IR 05000440/2024003
| ML24302A270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry, 07200069  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2024 |
| From: | Dariusz Szwarc NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Penfield R Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2024003, IR 2024001 | |
| Download: ML24302A270 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2024003 AND 07200069/2024001
Dear Rod Penfield:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On October 9, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
October 30, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Dariusz Szwarc, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000440 and 07200069 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000440 and 07200069
License Number:
Report Number:
05000440/2024003; 07200069/2024001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024003-0063; I-2024001-0138
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company, LLC
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Perry, OH
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2024, to September 30, 2024
Inspectors:
J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Nance, Operations Engineer
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
D. Sargis, Health Physicist
J. Steward, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Dariusz Szwarc, Branch Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Division 3 Diesel Generator Declared Inoperable Due to Severe Weather Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000440/202400301 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.06 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) for the licensees failure to properly identify and scope work on diesel generator roof penetration seal (1PDG2005). Specifically, the licensees failure to repair the division 3 diesel generator exhaust piping penetration seal, after identifying in 2017 that the seal was leaking under severe rain conditions and could prevent the division 3 diesel generator from fulfilling its safety function, resulted in rainwater intrusion and the unplanned inoperability of the division 3 diesel generator.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000440/2024003-00 LER 2024003-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1,
Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Increase in RCS Unidentified Leakage 71153 Closed LER 05000440/2024002-00 LER 2024002-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
Reactor Water Clean Up Leak Detection Loss of Safety Function 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 28, 2024, the plant reduced power to approximately 45 percent for planned corrective and preventative maintenance, restoring to full power on September 29, 2024. The plant operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period with occasional power derates related to heat and humidity.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)licensee response to severe weather conditions during a storm event on August 6, 2024
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)high pressure core spray on July 29 and 30, 2024 (2)division 3 shutdown safety electrical distribution on July 30 and 31, 2024 (3)emergency closed cooling B train on August 13 and 14, 2024 (4)emergency service water pump house ventilation system on August 13, 2024 (5)emergency service water train B on August 13 and 14, 2024 (6)low pressure core spray system on August 14 and 15, 2024
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)reactor protection system on July 23, 2024
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in the diesel generator roof and diesel generator rooms.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during deep backshift operations on August 15, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an evaluated simulator scenario on August 12, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)division 1 diesel generator maintenance completed on July 20, 2024 (2)maintenance effectiveness approach due to the average power range monitor D bypass since July 12, 2024 (3)review and follow-up of activities during the deep down power and associated activities between September 27 and 29, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)risk related to the division 1 abnormal test and data gathering in order to predict potential card(s) replacement(s) in the 1R20 outage on September 4, 2024 (2)risk evaluation related to the shift of the stator water duplex strainers from B to A while in MODE 1 for the first time in their history, and the related potential initiation event(s) on September 11, 2024 (3)emergent work related to unplanned alarms and card replacement on the division 1 emergency diesel generator during the week ending September 22, 2024 (4)risk related to deep down power to fix steam leak associated to the 1B moisture separator reheat on September 28, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)division 3 diesel generator output breaker past operability assessment
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1)automatic flow demand limiter threshold permanent modification
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)replacement of the PS24 electrolytic capacitors as part of the average power range monitor C / G systems on May 8, 2024 (2)replacement of the lower airlock solenoid control valve 1P522F1429B on July 9, 2024 (3)relay card (Z405) and the trip reference (Z423) cards replacement associated with the average power range monitor D system on July 11, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) A standby liquid control vibrations and other surveillance tests on June 20, 2024 (2)mobilization of equipment for spent fuel canister under the campaign #6 on July 10, 2024 (3)lower containment airlock door test between July 3 through 8, 2024 (4)essential service water pump A flow and differential pressure surveillance on July 16, 2024 (5)intermediate range monitor E detector checks and current to voltage plots between September 3 and 4,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The NRC review for LER 05000440/2024002-00 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24179A014)was removed from Section 71153 in Inspection Report 05000440/2024002 (ML24214A188).
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This review did not constitute another sample in 71153 since the sample was already taken in Inspection Report 05000440/2024002.
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complied with reporting requirements.
- (1) LER 05000440/2024003-00,Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Increase in RCS Unidentified Leakage (ADAMS Accession No. ML24198A025).
The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in Inspection Report
===05000440/2024002 Section 71153 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24214A188).
