IR 05000483/1984045
| ML20128P974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1985 |
| From: | Weil C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Pawlik E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128P933 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-214 NUDOCS 8507130347 | |
| Download: ML20128P974 (50) | |
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UNITED STATES p* 88 Cg,'c.,
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,o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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REGION lil
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March 1, 1985
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ME ORANDUM FOR:
E. T. Pawlik, Director, Office of' Investigations Field Office, RIII FROM:
Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist SUBJECT:
GAP ALLEGATIONS AT CALLAWAY (50-433)
(ATS N0. RIII-84-A-0138) (01 N0. 3-84-022)
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Enclosed is a copy of Inspection Report No. 50-483/84-45 in which the GAP allegations at Callaway were reviewed by the' Region III Staff. The report is forwarded for you use in conjunction with the ongoing 01 investigation ut Callaway.
A Charles H. Weil Investigation and Compliance Specialist
Enclosure:
2/25/85 Memo,
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J. G. Keppler to T. A. Rehm
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with Inspection Report
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8507130347 850515 PDR FOIA CARDE85-214 PDR A/7
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'. t. I t N uaTA HASL HLviEw/UPDAlt SNEt1 UATA AS Of INE IND OF FtUHVANY 19HS wnus?
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ALLtu4TiuN NUMnths Hill-No-A-013d tACILiff/UUCatis CALLawaY !
US000AuJ PUNCilONAL Awt48 UNSilE MFaLTH AND S4ttTV L ON5 I Htst T I(JN S AP t utl Apts5 btSCwipfl0Ns A tt AL L t ei A l l t>NS : wtLOINbl s t Lt)t H UUALSI Slit SCHt tN I Ns.1 TLu MUNifuMINi.I CONCHtit HtPA!Hdi tLECINICAL.
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SOUHtt8 O H(i - tsOVtkNMLNI ALCOUNIAHILIIT PH0JtCT UATt NECEIVtu8 10/u//n=
Ptwsom HLLtiviense pH ettnt UFFILt HELtlWINbt HJ Atil0N UFFICE CONIACis tf Pawl!M
>TS PHONt Nua*Ht w :
J e et-d e tt o SIAIU55 UPtN
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F2 inc f olio. rg is the n" story r,f int action; taker by tne NRL F.egier 1:1 sta'f wnile nepetiating with Gc0 tc c:tair afficenti and backup informe-tier s;pporting allegatier.! regard'np concerns a. ut the Callawny nuclear p i a r.t :
T,e ta il s Late v.cy 1"., '. R a GAD informe: i.'illian. Torney, Eecion III that GAF r.ad e: pre >inatcly 25 allegatic.ns ' row five al'.egte v.hd hed te.cerns about the Callaway r.uci t ar : ~. a r. t.
The GAP rer.resentative statec that tr.e cliegatieit were being revie.ee.
William ' c.rr.ey, Ecgion lij was i: Headqucrters, e
P.ay 14, 19E en nt.e-businets when he talled 248 He stated
that he woulc stop oy thc GAP off.se or have some-ene r.eet the GAP represer.tative at or neer the Callaway sitt to pick up cor.ies of the allegations.
The G1F repretert'ative stated the information would be prcvided on May 18, 1984 May 15, 1954 Ecbert War'nict, Regior. II:
Inspection Report
No. 50-483/84-45(DRP)
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Union Electric Company
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cc w/ enc 1:
W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear
Construction
S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager
R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager
Quality Assurance
DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
Region IV
K. Drey
Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri
Public Service Commission
SNUPPS
RIII
RIII
RIII
RIII
Pelke/kja
Forney
Weil
Warnick
12/10/84
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/84-45(DRP)
License No. NPF-30
Docket No. 50-483
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Licensee:
Union Electric Company
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166
Facility Name:
Callaway Plant, Unit 1
Inspection At:
Callaway Site, Steedman, MO 65077
Inspection Conducted:
October 1 through November 23, 1984
Inspector:
J. H. Neisler
Approved By:
W. L. Forney, Chief
Projects Section 1A
Date
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on October 1 throuch November 23, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-45(ORP))
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection by the Senior Resident Inspector of
allegations; 10 CFR 50.55(e) items; and followup operating license conditions.
The inspection involved 248 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector
including 62 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
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W. Weber, Manager Nuclear Construction
R. Powers, Assistant Manager, QA
M. Doyne, General Superintendent, Nuclear Construction
R. Veatch, Supervisory Engineer, QA Construction
J. Laux, Supervisory Engineer, QA Startup
C. Plows, QA Consultant
H. Millwood, QA Consultant
L. Kanuckel, QA Engineer
S. Hogan, QA Engineer
B. Stanfield, QA Engineer
W. Norton, QA Engineer
J. Patterson, Operations Superintendent
G. Pattrissi, Consultant, Fire Protection
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Contractor and Other Personnel
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G. Wilson, QA Engineer, Daniel International
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W. Reilly, SNUPPS
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M. Majors, Level II Quality Inspector, Daniel International
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R. Ruggles, NDE Level II, Daniel International
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In addition to the above, the inspector contacted other personnel in the
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crafts, engineering and quality areas.
2.
Allegations
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(Closed) ATS No.V
On October 2, 1984, the NRC received a request from the
Government Accountability Project (GAP) to suspend the Callaway low power
license. The request cited 48 examples of allegations of deficiencies
during the construction at Callaway.
The inspector investigated the GAP allegations by physically inspecting
alleged deficient items interviewing site personnel and by review of
documentation pertaining to the allegations. The allegations either
were not substantiated, did not pertain to nuclear safety-related issues
or had been previously addressed by the NRC.
(Closed) 1.
Painters at Callaway have prepared thousands of welds in
the Reactor Building for painting by removing the rust proofing from
the welds.
The rust proofing was removed with grinders from these
welds that had already been Quality Control inspected and approved.
No measurements were made of the remaining weld metal or base metal.
