IR 05000456/1990016

Insp Repts 50-456/90-16 & 50-457/90-19 on 900729-0915. Noncited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items,Operational Safety, Maint Surveillance & ESF Sys

ML20059N703
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	10/05/1990
From:	Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059N701	List: IR 05000456/1990016 ML20059N700
References
50-456-90-16, 50-457-90-19, NUDOCS 9010170163
Download: ML20059N703 (20)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'

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REGION'III-Reports No. 50-456/90016(DRP);50-457/90019(DRP)

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. Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

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Opus' West III

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1400 Opus. Place t

Downers Grove, IL 60515

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' Facility Name: -Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

July 29 through September 15, 1990-t Inspectors:

B._L. Jorgensen

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J. A. Hopkins D. R. Calhoun Approved By:

i. Fa er, Chief

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React r Projects Section IA DHe -

Inspection Summary Inspection from July 19 through Seatember 15, 1990 (Reports No.

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507 56790UTETUU W EU757790D19TURm

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Areas InspeReBi Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident Tnspectors and a regional. inspector.of: ' licensee action on previously

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identified items'; operational safety, including status of engineered safety

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feature systems; radiological controls; maintenance; surveillance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; safety assessment / quality verification; reportable events; and NRC Region III

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requests.

No Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewed.

Results: ;Of the eleven areas' inspected, no violations were identified in ten areas.

In the remaining area, one non-cited violation was identified regarding failure to properly post a " radiation area," (paragraph 4).

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In the area of plant operations, control room personnel appeared attentive to

. systems and procedures, as evidenced by the uneventful startup of Unit 1.

However, an error in the administrative control of post-testing for MODE change

occurred.

In the radiological protection area, an unposted " Radiation Area" sign was discovered, but the condition appeared to be an isolated instance.

Plant maintenance appeared to be properly identified, scheduled, and-performed; however, post-maintenance cleanup'was left incomplete in a couple of instances.

Concerning the surveillance program, it appears that some surveillance procedures do not clearly indicate whether the equipment involved in the testing is inoperable during the conduct of the procedure.

This complicates 9010170163 901005 DR ADOCK 0S00 6.

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Ldecision-ma' king abbut when such' proceduresi may properlyc be performed.. Also,,

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itwofevents: occurred which:seem to' bear'some' similarity.<to;recently cited:

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"f i failuresitoiproperly-perform "nonproutine" surveillances,

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INrformancein engineering / tech'nical. support appeared mixed, LThe 'timelinessfof i

t e.9 fL corporate. engineering support, concerning1 safety' pump welds: and: the: pressurizer.

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(10w-pressure SIlsetpoint,.was questioned;!however support to-' evaluate. operability.

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concerns;for auxiliary feedwater motor operated valves was commendable.3 p1

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DETAILS

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P'rsons' Contacted e

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" Common 3 alth Edison-Company (CECO)

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M. Wallace,lVice. President, PWR Operations-i

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K.'L'. Kofron, Station Manage *

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• D.!E.i0'Brien, Technical: Superintendent a

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• G. E. Groth, Production:Superintentent.

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.S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Adinistrator.

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-J. Graham,oBraidwood' Project Manager, PWR Projects Department

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• R. J. Legner,: Services:Di-ector

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- G.'R'. Masters, Assistant Superintendent'- Operations'

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• M. E;;Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance P. Smith,10perating Engineer --Unit 1 b

R. '.Yungk, Operating-Engin_eer - Unit-2-

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'W. B. McCue," Operating Engineer - Unit 0-

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R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor -

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• D. J.; Miller,' Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

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• D'.; E. Cooper, Technical Staf f Supervisor A. D! Antonio, Quality Control Supervisor.

• A, Checca, Security Administrator.

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R.-L.=Byers,= Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup.

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L.iW. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor.

C. Vanderheyden, Training Supervisor-_

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• PL Maher, Assistant Technical Staf f Supervisor

• D. F. Ambler, Health Physics Supervisor

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'_*D.: Skoza,jSite Engineering Supervisor

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• E. W Carroll, Regulatory Assurance

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• P. Holland, Regulatory ' Assurance

. J. ' Smith,: Master, Electrical Maintenance'

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. V..D.sBean, Chief l Steward, Maintenance

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• R.-Vignocchi,; Chief Steward

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• K. Curtis, Steward-

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• M.1J. Andrews, Operations

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• B. Herbera, Safety Assessment a

• E.LR. Wendorf, Engineering and Construction Project Manager

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• E. M.- Roche, Health Physics

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• C'. Zamudio, Chief Steward : Clerical

• Denotes those attending the_ exit interview conducted on September 14, 1990, and at other times.throughout.the inspection period.

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The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee

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employees, including members of_the. technical and engineering staffs,-

c reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and l,

electrical,~ mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract

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security personnel._

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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702)

~The inspector reviewed.the following items by means of direct i

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observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of licensee H

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closeout packages and-other applicable records. These reviews emphasizedi i

the: adequacy of_the licensee's safety assessment in determinint actions

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to takef and the degree _ of quality maintained in implementing those C

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actions; a.

Open Items (Closed) 457/88007-03(DRS):. Scheduling-of the Lubrication' of j

EijuTpment/ComponenIs.

In February 1988,c the Special 0perational -

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e Readiness Inspection (ORI) team for Unit 2 identified a concern with v

the lubrication schedule when equipment was transferred from a

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construction /preoperational testing to the. operations department.-

u The. specific examples were the 2A and 2B Residual-Heat Removal-(RHR).

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pumps. They were turned.over to the operations department on:

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January 4,1988, and ~ entered into' the station's lubrication program

experienced a lubrication related failure.