This LER is Closed.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Operation of an ISFSI===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) cask loading activities from July 29 through August 2, 2024. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities during the loading of multi-purpose canister (MPC) 03960438:
- heavy load movement of loaded MPC out of the spent fuel pool
- closure welding and non-destructive evaluations
- forced helium dehydration
- helium leak testing
- stack up of the MPC and transfer cask onto the storage cask
- radiological field surveys
- cask transfer to the ISFSI pad The inspectors performed walkdowns of the ISFSI pad, which also included performing independent radiation surveys and walkdowns of the ISFSI haul path.
The inspectors evaluated the following:
- spent fuel selected for loading into dry cask storage during this loading campaign
- selected corrective action program documents
- selected 72.48 screenings
- changes to the sites 10 CFR 72.212 report since the previous inspection
INSPECTION RESULTS
Division 3 Diesel Generator Declared Inoperable Due to Severe Weather Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000440/202400301 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.06 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) for the licensees failure to properly identify and scope work on diesel generator roof penetration seal (1PDG2005). Specifically, the licensees failure to repair the division 3 diesel generator exhaust piping penetration seal, after identifying in 2017 that the seal was leaking under severe rain conditions and could prevent the division 3 diesel generator from fulfilling its safety function, resulted in rainwater intrusion and the unplanned inoperability of the division 3 diesel generator.
Description:
On June 18, 2024, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, entered the off-normal instruction for severe weather. Subsequently, rainwater was discovered on the division 3 diesel generator, and it was declared inoperable as documented in Event Notification 57181 submitted June 19, 2024. The circumstances surrounding this event and response are documented in Inspection Report 05000440/2024002 Section 71153 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24214A188). On August 15, 2024, following licensee investigation and assessment of the division 3 diesel generator exciter and generator, the as-found condition revealed that no water intrusion occurred and, therefore, would not have impacted the diesel generators ability to start, run, and produce the required electrical power to perform its required safety function. Therefore, EN 57181 was retracted and documented in the August 16, 2024, NRC event reports with no licensee event report required.
This inspection sample assessed the external flooding and severe weather protection related to the diesel generator building and its roof, the event causes, and corrective actions. The inspectors review of the updated safety analysis report and support documentation confirmed the penetration seal (1PDG2005) in question was not safety related, not seismic, and not controlled under the licensees quality assurance program. The inspectors determined those components protecting the structural integrity of the roof and building to be intact and functional. However, safety-related facilities, systems, and equipment are required to be protected from the effects of a local intense precipitation. In this instance, the degraded seal, under extreme but analyzed conditions, provided a limited pathway for rainwater to reach the diesel generator and questioned the operability of the safety-related equipment. This issue was initially identified in November 2017, when a heavy rain caused water intrusion into the division 3 diesel generator room but caused no alarms or abnormal conditions and was contained away from sensitive components. The inspectors did not identify any flooding violations during this assessment for the past event, but the penetration seal degradation and failure to restore full function was identified as a performance deficiency, the proximate cause of the unplanned inoperability of the division 3 diesel generator.
The licensee utilized an organizational effectiveness investigation and equipment failure analysis to identify the equipment related issue(s) that resulted in the water leakage into the division 3 diesel generator room and identify organizational factor(s) and/or cause(s)that contributed to the event. The direct cause was determined to be the degraded penetration seal (1PDG2005) allowing water to pass through it and subsequently into the division 3 diesel generator room and on to division 3 diesel generator equipment.
The primary cause was a lack of sensitivity to the consequences associated with degraded roof conditions. This led to a reactive rather than preventive strategy for dealing with roof leaks. Driving this cause was the effectiveness and accountability of the notification screening and backlog review committees. Because of the work order miscoding, the licensee failed to repair the division 3 diesel generator exhaust piping penetration, after identifying in 2017 that the penetration seal was leaking under severe rain conditions and could prevent the division 3 diesel generator from fulfilling its safety function. As a result, on June 18, 2024, the degraded seal permitted accumulated rainwater to enter the exhaust piping penetration, ran down the exhaust onto the turbo charger, and settled on the generator. The division 3 diesel generator was shut down to secured status and declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.1, preventing the division 3 diesel generator and supported high pressure core spray pump from performing their safety functions during a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power. The inspectors determined the causal assessment was adequate regarding both the direct and primary causes.
Several actions have already been completed to correct the causes listed above. The water intrusion path has been temporarily mitigated by sandbags installed per Order 200949865.
The past practice of coding all roof leaks as general facility orders when they are presented to screening has been corrected and procedural guidance will be followed for future coding.
Actions for the direct cause include implementation of ECP 241107 to install flood barriers to prevent water from getting to the degraded penetration per Order 200951146 have been completed. Actions for correction of the penetration seal per Order 200734250 are planned.
