IR 05000440/2020002
| ML20227A073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry |
| Issue date: | 08/14/2020 |
| From: | April Nguyen NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Payne F Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20227A073 (16) | |
Text
August 14, 2020
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2020002
Dear Mr. Payne:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On July 23, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
April M. Nguyen, Acting Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000440
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0034
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Perry, OH
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
S. Bell, Health Physicist
J. Nance, Reactor Engineer
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
April M. Nguyen, Acting Chief
Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000440/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Loss of Safety Function Due to Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperability 71153 Closed LER 05000440/2018-003-00 LER 2018-003-00 for Perry,
Unanalyzed Condition Resulting from Unfused Alternating Current Control Circuits 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
The plant began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On June 12, 2020, reactor power was lowered to 58 percent to perform a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on June 13, 2020. The unit remained at, or near, rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period with the exception that on several occasions, power was reduced to maintain condensate demineralizer outlet temperature and/or high condenser circulating water outlet temperature at or below their respective upper limits due to environmental conditions. The power reductions varied between 1 and 16 percent of rated thermal power and lasted from a few hours to several days.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending high winds and thunderstorms on June 2, 2020
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Train 'B' emergency closed cooling system on April 10, 2020
- (2) Division 2 emergency diesel generator on April 16, 2020
- (3) High pressure core spray on April 22, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Control complex 4160-volt and 480-volt switchgear room, 620-foot elevation, on April 6, 2020
- (2) Auxiliary building, 574-foot elevation, fire zone (FZ) 1AB-1g, on April 10, 2020
- (3) Diesel generator division 2, (FZ) 1DG-1a, on April 10, 2020
- (4) Fuel handling building, 574, 585, and 599-foot elevations, fire zones (FZ) 0FH-1, 0FH-2A, and 0FH-2B, on April 22, 2020
- (5) Intermediate building, 574, 585, and 599-foot elevations, fire zones (FZ) 0IB-1 and 2, on April 22, 2020
- (6) Emergency service water pump house, (FZ) 0EW-1a, and Diesel fire pump room, (FZ) 0EW-1b, on May 14, 2020
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on May 8, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Underground cable inspection and condition review for safety-related manhole 3 on June 24, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during heightened risk activities, including offsite power source manipulations and reactor protection system main steam line half isolations due to maintenance on May 4, 2020 and power maneuvers to complete a rod sequence exchange on June 12 to 13, 2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an operations crew-evaluated scenario in the plant training simulator on June 8, 2020
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Procurement and installation quality control activities for the replacement of the low-pressure core injection residual heat removal 'C' flush line vent valve performed under WO 200808828 on May 27, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent work associated with the unplanned inoperability of the RCIC system on April 21 to 22, 2020
- (2) Division 3 emergency diesel generator emergent lubrication oil leak, identified on May 12, 2020, and repaired under WO 200823511
- (3) Replacement of low-pressure core injection residual heat removal 'C' flush line vent valve under WO 200808828
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Nuclear steam supply shutoff isolation outboard logic test switch 1B21H-S19D inoperability determination of reactor protection system channel 'D' on May 22, 2020
- (2) Drywell unidentified leakage increase on April 2 to 3, 2020
- (3) Auxiliary building 574-foot elevation east area radiation monitor failed check source on April 7, 2020
- (4) Review of licensee actions and limits following identification by the fuel vendor of possible non-conservative thermal limit calculations on June 16 to 17, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Replacement of standby liquid control storage tank level instrumentation from May 13-21, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Functional check of APRM 'F' channel following reactor protection system relay replacement on April 15, 2020
- (2) Functional check of RCIC high steam flow time delay relay following replacement on April 22, 2020
- (3) VT-2 visual examination and MT magnetic particle examination of the low-pressure coolant injection residual heat removal 'C' flush line vent valve replacement on May 27, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Remote Shutdown Panel 1C61-P001 Control Operability Test RHR 'A', ESW 'A', ECC
'A' and Division 1 Diesel Generator per WO 200743154
- (2) SVI-B21-T0061D, RPV Low Level 1 and 2 Channel 'D' Functional for 1B21-N681D, on May 4, 2020
- (3) SVI-B21-T0072D, MSL Low Pressure Channel 'D' Functional for 1B21-N676D, on May 4, 2020
- (4) SVI-B21-T0076D, MSL Low Condenser Vacuum Channel 'D' Functional for 1B21-N675D, on May 4, 2020
- (5) SVI-E31-T0074F, MSL High Flow Channel 'B' Functional for 1E31-N687B and 1E31-N689B, on June 18,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses
71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment
Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization
External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to external dosimetry that is used to assign occupational dose
Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments for actual internal exposures:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the internal dose determination for an event on March 17, 2019, which occurred during insulation removal work in the steam tunnel
Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated declared pregnant worker records dated May 30, 2019, and July 16,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 2019-March 2020)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 2019-March 2020)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 2019-March 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in the redundant reactivity control system that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors did not find an adverse trend that would cause the inspectors to question the redundant reactivity control system's ability to carry out its design function
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Scaffolding and seismic concerns as documented in CRs 2020-03544, 2019-04494, 2019-04490, 2018-07838, 2018-01407, and 2017-06860
===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000440/2019-002-00, Loss of Safety Function Due to Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperability (ADAMS Accession No. ML19199A150). The issue of concern associated with the event described by this LER was documented in Inspection Report 05000440/2019003 Section 71152. The closure review of this LER did not identify any additional performance deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements
- (2) LER 05000440/2018-003-00, Unanalyzed Condition Resulting from Unfused Alternating Current Control Circuits (Adams Accession No. ML18334A366). The issue of concern associated with the event described by this LER was documented in Inspection Report 05000440/2018011 Section 71111.05T. The closure review of this LER did not identify any additional performance deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Scaffolding and seismic concerns 71152 The inspectors performed a detailed review of Condition Reports (CRs) 2020-03544, NRC ID: NRC Walkdown Results 4-22-2020; 2019-04490, NRC ID - Unrestrained Scaffold in Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 'B' Pump Room; and 2018-01407, NRC ID: Control Complex 574' Elevation Scaffold Laydown Area Storage in Close Proximity to Control Complex Chilled Water Piping. Each of these condition reports identified minor non-conformances with the licensee's control of scaffolding procedure.
CR 2020-03544 documented the inspectors' questions concerning an unrestrained scaffold in the turbine building chilled water-cooling system area that was being used as a tool bench and was within six feet of the Emergency Closed Cooling System Ventilation (ECCS) Control Panel. The scaffolding was not built in accordance with the requirements of NOP-WM-5008, Control of Scaffolding, which required that free-standing scaffolding height shall be less than 1.5 times its width. The scaffolding in question measured six feet in height and was seven feet wide. The licensee performed an engineering evaluation that documented that the scaffold would not have impacted the ECCS Control Panel during a seismic event. Likewise, the inspectors had previously identified an unrestrained scaffold built in the residual heat removal room 'B' on May 17, 2019, which was documented in CR 2019-04490. The CR documented that the scaffolding did not meet the seismic restraint requirements of NOP-WM-5008, for scaffolding installed near safety-related equipment. The inspectors determined that there was no direct impact to safety-related equipment and, therefore, the inspectors concluded that the non-conformance was minor.
On February 16, 2018, the inspectors identified that the scaffold laydown area on Control Complex 574' Elevation had scaffold material stored above the documented nine foot maximum height and was in close proximity to the Control Complex Chilled Water piping.
The inspectors were concerned that during a seismic event, loose scaffolding could become an impact hazard to safety-related piping. The licensee documented the inspectors' concerns in CR 2018-01407. The licensee documented in its Engineering Evaluation Report that scaffold parts were stored above the approved height of nine feet as specified in the licensee's Field Clarification Request (FRC) which was the precursor of the Engineering Evaluation Report process. The licensee also documented in its EER that the scaffolding would not adversely impact the Control Complex Chilled Water System, which is a safety-related system nor would it have impacted any other safety-related system during a design basis earthquake. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to their concerns and determined that the non-conformances identified in CR 2018-01407 were minor because there no was real or potential impact to safety-related structures or equipment.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions taken in accordance with their corrective action program were reasonable given the overall safety significance of the issues. The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of NRC requirements that exceeded the more than minor threshold in the course of their review.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review - Redundant Reactivity Control System 71152 The inspectors conducted a search of the corrective action program of the previous six-month period for issues associated with the redundant reactivity control system (RRCS). The inspectors noted that CR 2020-00272, "RRCS Division 2 Trouble Alarm," CR 2020-00694, "Division 2 RRCS Trouble Alarm," and CR 2020-02507, "RRCS Division 2 Trouble Alarm,"
documented discrepant conditions associated with the RRCS which warranted further review.