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Since no re-inspection has been done, the quality and safety of
thousands of welds in the Reactor Building is now indeterminate.
The inspector examined accessible welds in the Reactor Building
on October 1, 1984.
No indications of questionable wall thickness
was observed during the examination.
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Approximately 2000. elds were prepared for inservice inspection.
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pip,tu.
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preparation included grinding the weld smooth to permit ultrasonic
inspection of the weld area during preservice and inservice inspectio
These welds were inspected using approved NDE techniques prior to beinq
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placed in service and will be periodically inspected to Section XI of
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the ASME Code throughout the life of the plan't. yuk-MAny Oeldments that
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had questionable wall thicknesses were identified as nonconformances
and dispositioned by completing the necessary corrective action to meet
Code requirements.
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Based on M inspection of structural and pipe welds and examinatio
of preservice inspection results, this allegation was not substantiated,
and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 2.
Welders have ground smooth the horizontal, the vertical
and the floor panel welds of the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal and
Cask Loading Pool.
In the process, negligent welders removed weld
metal and base metal. As a result of this overgrinding, certain areas
of these pools no longer meet thickness requirements.
The integrity
of the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal and Cask Loading Pool is
questionable.
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The inspector performed a visual inspection of welds in the spent fuel
The welds
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pool, transfer canal and cask loading pool on October 1,1984.
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had not been ground smooth.
Each weld had a crown that appeared to have
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been smoothed with a polishing or flap wheel. The inspector did not
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observe indications that base metal had been removed from the one-fourth.
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inch thick stainless liner plate. The weld seams have been subjected
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to a vacuum box test and the liner leak tested.
Test records indicate
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that there are no leaks in either of these structures.
Leak chases are
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installed and monitored.
Liners of spent fuel pools, transfer canals,
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and cask loading pools are not classified as Category 1, safety-related
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structures.
This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to
be closed.
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(Closed) 3.
Hasty and improper rework was done on the seam welds of
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the liner plates in the Spent Fuel Pool, Transfer Canal, and Cask Loading
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Pool.
These liner plates are defective in that they are not exactly
square.
This defect made original welding difficult.
The seam welds
of the liner plates were reworked but because of time constraints, the
welds were not sufficiently repaired.
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These seam welds were inspected on October 1,1984, (see response to
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allegation two above) by the resident inspector.
At the time of the
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inspection, the welds were considered to meet the provisions of the
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applicable Code. The welds have been vacuum box tested and leak
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tested successfully.
The liner plates were procured as plates not
as a complete unit; therefore, fit up was performed during erection.
The canal and pool liners are not classed as safety-related structures.
This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 4
Weld metal joining the reinforcing ribs and the steel liner-
plates of the Containment Building has been eaten away by rust and
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corrosion.
These welds located on the backside of the steel liner
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plates were not rust proofed.
Corrosion covered the backside of these
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plates before they were encased in concrete.
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Rust on steel that is to be used as a form for concrete is permitted by
the American Concrete Institute.
ACI-318 states that rust increases
the bonding of concrete to steel.
ACI-318 further states that steel
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will be free from nonmetallic substances (paint) that would affect
bonding.
The reinforcing ribs are not considered structural members of
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containment but are to keep the liner in shape until concreting is
complete.
Since rusting of steel is desired prior to placing concrete,
the inspector has no further concerns in this area.
This allegation is
considered to be closed.
(Closed) 5.
Bad welds exist on pipehangers as well as on the embed
plates that anchor the pipehangers. These pipehangers and embeds are
located near the floor of the Reactor Building.
They are difficult to
reach due to the surrounding installed equipment.
The bad welds have
excessive weld material, tiny holes, and pockets on the surface; some
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of the welds are actually incomplete.
No rework has been done on these
faulty welds.
The inspector, accompanied by a Level II welding quality inspector and
an NDE consultant, inspected pipe support (hanger) welds -ioceiwa.a..
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--the f!:0- (t A vi oppro & :tely :io fwut-) of the reactor building
on October 11, 1984.
The inspection encompassed every pipe support
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(hanger) observed around the total 2000 foot level of the reactor buildin.
Particular attention was placed on welds in the less readily accessible
No unacceptable welds were observed during this inspection. Thi-i
areas.
allegation was not substantiated and is considered closed.
(Closed) 6.
Not all welds that have been Quality Control approved
have been Quality Control inspected. Welds in difficult to reach
areas, such as on unistruts, have been approved without the Quality
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Control inspector's examination. There are also welds that have been
approved without inspection located on the condensers in the Turbine
Building.
"Unistrut" is one manufacturer's brand name for light weight steel
shapes used for various supports. These support members are commonly
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used for cable tray support. Usually only one weld is performed on
a member at the attachment to an embed or plate other connections are
bolted. The inspector's observation of cable tray support welds in
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the reactor, auxiliary and diesel / control buildings did not identify
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unsatisfactory welding in this area. Tray supports were inspected
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system by the Integrated Design Inspection Team.
No violations were
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cited by either of these teams. Welding on the condenser in the
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turbine building is outside the NRC area of responsibility and was
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not reviewed. The allegation.that all welds were not inspected was
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also addressed in Inspection Report No. 483/84-30.
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This al'.egation as pertaining to nuclear safety-related equipment was
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not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 7.
Idexperiencedandunderqualifiedwelderswereemployed
at Callaway.
Union pipefitters and welders were not hired by Daniels
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International because there was a shortage of skilled welders.
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result, a welder training program was established.
The program was
very brief, and it was commonly referred to as a program which produced
" instant welders". Journeymen welders generally spend several years
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developing the expertise required for welding.
This program produced
welders in a matter of weeks.
Training and requalification of welders is required by the ASME Code,
Section IX and by the AWS Structural Welding Code regardless of
previous welding experience. There are no minimum or maximum time
limits established by the Codes for initial welder qualifications.
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All welders at Callaway who were performing Code welds were required
to qualify prior to performing welds. Welder qualification or
training has been addressed in over 15 inspections including the
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Construction Assessment Team Inspection.
