IR 05000440/2023001

Integrated Inspection Report (05000440/2023001)

ML23122A272
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	05/04/2023
From:	Billy Dickson NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To:	Penfield R Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
References
IR 2023001
Download: ML23122A272 (1)

Text

May 4, 2023

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2023001

Dear Rod Penfield:

On March 31, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On April 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Chris Elliott, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Dickson, Billy on 05/04/23 Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000440 License Number: NPF-58 Report Number: 05000440/2023001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-001-0062 Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Location: Perry, OH Inspection Dates: January 01, 2023 to March 31, 2023 Inspectors: J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector E. Fernandez, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist J. Nance, Operations Engineer T. Ospino, Resident Inspector Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

LER 2023-001-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Manual ECCS Actuation Following Automatic Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 FIN 05000440/2023001-01 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that components are manipulated, verified, and position checked to maintain personal safety and operational configuration as directed by NOP-OP-1014, Plant Status Control, contributing to an unplanned automatic reactor trip.

LER 2020-001-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor was Declared Inoperable due to Degraded Thermal Overloads Resulting in Technical Specification Violation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green None (NPP) 71153 NCV 05000440/2023001-03 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.3, "Combustible Gas Mixing System," was identified when the licensee failed to perform the required actions for an inoperable "B" combustible gas mixing compressor from November 1, 2019, until February 24, 2020.

LER 2021-001-00 for Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.10] - Bases 71153 Systems NCV 05000440/2023001-02 for Decisions Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," was identified when the licensee failed to perform the required surveillance and actions for an inoperable division 3 emergency diesel generator.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000440/2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for Perry 71153 Closed Nuclear Power Plant,

Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor was Declared Inoperable due to Degraded Thermal Overloads Resulting in Technical Specification Violation LER 05000440/2023-001-00 LER 2023-001-00 for Perry 71153 Closed Nuclear Power Plant,

Manual ECCS Actuation Following Automatic Reactor Trip LER 05000440/2020-002-01 LER 2020-002-01 for Perry 71153 Closed Nuclear Power Plant,

Standby Liquid Control System Rendered Inoperable due to Valve Misposition LER 05000440/2021-001-00 LER 2021-001-00 for Perry 71153 Closed Nuclear Power Plant,

Division 3 EDG Inoperability Resulting in an Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On January 5, 2023, the unit shutdown on automatic protective action. On January 9, 2023, Unit 1 restarted, incurred a loss of one of the reactor recirculation pumps, and was limited in full power restoration to 50 percent power while in single loop reactor recirculation operation. On February 26, 2023, the unit was shut down manually to perform a refueling outage and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending high winds on February 15, 2023.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) alternating current (AC) offsite power to shutdown safety busses on March 2 and 3, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) turbine building between February 27 and March 1, 2023

(2) fire protection zone related to the refuel floor, elevation 652 on March 8, 2023

(3) review of the fire zone associated with the residual heat removal A pump room between March 20 and 30, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on January 25, 2023.

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) (Partial)the division 1 residual heat remover heat exchanger

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 6 through March 10, 2023:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam line weld Component ID 1B21-0085 2. Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam line weld Component ID 1B21-0089A 3. Work Order (WO) 200779608, Replace Kalrez Insert 6" Rockwell Edwards Testable Piston Check Valve

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power ascension after synchronizing to the grid on January 8 and 9, 2023.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated refueling outage shutdown just-in-time training on February 21, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) control rod drive mechanism replacement

(2) A reactor recirculating motor replacement

(3) A reactor recirculating cable replacement

(4) transformer LH1A high side cable repair

Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:

(1) safety relief valve replacement

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) emergent work due to the failure of the feedwater system from January 5 to 7, 2023

(2) emergent work related to the spike on the emergency service water (ESW)

"A" D17-K604 radiation monitor activity on January 25, 2023

(3) planned work of single loop 10 percent power reduction for rod pattern adjustment on February 11, 2023

(4) emergent work generated due the issue with the RB6 thermocouple on the division 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on February 15, 2023

(5) planned work on electrical power during single source of credited offsite power and only 1 EDG operable from March 2 to March 6, 2023

(6) planned work on reactor coolant inventory control and decay heat removal during reduced inventory and decay heat control removal systems from March 2 to March 8, 2023

(7) emergent work related to the outboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV) "B" valve stem challenges on March 21, 2023

(8) emergent work generated for the MSIV D on March 23, 2023

(9) actions after challenges associated with, "A" flow control valve 1B33-F060, did not move, as part of a testing procedure on March 29, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) CR-2023-00169; ESW "A" Radiation Monitor Trip on January 26, 2023

(2) CR-2023-01057; Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Missing Thermocouple on February 15, 2023

(3) CR-2023-01945; CRDM 14-51 Incorrect Control Rod Position Indication Probe Removed on March 15, 2023

(4) CR-2023-01995; LH1A Doble Test Results on March 17, 2023

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) provide alternate power to uninterruptible power source (UPS) loads while Technical Support Center UPS inverter is degraded (Engineering Change 22-1098-000-001) on January 31 and February 1, 2023

(2) permanent modification of rod control and information system during system replacement

(3) permanent modification of drywell instrument air to SRVs and inboard MSIVs

(4) implementation of the hydranuts on the unified system A and C, residual heat removal (RHR) A heat exchanger between 28 February and March 30, 2023

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial)

(1) The inspectors evaluated a forced outage from January 5 through 8, 2023.

