainless liner plate. The weld seams have been subjected '

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' to a vacuum box test and the liner leak teste Test records indicate

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that there are no leaks in either of these structure Leak chases are

! installed and monitore Liners of spent fuel pools, transfer canals,

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and cask loading pools are not classified as Category 1, safety-related

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i structure This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.

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! (Closed) Hasty and improper rework was done on the seam welds of i

the liner plates in the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal, and Cask Loading i

Poo These liner plates are defective in that they are not exactly squar This defect made original welding difficul The seam welds of the liner plates were reworked but because of time constraints, the welds were not sufficiently repaire These seam welds were inspected on October 1,1984, (see response to

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'..) [J f. b 'c allegation two above) by the resident inspector. At the time of the

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.9 inspection, the welds were considered to meet the provisions of the

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applicable Code. The welds have been vacuum box tested and leak )

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tested successfull The liner plates were procured as plates not as a complete unit; therefore, fit up was performed during erectio The canal and pool liners are not classed as safety-related structure This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close __

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(Closed) 4 Weld metal joining the reinforcing ribs and the steel liner-plates of the Containment Building has been eaten away by rust and I

i corrosio These welds located on the backside of the steel liner i

j plates were not rust proofe Corrosion covered the backside of these I

i plates before they were encased in concret I

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Rust on steel that is to be used as a form for concrete is permitted by the American Concrete Institut ACI-318 states that rust increases the bonding of concrete to stee ACI-318 further states that steel

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will be free from nonmetallic substances (paint) that would affect

bondin The reinforcing ribs are not considered structural members of

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containment but are to keep the liner in shape until concreting is complet Since rusting of steel is desired prior to placing concrete, the inspector has no further concerns in this are This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) Bad welds exist on pipehangers as well as on the embed plates that anchor the pipehangers. These pipehangers and embeds are located near the floor of the Reactor Buildin They are difficult to reach due to the surrounding installed equipmen The bad welds have

- excessive weld material, tiny holes, and pockets on the surface; some of the welds are actually incomplet No rework has been done on these I

faulty weld The inspector, accompanied by a Level II welding quality inspector and

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an NDE consultant, inspected pipe support (hanger) welds -ioceiwa .a..

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--the f!:0- (t A vi oppro & :tely :io fwut-) of the reactor building on October 11, 198 The inspection encompassed every pipe support

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(hanger) observed around the total 2000 foot level of the reactor buildin .

Particular attention was placed on welds in the less readily accessible area No unacceptable welds were observed during this inspection. Thi-i allegation was not substantiated and is considered close (Closed) Not all welds that have been Quality Control approved have been Quality Control inspected. Welds in difficult to reach areas, such as on unistruts, have been approved without the Quality

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Control inspector's examination. There are also welds that have been approved without inspection located on the condensers in the Turbine Buildin "Unistrut" is one manufacturer's brand name for light weight steel shapes used for various supports. These support members are commonly used for cable tray support. Usually only one weld is performed on l

a member at the attachment to an embed or plate other connections are I

bolted. The inspector's observation of cable tray support welds in the reactor, auxiliary and diesel / control buildings did not identify _

unsatisfactory welding in this area. Tray supports were inspected e *by Region III based inspectors during the as-built walkdown and in one kI h'dsystem by the Integrated Design Inspection Tea No violations were

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. cited by either of these teams. Welding on the condenser in the f

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I turbine building is outside the NRC area of responsibility and was ..

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' not reviewed. The allegation.that all welds were not inspected was a

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also addressed in Inspection Report No. 483/84-3 .

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This al'.egation as pertaining to nuclear safety-related equipment was ,

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not substantiated and is considered to be closed.

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(Closed) Idexperiencedandunderqualifiedwelderswereemployed

at Callawa Union pipefitters and welders were not hired by Daniels International because there was a shortage of skilled welder As a

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i result, a welder training program was established. The program was very brief, and it was commonly referred to as a program which produced

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" instant welders". Journeymen welders generally spend several years developing the expertise required for weldin This program produced welders in a matter of week Training and requalification of welders is required by the ASME Code,Section IX and by the AWS Structural Welding Code regardless of previous welding experience. There are no minimum or maximum time limits established by the Codes for initial welder qualification All welders at Callaway who were performing Code welds were required to qualify prior to performing welds. Welder qualification or

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training has been addressed in over 15 inspections including the -

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Construction Assessment Team Inspectio ,

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Because of the number of inspections that involved welding and that

• Daniel welder qualifications meet the requirements of AWS and ASME, I t '? .

this item not substantiated and considered to be close '

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l (Closed) The welder certification testing program allowed almost everyone who took the examination to pas Thus, the program permitter .'