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Because of the number of inspections that involved welding and that
Daniel welder qualifications meet the requirements of AWS and ASME,
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this item not substantiated and considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 8.
The welder certification testing program allowed almost
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everyone who took the examination to pass.
Thus, the program permitter
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inadequate welders to weld safety-related structures.
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The inspector reviewed welder qualification documentation showing th
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33% of the welders tested whose welds were radiographed failed the test-
In addition, approximately 10% failed required bend tests. Welder
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certification and/or testing was inspected by the NRC during inspec-
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tions 83-19, 83-15, 83-14, 83-06, 82-19, 82-15, 82-13, 82-06, 81-17,
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81-11, 81-09, 81-07, 80-28, 80-26, 80-25, 80-24, 80-23, 80-22, 80-18,
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80-15, 80-12, 80-08, 80-05, 80-04, 80-03, 80-02, 79-16, 79-12, 79-03,
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78-14, 78-10, 78-07, 78-04 and 77-09.
This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 9.
The welder certification testing program did not screen
out these bad welders.
It was apparent that it was set up for the
purpose of producing men to do the work rather than to risk slowing
up production by withholding certification from bad welders.
In fact,
it was reported as common knowledge that the welding certification
supervisor for several years would look the other way, and certify
technically inadequate welders.
He did this in exchange for the
payment of bribe money. Workers who were unable to weld adequately
graduated from this program.
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The welder certification was conducted according to Daniel Procedur
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QCP-502.
The welding supervisor does not certify welders.
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Certification is the result of the welder successfully passing NDE
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and QC inspections.
This certification process was inspected during
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the Construction Assessment Team Inspection, Report No. 483/82-03
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and no deficiencies were observed.
There was, and is, no position, f-
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of welding certification supervisor.
The individual supervising the7
welder qualification testing does not certify the welders.
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cation results from completing welds that successfully pass the
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required nondestructive examinations.
Allegations regarding welder
qualiff' cations were previously investigated and not substantiated
in Inspection Report No. 483/78-04. This allegation was not
substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 10.
Another technique used to pass welder-applicants was
accomplished by allowing applicants to take the test as many times
as was necessary.
If an applicant failed, the test was not considered
as as a " test" but rather merely as practice. Welder-applicants took
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the test as many as five times before an acceptable weld was produced.
Retests of welders who fail the qualification test are permitted by
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the AWS Structural Welding Code AWS D.1-1 and the ASME Code Section IX,
Subsection QW 320.
Neither Code limits the number of retests for a
welder who fails the qualification test.
The only limits are those
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imposed by the individuals' employer.
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Since retesting of welders whn fail the qualifications tests are
permitted by both welding codes, the inspector has no further concerns
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regarding this allegation and the allegation is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 11.
As a result of using this underqualified and inexperienced
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work force, much rework had to be done. The pipe hanger department
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suffered the most because the worst were often relegated to pipehanger
welding.
Many of these welders were hired during the construction of
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the Control Building.
Pipehangers and supports were slapped in by
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these inexperienced welders to keep the construction of the Building
on schedule.
A lot of shoddy work was done, and duplicate work was
required by the hanger department in later years.
The inspector visually inspected hanger welds on safety-related systems
in the lower elevations of the control building.
The welding in this
area met the requirements of the applicable Codes and site welding
specifications.
During construction the inspector observed that
temporary pipe hangers were installed to facilitate pipe installation.
These temporary hangers were uniquely identified with yellow paint
and subsequently replaced with permanently installed hangers.
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inspector found no temporary hangers remaining on the piping systems
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in this area during this inspection.
As a result of visual inspection
in this area, this allegation was not substantiated and is considered
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to be closed.
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(Closed) 12.
This mode of construction creates many problems.
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construction was complete, repair and rework was done on the lower levels
of the Control Building two to three years later. Some of the welds
could not be reached; some were covered with concrete.
This rework
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weakens 15e. metal because of the required reheating.
The tensile
strength is reduced and the metal becomes brittle.
In addition, the
cost of each weld that has to be reworked is double.
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The inspector visually inspected pipe supports in the lower levels of
the control building on October 18, 1984. The safety-related piping
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No
supports inspected were on the essential service water system.
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deficient welds or support members were observed.
Both the AWS and
ASME Codes permit rewelding, pre"iding the raqu' ed greneat and posi
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Plant records reviewed indicate that temporary
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supports were used to support the pipes before the permanent prefab-
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ricated supports were installed subsequent to final pipe alignment.
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The documentation for this area does not indicate that it was necessary I
to repair or rework Category 1, structural steel two or three years later.
This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 13.
Quality Control inspectors did not always maintain the
necessary independence from the pressures of schedule and cost.
It
was reported that Quality Control inspectors would sometimes approve
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without inspection welds located in hard to reach areas. These areas
are exactly the places where it is more difficult to do welding, and
therefore, more important to inspect for poor welds.
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This item was addressed in Inspection Report No. 483/84-30 and is
considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 14.
Quality Control inspectors were known to favor their
friends.
They would inspect to a lesser standard than they were
required.
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Interviews and discussion with craft persons still on the job and
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during the past three years indicate that inspectors did not show
favoritism when performing inspections.,/~ The inspector reviewed QA
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audits and surveillances of QC performance and found no indications,.- '~
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of QC inspectors favoring their friends.
The inspector's direct
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observation of QC inspections and his followup inspections, other
NRC inspection reports, and licensee and constructor QA audits
and surveillance reports do not substantiate the above allegation.
This allegation is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 15.
Those Quality Control personnel who attempted to be
assertive in their positions have been subjected to intimidation
and harassment.
It is reported that workers have dropped things
from heights such that the hardware dropped would land near the
Quality Control inspectors.
Quality Control inspectors have been
splashed with concrete and with w'ater, and one Quality Control
inspector had his hand intentionally smashed with a vibrator
by a workman.