(2) (Partial)

The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 19 activities from February 27 through March 31, 2023.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality: Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Review of the replacement and installation of breaker ED1A03 on January 3, 2023.

(2) Replacement of one of the processors computers, Foxboro CP101, on January 6, 2022.

(3) Review of energizing/de-energizing operations and subsequent motor analysis related to the control rod drive pump B work on January 17, 2023.

(4) Review of the work involving the replacement of capacitors in Technical Support Center (TSC) ERIS computer power center on January 18, 2023.

(5) Repair of cable attached to the "B" intermediate range monitor while performing under vessel activities on March 20, 2023.

(6) Reactor recirculating pump "A" uncoupled run following motor and cable replacement on March 27, 2023.

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

(1) Review of surveillance and actions related to the FLEX 4160kv generators quarterly performance that ended with the explosion of one of the engines associated with the PY-1X11S0011 generator on November 30, 2022.

(2) Testing of the jacking device alarm PY-1R43N004B during the division 2 planned outage on December 11, 2022.

(3) Surveillance related to the reactor protection manual SCRAM channel functional check on December 26, 2022.

(4) SCRAM discharge volume vent and drain valves surveillance (SVI-C11-T2004)on February 6, 2022.

(5) Division 2 emergency core cooling system integrated test on March 16 and 17, 2023.

(6) Surveillance of MSIV B inboard and outboard valves set as part of the Local Leak-Rate Testing (LLRT) activities on March 16, 2023.

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) Final LLRT related to the D MSIV (22D and 28D) on March 25, 2023

(2) Inservice Leak Test (ISLT) related to the RHR A (C) heat exchanger on

March 30, 2023 Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) Surveillance SVI-M14T9313, LLRT 1M14 penetration V313 on January 25, 2023.

(2) Review of LLRT performed for valve E-12-F053B on March 14, 2023.

(3) Test of containment isolation valve and penetration P131 on March 10, 2023.

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) FLEX 4160 volt generator (PY-1X11S00111) following replacement on February 6, 2023.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) Emergency preparedness tabletop drill on February 2,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:

(1) workers exiting the radiologically controlled area at the drywell control point

(2) workers exiting the radiologically controlled area at the balance of plant control point

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

(1) local leak rate testing under radiation work permit (RWP) 2300414

(2) undervessel activities under RWP 2300518

(3) reactor water clean-up heat work under various RWPs High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) fuel transfer tube

(2) residual heat removal pump "A" room

(3) reactor water clean-up heat exchanger room

(4) containment annulus Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

(1) reactor head laydown area

(2) reactor water clean-up heat exchanger room

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2022)

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors performed a semiannual review of the licensee's potential adverse trend in procedure adherence, specifically job qualification, for the previous six months.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Follow-up of events related to reactor recirculating pump "A" trip on January 9, 2023

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)

(1) LER 05000440/2020-002-01, "Standby Liquid Control System Rendered Inoperable due to Valve Misposition," (ADAMS Accession No. ML21131A168). The inspectors reviewed the LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 050004402021001 under Inspection Results Section 71153.This LER is Closed.

(2) LER 05000440/2021-001-00, "Division 3 EDG Inoperability Resulting in an Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications," (ADAMS Accession No.

ML21209A105). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.

(3) LER 05000440/2020-001-00, "Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor was declared Inoperable due to Degraded Thermal Overloads resulting in Technical Specification Violation." (ADAMS Accession No. ML20107F741). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.