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inadequate welders to weld safety-related structure \ .o

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The inspector reviewed welder qualification documentation showing th -

33% of the welders tested whose welds were radiographed failed the test-In addition, approximately 10% failed required bend tests. Welder certification and/or testing was inspected by the NRC during inspec-l I

tions 83-19, 83-15, 83-14, 83-06, 82-19, 82-15, 82-13, 82-06, 81-17,

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81-11, 81-09, 81-07, 80-28, 80-26, 80-25, 80-24, 80-23, 80-22, 80-18, ,

80-15, 80-12, 80-08, 80-05, 80-04, 80-03, 80-02, 79-16, 79-12, 79-03,

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78-14, 78-10, 78-07, 78-04 and 77-0 This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) The welder certification testing program did not screen out these bad welder It was apparent that it was set up for the purpose of producing men to do the work rather than to risk slowing up production by withholding certification from bad welder In fact, it was reported as common knowledge that the welding certification supervisor for several years would look the other way, and certify technically inadequate welder He did this in exchange for the payment of bribe money. Workers who were unable to weld adequately graduated from this progra ,

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QCP-50 The welding supervisor does not certify welders.

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Certification is the result of the welder successfully passing NDE -

and QC inspection This certification process was inspected during N '

the Construction Assessment Team Inspection, Report No. 483/82-03

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and no deficiencies were observe There was, and is, no position , f- \

of welding certification superviso The individual supervising the7 welder qualification testing does not certify the welder Certifi-

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cation results from completing welds that successfully pass the V

required nondestructive examination Allegations regarding welder qualiff' cations were previously investigated and not substantiated in Inspection Report No. 483/78-04. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 1 Another technique used to pass welder-applicants was accomplished by allowing applicants to take the test as many times as was necessar If an applicant failed, the test was not considered as as a " test" but rather merely as practice. Welder-applicants took

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the test as many as five times before an acceptable weld was produce Retests of welders who fail the qualification test are permitted by q the AWS Structural Welding Code AWS D.1-1 and the ASME Code Section IX, Subsection QW 32 Neither Code limits the number of retests for a welder who fails the qualification tes The only limits are those imposed by the individuals' employe ' N 'b ' # *

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Since retesting of welders whn fail the qualifications tests are

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permitted by both welding codes, the inspector has no further concerns regarding this allegation and the allegation is considered to be close .

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I (Closed) 1 As a result of using this underqualified and inexperienced i i work force, much rework had to be done. The pipe hanger department

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weldin Many of these welders were hired during the construction of

' the Control Buildin Pipehangers and supports were slapped in by

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these inexperienced welders to keep the construction of the Building on schedul A lot of shoddy work was done, and duplicate work was required by the hanger department in later year The inspector visually inspected hanger welds on safety-related systems in the lower elevations of the control buildin The welding in this area met the requirements of the applicable Codes and site welding specification During construction the inspector observed that temporary pipe hangers were installed to facilitate pipe installatio These temporary hangers were uniquely identified with yellow paint and subsequently replaced with permanently installed hanger The

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in this area during this inspectio As a result of visual inspection in this area, this allegation was not substantiated and is considered r

to be close .

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(Closed) 1 This mode of construction creates many problem Onc * _

construction was complete, repair and rework was done on the lower levels of the Control Building two to three years later. Some of the welds could not be reached; some were covered with concret This rework

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weakens 15e. metal because of the required reheatin The tensile strength is reduced and the metal becomes brittl In addition, the cost of each weld that has to be reworked is doubl ,

The inspector visually inspected pipe supports in the lower levels of the control building on October 18, 1984. The safety-related piping

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supports inspected were on the essential service water syste No deficient welds or support members were observe Both the AWS and ASME Codes permit rewelding, pre"iding the raqu' ed greneat and posi

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Plant records reviewed indicate that temporary supports were used to support the pipes before the permanent prefab- ,

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ricated supports were installed subsequent to final pipe alignmen )

The documentation for this area does not indicate that it was necessary I to repair or rework Category 1, structural steel two or three years late This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 1 Quality Control inspectors did not always maintain the necessary independence from the pressures of schedule and cos It was reported that Quality Control inspectors would sometimes approve

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without inspection welds located in hard to reach areas. These areas are exactly the places where it is more difficult to do welding, and therefore, more important to inspect for poor weld .