(It should be noted here

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that the 2A and 2B RHR pumps were lubricated in February and

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March 11988 respectively, for reasons unrelated to the lubrication

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.s chedu le. )-

The requirement.for the system engineer to review the equipment's:

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lubrication history prior to operations department turnover,_ the-Llack of lubrication related failures of ECCS equipment, and the a

successful implementation of 'the' station lubrication program L-satisfied the inspector. This item is considered closed.-

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-(0 pen) 456/90013-02(DRP); 457/90016-02(DRP):

Unit 2 Heat Flux Hot BianneT Ticlor T limitsby0.45%.fU.UnJulyTBT990, Unit 2exceededits-F(Z)-

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The licensee entered the applicable Technical

l JSpecification (TS) Action Statement and stabilized the unit to obtain

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a flux map on July 20, 1990. The July'20, 1990 flux map indicated-

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thattheRadial-Peaking-Factors (Fxy)andF[-(Z)werewithintheir.

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s-limits. The licensca committed to perform flux map every two. weeks J

until Fxy began to trend away from its limit.

(See Inspection' Report

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456/90013(DRP); 457/90016(DRP) for details.)

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The licensee -has taken flux maps every two weeks.

In each of the.

maps Fxy-has exceeded its limit and has not started to trend away from its limit.. F (Z) has remained within acceptable TS limits. A region based core hhysics specialist, onsite for a routine inspection in August 1990, has reviewed the F (Z) issue.

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specialists conclusions were documented in Inspection Report

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1456/90018(DRS);1457/90020(DRS)? For purposes of-this reporti Open t

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Item 456/90013-02(DRP);!457/90016-02(DRP);is still considered open*.;

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(Closed) 456/88026-01(DRSS); 457/88026-01(DRSS)if Failureito inform ii

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REB 5E7 Chemistry Department personnel of a secondary sampling j!

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N-panel /sinkJtrouble annunciator alarm, which resulted in a dual' unit

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, shutdown due to: abnormal' chemistry. The licensee's;immediate i

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corrective action to thel Notice of Violation,(NOV) was to verbally

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. inform all: appropriate _ operating shif t personnel:that the Chemistry'

Department:should be notified when the secondary sampling panel /sinki

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y-trouble annunciator / alarms.

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.As-part of the corrective action taken to: avoid furtherLviolations,

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the-licensee issued Braidwood Station General Information Notice ni

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-(GIN)'88-27, " Adherence tol Procedures,"Lin October 1988, emphasizing

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- action -included Shift Engineer:" tailgate" training on GIN

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-88-27, the specific NOV, and the' licensee's response to the NOV.

This was _ completed in December 1988. -

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In May:1989, the licensee incorporated into-their Licensed Operator.

J Requalification program specific training to address control room

response 1 to annunciators, the.significant events recorder and-i

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slocal' alarms.

t TheElicensee's corrective action appears adequate to prevent

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recurrence. This; issue is considered closed..

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-(Closed)~456/90012-01(DRSS);457/90015-03(DRSS):

Protective-N Clothing Requirements of a Radiatioh Work Permil (RWP) were not-

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followed..'The licensee's immediate corrective action was'to have

the-workers re-don their protective clothing:(gloves and.-liners)-and~

counsel them on the importance of protective clothing. Corrective

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action taken to avoid further violations' included a HealthjPhysics

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Department discussion with work groups emphasizing the:need to.

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M follow RWP requirements. Additionally,cthe incidents'were' presented.

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in the work group's weekly safety sheet, i

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The licensee's corrective action appears to be adequate to prevent b

1 recurrence. This item is considered closed.

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No-violations, deviations, unresolved, or open ~ 1tems were -identified.

O 1 L3t Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710, 42700)

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During the inspection period, the ins)ectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance wit) the_ licenses and regulatory T

requirements and that the' licensee's management control system was

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effectively carrying out its responsibilities for-safe operation. This

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was done through routine direct observation of activities and equipment,

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tours _,0f the' facility, interviews and discussions with licensee I

- personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting

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-conditions'for' operation' action requirements _(LC0ARs), corrective action,

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' and review of f acility. records. -

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~0n'a; sampling basis the' inspectors: verified proper control room staffing-and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant activities with ongoing: control room operations;. verified operator adherence with the-

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. latest rev.isions of procedures for ongoing activities; verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS), including compliance with:

LC0ARs, with~ emphasis on engineered safety. features (ESF) and ESF electrical! alignment and' valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and-duplicateLchannels for abnormalities; verified statusi

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of various lit annunciators for operator understanding. off-normal-condition, and corrective actions being taken; examined nuclear instrumentation (NI) and'other protection channels for proper ' operability;

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reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal. conditions;, ~

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L, verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager,

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superintendents, assistant l operations superintendent, and other managers;s and observed the Safety Parameter Display System for operability.

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S During one control room tour, a specific comparison.wa's made between-the

l power level indicated by-the' post-accident neutron monitoring system and

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the-level = indicated by the normal power range ~excore neutron monitoring j

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system. The comparison was.made as.a result of the-NRC inspector at Byron station having noted an approximate 60-percent-deviation bet _ ween-

-the two systems:at that plant. The-Braidwood station monitoring. systems-

were in agreement.-

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Plant Operations Effective August 1, 1990, Kurt.Kofron, formerly the Production.

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Superintendent, became the Braidwood Station Manager. Jerry Groth, formerly the site Project Manager, replaced Mr. Kofron. -No new-

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Project Manager _has been named. Robert Querio, formerly1the _Braidwood-

Station Manager, was promoted to a corporate office position.