During NRC inspection 483/82-03, the subject of QC intimidation and
harassment was thoroughly examined. QC inspectors were selected at
random by the NRC inspectors for private interviews by a team of NRC
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interviewers.
As a result of these interviews, the NRC inspection
team concluded that QC personnel were free from harassment, intimidati n
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Interviews % % ir-4 b the remaining quality inspectors indicated
that they did not feel they were unduly harassed or that they had
been intimidated.
Review of records in the co h First Aid station did not show
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any record of a QC inspector being treated for an injured hand during
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the years that concrete was being installed at Callaway.
This allegation
h substantlattr8 and is Considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 16.
Quality Control-issued " hold tags" often left workers
idle for one or two days.
" Hold tags" indicate that there is a problem
with the tagged item and all work on this item should be stopped until
the problem is resolved.
Once the problem is resolved, a Quality Control
inspector removes the tag and work can continue on the item.
Often, a
foreman or supervisor would eventually give the order to proceed with
work and ignore the hold tags. Workers questioned the unexplained orders
to proceed when the work had not been changed or been seen fixed. Either
money was being wasted on non problems or safety deficiencies were being
accepted.
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The issue or installation of QC hold tags was controlled by Daniel
Procedure AP-VII-02 and AP-VII-13. When an NCR or DR is issued the
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hold tag is placed on the nonconforming item. The nonconformance is
evaluated by the constructor engineering group and/or the architect /
engineer.
Based on the evaluation by engineering and quality assurance
personnel a conditional release may be issued and the supervisor
instructed to continue the work.
The inspector verified that
conditional releases are tracked and closed out when corrective
action is complete and the nonconformance no longer exists.
This
allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 17.
There was a shortage of Quality Control inspectors. One
worker reports waiting six, ten hour days for a Quality Control inspector.
During this delay, the worker was not permitted to move onto a new work
assignment.
Adequacy of quality assurance and quality control personnel staffing
j
was reviewed by the Region III Construction Assessment Team. Staff
-
levels were determined to be adequate.
In 1982, the NRC compiled a
,~
//
listing of worker to QA/QC personnel at all nuclear plant construction ~
sites within the United States.
Callaway's ratio of 7.6:1 showed this
There was no
sites's QA/QC staffing among the ten best in the country.
i
shortage of Quality Control Inspectors at Callaway.
Since the second
and third sentences in the allegation have no apparent connection with
I
nuclear safety, the inspector did not address those parts of the
allegation. This allegation was not substantiated and is considered
,
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to be closed.
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(Closed) 18.
Deficient electrical cable has been used on safety-related
systems throughout the plant. Generic problems regarding the environ-
mental qualification testing of this Class E electrical cable have been
recognized and acknowledged by the NRC, Office of the Inspection and
Enforcement.
It is reported that this cable is literally all over the
plant.
.
The NRC issued Inforration Notice 84-44 concerning the environmental
qualification of certain cables manufactured by Rockbestos Company.
Six types of Rockbestos cables are used at Callaway,
a.
Two of the cable types have been qualified at Sandia
Laboratories,
b.
One was tested but the test did not meet all SNUPPS
requirements.
c.
Three cables, plus the cable that did not meet all
requirements, are currently being subjected to a two
year qualification test program by Rockbestos.
,
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The inspector verified that the Rockbestos cables that are not fully
_
qualified have been tracked and documented as to cable number and
location so that proper corrective actions can be initiated in the
event the cables do not successfully pass the qualification test program.
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The allegation is correct in that certain cables have been identified
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by the NRC as having incomplete environmental qualifications, but the
cables at Callaway are identified, have been evaluated by the plant
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designer for interim acceptance and measures are in place to perform.
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the necessary corrective actions if the cables are not qualified.
This allegation is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 19.
Electrical cables were installed too early in construction
operations. The cables have been exposed to the harsh environment of
n
early construction and have been damaged during construction from hot
metal and other elements thrown around during early construction.
\\
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On June 12, 1984, it was previously alleged that cables had been damageo\\
by workers climbinp on the cables.
That allegation was closed in
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Inspection Report No. 483/84-30 as unsubstantiated..As reported in
483/84-30, the NRC inspector visually inspected the cables and found
no damaged cables.
Also, these cables were functionally tested during
plant preoperational testing with no failures.
This allegation was
not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 20.
Violations of electrical wire bend radius are reported.
Eighty to eighty-five percent of junction boxes are too small through the
Auxiliary Bui' ding and the Control Building.
Because these junction
boxes are undersized, wires which feed in and out of the boxes are
overstressed.
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On March 14, 1983, the licrasee reported this item to the NRC pursuant
to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Subsequent review showed
23 undersized junction boxes containing cable mininum bend radius
violations. The cables passing through or into these boxes were
,
analyzed by the designer and the cables with obvious violations of
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minimun, bend radius were replaced. Those cables with questionable
bend radius violations were subjected to a 1000 volt insulation,
i
resistancetesttodeterminewhetherthebendhaddegradedthef
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dielectric properties of the cable. This item was closed in i
' Inspection Report ito. 483/03-33.
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The allegation is correct in that some junction boxes were undersized.
c-
But this' deficiency had been iidentif f ed by the licensee quality
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assurance program a year and $ne'-Nalf earlier.
It was correctly
.. -
reported to the NRC, corr'ective action was taken and that action
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reviewed and inspected by the NRC.
This' allegation is considered
to be closed.
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(Cloged) 21.'
There are no;protectivi cable jackets and static bleeder
wires on cables feeding through the cabinets into the Control Room.
Protective cable, jackets and half-wrapped, outside electrical inter-
ference deflector. wire were removed in order to fit the cables through
the undersized cabinets.
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The inspector examined documentation showing that the design organization
!
approved modifying the prefabricated cable in the cabinets in question.
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Additional jacket was removed from the prefabricated cable to facilitate
installation ~into these cabinets. The drain wires are connected at the
opposite ends of the cables. To connect the wire at both ends would
tend to induce circulating currents and defeat the purpose of installing
drain (static bleeder) wires.