(4) LER 05000440/2023-001-00, "Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Manual ECCS Actuation Following Automatic Reactor Trip," (ADAMS Accession No. ML23053A083). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Semiannual Sample for Potential Adverse Trend in Qualifications 71152S The inspectors performed a semiannual review of the licensee's potential adverse trend in job ownership, where individuals understand and demonstrate personal responsibility for the behaviors and work practices that support nuclear safety. Specifically, the behavior in question is individuals ensure that they are trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

CR-2022-09845, while performing engineering qualifications, a discussion item was erroneously signed complete. A potential consequence of being signed off by an unqualified mentor would be the then unqualified mentee could have potentially performed work that led to inaccurate trending and a plant event. CR-2023-00661, while completing on-the-job training for a qualification card, the trainee and supervisor failed to validate the qualifications to perform the training. A potential consequence would be an individual could have become qualified for a task with training performed by an unqualified individual resulting in inadequate maintenance. CR-2023-01061, a licensed reactor operator, assumed the shift with expired respirator qualifications. A potential consequence would be that the operator may not have been able to perform all functions in an oxygen-deficient environment or that the operator's safety could have been compromised while attempting to do so. After these three instances, CR-2023-01266 was generated for an area of concern regarding qualification program requirements. Corrective actions included work stoppage, management-led discussions and briefs, and an overall emphasis on qualifications up and down the chain of command.

During this inspection, the inspectors completed the objectives of the inspection procedure and the inspectors trended the behavior to consider potential safety culture weaknesses and to encourage the licensee to take appropriate actions before significant performance degradation occurs, as stated in NUREG-2165, "Safety Culture Common Language." The inspectors identified no additional examples of qualification issues following the implementation of trend qualifications during the inspection period. Regarding the listed examples, the inspectors identified no more than minor performance deficiencies or violations. These examples did not adversely affect any cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems or personnel that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

LER 2023-001-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Manual ECCS Actuation Following Automatic Reactor Trip Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green None (NPP) 71153 FIN 05000440/2023001-01 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding was identified when the licensee failed to ensure that components are manipulated, verified, and position checked to maintain personal safety and operational configuration as directed by NOP-OP-1014, Plant Status Control, contributing to an unplanned automatic reactor trip.

Description:

On January 5, 2023, with the reactor in Mode 1 and at 98% rated thermal power, the licensee performed maintenance activities and repairs on a power supply regulating transformer. The reenergizing of the power source after maintenance interrupted the normal reactor water level inventory control function of the digital feedwater control system (DFWCS) and initiated an automatic reactor protection system trip on lowering water inventory and the automatic initiation of emergency core injection systems to restore reactor water inventory. Shortly after restoration of the reactor water inventory, the operators reset and returned to service the DFWCS to maintain inventory. The operators ultimately placed the unit in its lowest energy state, Mode 4 Cold Shutdown, without further complications.

The licensee attributed the direct cause of the automatic reactor trip to the failure of a DFWCS level control processor module and an intermittent power supply failure, combined with a network traffic overload. The component failures in DFWCS, and an overloaded communications network, caused the unexpected loss of additional DFWCS workstations and indications to the operators, with a DFWCS zero injection demand signal. This failure lowered reactor water inventory and resulted in an automatic reactor safety system trip. The inspectors evaluated the procedures and documentation associated with the reactor scram and supporting data to identify potential performance deficiencies related to the stations procedures, equipment, and personnel performance. The inspectors identified no issues with the direct cause of the event or within the response of the station's procedures, equipment, or personnel performance.

A contributing cause existed in a latent configuration control issue and nonconforming condition within the media translator power supply portion of the DFWCS. During DFWCS replacement work orders in 2012-2013, a configuration control issue was introduced due to the physical differences of the plug and the spacing constraints of the power receptacles. The issue became evident with the unexpected loss of indication of the DFWCS workstations during the maintenance and increased DFWCS network communication traffic due to the loss of interface screens hindering the operator's ability to acknowledge alarms, ultimately overloading the network traffic. The impact of the configuration issue during the event was that both DFWCS communication networks were lost, and both workstations were not available to manipulate the DFWCS at the onset of the event. Hardware repairs for the transformer capacitor replacement before plant startup revealed the latent configuration control issue.

The licensee performed a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) bounding evaluation on the January 5, 2023, event. The analysis of this uncomplicated plant scram resulted in a delta core damage frequency and a delta large early release fraction well below the acceptable thresholds of 1.0E-06 per year and 1.0E-07 per year, respectively, as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.174. The risk of this event was considered to be of very low safety significance in accordance with the Regulatory Guidance.

This event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)

(60-day License Event Report report). The LER number is 2023-001.

Corrective Actions: On January 5, 2023, the licensee repaired and restored the hardware issues of the control processer, the degraded power supply, and the overloaded communications network. Additionally, the latent configuration control issue with the media translator power supply were restored to conformity.

Corrective Action References: CR-2023-00100, Reactor SCRAM due to temporary loss of Feedwater

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to ensure that components are manipulated, verified, and position checked to maintain personal safety and operational configuration as directed by NOP-OP-1014, Plant Status Control.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Per Exhibit 1, Section B Transient Initiators; question 1, the inspectors determined the finding did cause a reactor trip but did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition and screened the finding as very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

LER 2021-001-00 for Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.10] - Bases 71153 Systems NCV 05000440/2023001-02 for Decisions Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," was identified when the licensee failed to perform the required surveillance and actions for an inoperable division 3 emergency diesel generator.