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On two occasions on August 1, 1990, the Economic Generation Control (EGC) system (Load Dispatcher power control); ramped up Unit-1 power at'5 f1We per' minute _when 1.1 MWe per minute was the setpoint. A software error was identified and corrected.

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' Unit 1 conducted a' forced outage to repair a service water check

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valve and.a leaking safety' injection accumulator test connection-

during the peHod of August 3-14, 1990.. The startup was uneventful,

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and the unit operated on EGC through the remainder of the inspection J

period.

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On. August 24,1990,LtheIB.circulatingwater(CW)maincondenser

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water box.was isolated to' repair leaking CW tubes. Two tubes were i

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plugged and the water box was' returned to service on August 26,

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1990.

Unit I steam generator chemistry analysis has not indicated any subsuquent CW tube leakage.

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On August 28, 1990, at approximately 3:30 p.m., a tornado struck the r

ioliet, Illinois area. Two of the 345KV lines which serve the

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Joliet/ area were destroyed, causing fluctuation _on'the system grid.i __

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f Unit liand 2,1which were both at: full power, experienced.generatorfload:

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oscillations of approximatelyt50 MWe, The grid oscillation' dampened.

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Louti t approximate 1y'4:30;p.m.

Unit I and 2 reactor parameters were:

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not noticeably. af fected.

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On July 30, 1990, the Unit 2 reactor coolant _ system (RCS) Iodine-131

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(1-131). activity. began' to increase. Annincreaselin I-131 activity-:

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usually indicates fuel' rod cladding failure. Corpora.te and. station e

technica1Lstaff engineers l estimate that 5 to 10 fuel rods may have

failed cladding. The licensee entered Action Level 1 of.

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L BwAP 2000-84, " Failed Fuel Action-Plan." Action Level 1 activities.

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include increased frequency of RCS samples,_ estimating the number--ofo

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defective fuel rods, identifying possible causes of the failure, and.

developing short'and long term plans.to mitigate the consequences of

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the existing' failures on plant operations.

The major > impact of thecincreased I-131 activity, which appears to:

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have < 1eveled 'out at approximately 1E -02 uCi/g, has increased -

general area radiation levels in thetunit 2 Volume Control Tank pj room.

(The TS limit for'l-131 is less than or equal to 1.0 uCi/g'.).

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Unit'l experienced _ increased I-131-activity in June 1990. - Currently,;

there has not been any significant impact or adverse effect.oniplant

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operations.-

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Unit 2 operated routinely on EGC throughout the inspection period,

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Fire Protection

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' Fire _ protection program activities, including fire prevention:and-

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other activities associated with maintaining capability: for early.

detection and suppression of_ postulated fires, were examined.. ' Plant cleanliness, with a. focus on control of combustiblesLand on-

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- maintaining continuous ready access.to fire: fighting equipment. and-R materials,:was included in the-items evaluated, c,

. Plant and Equipment Material Condition and Cleanliness'

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The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and general l

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plant cleanliness, and assessed the condition of plant equipment.by,

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insp'ection for leaks, overheating, unusual noise, etc. For o

equipment which was not in optimum condition, the inspector verified j

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the licensee's plans to perform appropriate repairs or

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modifications.. Licensee equipment status monitoring was also

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-assessed by observing shift turnovers, and by verifying activities

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in the' plant'(maintenance, surveillance) were properly controlled to:

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. repair.or adjust equipment and would not adversely. af fect any other, d

Minor housekeeping items were routinely referred to the licensee-

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personnel designated responsibility for cleanliness in the subject

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For example, a few items were noted lying around the 08:

control room Heating, Venting and Air Conditioning area, including a gum wrapper and a used coffee cup, and the licensee was informed.

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Cleanup in this "No Eating or Drinking" area was expeditious and j

thorough.

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. (EEE) room, numerous small. clumps of gray fib'rous material were1found:

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scattered about. The licensee was notified-and;the area was-

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icleaned. : Five _ days ~later, however, the same condition wasL found.-

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- A. handfulLof the material was taken to the Shif t Engineer on ' duty,

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- who innediately' investigated the issue. The= problem was traced to~a-

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disintegrating filter in the ventilation : system for this. room,.which -

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,r contained the control rod power supply cabinets and motor-generator

sets. The damaged. filter was replaced. :The Unit 1 EEE room did not

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' experience this condition.

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Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Actuations (93702)

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Unit 2 Containment Ventilation isolation Signa,1

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On August:5, 1990, the Unit 2 Containment Fuel Handling incident

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Area Radiation Monitor,_2AR012, detector' failed, resulting in a-

u containment ventilation' isolation signal.

Details on the event are:

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given in Paragraph 5, below.

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Unit l' Train B Feedwater Isolation Signal-(FWIS)

On August 11, 1990, with. Unit l'in Hot Shutdown (Mode 4), the Unit 11

L Nuclear Station _0perator (NS0)L(licensed operator) observed that an apparent spurious ESF: signal.was received..The feedwater tempering line flow control: valves, IFWO35 A-D, which were being used to manually' control steam generator level, had shut.

No annunciators

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'on the main control board had alarmed.; A. status light'for the-

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' Train.B FWIS:had' illuminated.

No other' components had actuated.

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The Unit-1 NS0 verified that the. condition-for a FWISidid not

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- exist, reset.the Train B-FWIS and,re-established flow to the SGs.

Stable plant conditions were maintained throughout the event.