The installation has been inspected by Quality Control inspectors, NRC
resident inspectors, NRC region based electrical inspectors and NRR
site review teams which considered the installation to be acceptable.
,,. -
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Although the allegation is correct in that the cable jackets were
(
removed and drain wires not connected in the cabinets, the as-built
installation meets approved standards since cable jackets must be
removed to terminate multi-conductor cables and connecting drain
wires at both ends would be an unacceptable installation.
This
allegation is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 22.
High voltage splicers frequently are submerged under
water in eight foot deep concrete man holes.
These man holes, built
for high voltage splicers, have no drainage system.
Water collects
in the man holes submerging the electrical cables until the water
eventually evaporates.
~
The inspector's review of electrical drawings and cable installation
records show that Class 1E high voltage cables were not spliced in
concrete manholes.
SNUPPS electrical specifications do not permit
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Class IE high voltage cables to be spliced.
The NRC Environmental
Qualification Team reviewed the qualifications of the pow r cables
used at~ Callaway during their 1983 site visit.
Submerged cables
were identified during a Union Electric Quality Assurance surveillance
in October 1982.
The architect / engineer's analysis of the cable
qualification determined that submersion in water would have no
deleterious effect on the cable.
,:?'
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As a result of the determination that Class IE cable was not spliced
in the duct banks, this allegation was not substantiated as pertaining
to safety-related material or components and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 23.
Insufficient fire proofing has been installed on these
high voltage splicers.
These splicers have only one-third the required
fire proofing.
In item no. 22, it was determined that there were no splices in Class IE
,"em
cables in underground duct banks and the are separated from non-1E cables
's_-
within the duct banks.
The fiberglass wrapping supplied in splice kits
is not fireproofing.
Its purpose is to afford mechanical protection
for the electrical insulation in the splice, not fire protection.
There
is no requirement for fireproofing splices in underground duct banks
.
(manholes).
Since no requirement exists for fireproofing splices, this
allegation is not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 24.
The use of vibrators was an ineffective means of spreading
concrete. Vibrators did not settle all of the concrete. Throughout the
pours, the density of the concrete and the high volume of reinforcing
steel created problems with the flow of the concrete.
Pockets of air
were created around the reinforcement bars. Voids remain in the concrete.
,W[?
Intervenor contentions regarding concrete quality and voids in concrete
were examined and ruled upon by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
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and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. This allegation is
is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 25.
The only attempt to test the concrete for voids was the
visual inspection. Visual inspection, as the only means used to detect
voids, reveals only those voids which are apparent on the surface of
- the concrete.
Sound testing is not an effective means of detecting
voids because of the high volume of reinforcing steel used.
For
instance, in the base mat of the Containment Building, there was
approximately one pound of reinforcing steel for every n e pounds
of concrete.
Intervenor contentions regarding concrete quality, voids in concrete, $i
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and inspection of concrete were addressed at the Operations Licensing
Hearing and ruled upon by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. This allegation is
considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 26.
Patchwork of the voids was very limited. The rebar
prevented cement finishers from reaching some of the more extensive
voids.
Thus, grouting was done only in those areas that the
finishers could reach.
em
Concrete patching was addressed in Inspection Reports 483/83-15 and
483/84-22.
The inspector's review of Callaway Civil Specification
.
C-103'and Daniel Procedures WP-109 and CP-109 indicate that concrete
patching criteria were specified and that concrete patches were
installed according to approved work procedures and inspected
according to approved Quality Control Procedures.
Review of
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concrete pour cards for repair of pours shows that Category 1
,,
repairs were controlled according to approved procedures and
specifications.
This allegation was not substantiated and is
considered to be closed.
(Closed) 27.
Defective bolts were used to install the embeds on
concrete ceilings of the Control Building. These embeds were not
installed at-the time of the concrete pours of the ceilings as
planned.
Instead, these plates were placed with expansion bolts.
Some of the expansion bolts used were " Redheads".
" Redheads"
hasa been found by many construction companies to be defective.
!
The inspector's review of plant records pertaining to concrete
expansion anchors indicates that only Hilti and ITT-Phillips
anchor bolts were used in safety-related applications. " Redheads"
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were found to have been used in some temporary applications and
for mounting fire extinguisher brackets on walls.
Plant specifi-
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cations did not permit the use of self drilling expansion anchors
^
(Redheads) in safety-related systems. This allegation was not
substantiated and'is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 28.
Drainage in the Auxiliary Building is poor.
Six to
.
eight inches of water on the lower floor has been reported repeatedly.
Possibly there is debris clogging the pipes or the pipes are too small
to handle the large volume of water.
This allegation appears to be a repeat of a previous allegation
received on June 12, 1984, which was addressed in Inspection
Report No. 483/84-30. This allegation is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 29.
Pipehangers soiled with metal filings and dirt during
the flood of the Reactor Building on June 2, 1984, have not been cleaned.
These hangers were cleaned on their outer, easy to clean side, but were
not cleaned inside the band which extends entirely around the pipe.
The integrity of the pipe will be jeopardized by these dirty hangers.
The " flood" consisted of a spill of water that reached a depth of
approximately six inches on the reactor building floor outside the
secondary shield structure. During an inspection of this area of
the reactor building on October 11, 1984, the inspector determined
that no safety-related pipe clamps (bands) were installed at an
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elevation of less than six inches above the floor. Therefore, the
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pipe clamps (bands) were not submerged. This allegation was not
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substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 30.
Construction drawings were not being updated and revised
For instances, laborers cutting a trench to lay a pipe
as necessary.
discovered a six-inch diameter pipe. There was no record of the pipe
on the construction drawing. The identity of the pipe was unknown to
the crew as well as to the supervisor.
The inspector's review of site plans did not reveal a nuclear safety-
related six-inch diameter pipe buried outside the power block that
.Q
might have been discovered by laborers' entrenchment activities.
j
Control of drawings, design control and change control have been
..
inspected by the NRC over nine times during the construction phase,
including the Integrated Design Inspection and C.A.T. Inspections. \\
This allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 31.