Description:

On June 1, 2021, and during the start of the division 3 emergency diesel generator for monthly operability surveillance test, voltage oscillations existed for approximately 45 seconds after the start. The operators monitored that the fluctuations subsided, and diesel field volts/amps and stator volts all remained in their respective bands. The division 3 emergency diesel generator stabilized, and the operators noted no further oscillations for the remainder of the operability surveillance test.

On June 3, 2021, the licensee performed a follow-up operability determination and determined that the division 3 emergency diesel generator could not support continued operability. The licensee declared the division 3 emergency diesel generator inoperable and unavailable. When the operators first noted oscillating output voltage for the division 3 emergency diesel generator, entry into TS 3.8.1 Condition B and the accompanying actions did not occur. Surveillance requirement 3.8.1.1 was not performed as required within one hour and subsequent action TS 3.8.1 Condition F to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> was also not met. Since completion times were not met for TS 3.8.1 Condition F, this issue was reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.

Also, on June 3, 2021, the licensee performed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)evaluation for the division 3 emergency diesel generator voltage regulator inoperability event that resulted in delta core damage frequency and delta large early release fraction values less than 1.0E-06 per year and 1.0E-07 per year respectively as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.174.

A review of the division 3 emergency diesel generator maintenance history revealed that the voltage regulator was replaced and passed the post maintenance test on May 15, 2021. No other failures of the division 3 emergency diesel generator or the voltage regulator could be found during the previous three years.

On June 4, 2021, the voltage regulator was replaced, tested satisfactory, and the division 3 emergency diesel generator returned to operable status.

Corrective Actions: On June 4, 2021, the licensee removed voltage regulator PY-1E22Q3004 from the division 3 diesel generator. After replacement, post maintenance testing identified no additional issues and returned the division 3 emergency diesel generator to service.

Corrective Action References:

CR-2021-04371, Division 3 DG Voltage Regulator Oscillations Upon Start for SVI-E22-T1319 CR-2021-04432, Division 3 DG Follow-up Operability Determination (FOD)per CR 2021-0437

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to perform the required actions for an inoperable division 3 emergency diesel generator in Mode 1 on June 1, 2021. Specifically, erratic output voltage falling below the allowable band during startup of the division 3 emergency diesel generator did not result in the application of TS 3.8.1 and its required actions within the specified time.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Per Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screen Questions, Section A Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality, the inspectors answered all questions no and screened the finding as Green.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.10 - Bases for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the bases for operational and organizational decisions are communicated in a timely manner. The timeliness of the follow up operability determination was beyond the time requirement for the limiting condition for operation action.

Enforcement:

Violation: Perry Nuclear Power Plant TS 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, requires that while in Modes 1, 2, and 3, three diesel generators shall be operable. The TS ACTION A statement requires that with one required offsite circuit inoperable, perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The TS ACTION F statement requires with ACTION A and associated completion time not met to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, between June 1, 2021, and June 3, 2021, while the plant was in Mode 1, the division 3 emergency diesel generator was inoperable, in that erratic output voltage falling below the allowable band during startup and ACTION A was not taken to perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Between June 1, 2021, and June 3, 2021, with ACTION A not taken within the associated completion time, ACTION F was not taken to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

LER 2020-001-00 for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor was Declared Inoperable due to Degraded Thermal Overloads Resulting in Technical Specification Violation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Barrier Integrity Green None (NPP) 71153 NCV 05000440/2023001-03 Open/Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.3, "Combustible Gas Mixing System," was identified when the licensee failed to perform the required actions for an inoperable "B" combustible gas mixing compressor from November 1, 2019, until February 24, 2020.

Description:

On November 1, 2019, the "B" combustible gas mixing compressor tripped immediately on thermal overload during the performance of SVI-M51-T2003B. Maintenance and operations restarted the compressor and could not reproduce a trip and the licensee closed the issue.

On February 3, 2020, the "B" combustible gas mixing compressor tripped 20 seconds after starting on thermal overload during the performance of SVI-M51-T2003B. The High Motor Amp local panel alarm locked in after the trip. The licensee declared "B" combustible gas mixing subsystem inoperable under TS 3.6.3.3, Condition A. After a review of the past three years, the licensee identified a similar issue. During November 1, 2019, testing, "B" combustible gas mixing compressor tripped on thermal overload, and the licensee entered TS 3.6.3.3, Condition A. On November 1, 2019, a work order reset the overload relay, and the licensee ran the compressor successfully with normal amperages and voltages. The licensee bench-tested the overload relay on November 4, 2019, with satisfactory results and met TS 3.6.3.3.