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Surveillance 1Bw0S 3.1.1-21,c" Unit-1 Solid State Protection System.

l (SSPS), Reactor Trip Breaker and Reactor Trip Bypass ' Breaker A

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Bi-Monthly (Staggered) Surveillance (Train B)," was. performed in-an-

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. attempt'to reproduce the event. Train B SSPS functioned properly'-

M and:the event did not repeat.-

g The inspector will review the LER for root cause determination and corrective action.-

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Auxi_liary Building Charcoal Booster Fan Automatic Start

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On August 28,1990, at 5:37 a.m., the OB Auxiliary Building Charcoal

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Booster Fan auto-started. An investigation of the inadvertent

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start determined that there was no valid actuation signal.

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. components other than the OB fan operated. The fan was secured at w-5:51 a.m.

The inspector will review the LER for the root cause

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L" determination and corrective action.

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.The' newly-assigned NRC Senior Resident: Inspector performed a gf specific review of(selected licensee administrative' procedures, W'

relating'.to. the area of plant operations, ~as fol_ lows::

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BwAP.300-1, " Conduct-of Operations."

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.BwAP 335-1, " Operating Shift Turnovertand Relief."

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. BwAP;335-2, " Operator Watchstanding Practices."

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.BwAP 340-1~, "Use of Procedures =for.0perating Department."

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LR-BwAP'340-6, " Technical Specification LimitingiConditions for; g. 3 Operation / Administrative Action Requirements."1 q

mVg BwAP 350-1,o" Operating Logs and. Records."

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The purposes of _the review included. inspector. familiarization with

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specific. details. and techniquesiofilicenseetadministrative controls!

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.in this area, and an assessment 1of procedure clarity, completeness '

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and conformance to regulatory requirements'.

No significant problems =

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discussed with appropriate licensee representatives.

- l I;j The inspect' ors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers,

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.shiftly logs-and-surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various;

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chemistry'and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review

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results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings re. quired per 10 CFR 19.11.

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~NoLviolations,. deviations, unresolved, or open' items were identified.

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RadiologicalControls'(71707142700)-

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.The-inspectors verified that workers were following health physics d

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- procedures tfor dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking,L posting,' etc.,

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.'and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, q

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operability, and. calibration.

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Weskly radiation-dose reports were periodically reviewed to assess

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W whether unusual individual or group exposures were occurring.

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Independent surveys were occasionally performed in various radiologically;

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-controlled areas and effluent releases were reviewed or observed on a

- sampling basis to verify proper monitoring and documentation.

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During one independent radiological survey, in the "A" essential service

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water (SX) pump room on August 24, 1990, the resident inspector

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identified'a small area of elevated dose rates compared to those from the

.

licensee's survey the previous day. An investigation showed a drain pipe A

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line-of-sight. radiationi field.- 1 At1about tenL feet from the[ enclosure,.

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e this field was approximately three mR/hr., Because of the; geometry, this'

y field was shielded below waist. level - approximately-three feet above the d

floor. The' radiation field strength closer to the pipe increased to

.

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around 10 mR/hr some five-feet from the enclosure. :At this distance, the

- field was' shielded-below'about head height - some five to six feet above.

the floor.

'

'

Th'ese measurements were made with a calibrated NRC survey meter.. Since

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theLlicensee's' survey sheet showed only'one measurement in the general:

area, of.less than 0.1 mR/hr, the inspector. asked the licensee 'to

';

resurvey the area and confirm the' radiological conditions.

,

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The licensee survey confirmed the presence of an area about three feet

'

deep and ten feet wide where, at waist height and above, a major portion'

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of the body-could receive, in one hour, aidose.in excess of 5' mR,)or (in.

.

a slightly larger area) in any five consecutive days, a dose in excess of -

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100 mR; Thus, the' subject area met the definition of a " Radiation Area" givenin10CFR.20.203.-Section-(b)(2).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.203, m,

.Section (b),,such an area is required to be conspicuously' posted with a,

sign bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words, "CAUTI0ft -

i RADIAT!0?l AREA." This area was not'so posted..There was a= rope barrier

atop the enclosure only a few inches from the drain pipe, and only that-

.

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area on the roof of the enclosure very near the pipe was posted as ac O

radiation area.

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I failure to provide the required posting of.the radiation area described above is-considered a violation of 10 CFR 20.203 (456/90016-01(DRP);

457/90019-01(DRP)). This violation was discussed with Region III

technical staff having radiation protection expertise, and was evaluated against the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C -as to'its significance.

>

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The' inspector concluded this was a Level'V violation (low safety-k'

significance),~which was n'ot programmatic or repetitive and for which the.

licensee took appropriate: corrective: action. ' Corrective actions included a rope barrier and proper briefings on the findings. posting,, updated survey maps, and personnel)

' Based on the foregoing, this matter meets NRC criteria for exercise.of enforcement discretion, so no Notice of a

Violation is being issued..

,

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One non-cited violation was identified.

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= 5.

Maintenance (62703,42700)

Station maintenance activities af fecting the safety-related systems and

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components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they

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were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides

-and industry' codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting

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conditions.for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to l

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' initiating'the work';' activities-were accomplprocedures and:were inspecte

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(functional' testing-and/or-

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"R calibrations were. performed prior to returning components orl systems;to-

,

.' ~' service;; quality; control records were maintained;-activities were a

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accomplished by-qualified personnel; parts and materials ~used were-d

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properly _certif.ied; radiological controls were implemented;.and-fire d

p prevention controisiwere1 implemented.. Work requests were reviewed to-d

' determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority. is-

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' assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system

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performance..

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h The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:-

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Unit 1

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Instrument' Inverter 114ElectricalTroubleshootinLand'Repa)

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.This activitycinvolved replacement of theiferro-resonant voltage

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stabilizing transformer, under NWR No..A42507 and procedure.BwHP.