Construction drawings were defective. A concrete column
It was later dis-
was poured according to the construction drawings.
covered that this column was too high to meet the necessary connecting
The concrete column had to be entirely removed.
Construction
beam.
of the column was halted for three months thereaf ter, while the drawings
were being corrected.
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The inspector reviewed site construction records and interviewed
personnel who had spent several years on site and was not able
'~
to substantiate that this allegation ever occurred in the nuclear
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safety-related areas of the facility. All columns.within the
safety-related structures are composite columns, not concrete.
This allegation is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 32.
Poor construction resulted from engineering errors in 5005
construction drawings.
5005 drawings were used for the installation
of cable tray supports in the Control Building and the Auxiliary Building.
As a result of the poor engineering, hangers were not centered properly
on the embeds. The nonconformance report attributed the poor construction
to craft error.
In fact, the error was due to-the incorrect drawings
issued by engineers. Quality Control approved this inaccurate construction
and accepted "as is".
"As is" approval did not reflect appropriate
engineering review.
The 5005 drawings referred to above were not construction drawings.
FS-E-5005 drawings or " Field Sketches" were shop drawings used in
the constructor electrical fabrication shop for prefabrication of
some cable tray supports and did not include tolerances for attachment
~
These tolerances are specified on the civil engineering /
to embeds.
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installation drawings and do not require each support to be centered
on the embeds.
Cable tray support installations were addressed in
Inspection Report No. 483/84-30. This allegation was not substantiated
and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 33.
Undocumented rework was performed on the Transfer Tube.
Under cover at night two boilermakers welders and two helpers removed
a piece of this stainless steel tube in order to do repair work within
the tube. This work was done without any paper or documentation and
without any Quality Control inspection.
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The inspector reviewed nonconformance reports 2SN-5088-CW, 2SN-5089-C,
These nonconfor-L
/j // 2SN-5062-CW, 2NN-0389-C, 2SN-5462-C, and 2SN-6020-CW.
mances indicate that rework or repairs on the transfer tube were in fact
documented, work supervised and inspected, and that the repair work was
,
reviewed by the appropriate personnel in the organization.
Discussions with the two individuals who are cognizant of the work in
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I this area that are still onsite indicate that no undocumented work
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was performed on the transfer tube.
This allegation was not substantiated
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and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 34.
The reliability of the on-site laboratory is challenged
by inaccurate test results.
During the flood of the Reactor Building
of June 2, 1984, fiberglass insulating blankets were soaked with borated
Eighty-five blankets were removed and sent to the onsite
water.
The
laboratory to be tested for damage caused by the caustic acid.
on-site laboratory concluded that the barated water soaked blankets
did not need to be replaced. The strength of the blankets had in fact
deteriorated such that they could be shredded by hand. The blankets
were ultimately found to be defective by the pressure of the workers
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and were replaced.
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The inspector's investigation of this allegation found that the plant
laboratory was requested by the contractor to perform a chemical
analysis of the insulation per NRC Regulatory Guide 1.36.
The
laboratory report indicates that the insulation was analyzed for
. gy 4G.-J
leachable chlorides, fluorides, sodium and, silicates.l' No testing
llp A.vy'M
for brittleness was performed.
Replacement of the blankets was the
,
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result of their being determined to be unacceptable by the contractor
!
Quality Control inspector. This allegation was not substantiated and
is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 35.
Dosimeters were not worn by workers in the Reactor
Building while fuel was being loaded in the Reactor Core.
SNUPPS
Radiological Emergency Response Plan requires that all personnel
entering the controlled areas be issued thermoluminescent dosimeter-
badges. Most workers in the Reactor Building had not been issued
badges nor had they been given the necessary radiation protection
training. Without radiation detection badges, it was impossible
for anyone to determine the level of exposure to radiation while
working in the Reactor.
Investigation has determined that the reactor building was a radiation
control area (RCA) only when the fuel assemblies containing startup
sources were being placed in the reactor vessel. The inspector re-
viewed the report of a radiation survey performed at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br /> on
June 16, 1984, showing that radiation levels did not require personnel
dosimetry. This survey was performed subsequent to placing the fuel
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assemblies in the reactor vessel and before the RCA was terminated.
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The Radiological Emergency Response Plan only addresses actions
,
during an emergency condition, not routine plant activities.
Fuel
,
load is not an emergency.
NRC radiation protection reviewed the
f'
Callaway radiation protection program during Inspection Report
.,
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No. 483/84-35.
.
This allegation was not substantiated as pertaining to the safety
of plant workers and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 36.
Psychological testing conducted in late 1983 and early
1984 failed to remove the potentially bad elements from the work site.
Acts of sabotage have occurred since the examination was administered.
On July 4, 1984, there was such an act.
Breakers in the Motor Control
Room in the Auxiliary Building were shut off.
It has been reported
that in connection with the circuit breaker shut off, a voice announced
over the communications system at the plant, "UE - Have a nice fourth
of July".
For the following days, craft workers made a joke about
"UE - Have a nice day".
The alleged "act of sabotage" that occurred on July 4,1984, was
investigated by the licensee's security organization.
This investi-
gation was reviewed by the NRC's safeguards inspectors in Inspection
Report No. 483/84-33. The NRC report did not identify any discrepancies
,.
in the licensee's investigation and the event was considered to be closed.
Screening of personnel including psychological testing was inspected
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during Inspection Report No. 483/84-17. The inspector determined that
testing was conducted in 1984 and none in 1983. This allegation is
considered to be closed.
(Closed) 37. The psychological test failed as a screen for employees,
but served as a means of harassment. Workers were coerced into taking
.
the test.
Everyone on site was given an opportunity to take the test.
The test was not required although non-tested employees who had been
on site for less than three continuous years of service could not be
employed in restricted areas, that is behind the fence. Those who
refused the test faced certain termination for lack of work opportunity.