On February 14, 2020, the licensee replaced the overload relay and completed post-maintenance testing satisfactory. The licensee returned the "B" combustible gas mixing compressor to operable status.

On March 6, 2020, the licensee determined that inadequate procedural guidance in GEI-0029, Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Overload Heater Relays, degraded thermal overload relay testing and caused the previous system trip in November of 2019. Based upon this new information, the licensee determined "B" combustible gas mixing compressor to be inoperable from November 1, 2019, to February 14, 2020. In addition, the combustible gas mixing system function was lost during coincidental maintenance on the "A" combustible gas mixing compressor on November 1, 2019, through November 4, 2019, and again on February 4, 2020, through February 14, 2020.

On May 4, 2020, the licensee submitted Licensee Event Report (LER) 2020-001-00 per 10 CFR 50;73(a)(2)(i)(B) as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant technical specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of the combustible gas mixing system.

The licensee performed a PRA evaluation for the November 1, 2019, to February 14, 2020, "B" combustible gas mixing compressor inoperability event. The combustible gas control system is not modeled in the PRA. The combustible gas mixing system protects the reactor containment following a core damage event. As such, the inoperability of the "B" combustible gas mixing compressor does not affect core damage frequency. The combustible gas mixing compressors, hydrogen recombiners, and hydrogen igniters control hydrogen when the hydrogen concentration is below the hydrogen deflagration overpressure limit in the containment and drywell. The assessment determined that the loss of the combustible gas mixing compressor system did not impact the functions of mitigation of hydrogen and combustible gas accumulation in containment.

The inspectors identified no modeling of the combustible gas mixing system in the NRC PRA model. Also, the inspectors determined that the limited loss of the combustible gas mixing compressor system availability did not significantly impact the functions of mitigation of hydrogen and combustible gas accumulation in containment.

Corrective Actions: On February 14, 2020, the overload relay was replaced, and post maintenance testing completed satisfactory, and "B" combustible gas mixing compressor was returned to operable.

On February 18, 2020, the licensee determined the "B" combustible gas mixing compressor may not function as designed.

On March 6, 2020, the licensee investigated evidence from CR 2020-00843 Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor B tripped during surveillance testing has indicated that inadequate procedural guidance within GEI-0029 resulted in the successful testing of the thermal overloads associated with B combustible gas mixing compressor in November of 2019. The conclusion from CR 2020-00843 noted that inadequate procedural guidance within GEI-0029 is why the degraded thermal overloads passed during the previous trip in November 2019.

The licensee revised the procedure by clarifying the testing this type of overload relay.

Corrective Action References:

CR-2019-09212, Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor B Trip on Thermal Overload CR-2020-00843, Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor B Tripped During Surveillance Testing CR-2020-01274, Post Maintenance Testing Requirements Questioned for Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor Work CR-2020-01878, Potential past operability concerns with Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor B

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to perform the required actions for an inoperable

'B' combustible gas mixing compressor from Nov 1, 2019, to February 14, 2020, as required by TS 3.6.3.3.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power Per Exhibit 3, Section C Reactor Containment; question 1, the inspectors determined no conditions listed applied; question 2, the inspectors determined the combustible gas mixing compressor system to not reduce the function of the hydrogen igniters in reactor containment and screened the finding as very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Perry Nuclear Power Plant TS 3.6.3.3, Combustible Gas Mixing System, requires that while in Modes 1 and 2, two combustible gas mixing subsystems shall be operable. The TS ACTION A statement requires with one combustible gas mixing subsystems inoperable, restore combustible gas mixing subsystem to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The TS ACTION B statement requires with two combustible gas mixing subsystems inoperable, verify by administrative means that the hydrogen control function is maintained within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore one combustible gas mixing subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The TS ACTION C statement requires with ACTION A or B and associated completion time not met to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, between November 1, 2019, and February 14, 2020, B combustible gas mixing compressor was inoperable, in that degraded thermal overload relay testing caused spurious trips, and that with one combustible gas mixing subsystems inoperable, ACTION A was not taken to restore combustible gas mixing subsystem to OPERABLE status within 30 days. Between November 1, 2019, until November 4, 2019, and again on February 4, 2020, until February 14, 2020, with two combustible gas mixing subsystems inoperable, ACTION B was not taken to verify by administrative means that the hydrogen control function is maintained within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore one combustible gas mixing subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Between November 1, 2019, and February 14, 2020, with ACTION A and/or B not taken within the associated completion time, ACTION C was not taken to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Follow up of events related to reactor recirculating pump 'A' trip on 71153 January 9, 2023 The reactor plant was in Mode 1 but at reduced power while recovering from a previous plant shutdown. During power ascension, the operators shifted the reactor recirculating pumps from slow to fast speed to support the reactor power control and decay heat removal functions. When shifting the 'A' reactor recirculating pump, an electrical protective function automatically removed the pump from service. The operators entered an off-normal operating procedure for this condition and completed all actions as required. In addition, the relevant technical specifications limiting condition for operation was addressed in the applicable reactor plant mode, Mode 1, for single loop recirculation operation. Included were maximum thermal power limitations and various thermal limits placed on the nuclear fuel. As the reactor plant was relatively low in power compared to full power operation, all limits were within the limiting condition for operation. Plant operators identified additional limitations for this condition in the operational requirement manual and validated that none of these limitations were exceeded. The inspectors reviewed the overall event response for operator and equipment performance and identified no more than minor issues.