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4006-11, " Electrical Maintenance : Troubleshooting Worksheet." The-inspector verified that-component: replacement was within the scope -

, #y J of the work request and-procedure..'On.a subsequent tour of the area-(four ' days-later) three empty. cardboard " Electrical Kit" boxss were

. observed near_ the inverter, which appeared to have'been left behind=

from this job. ; Shift management was informed and the boxes werei

removed.-

.

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IB Centrifugal Charging (CV) Pump _ Seal Leak (NWR A40847).

'

~i On July 7,1990, a 1.2 gpm seal-leak was: identified on the IB CV j

pump wi.th'the pump running.

(The seal leak was approximately -l'.2 gph -

m with the pump secured.)< A Caution Tag was:placed on the 18~CV pump's control' switch to alert the control: room operators toiuse the pump only if needed. This would ' avoid contaminating the pump room cubicle.

On August 3,1990,:during a. Unit 1: forced outage,.the IB CV pump was

'

taken Out-of-Service (00S) to repair / replace the pump, seal..On e

. August 8, 1990, the repairs'were completedj post-maintenance testing was completed satisfactorily and the pump was returned to service.

?'

1A Essential Service Water (SX) Pump Discharge Check Valve Failure On August 1, 1990, while performing 18wVS 0.5-3.SX 1, "ASME-

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Surveillance Requirements for Essential Service Water Pumps," the 1A

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SX pump -discharge check valve failed.to seat. The'1A SX train was.

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declared inoperable and the approp(LCO)'was entered. Attempts toriate Tec

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Limiting Condition for Operation

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.

seat the check valve by isolating the pump and " jogging" the pump

failed.

Unit I commenced a shutdown to' Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) on i

V-August 2, 1990.

..

R Inspection of the valve internals indicated that the opening where

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the hinge pin. supports the valve disk failed, which caused the valve to bind open. The failure is-believed to be the result of the valve L

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disk " fluttering" in the SX flow stream = The valve internals were

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h sent to the corporate System Materials Analysis' Division (SMAD) in

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Maywood, Illinois 4for engineering evaluation of the failure-

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mechanism. The valve internals were replaced, post-maintenance testing was completed and the.1A SX train was returned to service on August 10,

-1990. Wheg.thecheckvalvewasre-installed,itsorientationwas

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rotated 90 to mount the hinge pin in a vertical position. This t

'

orientation, approved by the manufacturer and used at the Byron Station,

.3 was changed to reduce the valve disk " fluttering" and reduce the load

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on.the hinge pin.

,

On July 13, 1990, there was a precursor to the August 1, 1990 check j

valve. failure.

The idle 1A SX pump was discovered slowly rotating backwards during the performance of 18w05 6.2.3.a-1, " Reactor -

Containment Fan Cooler (RCFC) ftonthly Surveillance." The pump was isolated and " jogged" and the check valve was reseated. The Unit 1 Operating Engineer directed.that a Caution Card be hung on the 1A SX

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. pump control switch to alert operators to the problem.- The Caution Card was never hung. Discussions with the licensee indicated that-a the reverse rotation of the 1A SX pump was an isolated case.

'

The inspector will review the LER for root cause determination and appropriate corrective action.

18 Safety Injection (SI) Accumulator Test Line Leak a

OnAugust3,:1990,withUnit1inMode3(HotStandby),a.leakwas discovered in a 3/4-inch test line for the IB SI Accumulator.-

'

(Unit I was cooling down to cold shutdown to repair a check valve in the Essential Service Water System - see discussion above.) The

,

leaking test line, which is used to measure check valve leakage-from the B-loop of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the IB SI.

Accumulator,)had the potential for affecting both Residual Heat Removal (RHR. systems during Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS)

injection.

Both RHR trains and the IB Accumulator were declared inoperable.

(It should be noted however,-that both trains were

considered. operable for RCS cooldown purposes.)

,

The source of the leak was from a cracked weld on the branch a

connector between the:10-inch Accumulator injection line and the

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L 3/4-inch test line. The leak was isolated, the connector and weld L

were removed for analysis, and a new connector was welded in its place. The IB Accumulator was pressurized and th9 new welds were dye penetrant tested (PT) and found acceptable. Tru test lines on g

the other three Accumulators were PT examined with no apparent defects.

b (The licensee'has committed to a PT examination of the Unit 2 test-O. g line welds during the next outage of sufficient duration.)

h Sargent & Lundy and the station Technical Staf f engineers u'

performed a visual examination of the piping-configuration

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associated with the test lines.

Some piping vibration in the area J

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d of. the_ leak was identified... Preliminary evaluation indicates that -

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X the vibration induced stresses were within acceptable = range.

Further evaluation isiplanned to determine'if the vibration-

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contributed to the weld' crack.'

,,

The defective weld was taken to Argonne National-Laboratory.for;.

.

1 metallurgical analysis by corporate System Material Analysis Division-h (SMAD). Preliminary analysis identified l stress corrosion cracking;as the failure mechanism.

Final root cause: analysis. is still-in progress.--

w The: inspector will review'the LER: for. the results of the PT examination of-Unit 2 test lines, the vibration analysis of the IB

Accumulator piping configuration and.the' root cause analysis off the.

-weld crack.

Unit 2-

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Containment Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiatitm Monit'or (2AR012)-

~

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Detector FiTTure THWR!A424T5)

On' August 5,- 1990, with Unit 2 at :100% power, radiation monitor,.

-2AR012 " spiked," which developed a Containment Ventilation Isolation-signal. This Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) signal did~not require o

or result in' repositioning any dampers.. The 2AR012 values returned:

' to normal af ter the spike. -Readings from the other' containment fuel handling; incident monitor. channel (2AR011) were normal and stable.,

Later that day and.on August 6,1990,'the.2AR012 monitor spiked with -

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identical:results.