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(Closed) 1 Quality Control inspectors were known to favor their friend They would inspect to a lesser standard than they were require ,"'

fMJ Interviews and discussion with craft persons still on the job and i during the past three years indicate that inspectors did not show

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favoritism when performing inspections.,/~ The inspector reviewed QA L/

audits and surveillances of QC performance and found no indications ,.- '~

r of QC inspectors favoring their friend The inspector's direct i

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observation of QC inspections and his followup inspections, other NRC inspection reports, and licensee and constructor QA audits and surveillance reports do not substantiate the above allegatio This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 1 Those Quality Control personnel who attempted to be assertive in their positions have been subjected to intimidation and harassmen It is reported that workers have dropped things from heights such that the hardware dropped would land near the Quality Control inspector Quality Control inspectors have been splashed with concrete and with w'ater, and one Quality Control inspector had his hand intentionally smashed with a vibrator by a workma During NRC inspection 483/82-03, the subject of QC intimidation and harassment was thoroughly examined. QC inspectors were selected at random by the NRC inspectors for private interviews by a team of NRC

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interviewer As a result of these interviews, the NRC inspection team concluded that QC personnel were free from harassment, intimidati n'

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Interviews % % ir-4 b the remaining quality inspectors indicated that they did not feel they were unduly harassed or that they had been intimidate Review of records in the co h First Aid station did not show

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any record of a QC inspector being treated for an injured hand during .

'u the years that concrete was being installed at Callawa This allegation

. h substantlattr8 and is Considered to be close (Closed) 1 Quality Control-issued " hold tags" often left workers idle for one or two day " Hold tags" indicate that there is a problem with the tagged item and all work on this item should be stopped until the problem is resolve Once the problem is resolved, a Quality Control inspector removes the tag and work can continue on the ite Often, a foreman or supervisor would eventually give the order to proceed with work and ignore the hold tags. Workers questioned the unexplained orders to proceed when the work had not been changed or been seen fixed. Either money was being wasted on non problems or safety deficiencies were being accepte '

The issue or installation of QC hold tags was controlled by Daniel Procedure AP-VII-02 and AP-VII-13. When an NCR or DR is issued the

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hold tag is placed on the nonconforming item. The nonconformance is evaluated by the constructor engineering group and/or the architect /

enginee Based on the evaluation by engineering and quality assurance personnel a conditional release may be issued and the supervisor instructed to continue the wor The inspector verified that conditional releases are tracked and closed out when corrective action is complete and the nonconformance no longer exist This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close i .

L, (Closed) 1 There was a shortage of Quality Control inspectors. One worker reports waiting six, ten hour days for a Quality Control inspecto During this delay, the worker was not permitted to move onto a new work assignmen Adequacy of quality assurance and quality control personnel staffing j was reviewed by the Region III Construction Assessment Team. Staff

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levels were determined to be adequat In 1982, the NRC compiled a ,~

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listing of worker to QA/QC personnel at all nuclear plant construction ~

sites within the United State Callaway's ratio of 7.6:1 showed this sites's QA/QC staffing among the ten best in the countr There was no shortage of Quality Control Inspectors at Callawa Since the second i

I and third sentences in the allegation have no apparent connection with

nuclear safety, the inspector did not address those parts of the

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allegation. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered I to be close i.

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(Closed) 1 Deficient electrical cable has been used on safety-related systems throughout the plant. Generic problems regarding the environ-mental qualification testing of this Class E electrical cable have been recognized and acknowledged by the NRC, Office of the Inspection and Enforcemen It is reported that this cable is literally all over the plan .

The NRC issued Inforration Notice 84-44 concerning the environmental qualification of certain cables manufactured by Rockbestos Compan Six types of Rockbestos cables are used at Callaway, Two of the cable types have been qualified at Sandia Laboratories, One was tested but the test did not meet all SNUPPS requirement Three cables, plus the cable that did not meet all requirements, are currently being subjected to a two year qualification test program by Rockbesto , 7 gh, &,#ANW W *

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qualified have been tracked and documented as to cable number and location so that proper corrective actions can be initiated in the event the cables do not successfully pass the qualification test program.

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The allegation is correct in that certain cables have been identified l

by the NRC as having incomplete environmental qualifications, but the l

cables at Callaway are identified, have been evaluated by the plant '

! designer for interim acceptance and measures are in place to perform . >

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L I the necessary corrective actions if the cables are not qualifie This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 1 Electrical cables were installed too early in construction operations. The cables have been exposed to the harsh environment of n early construction and have been damaged during construction from hot metal and other elements thrown around during early constructio \

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On June 12, 1984, it was previously alleged that cables had been damageo by workers climbinp on the cable That allegation was closed in \ ,

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Inspection Report No. 483/84-30 as unsubstantiated. .As reported in 483/84-30, the NRC inspector visually inspected the cables and found no damaged cable Also, these cables were functionally tested during plant preoperational testing with no failure This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 2 Violations of electrical wire bend radius are reporte Eighty to eighty-five percent of junction boxes are too small through the Auxiliary Bui' ding and the Control Buildin Because these junction boxes are undersized, wires which feed in and out of the boxes are overstresse ,

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s On March 14, 1983, the licrasee reported this item to the NRC pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). Subsequent review showed 23 undersized junction boxes containing cable mininum bend radius violations. The cables passing through or into these boxes were

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analyzed by the designer and the cables with obvious violations of minimun, bend radius were replaced. Those cables with questionable l

i bend radius violations were subjected to a 1000 volt insulation, i resistancetesttodeterminewhetherthebendhaddegradedthef s, .