The licensee generated and approved an operational decision-making issue document to address the unusual plant configuration while consolidating and reconciling all potential limitations with the single loop recirculating loop in operation. This document included a brief description of the system operation and all relevant procedures governing the reactor plant operation while in this condition. The inspectors reviewed the operational decision-making issue document for correctness, application, and potential risks regarding single loop recirculation operation. The plant's safety analysis report addresses single loop recirculation operation and has determined that this transient is bounded by other analyzed transients. Also included was the core operating limits report that contains guidance related to how thermal limits are impacted by single loop operation. The inspectors reviewed the generation, implementation, and adherence of the operational decision-making issue document and identified no more than minor issues.

The reactor plant was shut down for a refueling and maintenance outage. The identified cause of the reactor recirculation pump trip was the cables leading from the electrical source breaker to the pump motor. The licensee replaced all three phase cables. Samples of the impacted cable were designated for further inspection by an appropriate laboratory, but at the close of this inspection, that conclusion has not been completed. In addition, the licensee replaced the 'A' reactor recirculating pump motor as planning and preparation for the activity was complete.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Chris Elliott, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

On March 30, 2023, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Rod Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 13, 2023, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Chris Elliott, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Procedures SOI-1R10(4KV) Plant Electrical System (4KV) Unit 1 10/04/2022

SOI-S11 Power Transformers 06/09/2022

71111.05 Corrective Action CR-2023-02742 Fire in Generator Exciter Breaker 04/07/2023

Documents

Fire Plans 1RB-1C Drywell 03/08/2022

FPI-1TB Turbine Building Unit 1 09/14/2018

FZ 1AB-1B Unit 1 - RHR A System 574 10 Elevation Rev. 2018

71111.08G Corrective Action CR-2021-01850 Foreign Material Found in Vessel, 310 Degrees Near the 03/24/2021

Documents Top Guide Hold Down Bolt

CR-2021-02545 1R18 RPV Leak Test: CRDMs Found Leaking 04/05/2021

Corrective Action CR-2023-01371 1R19 ISI Scope Change 02/28/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

NDE Reports 1R19-APR-03 Ultrasonic Examination of Pipe to Safe End Weld No. 03/18/2023

1N27-0034

1R19-APR-05 Ultrasonic Examination of Safe End to Nozzle Weld 03/20/2023

No. 1B13-N4C-KB

UT-23-E002 Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam Line Weld 03/10/2023

Component ID 1B21-0089

UT-23-E004 Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam Line Weld 03/10/2023

Component ID 1B21-0089A

Procedures GEH-PDI-UT-1 PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of 12.1

Ferritic Welds

GEH-UT-716 Procedure for the Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel 3

Welds from the Outside Surface with Microtomo in

Accordance with Appendix VIII

GEH-UT-718 Procedure for the Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel 3

Nozzle Inside Radius Sections from the Outside Surface

with Microtomo in Accordance with Appendix VIII

NOP-CC-5762 Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of 6

Ferritic Pipe Welds

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

NOP-CC-5763 Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of 6

Austenitic Pipe Welds

NOP-CC-5764 Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Through-Wall Sizing 2

of Planar Flaws in Similar Metal Welds

NOP-CC-5766 Appendix VIII Generic Procedure for Ultrasonic Detection & 3

Sizing of Reactor Pressure Vessel Nozzle-to-Shell Welds &

Nozzle Inner Radius

SMAW/GTAW WPS No. 1.1.2-002 3

Welding of P1 to

P1

WPS No 8.1.2- SMAW/GTAW Welding of P8 to P8 7

001

71111.11Q Procedures Scenario booklet 2023 1st Quarter ERO Table-Top Drill. TSC-EOF 02/02/2023

71111.12 Work Orders WO 200570496 Repair of Transformer LH1A High Side Cable 03/14/2023

WO 200857370 CRDM Replacement Revision 0

WO 200866718 Safety Relief Valves Remove and Replace Revision 0

WO 200900234 Replace 'A" Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor Cables Revision 0