The inspector reviewed the requirements for screening persons who are
to be authorized unescorted access to plant protected areas and deter-
mined that the licensee followed the provisions of American National
Standard ANS 3.3 in not requiring psychological testing for persons with
uninterrupted employment of three or more years.
Since the allegation
states that everyone had the opportunity to take the test to qualify for
the limited number of temporary positions inside the restricted area, it
does not appear that harassment was involved.
The personnel involved were
contractor personnel whose numbers were being reduced as construction was
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completed and were to be used during plant startup, not as permanent
.
employees.
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This allegation was not substantiated as to employees being harassed or
,
coerced #m W%uplopet werediverthe;_spportun4ty* to take the test,
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(Closed) 38.
The psychological test, the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory is a test intended for psychological diagnosis.
There is no pass or fail standards for the diagnostic test.
At the
Callaway site, a pass / fail system was imposed on the test.
In fact,
several dozen employees were terminated because they failed to pass
the test.
Investigation by the inspector indicates that the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI) Test was not administered a* Callaway and
that personnel were not terminated for failing the MMPI.
Screening of
personnel for unescorted access to plant areas was performed by the
licensee's contractor, IPAT Corp., using tests developed by IPAT. No
workers were terminated as a direct result of the screening; however,
only persons having unescorted access authorization were considered for
retention to work in vital areas after construction was complete. This
allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 39.
The general attitude of workers about construction
operations at the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant is that it is a disgrace
to the construction industry.
Interviews with craft workers conducted in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by the
resident inspector indicates that they were proud of their performance
at Callaway. The Region III Deputy Regional Administrator interviewed
,
crafts, supervisors and quality inspectors prior to fuel load and the
interviewees were unanimous in their opinion that Callaway was a well
constructed plant.
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Callaway's SALP report ratings by NRC inspectors have been consistantly
among the highest in NRC Region III.
As a result of NRC's interviews with workers and ratings issued by
inspectors, this allegation was not substantiated and is considered
to be closed.
(Closed) 40.
There have been en.ormous amounts of cost overruns overruns
at the plant. There were excessive amounts of manpower on site.
Approximately 200 electricians were hired in late 1983.
Despite this
almost one-third increase in manpower, there had been no increase in the
work assignments.
In general, the plant was overwhelmed with manpower.
Seven, ten to twelve hour shifts became mandatory.
Employees who could
not maintain this demanding work schedule and missed a day of work were
terminated.
A medical excuse, a death in the immediate family or a call
to jury duty were the only acceptable excuses for any absence.
Bogus
medical excuses were available on site for three dollars.
Less work was
done during this manpower overload than previously in an eight hour day.
Cost overruns, if any, are not within the NRC's scope of inspection
responsibility. Any action in this area will be between the licensee
.
and the state regulatory agency.
As it might pertain to nuclear safety-related issues, this allegation
,
was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 41.
People were idle on the job site.
Some slept at work;
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a few brought in alarm clocks to wake up in time to go home.
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Whether construction workers are idle on the job site is not within,
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the NRC's scope of responsibility.
This allegation is considered to
j
be closed.
(Closed) 42.
Illegal drugs, alcohol, gambling and prostitution could
be found on the job site.
In February of 1984, seven Quality Control
employees were fired for alleged drug use.
Please refer to the attached
articles from the Kingdom Daily Star-Gazette. The Government Accounta-
bility would like information about the drug-related terminations and
.
related developments at the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant, including but
not limited to, the attached list of questions.
The licensee had a drug prevention program during construction. The
inspector observed the use of trained drug detection dogs used to
periodically search the site for drugs and reviewed the results of
these searches with licensee management.
Lunch boxes, giackages, and vehicles (including those of NRC inspectors)
were searched as they entered the site.
i
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Drug awareness training was presented to supervisors and drug abuse
lectures and literature was presented to workers.
Personnel using or
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possessing drugs or alcohol onsite were terminated.
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The inspector's discussions with workers and supervisors failed to
reveal evidence that prostitution could be found on the job site,
nor did any interviewee know of organized gambling onsite.
'
This allegation as it pertains to inadequate programs to control d
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and alcohol abuse, gambling or prostitution is not substantiated and is'<
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considered to be closed.
(Closed) 43.
Workers were almost encouraged not to accomplish too much
too quickly.
One witness reports that he was physically threatened at
work for working too hard.
He told his foreman and it was taken as a
joke.
Other workers report that crews were eventually split up if they
-
were working too fast.
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Worker productivity is not within the scope of the NRC's responsibility.
This allegation was not substantiated as pertaining to nuclear safety
-
and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 44.
Poor management was another cause of the cost overruns at
the plant.
For instances, it is reported that two electricians spent
eight hours hanging one electrical light fixture. This fixture could have
been hung by one man in one hour. Much of the delay was due to the lack
of work assignments. Work assignments were required for any job on site.
Sometimes a worker would be idle for one or two days waiting for such
an assignment.
In the meantime, the worker would appear to be busy or
just sit around until he was issued a work assignment.
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Worker productivity is not within the NRC's scope of responsibility.
Whether or not a task if performed within a specified time has no
bearing on nuclear safety.
This item was not substantiated and is
A
L W R. f A l # # # Cr
considered to be closed.
riuc Jan. SAFGT1Y-
(Closed) 45.
Cost overruns can also be attributed to the high volume of
discarded materials.
For instance, one individual reports that over the
course of his employment as a dump truck driver, he dumped several
thousand pounds of welding rods. Welding rods are very expensive; many
companies control the rods when the rods are issued to the welders as well
as when they are returned. Daniels, on the contrary, only controlled
these rods when they were issued to workers.
It is reported by one worker
that he has seen, on several occasions, welders take out ten pounds of
welding rods in the morning, not use any of the ten pounds of rods during
the day, and later dispose of the ten pounds in the barrel provided on
site.