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h 0n August 7, 1990, the 2AR012' detector was-replaced, post-maintenance. testing was. completed satisfactorily, and the.

instrument was returned to service.: -The inspector questioned

overall, licensee. experience with these. detectors. '.In response,.

.,

the-' licensee reviewed the operating and maintenance. history for-

similar failures and concluded there were 'no major-reliability a

concerns or adverse trends. Additionally,tthe detectors are j

replaced on an 18 month frequency in accordance with the.

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. environmental qualification'.(EQ) program. The root cause of the -

U detector failure remains under investigation...This item will be j

reviewed further on receipt of the-anticipated LER.

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No violations, deviations, open,:or unresolved items were identified.

J 6.

Surveillance (61726,:42700)-

The inspectors reviewed surveillance-testing required by Technical

. Specifications and verified that testing was performed in accordance with

,

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adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that a

limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration

of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with o-Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by i

personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any

deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

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resolved by appropriate management personnel.

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LTheinspeStioncoveredallorlpartiof'the=followingtestadtivities:

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BwlS 3.1.1-230, " Modes 1 Through 6 Analog Channel Operational Test

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of Nuclear Instrumentation System Intermediate. Range!N35 and N36."'

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. Bw0P RH-5, "RH System Setup for Recirculation;o

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L 18wVS O.5-3.SX-1, "ASME Siirveillan'ce Requirements for. Essential.

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Service Water Pumps."

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mt 42Bw0S 8.1.1;2.a-2, " Unit Two 28 Diesel Generator: Operability' Monthly

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(Staggered)~and? Semi-Annual (Staggered). Surveillance'." -

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2Bw0S 3.2.1-816, " Unit >Two ESFAS Instrumentation ~ Slave Relay

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Surveillance."'

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2Bw0P DG-12' " Diesel Generator Shutdown."

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a 2BwVS:S.2.F.2-1, ",ASME Surveillance Requirements for. Safety w3 Injection Pumps.

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2BwVS '6.2.1.B12,:"ASME Surveillance Requirements) for; B Containment i

SpraysPump.and Check Valves CS003B, CS011B."

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components should be concurrently inoperable. This is

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. partially specified in' procedure BwAP.330-1,:" Station Equipment?

' Out-of-Service (005) Procedure," which requires all TS 00S be

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y reviewed to assure opposite train' operability..;The. subject a

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- Train 1BJcontainment spray p(essential service water) wasump test-wa

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.1990, while:a Train A 0051

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concurrentlyJin'effect.

Thecinspector. questioned whether the g

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-Train, Bf test -should occur while; the Train :Af005. applied; The M;

licensee's initial response wasithat.the" test;did not affect

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operability of. any Train B components. The-inspector reviewed

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the: procedure, however, and found the system alignment for the test.(via procedure Bw0P CS-5, " Containment Spray System

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Recirculation to the RWST") renders Train.B of the spray

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additiveLsystem inoperable. The licensee was advised of this J'

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finding,. and the test was subsequently.done on containment E

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spray Train B after essential' service water Train A was x

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restored to an operable status.

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W 2BwVS 0.5-3.SX-1, "ASME Surveillance Requirements for-Essential d

Service Water Pumps."

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The test of the 2B pump was observed. The inspector verified a

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the.. idle A train pumps were not rotating backward, as had

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occurred in a previous test on August 1,1990 (see Paragraph 5

above), and would indicate leaking discharge check valves.

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f Prerequisite No-14 of the referenced procedure' requires

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"w communications be established with the main control l room.- The inspector noted that communications with'the control room.from:

the pump room were Lvia-portable radio. and were quite dif ficult. =

P The pump. room:is-equipped with sound-powered' phone lacks. The-inspector also noted the Train'B pump room floor was dirty, wets in several places, and generally, sticky with some kind of,

. residue;' The Train A pump room was even dirtier,:though.not-sticky..The above observations were' discussed at a management

' interview.

In response, the-licensee investigated and.

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. determined the communication-dif ficulties were caused by a-

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balky portable radio and were not representative of a generic" communications ~ problem. A Housekeeping-Deficiency Tag was initiated,for cleanup on one SX pump room; the other pump room-

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.had already been identified for cleanup 'on licensee initiative.

.

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MissedTechnicalSpecification-(TS):Surveillances In the previous inspection report a Notice of Violation (456/90013-01(DRP)) was issued for a weakness in the licensee's overall management control,of non-routine TS surveillances.

Prior to the licensee'siresponsetotheNoticeandimplementationofcorrective~-

action, two TS surveillances, which appear to have characteristics--

~

similar to the: examples in the Notice, were missed.

Below is a_brief description.

'On' August 12, 1990, at 7:57 a.m., UnitL1 entered Hot Standby

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(Mode 3) without-performing the; operability test on the IB Main SteamIsolation-Valve (MSIV)StandbyAccumulator.

(Unit _1 was-

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heating up following a forced shutdown to repair the essential 7-service water ~ system.)- The IB MSIV had been experiencing erratic,

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behavior during surveillance BwVS 0.5-2.MS.1, "MSIV Partial Stroke

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Test," using the_ standby accumulator..0n' August 11, 1990,

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.BwVS 0.5-2.MS.1 was performed on~the 18 MSIV as part of thelpost-

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maintenance testing.

The IB MSIV failed the: test.

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The licensee; determined that successful completion of'BwVS :

0.5.2.MS.1 was not required for.1B MSIV operability determination..