The inspectors reviewed the associated documentation and determined that because of the similar nature associated with each condition and the relatively close proximity in time over which they occurred to further extend the time over which the review was to be conducted.
The inspectors extended out their search over a year and noted a further three condition reports highlighted discrepant conditions associated with RRCS cards. The inspectors engaged licensee staff to gain an understanding of the RRCS overall condition and issue disposition. The inspectors were made aware of a licensee review conducted and associated with CR 2020-00358, "Roll up Condition Report for Adverse Trend-Redundant Reactivity Control System." The inspectors reviewed CR 2020-00358 and noted the primary cause for card failure was likely associated with age-related degradation. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan for card replacement and the associated maintenance strategy and did not identify any concerns.
The review conducted by the inspectors did not identify any instances where the discrepant conditions identified within condition reports would have impaired the design function of the redundant reactivity control system. The inspectors did not identify an adverse trend associated with the design function of the RRCS and did not identify any concerns.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 23, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. F. Payne, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. B. Blair, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
ONI-ZZZ-1
Acts of Nature-Severe Weather
Drawings
2-0352-00000
Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
2-0353-00000
Standby Diesel Generator Lube Oil
T
2-0354-00000
Standby Diesel Generator Jacket Water
V
Procedures
VLI-E22A
VLI-P42
Emergency Closed Cooling System
VLI-R45
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Unit 1)
VLI-R46
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Systems
(Unit 1)
VLI-R47
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil
Fire Plans
FPI-0CC
Control Complex
FPI-0EW
Emergency Service Water Pumphouse
FPI-0FH
Fuel Handling Building
FPI-0IB
Intermediate Building
FPI-1AB
Auxiliary Building Unit 1
FPI-1DG
Diesel Generator Building
Miscellaneous
PNPP No. 7015
Scenario FD-1100 Fire Drill
05/08/2020
Work Orders
200688892
MANHOLE 3 &4 / DIVISION 1 Inspections (Visual
Inspection)
06/24/2020
Miscellaneous
Evolution
Specific
Reactivity Plan
June 2020 Sequence Exchange
Simulator
Scenario Guide
OTLC-3058202007_PY-SGC1 Evaluated Simulator
Scenario C1
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 2020-04954
Documentation Not Included in Receipt Inspection Report
06/09/2020
Procedures
NOP-CC-5708
Written Practice for the Qualification and Certification of
Nondestructive Examination Personnel
Work Orders
200808828
Replace Manual Valve with ValveTech Ball Valve per
EER#601262736 to Promote More Efficient and Effective
05/27/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Air Vent during SVI-E12-T1182C
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2020-04202
Lube Oil Leak on Lube Oil Cooler Clamping Plate
05/12/2020
Miscellaneous
NOP-OP-1007-
Risk Management Plan for Racking of Breakers that
Involve Calculated Incident Energy > 40 cal/cm2
09/19/2019
Procedures
NOP-OP-1007
Risk Management
Work Orders
200823511
05/12/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2020-03272
Drywell Identified Leak Rate Determined to have Risen
from 2.0 to 2.1 Gallons Per Minute
04/15/2020
CR 2020-05085
Fuel Vendor Identified Possible Non-Conservative
Thermal Limit Calculation
06/15/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
ATL-2020-0298-
ATA-27
NRC Resident Question Regarding SVI-B21-T0061D
05/05/2020
CR 2020-03263
NRC ID. Basis for Redundant Instrumentation in EOP-3
04/15/2020
Drawings
208-0013-00004
Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System, Switch
Development
Work Orders
200789607
Replace Transmitters 1C41N0010B and 1C41N0010D for
Standby Liquid Control Storage Tank
04/18/2020
Miscellaneous
IMI-E3-20,
1,