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dielectric properties of the cable. This item was closed in i

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The allegation is correct in that some junction boxes were undersize c-

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assurance program a year and $ne'-Nalf earlie It was correctly ..-

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reported to the NRC, corr'ective action was taken and that action ,

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reviewed and inspected by the NR to be close ,

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(Cloged) 21.' There are no;protectivi cable jackets and static bleeder wires on cables feeding through the cabinets into the Control Roo Protective cable, jackets and half-wrapped, outside electrical inter-ference deflector. wire were removed in order to fit the cables through

the undersized cabinet i e

The inspector examined documentation showing that the design organization

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approved modifying the prefabricated cable in the cabinets in questio I

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Additional jacket was removed from the prefabricated cable to facilitate installation ~into these cabinets. The drain wires are connected at the opposite ends of the cables. To connect the wire at both ends would tend to induce circulating currents and defeat the purpose of installing drain (static bleeder) wire The installation has been inspected by Quality Control inspectors, NRC resident inspectors, NRC region based electrical inspectors and NRR site review teams which considered the installation to be acceptabl ,,. -

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Although the allegation is correct in that the cable jackets were (

removed and drain wires not connected in the cabinets, the as-built installation meets approved standards since cable jackets must be removed to terminate multi-conductor cables and connecting drain wires at both ends would be an unacceptable installatio This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 2 High voltage splicers frequently are submerged under water in eight foot deep concrete man hole These man holes, built for high voltage splicers, have no drainage system. Water collects in the man holes submerging the electrical cables until the water eventually evaporate ~

The inspector's review of electrical drawings and cable installation records show that Class 1E high voltage cables were not spliced in concrete manhole SNUPPS electrical specifications do not permit

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O Class IE high voltage cables to be splice The NRC Environmental l Qualification Team reviewed the qualifications of the pow r cables used at~ Callaway during their 1983 site visi Submerged cables were identified during a Union Electric Quality Assurance surveillance in October 198 The architect / engineer's analysis of the cable qualification determined that submersion in water would have no deleterious effect on the cabl ,:?'

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As a result of the determination that Class IE cable was not spliced in the duct banks, this allegation was not substantiated as pertaining to safety-related material or components and is considered to be close (Closed) 2 Insufficient fire proofing has been installed on these high voltage splicer These splicers have only one-third the required fire proofin In item no. 22, it was determined that there were no splices in Class IE

,"em cables in underground duct banks and the are separated from non-1E cables

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within the duct bank The fiberglass wrapping supplied in splice kits is not fireproofin Its purpose is to afford mechanical protection for the electrical insulation in the splice, not fire protectio There is no requirement for fireproofing splices in underground duct banks .

(manholes). Since no requirement exists for fireproofing splices, this allegation is not substantiated and is considered to be close .

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(Closed) 2 The use of vibrators was an ineffective means of spreading concrete. Vibrators did not settle all of the concrete. Throughout the pours, the density of the concrete and the high volume of reinforcing steel created problems with the flow of the concret Pockets of air were created around the reinforcement bars. Voids remain in the concret Intervenor contentions regarding concrete quality and voids in concrete

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F1 d were examined and ruled upon by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. This allegation is is considered to be close (Closed) 2 The only attempt to test the concrete for voids was the visual inspection. Visual inspection, as the only means used to detect voids, reveals only those voids which are apparent on the surface of

- the concret Sound testing is not an effective means of detecting voids because of the high volume of reinforcing steel use For instance, in the base mat of the Containment Building, there was

approximately one pound of reinforcing steel for every n e pounds of concret Intervenor contentions regarding concrete quality, voids in concrete,

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and inspection of concrete were addressed at the Operations Licensing

$i Hearing and ruled upon by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. This allegation is considered to be close .