71111.13 Corrective Action CR 2022-07882 Division 1 Diesel Right Bank Cylinder 6 Low Exhaust 10/18/2022

Documents Temperature

CR 2023-00122 Unexpected ESW LOOP A PRCS RAD MON HIGH Alarm 01/06/2023

Received

CR 2023-01057 FME: Division 1 Right Bank #6 Thermocouple Outer Sheath 02/15/2023

Found Missing During Replacement

CR 2023-01848 Outboard MSIV Actuator Yoke Adjustment 03/11/2023

CR 2023-01915 Outboard MSIV B Valve Stem Gouged 03/14/2023

CR 2023-02047 02047 1R19 LLRT: Main Steam Line Penetrations Leakage 03/17/2023

Exceeds SVI-B21-T9000 Step 5.3.4 Acceptance Criterion

CR 2023-02200 1R19 - MSIV Accumulator Supply Check Valve D Failed 03/22/2023

SVI-B21-T2200 Acceptance Criterion

CR 2023-02356 B33 A FCV,1B33-F060A, Will Not Move for PMI-115 03/27/2023

CR 2023-02394 Reactor Recirculation HPU A Valves Wired Backwards 03/29/2023

During Replacement in 1R19

Drawings 08-0490 Hydraulic Schematic 2

B-208-015 202 Reactor Recirculation System Functional Diagram 03/29/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

B-208-015 A14 Reactor Recirculation System Logic Controller 03/29/2023

Interconnection Diagram A

D-209-0015 25 Reactor Recirculation System (1833-00038) Hydraulic 03/29/2023

Power Unit

Miscellaneous 1R19 SDDID 1R19 Shutdown Defense-in-Depth Report 1

Procedures IMI-E2-0028 Source Range Monitor/Intermediate Range Monitor Detector 03/20/2023

Installation and Removal

NOBP-OP-02 Reactivity Plan Evolution Specific February Single Loop 02/11/2023

Operation Pattern Adjustment

Work Orders 200899812 **** Emergency Plan Equipment **** Spike in Activity 01/25/2023

D17K0604/CR

71111.15 Corrective Action CR 2023-00169 D17K0604 Emergency Service Water Loop A Monitor Power 01/26/2023

Documents Switch Bumped - Misposition

CR-2023-01057 Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Missing 02/15/2023

Thermocouple

CR-2023-01057 Control Rod Drive Mechanism 14-51 Position Indication 03/14/2023

Probe Incorrect Removal

CR-20230-01995 LH1A Doble Test Results 03/17/2023

71111.18 Engineering ECP 22-1105-000 HydraNut Installation on the E12 RHR Exchangers with 03/30/2023

Changes Child Packages 001 and 002

TXI-0461 Rod Control and Information System Modification Revision 7

Engineering 22-198-000 Provide Alternate Power to UPS Loads While TSC UPS 001

Evaluations Inverter Is Degraded

71111.24 Corrective Action CR 2022-09157 Flex Generator Experienced Significant Failure During 11/30/2022

Documents Routine Testing

CR 2022-09288 TSC UPS A Regulator A.C. Output L1-N Reading Out of 12/06/2022

Band

CR 2023-00100 Reactor SCRAM Due to Temporary Loss of Feedwater 01/05/2023

CR 2023-01675 OTBD FW Check Valve B Inspection Second (1N27F0825B) 03/07/2023

Can Not Be Closed

CR 2023-02185 RHR A Heat Exchanger As Found Inspection Results 03/22/2023

CR 2023-02260 RHR A and C Heat Exchanger Inspection Results 03/24/2023

CR 2023-07961 Incorrect Breaker Installed in ED1A03 10/20/2022

Corrective Action CR 2023-000840 Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Outside of 02/06/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents Acceptable Stroke Time Range

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 304-0628-00132 Emergency Closed Cooling System 01/26/2023

1-B

Engineering 60140024 1R19 Freeze Seal tracking SVI-G33-T9131 03/23/2023

Evaluations

Miscellaneous Human GREEN - AWARENESS Wrong Breaker Installed for PM 09/30/2022

Performance

News Flash

NEI Efficiency NEI Efficiency Bulletin: 16-17 Optimizing FLEX Equipment 01/24/2023

Bulletin Preventive Maintenance Strategies

Procedures SVI-B21-T900 Type C Local Leak Rate Test of 1B21 MSL Penetrations 03/25/2023

(1P22, P124, P415, and P416)

SVI-C11-T2004 Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves Operability 02/06/2023

Test

SVI-G33-T9131 Type C Local Rate Test of 1G33 Penetration P131 03/10/2023

SVI-R43-T1000-B Division 2 ECCS Integrated Test 13

SVI-R43-T1318 Diesel Generator Start and Load Division 2 27

TAI-1120-1 Total 0.6La and Secondary Containment Bypass Calculation 01/25/2023

Data Sheet

Work Orders WO 200513171 Cal Check Jacking Device Alarm SW (DG 14 day LCO) 12/11/2022