Approved weld material control procedures do not permit low-hydrogen
welding electrodes that have been exposed to the atmosphere, moisture,
or that have damaged coatings to be used to weld plant components.
material controls were inspected during NRC Inspection Resports Numbered:
483/81-19, 483/82-03, 483/82-13, 483/82-15, 483/83-05, 483/83-11,
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483/83-14, 483/83-19, and 483/78-09. These inspections indicate that,-
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weld materials (electrodes) were being controlled according to the
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As it pertains to nuclear safety-related welding activities and controls,
this allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 46.
Barrels were provided on site for disposal of welding rods.
The barrels were filled with welding rod stubs as well as unused welding
rods. These barrels were later dumped in on-site landfills. Welding rods
were prohibited in the landfill.
It was also against regulations for
workers to dump their garbage from home in the landfill, but this was
routinely ignored. Many people, including the general supervisor, would
bring garbage from home and dump it in this landfill.
Unusable weld electrodes were.placed in locked 55 gallon drums.
The NRC's
concern in this area is that damaged or used electrodes and electrodes
that had been exposed to the plant environment longer than the allowable
time would not be reused in welding safety related systems. After reject
or unusable electrodes are removed from the site, the licensee may dispose
of the electrodes according to his procedures or policy for trash or scrap
disposal.
Disposal of the worker's garbage in the landfill is not an NRC
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concern as it does not pertain to nuclear safety-related activities.
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allegation was not substantiated and is considered to be closed.
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(Closed) 47.
Many acts of sabotage have also been reported. The NRC, in
its latest inspection reports, admits to eleven acts of malicious mischief
regarding the destruction of electrical cables. Workers have found
various items in pipes such as scraps of steel wire, ele:trical cables,
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two by four inch wooden boards, and welding rods. These pipes had to be
cut open in order to remove the material.
It was generally understood by
workers that these acts were done deliberately to slow up work production.
Damaged electrical cables were addressed in Inspection Report No.
483/84-30.
The licensee reported pipe cleanliness as a construction deficiency
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) in July 1981.
Corrective action regarding
thisdeficiencywasinspectedandclosedoutinInspectionReporth,
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No. 483/83-19.
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Piping systems were flushed according to approved procedures.
Systems
have been tested under the preoperational testing program and determined
to have met applicable acceptance criteria by the NRC Region III Test
Program Section.
Since concerns expressed in this allegation were previously addresse.d
by either the NRC or the licensee, this allegation is considered to be
closed.
(Closed) 48.
Although these construction and Quality Assurance problems
would be serious under any circumstances, they are made more for the
following reason. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III has been
violating its own rule regarding on-site inspections. The construction
inspection offices of the NRC profess that all on site inspections by the
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NRC are to be unannounced to personnel on site.
Quite the contrary, many
workers have reported that employees on all levels were prenotified by
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their foreman or general foreman of upcoming NRC inspections.
Several
days before the inspection, the job site would be prepared for the NRC.
Workers, who had not been directly informed, would know of an-upcoming
inspection when they were taken off of their regular job assignment and
put onto a clean up crew. This prenotification weakens the NRC inspec-
tion process itself and raises serious doubts about the reliability of
the staff conclusions concerning the quality and safety of the plant.
There has been a Resident NRC Inspector assigned to Callaway since
1979; therefore, persons onsite were aware that the NRC was onsite so
prenotification of inspections would have been redundant.
There is no rule that states that all NRC inspections will be unannounced;
therefore, this allegation is unsubstantiated and considered to be closed.
3.
Restrictions to Operatina License NPF-25
The following items relating to fire protection issues were included in
the Callaway operating license as restrictions to exceeding power levels
of five percent of rated power.
s.
Att.
1; G.1 - Adding Additional Emergency Lighting in
Safe Shutdown Areas.
Licensee engineering determined
that lighting problems existed in four areas. The inspector
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verified that emergency lights have been installed in the
two electrical penetration rooms and in the two Class 1E
switchgear rooms.
It was also verified that emergency
lighting is provided for the safe shutdown panels. This
item and Open Item No. 483/84-15-05 are considered to be
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closed.
b.
Att.1, G.2 - Communications to Support Shutdown from
Outside the Control Room. The inspector verified that
a Gai-Tronics handset with speakers and a telephone have
been installed in the auxiliary shutdown panel room and
that they are in working order. This item and Open
Item No. 483/84-15-06 are considered to be closed.
c.
2(7.)(a) Fire Protection. The inspector verified that
the Halon and sprinkler systems in the south electrical
penetration room were operable and that fire barriers
had been installed in penetrations in the auxiliary
building and that the installation of thermal detectors
in containment are complete.
This item is considered
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to be closed.
4.
Construction Deficiency Reports. 10 CFR 50.55(e)
The inspector examined the licensee's corrective action relative to
the following construction deficiency reports:
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(Closed) 483/84-09-EE - Electrical floor penetrations had shrinkage
cracks greater than allowed by specifications. The inspector verified
by observation that the seals have been repaired or replaced as indicated
in the licensee's final 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.
This item is considered
to be closed.
(Closed) 483/84-16-EE - 58-3 Limitorque valve operator failed in the RHR
system due to a key failure on the shaft.
The inspector verified that the
Limitorque operators have been replaced with type SB-1 operators. These
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replacement operators were tested during preoperational testing without
failures. This item is considered to be closed.
(Closed) 483/84-17-EE - Indeterminate qualification of terminal blocks
in Limitorque actuators. The licensee reported a deficiency in the
qualification status of two types of terminal blocks used in Limitorque
actuators for safety-related applications.
No documentation is available
to show proof of qualification of Kukla K622 and Buchanan 0824 termination
blocks.
The inspector reviewed field rework plans FM-236-001, FM-223C-002 and
FM-225-001 showing that the Kukla K622 and Buchanan 0824 terminal blocks
had been replaced with qualified Marathon 300 series terminal blocks.
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This item is considered to be closed,
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5.
Exit Interview
8ecause the inspection primarily involved allegation followup and the
licensee is performing a parallel investigation of the same allegations,
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no exit interview was conducted.
However, report findings were discussed
with members of licensee management.
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