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o (Closed) 2 Patchwork of the voids was very limited. The rebar prevented cement finishers from reaching some of the more extensive void Thus, grouting was done only in those areas that the finishers could reac em Concrete patching was addressed in Inspection Reports 483/83-15 and

. 483/84-2 The inspector's review of Callaway Civil Specification C-103'and Daniel Procedures WP-109 and CP-109 indicate that concrete patching criteria were specified and that concrete patches were installed according to approved work procedures and inspected according to approved Quality Control Procedure Review of ,-

r concrete pour cards for repair of pours shows that Category 1 ,,

repairs were controlled according to approved procedures and specification This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 2 Defective bolts were used to install the embeds on concrete ceilings of the Control Building. These embeds were not installed at-the time of the concrete pours of the ceilings as planne Instead, these plates were placed with expansion bolt Some of the expansion bolts used were " Redheads". " Redheads" hasa been found by many construction companies to be defectiv I

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were found to have been used in some temporary applications and

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for mounting fire extinguisher brackets on wall Plant specifi-1-

cations did not permit the use of self drilling expansion anchors

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(Redheads) in safety-related systems. This allegation was not substantiated and'is considered to be close (Closed) 2 Drainage in the Auxiliary Building is poo Six to

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eight inches of water on the lower floor has been reported repeatedl Possibly there is debris clogging the pipes or the pipes are too small to handle the large volume of wate This allegation appears to be a repeat of a previous allegation received on June 12, 1984, which was addressed in Inspection Report No. 483/84-30. This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 2 Pipehangers soiled with metal filings and dirt during the flood of the Reactor Building on June 2, 1984, have not been cleane These hangers were cleaned on their outer, easy to clean side, but were not cleaned inside the band which extends entirely around the pip The integrity of the pipe will be jeopardized by these dirty hanger The " flood" consisted of a spill of water that reached a depth of approximately six inches on the reactor building floor outside the secondary shield structure. During an inspection of this area of the reactor building on October 11, 1984, the inspector determined that no safety-related pipe clamps (bands) were installed at an r

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elevation of less than six inches above the floor. Therefore, the f ,

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pipe clamps (bands) were not submerged. This allegation was not

_ l,. 1 substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 3 Construction drawings were not being updated and revised as necessar For instances, laborers cutting a trench to lay a pipe discovered a six-inch diameter pipe. There was no record of the pipe on the construction drawing. The identity of the pipe was unknown to the crew as well as to the superviso The inspector's review of site plans did not reveal a nuclear safety-related six-inch diameter pipe buried outside the power block that .Q might have been discovered by laborers' entrenchment activitie j Control of drawings, design control and change control have been ..

inspected by the NRC over nine times during the construction phase ,

including the Integrated Design Inspection and C.A.T. Inspections. \

This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 3 Construction drawings were defective. A concrete column was poured according to the construction drawing It was later dis-covered that this column was too high to meet the necessary connecting The concrete column had to be entirely remove Construction bea of the column was halted for three months thereaf ter, while the drawings were being correcte S 5*

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The inspector reviewed site construction records and interviewed personnel who had spent several years on site and was not able

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safety-related areas of the facility. All columns.within the safety-related structures are composite columns, not concret This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 3 Poor construction resulted from engineering errors in 5005 construction drawing drawings were used for the installation of cable tray supports in the Control Building and the Auxiliary Buildin As a result of the poor engineering, hangers were not centered properly on the embeds. The nonconformance report attributed the poor construction to craft erro In fact, the error was due to-the incorrect drawings issued by engineers. Quality Control approved this inaccurate construction and accepted "as is". "As is" approval did not reflect appropriate engineering revie The 5005 drawings referred to above were not construction drawing FS-E-5005 drawings or " Field Sketches" were shop drawings used in the constructor electrical fabrication shop for prefabrication of some cable tray supports and did not include tolerances for attachment

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to embeds. These tolerances are specified on the civil engineering /

I ' i installation drawings and do not require each support to be centered on the embed Cable tray support installations were addressed in Inspection Report No. 483/84-30. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close ,

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(Closed) 3 Undocumented rework was performed on the Transfer Tub Under cover at night two boilermakers welders and two helpers removed a piece of this stainless steel tube in order to do repair work within the tube. This work was done without any paper or documentation and without any Quality Control inspectio 'e n g./

l' t, The inspector reviewed nonconformance reports 2SN-5088-CW, 2SN-5089-C, These nonconfor- L

/j // 2SN-5062-CW, 2NN-0389-C, 2SN-5462-C, and 2SN-6020-C mances indicate that rework or repairs on the transfer tube were in fact

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documented, work supervised and inspected, and that the repair work was reviewed by the appropriate personnel in the organizatio Discussions with the two individuals who are cognizant of the work in i t

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P' Ii this area that are still onsite indicate that no undocumented work )

was performed on the transfer tube. This allegation was not substantiated

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e i (Closed) 3 The reliability of the on-site laboratory is challenged by inaccurate test result During the flood of the Reactor Building of June 2, 1984, fiberglass insulating blankets were soaked with borated wate Eighty-five blankets were removed and sent to the onsite laboratory to be tested for damage caused by the caustic aci The on-site laboratory concluded that the barated water soaked blankets did not need to be replaced. The strength of the blankets had in fact deteriorated such that they could be shredded by hand. The blankets were ultimately found to be defective by the pressure of the workers