Planned actions for the primary cause include: reviewing the current backlog of roof deficiencies to ensure the potential consequences are understood and that they are prioritized appropriately; generation and delivery of a teaching and learning session to the Notification Screening Committee and Backlog Review Team to improve effectiveness; development of a What-Excellence-Looks-Like aid for the Notification Screening Committee and Backlog Review Team to drive accountability. The inspectors have evaluated the completed actions with no additional issues identified.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the condition into the CAP under issue CR-202405238 and performed a causal evaluation.
Corrective Action References: CR-202405238
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to repair the division 3 diesel generator exhaust piping penetration seal, after identifying in 2017 that the penetration seal was leaking under severe rain conditions and could prevent the division 3 diesel generator from fulfilling its safety function, resulted in rainwater intrusion and the unplanned inoperability of the division 3 diesel generator was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failed penetration seal would degrade the division 3 diesel generator that supports the high-pressure core spray pump and its high-pressure injection function to respond to initiating events.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Using Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2; the inspectors determined that the finding affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, for the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Question B for External Event Mitigating Systems (Seismic/Flood/Severe Weather Protection) was answered yes and directed to Exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required because they answered yes to question 1 in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 4. Specifically, they determined that the failed penetration seal would degrade the division 3 diesel generator that supports the high pressure core spray pump and its high pressure injection function.
A Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) performed a bounding evaluation by constructing an external flooding scenario using the guidance in the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 2, Section 5.0 and 6.0, SAPHIRE version 8.2.10, and the Perry SPAR model version 8.81. The scenario involved a heavy rain event followed by a consequential loss of offsite power and a subsequent degraded failure of the division 3 diesel generator due to water intrusion from the exhaust piping penetration seal. The quantification of the external flooding scenario was similar to the initial assessment for MD 8.3, Decision Documentation for Reactive Inspection, completed on June 24, 2024, (ML24199A151) with the exception that the best estimate case was 2.5 inches of rain in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and assumed a degraded failure of the division 3 diesel generator with a probability of 0.5. The basis for this assumption was that the inspectors determined that it was likely the division 3 diesel generator would have been able to perform its function since inspections of the diesel by the licensee determined that water had not entered the internals of the generator. The resultant change in core damage frequency was estimated to be less than 1E-6/year. A sensitivity case for failure of the division 3 diesel generator, EPS-DGN-FS-DGC set to TRUE, was also estimated to be less than 1E-6/year.
Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix H, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
The dominant core damage sequences included heavy rain-induced loss-of-offsite power with a consequential failure of the division 3 diesel generator, successful operation of RCIC, failure to recover onsite and offsite power sources within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, and failure of FLEX components.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the behavior in question was whether work was effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk insights, jobsite conditions, and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. In this instance, the degraded condition existed for 7 years and resulted in an unplanned impact to safety-related equipment during a severe weather event.
The recent past practice of coding all roof leaks as general facility orders when they are presented to screening has been corrected and procedural guidance will be followed for future coding.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Minor Violation 71153 LER 2024002-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Reactor Water Clean Up Leak Detection Loss of Safety Function Minor Violation: On May 11, 2024, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, entered a planned maintenance outage to replace degrading reactor recirculating pump B seals. Upon completion of the maintenance activities, actions commenced to restore power operations on May 16, 2024. During the restoration to power, reactor water cleanup (RWCU) leak detection instruments began to register invalid flow instabilities approaching RWCU system isolation setpoints. The RWCU system was the primary reactor coolant system inventory control mechanism at this point with the reactor near criticality and the point of adding heat.
Operations verified the instabilities as invalid and placed the RWCU isolation bypass switches in bypass to prevent the isolation of RWCU system and subsequent loss of the primary reactor coolant system inventory control mechanism during this significant portion of a reactor startup. This action by operations rendered the associated Specification function inoperable.
The resident inspector staff was present, informed, and monitored the plant and personnel performance.
As documented in Event Notification 57130 submitted on May 16, 2024, operations declared the RWCU leak detection instruments related to the high differential flow signal inoperable.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation, conditions A and B were entered, as one required channel of instrumentation was inoperable, and an automatic function with isolation capability was not maintained. One channel isolates the inboard containment isolation valves and the other channel the outboard containment isolation valves. In this instance, both channels were inoperable. Therefore, this condition was reported as an 8-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). However, the notification was reported about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the event rather than the required 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The inspector and regional NRC staff maintained observation and understanding of the events during the entire sequence and were not impacted in their regulatory oversight functions. Appropriate TS conditions and actions were complied with, including entry into a 12-hour shutdown statement. While in the TS shutdown required actions, appropriate conditions existed and were executed to properly fill, vent, and verify proper operation of the leak detection instruments. Operations then declared the affected instruments operable and exited all relevant TS action statements. Upon exiting the action statements, power was subsequently restored to power over the following days to full achievable power.