Agastat GP,
ETR Relay Test
Data Sheet
PY-1E51Q7065, 1E51A-K65, Model No. ETR14B3C004,
Serial No. 18330403
04/22/2020
Procedures
SVI-C51-T0027F
APRM F Channel Functional for 1C51-K605F
SVI-E31-T5395-
A
RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional For
04/22/2020
Work Orders
200391664
Relay Replacement of 1C71A-K012F
04/03/2020
200748959
SVI-E31T5396A 1 (24M) RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow
High Channel Calibration For 1E31-N084A
04/22/2020
200754246
SVI-R43T1317 DIV-1 D/G Start and Load Functional
Testing
06/24/2020
Work Orders
200808828
Replace Manual Valve with ValveTech Ball Valve per
EER#601262736 to Promote More Efficient and Effective
Air Vent During SVI-E12-T1182C
05/27/2020
200821043
PY-1E51AK0065 Failed to Change State During the
Performance of SVI-E31-T5396A
04/22/2020
Miscellaneous
Control Room Personnel Respirator Qualification Records;
Dayshift
05/07/2020
LAA34801 and
LAA348805
SCBA Maintenance and Repair Records
Various
Procedures
NOP-OP-4301
Respiratory Protection Program
NOP-OP-4702
Air Sampling and Analysis
Self-
Assessments
SA-BN-2019-
1766
Pre NRC-Inspection in Plant Airborne Radioactivity
Control/Mitigation and Occupational Dose Assessment
2/17/2020
Work Orders
200753612
Respirator Checks/Inspections
01/06/2020
200753613
Respirator Checks/Inspections
2/03/2020
200753614
Respirator Checks/Inspections
03/05/2020
Calculations
Internal Dose Calculation for Insulation Removal in the
Steam Tunnel
03/17/2019
Internal Dose Calculation for Shielding Removal on the
Recirculation Loop
03/24/2019
First Dosimetry Period of 2019 (01/01/19 through
04/30/19) Dosimetry Comparison Data for TLD and
Electronic Dosimeters.
Undated
Cycle 17 Radioactive Source Term Report
09/30/2018
14195
TLD/SRD Deviation Investigation Report
06/10/2019
27362
TLD/SRD Deviation Investigation Report
06/10/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2018-06458
Area TLD Data Not Completed and Reviewed in Timely
Manner
07/19/2018
CR-2019-04423
Control TLDs Separated from Dosimeters of Legal Record
05/15/2019
CR-2019-05259
Damaged Dosimeters for PY1R17
09/25/2019
Miscellaneous
Dosimetry Relocation Evaluation for Under Vessel Work
03/18/2019
Personal Contamination Monitor Internal Sensitivity Test
07/26/2016
Declared Pregnant Worker Dosimetry Evaluation
05/30/2019
Declared Pregnant Worker Dosimetry Evaluation
07/19/2019
Portal Monitor Internal Sensitivity Test
07/18/2016
100555-0
NVLAP Scope of Accreditation - Mirion Technologies Inc.
07/01/2019
Procedures
NOP-OP-4201
Routine External Exposure Monitoring
NOP-OP-4202
Declared Pregnant Workers
NOP-OP-4204
Special External Exposure Monitoring
NOP-OP-4205
Dose Assessment
NOP-OP-4206
Bioassay Program
71151
Miscellaneous
NOBP-LP-4012-
Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)
Unavailability Index (UAI) and Unreliability Index (URI) for
Emergency AC Power Systems
04/01/2019-
03/31/2020
NOBP-LP-4012-
Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)
Unavailability Index (UAI) and Unreliability Index (URI) for
High Pressure Injection System (HPCS) and High
Pressure Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
04/01/2019-
03/31/2020
NOBP-LP-4012-
Safety System Functional Failures
04/01/2019-
03/31/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2020-00043
During Replacement of Optical Isolator Noted Charring
Around Two Fuses on the Card
01/03/2020
CR 2020-00272
Redundant Reactivity Control System Division 2 Trouble
Alarm
01/14/2020
CR 2020-00358
Roll Up Condition Report for Adverse Trend-Redundant
Reactivity Control System
01/17/2020
CR 2020-00694
Division 2 Redundant Reactivity Control System Trouble
Alarm
01/29/2020
CR 2020-01416
Green Indicating Light for C22-F160A is Out on Division 1
Redundant Reactivity Control Panel
2/23/2020
CR 2020-02507
Redundant Reactivity Control System Division 2 Trouble
Alarm
03/22/2020
Procedures
NOP-WM-5008
Control of Scaffolding
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2018-08718
2018 NRC Fire Protection Inspection-Vulnerability to
Cause Secondary Fire due to Unfused M43 Circuit
Caused by Fire Induced Shorts
10/04/2018