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The inspector's investigation of this allegation found that the plant laboratory was requested by the contractor to perform a chemical analysis of the insulation per NRC Regulatory Guide 1.3 The laboratory report indicates that the insulation was analyzed for

. gy 4G .-J leachable chlorides, fluorides, sodium and , silicates.l' No testing llp A .vy'M

for brittleness was performe Replacement of the blankets was the ,

I result of their being determined to be unacceptable by the contractor

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Quality Control inspector. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 3 Dosimeters were not worn by workers in the Reactor Building while fuel was being loaded in the Reactor Cor SNUPPS Radiological Emergency Response Plan requires that all personnel entering the controlled areas be issued thermoluminescent dosimeter-badges. Most workers in the Reactor Building had not been issued badges nor had they been given the necessary radiation protection training. Without radiation detection badges, it was impossible for anyone to determine the level of exposure to radiation while working in the Reacto Investigation has determined that the reactor building was a radiation control area (RCA) only when the fuel assemblies containing startup sources were being placed in the reactor vessel. The inspector re-viewed the report of a radiation survey performed at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br /> on June 16, 1984, showing that radiation levels did not require personnel dosimetry. This survey was performed subsequent to placing the fuel

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assemblies in the reactor vessel and before the RCA was terminated.

i s The Radiological Emergency Response Plan only addresses actions ,

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during an emergency condition, not routine plant activitie Fuel load is not an emergenc NRC radiation protection reviewed the f'

Callaway radiation protection program during Inspection Report .,

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No. 483/84-3 .

This allegation was not substantiated as pertaining to the safety of plant workers and is considered to be close (Closed) 3 Psychological testing conducted in late 1983 and early 1984 failed to remove the potentially bad elements from the work sit Acts of sabotage have occurred since the examination was administere On July 4, 1984, there was such an ac Breakers in the Motor Control Room in the Auxiliary Building were shut of It has been reported that in connection with the circuit breaker shut off, a voice announced over the communications system at the plant, "UE - Have a nice fourth of July". For the following days, craft workers made a joke about

"UE - Have a nice day".

The alleged "act of sabotage" that occurred on July 4,1984, was investigated by the licensee's security organizatio This investi-gation was reviewed by the NRC's safeguards inspectors in Inspection

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Report No. 483/84-33. The NRC report did not identify any discrepancies in the licensee's investigation and the event was considered to be close Screening of personnel including psychological testing was inspected o

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during Inspection Report No. 483/84-17. The inspector determined that testing was conducted in 1984 and none in 1983. This allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 37. The psychological test failed as a screen for employees, but served as a means of harassment. Workers were coerced into taking .

the tes Everyone on site was given an opportunity to take the tes The test was not required although non-tested employees who had been on site for less than three continuous years of service could not be employed in restricted areas, that is behind the fence. Those who refused the test faced certain termination for lack of work opportunit The inspector reviewed the requirements for screening persons who are to be authorized unescorted access to plant protected areas and deter-mined that the licensee followed the provisions of American National Standard ANS 3.3 in not requiring psychological testing for persons with uninterrupted employment of three or more year Since the allegation states that everyone had the opportunity to take the test to qualify for the limited number of temporary positions inside the restricted area, it does not appear that harassment was involve The personnel involved were contractor personnel whose numbers were being reduced as construction was l completed and were to be used during plant startup, not as permanent employee .

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This allegation was not substantiated as to employees being harassed or  ;

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coerced #m W%uplopet werediverthe;_spportun4ty* to take the test, ,, 5 s cons s p y w as w er<A d

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(Closed) 3 The psychological test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory is a test intended for psychological diagnosi There is no pass or fail standards for the diagnostic tes At the Callaway site, a pass / fail system was imposed on the tes In fact, several dozen employees were terminated because they failed to pass the tes Investigation by the inspector indicates that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Test was not administered a* Callaway and that personnel were not terminated for failing the MMP Screening of personnel for unescorted access to plant areas was performed by the licensee's contractor, IPAT Corp., using tests developed by IPAT. No workers were terminated as a direct result of the screening; however, only persons having unescorted access authorization were considered for retention to work in vital areas after construction was complete. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 3 The general attitude of workers about construction operations at the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant is that it is a disgrace to the construction industr Interviews with craft workers conducted in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by the resident inspector indicates that they were proud of their performance

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at Callaway. The Region III Deputy Regional Administrator interviewed crafts, supervisors and quality inspectors prior to fuel load and the interviewees were unanimous in their opinion that Callaway was a well constructed plan . 34 I