Regarding the late notification, the station generated a corrective action item entry with actions to clarify in-house guidance regarding the notification regulatory requirements associated with these instrument functions. Given the significance of and circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been reported, the inspectors characterized this performance deficiency as a minor violation.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency is minor in accordance with IMC 0612 Appendix B, More-than-Minor screening questions as the delayed notification did not impact the regulatory process and had no actual safety consequence.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 9, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to R. Penfield, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 1, 2024, the inspectors presented the ISFSI cask loading inspection results to R. Penfield, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
24 Perry Dry Fuel Storage Campaign Fuel Selection
Calculations
G58-H-HI-
210216
HI-TRAN 225 Structural Evaluation
Calibration
Records
PNPP No. 10467
Ludlum Model 12 Survey Meter Calibration Record
2/27/2023
CR-202303219
ISFSI Cask 2-6 Temp Hi
04/19/2023
CR-2024-04571
PY-DCS-Holtec Retracted Approved Evaluation RRTI-
3119-0029R1
05/20/2024
CR-2024-05236
PY-DCS HI-TRAN Made Contact with
Zero Profile Transporter (ZPT)
06/18/2024
CR-2024-05417
PY-DCS - MPC #393 Lid Fabricated Without Threads
in the Vent Port
06/25/2024
CR-2024-05475
SFDS: Drain Line Plugs Not Installed in
HI-STORM FW Casks Placed into Storage in 2022
06/27/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2024-05835
PY-DCS Mating Device Drawer Malfunction
07/15/2024
CR-2024-06251
24 NRC ISFSI Inspection - Legacy Issue with
Procedure PMI-0031
08/01/2024
CR-2024-06254
NRC Identified - 2024 NRC ISFSI Inspection - Minor
Scaling Identified on ISFSI Pad
08/01/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2024-06264
NRC ID During ISFSI Inspection: Surveys of HEPA Unit
Supporting Vacuum Drying Evolution Not Meeting Full
Intent of Note in Holtec Procedure HPP-3119-0300
08/01/2024
2.48 - 24 -
00066
ECP 21-0001-002 - ISFSI Acceptance of FSW Baskets
and Miscellaneous Changes
04/16/2024
2.48 - 24 -
00850
Use of Weather-Related Administrative Controls and
HI-TRAN Structural Evaluations
06/19/2024
2.48 - 24 -
00895
Responding to Abnormal Conditions at Perry
06/26/2024
Miscellaneous
NOP-WM-5003-
Overhead Crane Pre-Operational Inspection Checklist
07/31/2024
20423-396-07
Canister Shell and Lid to Closure Rings
07/31/2024
60855
NDE Reports
MSLT-MPC-
Helium Leak Test Report for
07/31/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
HOLTEC
Multipurpose Canister (MPC) Vent and Drain Port Cover
Plates
HPP-3119-0300
MPC Processing at Perry
HPP-3119-0400
MPC Transfer at Perry
HPP-3119-0500
HI-STORM Movements at Perry
HPP-3119-0700
Responding to Abnormal Conditions at Perry
PAP-1313
Control of Lifting Operations
Procedures
PI-CNSTR-OP-
HLTC-H-01
Closure Welding of Holtec Multi-Purpose Canisters -
HI-STORM 100, HI-STAR 100, HI-STORM FW & UMAX
Systems
PY-M-20231012-
Quarterly Taskcal ISFSI Pad
10/12/2023
Radiation
Surveys
PY-M-20240108-
Quarterly Taskcal ISFSI Pad
01/08/2024
Self-
Assessments
MS-C-24-03-30
Quality Assurance Audit Report - ISFSI
04/22/2024
200778525
Periodic Crane Maintenance on FHB Crane
06/19/2024
200828117
Inspect Dry Cask Storage Concrete Areas
07/11/2023
200838114
Special Lifting Device Testing PMI-0120
06/25/2024
Work Orders
200892274
Annual HI-STORM Inspection
07/21/2023
CR 2024-06377
Loss of Security Equipment due to Quincy Sub Station
Power Outage
08/06/2024
CR 2024-06384
ONI-ZZZ-1 Entry for a Severe Thunderstorm Warning
08/07/2024
CR 2024-06385
Supplemental Action not Performed for ONI-ZZZ-1
08/07/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2024-06391
Supplemental Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit Lost Power
Due to Loss of Quincy
08/07/2024
Procedures
ONI-ZZZ-1
Acts Of Nature - Severe Weather