However, BwVS 7.1.5-1, "MSIV Full Stroke. Test," was.

(It should be

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noted here that both-the active and passive accumulators were.

H required to be operable for entry into Mode 3.) At approximately-

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7:20 p.m.,.on August 11, 1990, BwVS 7.1.5-1 was completed on IB MSIV.

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Due to several: communication errors between the Operating Engineer, q;

Shif t Engineer, Shift Control Room Engineer (all licensed-senior operators) and cognizant Technical. Staff Engineers (non-licensed),

j; e

the=1B MSIV standby accumulator was not tested. At 7:57 a.m., on-

'j August'12,-1990, Unit I entered Mode 3.

>

i At.approximately 9:00 a.m., on August.12,1990, the error was

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L" identified. The IB MSIV was.immediately declared inoperable, _

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DwVS 7.1.5-1 was performed satisfactorily and at 10:35 a.m. the 18 MSIV was declared operable, j

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,a " grab" sample on the: Unit 1 Auxiliary Building: Ventilation Stack.

- The Auxiliary Building Ventilation Stack Effluent Radiation Monitor,n

IPR 28J,r had_ been.0ut-of-Service (00S), since August 9,11990.- The TS

'

action statement required a -" grab" sample' to be taken once every 12

hours.- On August 29, 1990, the samples were taken at 4:00(a.m. and at 8:00 p.m.; The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> required sample was missed by four hours.

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m Based on the apparent similarity of the examples;above_to thos'e in' Notice-456/90013-01(DRP), the inspector will. complete a review of these matters when the' licensee's response to the Notice:is effective. The inspector will review-the LERs for root cause~ determination and-corrective action.

No: violations, deviations,' unresolved, or open: items were identified.

7.

Emer2ency Preparedness (82201, 82203, 93702)~

The, inspector observed a Generating Station Emergency. Plan.' exercise on.

LAugust 22, 1990, which the 11censee conducted:in preparation for.the

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NRC ' annual exercise of September 12, 1990.; This latter exercise was y

also observed by the inspector, in support of the NRC' Region III-o" assessment.

Inspector = observations are included;in-Inspection Reports q

No.50-456/90017(DRSS);457/90021(DRSS).

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i No violations, deviations, unresolved, or open items were identified.

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8.

SecuritL(71707)'

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-During the inspection: period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's-security-program to ensure that observed actions were being' implemented according to their approved security plan..The inspector,noted that

_3ersons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification =

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3adges and those individuals requiring escorts.were properly escorted.

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The inspector also: verified that checked vital areas were locked and

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a1 armed. ; Additionally, the inspector also verified.that observed

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_ personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched by appropriate. equipment or by hand.

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~ NoJv.iolations,' deviations, unresolved, or open items were identified.

En2neeringandTechnicalSupport(37!2@,41400,41701 92701,93702)

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a'.

, Design Changes

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.-The inspectors monitored the licensee's, work in progress and

.i verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper

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. procedures and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other

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applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that j

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' operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time, j

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! Training Effectiveness

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The effectiv'eness of training programs forDlicensed and non-licensed

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l personnel was reviewed by the inspectors.during theLwitnessing of

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-the' licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational' activities and during.the review of the licensee's a

response toJevents which occurred during the inspection period.

Personnel appeared.to be: knowledgeable of.the tasks being performed,

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and nothing.was observed which indicated.any inef fectiveness of--

>m trainingi c.

Routine Report _ Review

,

During the inspection period, the inspector ~ reviewed the. licensee's I

flonthly Performance Reports for July and August 1990..The inspector E

confirmed that the:information provided met the requirements of.

TechnicaliSpecification ~ 6.9.1.8' and Regulatory Guide?1.16.

lThe inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plant Status

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Report for July 1990.

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Events (93702)

Weli! Evaluation on Centrifugal Chargi, d V) and Safety _ Injection'(SI)

bLmps.

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On July 13, 1990, the station received a letter from Westinghouse

(W),: dated July 2, 1990, that identified a potential problem with y

welds on.the CV and SI pumps.. The problem pertained to the potential

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failure of the welds on the alignment dowel lug;and centering find block during a seismic event.. The failure-of the welds could' cause-

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misalignment.and subsequent failure of L the CV and SI: pumps..

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the inspectors inquired about the status of thei

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On July 27, 1990,

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weld inspections for both units. The welds,had not yet been: inspected.

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l0n' August'1, 1990,'.the licensee inspected the-welds.on:the pumps,

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including the CV and SI pumps in the warehouse, and. determined'that they met. the requirements in the July. 2,;1990 W letter.

(Itshould

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be noted here that-both Unit 2 CV pumps were installed and welded by the, station, not the'. vendor,'and did not require inspection based on the W letter.)

1.

"m Based on the date when the licensee received the W letter, the HRC's'

!-

w bsequent request for-the status of the welds and the licensee's apparently tardy physicalLinspection of the pumps, the inspectors

a questioned the initiative displayed by the licensee.

Regional management j

is evaluating the licensee's responsiveness to this issue. The inspector

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had no additional' technical concerns.

'

a Pressurizer (PZR) Pressure Low Safety Injection (SI) Setpoint Raised

,

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On August 8-10, 1990, the station raised the pZR pressure low SI

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setpoint from 1829 psi to_1850 psi for Unit I and 2.

The setpoint was raised as a result of. an ongoing-study of Engineered. Safety

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Features (ESF) trip s.etpoints methodology.

Preliminary calculations by W'and Commonwealth' Edison Company (CECO) engineers determined that.

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1829 psi may not'be conservative.

A final determination on the setpoint has not been reached.