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Callaway's SALP report ratings by NRC inspectors have been consistantly among the highest in NRC Region II As a result of NRC's interviews with workers and ratings issued by inspectors, this allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 4 There have been en.ormous amounts of cost overruns overruns at the plant. There were excessive amounts of manpower on sit Approximately 200 electricians were hired in late 1983. Despite this almost one-third increase in manpower, there had been no increase in the work assignment In general, the plant was overwhelmed with manpowe Seven, ten to twelve hour shifts became mandator Employees who could not maintain this demanding work schedule and missed a day of work were terminate A medical excuse, a death in the immediate family or a call Bogus to jury duty were the only acceptable excuses for any absenc Less work was medical excuses were available on site for three dollar done during this manpower overload than previously in an eight hour da Cost overruns, if any, are not within the NRC's scope of inspection

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responsibility. Any action in this area will be between the licensee and the state regulatory agenc As it might pertain to nuclear safety-related issues, this allegation

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was not substantiated and is considered to be close !

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(Closed) 4 People were idle on the job sit Some slept at work; -

a few brought in alarm clocks to wake up in time to go hom ,,

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the NRC's scope of responsibilit This allegation is considered to j be close (Closed) 4 Illegal drugs, alcohol, gambling and prostitution could be found on the job sit In February of 1984, seven Quality Control employees were fired for alleged drug us Please refer to the attached articles from the Kingdom Daily Star-Gazette. The Government Accounta-

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bility would like information about the drug-related terminations and related developments at the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant, including but not limited to, the attached list of question The licensee had a drug prevention program during construction. The inspector observed the use of trained drug detection dogs used to periodically search the site for drugs and reviewed the results of these searches with licensee managemen Lunch boxes, giackages, and vehicles (including those of NRC inspectors)

were searched as they entered the site.

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possessing drugs or alcohol onsite were terminated.

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The inspector's discussions with workers and supervisors failed to reveal evidence that prostitution could be found on the job site, nor did any interviewee know of organized gambling onsit '

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and alcohol abuse, gambling or prostitution is not substantiated and is'< ,/* *

ij considered to be close (Closed) 4 Workers were almost encouraged not to accomplish too much too quickl One witness reports that he was physically threatened at work for working too har He told his foreman and it was taken as a jok Other workers report that crews were eventually split up if they -

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Worker productivity is not within the scope of the NRC's responsibilit This allegation was not substantiated as pertaining to nuclear safety

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and is considered to be close (Closed) 4 Poor management was another cause of the cost overruns at the plan For instances, it is reported that two electricians spent eight hours hanging one electrical light fixture. This fixture could have been hung by one man in one hour. Much of the delay was due to the lack of work assignments. Work assignments were required for any job on sit Sometimes a worker would be idle for one or two days waiting for such an assignmen In the meantime, the worker would appear to be busy or just sit around until he was issued a work assignmen T

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Worker productivity is not within the NRC's scope of responsibilit Whether or not a task if performed within a specified time has no bearing on nuclear safet This item was not substantiated and is A

L W R. f A l # # # Cr 0 considered to be close riuc Jan. SAFGT1Y-(Closed) 4 Cost overruns can also be attributed to the high volume of discarded material For instance, one individual reports that over the course of his employment as a dump truck driver, he dumped several thousand pounds of welding rods. Welding rods are very expensive; many companies control the rods when the rods are issued to the welders as well as when they are returned. Daniels, on the contrary, only controlled these rods when they were issued to worker It is reported by one worker that he has seen, on several occasions, welders take out ten pounds of welding rods in the morning, not use any of the ten pounds of rods during the day, and later dispose of the ten pounds in the barrel provided on sit Approved weld material control procedures do not permit low-hydrogen welding electrodes that have been exposed to the atmosphere, moisture, or that have damaged coatings to be used to weld plant component Weld material controls were inspected during NRC Inspection Resports Numbered:

483/81-19, 483/82-03, 483/82-13, 483/82-15, 483/83-05, 483/83-11, ,

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483/83-14, 483/83-19, and 483/78-09. These inspections indicate that ,-

weld materials (electrodes) were being controlled according to the

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As it pertains to nuclear safety-related welding activities and controls, this allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close (Closed) 4 Barrels were provided on site for disposal of welding rod The barrels were filled with welding rod stubs as well as unused welding rods. These barrels were later dumped in on-site landfills. Welding rods were prohibited in the landfil It was also against regulations for workers to dump their garbage from home in the landfill, but this was routinely ignored. Many people, including the general supervisor, would bring garbage from home and dump it in this landfil Unusable weld electrodes were.placed in locked 55 gallon drum The NRC's concern in this area is that damaged or used electrodes and electrodes that had been exposed to the plant environment longer than the allowable time would not be reused in welding safety related systems. After reject or unusable electrodes are removed from the site, the licensee may dispose of the electrodes according to his procedures or policy for trash or scrap disposa Disposal of the worker's garbage in the landfill is not an NRC "J~