08/06/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2023-06490
RPS MG set B Output AC Voltage is High Out of Band
08/20/2023
SOI-C71
RPS Power Supply Distribution
07/23/2024
SOI-E22A
High Pressure Core Spray System
SOI-E22B
Division 3 Diesel Generator
Procedures
VLI-E21
Low Pressure Core Spray System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
VLI-M28
Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling System
VLI-P42
Emergency Closed Cooling System
Miscellaneous
Flood Hazard
Reevaluation
Report
Response to 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding
Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding
2/23/2015
Procedures
NOP-WM-1003
Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation and Screening
Miscellaneous
OTLC-
3058202409_PY-
SGC Cycle
2409
Evaluation
Scenario Guide C
Simulator Guide
24-05798
Received 1/2 SCRAM B/D (1H13-P680-5A-B9) Alarm
07/12/2024
24-06459
Received 1/2 SCRAM B/D (1H13-P680-5A-B9) Alarm
08/08/2024
24-06571
Maintenance Rule Plant Level Performance Criteria Limit
Exceeded and Not Identified
08/14/2024
24-06676
Bistable Event - Received ROD BLOCK APRM
UPSCALE alarm
08/19/2024
CR-2024-05931
As Found Condition of Div 1 Diesel Parts Receipt for
Outage Work Preps Unsatisfactory
07/18/2024
CR-2024-05939
Division 1 DG Fuel Oil Pressure Low Alarm Coming in
During Surveillance Testing
07/18/2024
CR-2024-05948
Div 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Exhaust Cover Bolts
Broken
07/19/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2024-05970
Div 1 DG Thermocouple LB4 on 1H51-P054A Faulty
07/21/2024
Procedures
SOI-N11
Main and Reheat Steam
09/28/2024
Work Orders
APRM D upscale caused 1/2 SCRAM Determine Cause
of APRM D Upscale and Repair as Necessary
07/11/2024
23-09441
Stator Water Cooling Water Pump A Abnormal Noise
Coming from Motor
2/30/2023
CR 2024-07107
Moisture Separator Reheater 1B Check Valve Steam
Leak is Degraded
09/06/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2024-07450
DIV 1 DG Alarms Strobe Flashing When Left in Alarm
During Run
09/20/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR 2024-07464
Multiple Alarms Locked in Div 1 Unit 1 DG Panel
09/22/2024
CR 2024-07466
Diesel Generator Control Panel Blown Power Supply
Fuse and Damaged Annunciator Card
09/22/2024
2-0112-00000
Rev JJ
High Pressure Heater
09/06/2024
Drawings
2-0361-00000
Gen Stator Winding Cooling Water Sys
09/11/2024
Miscellaneous
280-0140-INS-
001
001 Test Instructions Perry Nuclear Power Plant
EDG Baseline Voltage Bump Test
06/14/2024
Gather Data Prior to Card Replacement (Div 1)
09/04/2024
Work Orders
Stator Water Colling Strainer B Cleaning
09/11/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2024-04950
Relay Out of Tech Spec Allowable Limits
06/05/2024
24-05534
Lower Airlock Inner Seals Failed Drop Test
06/30/2024
24-05637
Lower Containment Inner Door Solenoid Control Valve
Electrical Connector Found Degraded
07/05/2024
CR 2024-04246
Intermediate Range Monitor E Indication Erratic and
Not Able to Range Properly
05/11/2024
CR 2024-04378
Intermediate Range Monitor E Indicating Erratic
05/20/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2024-05798
Received 1/2 SCRAM B/D (1H13-P680-5A-B9) Alarm
07/12/2024
GMI-0176
Containment Airlock Door Maintenance
ICI-C-C51-11
Average Power Monitor (APRM) Channel
Calibration/Adjustment
07/15/2024
SVI-C51-T0027D
APRM D Channel Functional For 1C51-K605D
Procedures
SVI-P53-T7305
Lower Containment Airlock Pneumatic System Leak Test,
Pen #305
PTI-P45P0001 1 (92D) ESW System Loop A Flow and
Differential Pressure Test
07/16/2024
APRMD Upscale Caused 1/2 SCRAM. Determine Cause
of APRM D Upscale and Repair as Necessary
07/12/2024
(IPO-36) Replace 1H13P0671-PS24 Electrolytic
Capacitors
05/08/2024
I/V Plot Detector / Check Electronics Tasks
09/04/2024
Work Orders
SVI-C41T2001A 2 (92D) Standby Liquid Control A Pump
and Valve Operability Test
06/20/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Low Airlock Solenoid Connector Degraded
07/09/2024