In the interim, the station chose a-conservative approach and raised the setpoint to 1850 psi..(It-should

be noted.here that the W study of setpoint methodology could effeet other ESF trip setpoints.)

,

Pe'nding further review of the final resolution of the PZR pressure-low SI setpoint and other ESF setpoints, this matter is considered an Open Item (456/90016-02(DRP); 457/90019-02(DRP)).

Potential for Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) Steam Generator (SG) Isolation

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Valve 5EuillTnUiider Accident Con 3TIIons

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On September 6,1990. CECO engineering staf f determined that 9 motor operated AF-SG isolation globe valves (AF013 A-H) may not

.close under certain postulated conditions. The postulated conditions, Motor Operated Valve (MOV)ponse to Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related part of the licensee's res Testing and Surveillance,"'were that the-high'

differential pressure (D/P) of a faulted SG, coupled with slightly-degraded'ESF bus voltage and no lubrication maintenance after three valve cycles, may prevent the' AF013 valves from fully closing. The-inability to isolate AF flow to a faulted.SG potentially af fects the assumptions in the Updated Fina'l Safety' Analysis Report. The licensee

.made a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) Notification for condition that could have prevented a safety function-from mitigating the consequences of an accident.

As part of the licensee's immediate corrective action, temporary:

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procedure changes (TPC) for three emergency operating procedures

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were issued. The TPCs provide alternate. methods of reducing the high D/P across the AF013 valves in the event they fail to fully close. The operating crews were briefed on:the TPCs during their pre-shift turnover briefing and the TPCs were discussed in the shift's " Daily Orders." The inspector reviewed the TPCs-and identified two minor editorial concerns. The TPCs appear to adequately provide sufficient compensatory measures to isolate

'AF. flow to a faulted SG.

-The inspector asked the licensee to investigate the generic

' implications of the issue and consider the need for a 10 CFR~21 notification. The licensee's review indicated that due to the station's unique AF system configuration (only Byron U-1 and 2 have the same configuration), a Part 21 notification was unnecessary.

The CECO engineering staff,-which appears to be aggressively pursuing-resolution of this issue, is continuing to evaluate the issue for a final resolution.

The inspector will review the LER for the licensee's final corrective action.

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One open item was identified.

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h 10p Safety Assessment / Quality: Yorification (40500).

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The ef fectiveness. of. management controls,- verification and oversight, activities, in the conduct of job's observed during this; inspection, was Y

evaluated.1 i

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The inspector frequently attended management and supervisory ~ meetings'

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. involving plant status and plans in order to observe the coordination-

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between ' departments.

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The results of the -licensee's auditing and. corrective' action' programs were

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routinely monitored by attendance 't meetings:and'by review of Deviation._

V Reports, Radiological Deficiency Reports, and, security. incident reports.

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AsLapplicable, corrective. action program documents were forwarded to NRC

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Region III' technical specialists for information and -possible followup evaluation.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed the results;of station-training assessment covering:the maintenance, chemistry, radiological

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protection, and technical staff training programs, as well as the:

by Materials' Control audit and the Operations Assessment.

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No_ violations,' deviations, unresolved or open items were identified.

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11.- Licensee Event Report (LER) Review'(92700).

O-Through direct observations, discussions with licensee' personncl, and'

review of-records,-the following event reports were reviewed to: determine.

that reportability requirements were, fulfilled, that immediate-corrective ~

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action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence j

c had been or would be accomplished in-accordance with Technical'

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? Specifications (TS):-

(Closed) 456/87006-L1:

Violated Fire Watches Attributed. to

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Personnel Error. Tlie licensee has re-instructed the personnel i

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involved or has taken appropriate disciplinary action, including.

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dismissal.. This item is considered closed.

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n No, violations, deviations,. unresolved,cor open items were identified.-

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'12.e Regional Rejuests (92701)

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By internal NRC memorandum, dated August 20, 1990, the resident i

inspectors were requested to remind the licensee of-the importance of determining the root cause of equipment performance problems.

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Specifically, operability determinations after a test' failure must be

-based.on more than a simple repetition of the test. The licensee was

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given this information at a management exit meeting on August 24, 1990.

The licensee representatives. indicated that their philosophy and-

practices in making operability determinations during testing are IJ consistent with'this position.

No violations, deviations, unresolved, or open items were identified.

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13. S'ite Visit by 'NRC Staf f

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b L0nSeptember 11,31990,:Mr. M. J. Farber, Chief; Division.of, Reactor Projects, Section 1A, wasionsite for a routine visit. During that time he met with-;

the. resident' inspector: and_ made a plant; tour. - Additionally, ~ a meeting.was=.

held'with the' station manager, station superintendents,' and others to discuss

the'present' plant status;and other timely topics. Topics discussed' included; the. station:long-t'erm goals, the impact o.f' corporate support: groups on NRC assessment of the; station, and plant and' equipment material condition.

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.No vio.lations,'dsviations, unresolved, or.open. items were identified.

14. Open Items.

0 pen items'are matters which have been discussed with the' licensee, which 1will be reviewed by the i_nspector and which involve some action on the

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- part o_f the NRC or, licensee, or both. An open item disclosed during the

. inspection is, discussed.in' Paragraph 9.

15. ' Management' Interview (30703)

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TheLinspectors met with.the licenseefrepresentativ_es denoted in Paragraph 1 during the? inspection period and at the conclusion'of-the,

. inspection'on' September:14, 1990. 'The inspectors summarized the scope; and results-of.the inspection and' discussed the'likely content of this.

inspection-report. -The ' licensee acknowledged the information and-did not-indicate.thattany of.the information disclosed during the inspection z

could be? considered l proprietary in nature.

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