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concern as it does not pertain to nuclear safety-related activities. This . '/

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allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be close ,

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(Closed) 4 Many acts of sabotage have also been reported. The NRC, in its latest inspection reports, admits to eleven acts of malicious mischief regarding the destruction of electrical cables. Workers have found various items in pipes such as scraps of steel wire, ele:trical cables,

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two by four inch wooden boards, and welding rods. These pipes had to be cut open in order to remove the materia It was generally understood by workers that these acts were done deliberately to slow up work productio Damaged electrical cables were addressed in Inspection Report N /84-3 The licensee reported pipe cleanliness as a construction deficiency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) in July 198 Corrective action regarding thisdeficiencywasinspectedandclosedoutinInspectionReporth, No. 483/83-1 *-Q4-l

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Piping systems were flushed according to approved procedure Systems have been tested under the preoperational testing program and determined to have met applicable acceptance criteria by the NRC Region III Test Program Sectio Since concerns expressed in this allegation were previously address by either the NRC or the licensee, this allegation is considered to be close (Closed) 4 Although these construction and Quality Assurance problems would be serious under any circumstances, they are made more for the following reason. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III has been violating its own rule regarding on-site inspections. The construction inspection offices of the NRC profess that all on site inspections by the

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NRC are to be unannounced to personnel on sit Quite the contrary, many workers have reported that employees on all levels were prenotified by

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their foreman or general foreman of upcoming NRC inspection Several days before the inspection, the job site would be prepared for the NR Workers, who had not been directly informed, would know of an-upcoming inspection when they were taken off of their regular job assignment and put onto a clean up crew. This prenotification weakens the NRC inspec-tion process itself and raises serious doubts about the reliability of the staff conclusions concerning the quality and safety of the plan There has been a Resident NRC Inspector assigned to Callaway since 1979; therefore, persons onsite were aware that the NRC was onsite so prenotification of inspections would have been redundan There is no rule that states that all NRC inspections will be unannounced; therefore, this allegation is unsubstantiated and considered to be close . Restrictions to Operatina License NPF-25 The following items relating to fire protection issues were included in the Callaway operating license as restrictions to exceeding power levels of five percent of rated powe At ; G.1 - Adding Additional Emergency Lighting in Safe Shutdown Area Licensee engineering determined that lighting problems existed in four areas. The inspector

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verified that emergency lights have been installed in the two electrical penetration rooms and in the two Class 1E switchgear room It was also verified that emergency lighting is provided for the safe shutdown panels. This

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item and Open Item No. 483/84-15-05 are considered to be

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close Att.1, G.2 - Communications to Support Shutdown from Outside the Control Room. The inspector verified that a Gai-Tronics handset with speakers and a telephone have been installed in the auxiliary shutdown panel room and that they are in working order. This item and Open Item No. 483/84-15-06 are considered to be close (7.)(a) Fire Protection. The inspector verified that the Halon and sprinkler systems in the south electrical penetration room were operable and that fire barriers had been installed in penetrations in the auxiliary building and that the installation of thermal detectors in containment are complet This item is considered

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to be close . Construction Deficiency Reports. 10 CFR 50.55(e)

The inspector examined the licensee's corrective action relative to the following construction deficiency reports:

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(Closed) 483/84-09-EE - Electrical floor penetrations had shrinkage cracks greater than allowed by specifications. The inspector verified by observation that the seals have been repaired or replaced as indicated in the licensee's final 10 CFR 50.55(e) repor This item is considered to be close (Closed) 483/84-16-EE - 58-3 Limitorque valve operator failed in the RHR system due to a key failure on the shaf The inspector verified that the Limitorque operators have been replaced with type SB-1 operators. These

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replacement operators were tested during preoperational testing without failures. This item is considered to be close (Closed) 483/84-17-EE - Indeterminate qualification of terminal blocks in Limitorque actuators. The licensee reported a deficiency in the qualification status of two types of terminal blocks used in Limitorque actuators for safety-related application No documentation is available to show proof of qualification of Kukla K622 and Buchanan 0824 termination block The inspector reviewed field rework plans FM-236-001, FM-223C-002 and FM-225-001 showing that the Kukla K622 and Buchanan 0824 terminal blocks

! had been replaced with qualified Marathon 300 series terminal block This item is considered to be closed, f

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5. Exit Interview 8ecause the inspection primarily involved allegation followup and the licensee is performing a parallel investigation of the same allegations, i no exit interview was conducte However, report findings were discussed with members of licensee managemen ..

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