WO 200559682 ASME OM Code Remove/Replace Relief Valve 11/16/2022

WO 200677375 Reperform Operations as Required to Install Refurbed BKR 01/03/2023

BREAKER ED1A03 OVERHAUL

WO 200709777 SVI-G33T9131 1G33 penetration P131 LLRT 03/22/2023

WO 200750750 SVI-C71T0051 (31D Reactor Protection System Manual 12/26/2022

SCRAM Channel Functional

WO 200792483 SVI-M14T9313 1 (184D) Type C Local Leak Rate Test of 01/26/2023

1M14 Penetration V313

WO 200838720 PY-1X11S-0011 Function Test and Inspection 02/06/2023

WO 200855134 De-Energized/ Energized Motor Analysis 11/21/2022

WO 200864378 SVI-E12T9414 1 (30M) Type C Local Leak Rate Test of 03/14/2023

RHR to FDW Injection Valve Injection Valve 1E12-F053B

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

WO 200871691 $Open/Clean/UTT RHR A HX 03/30/2023

WO 200892940 $Open/Clean/UTT RHR C HX 03/30/2023

WO 200898168 TSC UPS A Regulator L-1-N Out of Band 12/06/2022

WO 200899795 Digital Feedwater Troubleshooting 01/05/2023

WO 200899801 Replace Foxboro CP101 / CR 01/06/2023

WO 200900292 Reactor Recirculating Pump 'A' Uncoupled Run Following 03/27/2023

Motor and Cable Replacement

WO 200909694 Connect IRM B Cable 3/20/2023

71124.01 Corrective Action CR-2023-01647 Unbriefed Dose Rate Alarm 03/07/2023

Documents

Corrective Action CR-2023-01690 NRC Identified a Compromised HRA Barricade 03/07/2023

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Procedures HPI-C0018 Radiation Protection Response to Changing Plant 4

Conditions

NOP-OP-4101 Access Controls for Radiologically Controlled Areas 20

NOP-OP-4102 Radiological Posting and Labeling 15

Radiation PY-M-20230213- "A" RHR Pump Room 02/13/2023

Surveys 2

PY-M-20230216- "A" RHR Pump Room 02/16/2023

PY-M-20230302- Under Reactor Head 03/02/2023

PY-M-20230305- Bio-Shield Insulation Removal 03/05/2023

PY-M-20230305- Drywell 599 for ISI Exam 03/05/2023

PY-M-20230307- Separator Move Dose Rates 03/07/2023

Radiation Work 230414 1R19 - LLRT Activities 0

Permits (RWPs) 230518 1R19 - Undervessel Activities 0

230601 1R19 - RWCU System Activities - LHRA 0

230602 1R19 - FAC Exams RWCU Heat Exchanger Room - LHRA 0

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152S Corrective Action CR-2022-09845 Training Document Signed by Unqualified Mentor 12/29/2022

Documents CR-2023-00661 Electrician Performed OJT Without Validation of 01/31/2023

Qualifications

CR-2023-01071 Operator Assumed Shift with Expired Respirator Quals 02/16/2023

CR-2023-01266 INPO Area of Concern: Qualification Program 02/23/2023

Miscellaneous Human OJT Performed Without Checking Qualifications 02/03/2023

Performance, GREEN - AWARENESS

News flash

Human Human Performance NEWS FLASH YELLOW - EVENT 01/26/2023

Performance.

News flash

Procedures NOPM-LP-2009 Human Performance Handbook 10/01/2020

RO 71153 Corrective Action CR 2023-00169 Excessive Leakage on the Motor Feed Pump Flow Control 01/08/2023

Documents Valve(s) During Startup

CR-2021-04371 Division 3 DG Voltage Regulator Oscillations Upon Start for 06/01/2021

SVI-E22-T1319

CR-2021-04432 Division 3 DG Follow-up Operability Determination (FOD) 06/03/2021

per CR 2021-04371

Drawings 207-0040-00000 Electrical Three Line Diagram: Standby Diesel Generator T

Division 3 - Metering

210-0100-00155 (1H13-P865) Feedwater Control System

level-2

B-208-066 Sheet Electrical Elementary Diagram: HPCS Div. 3 D.G. Excitation V

B103 1E22-S001

Miscellaneous 7031537 Purchase Order / Receipt Inspection: Static Voltage 07/17/2000

Regulator; Division III Diesel Generator

G239-061P2 Vendor Manual: Basler Model SR4A & SR8A R

SR8A Voltage

Regulator

Logs Control Room Logs - High Pressure Core Spray Diesel 06/03/2021-

Generator 06/04/2021

Logs Logs and Other Computer Generated Data 01/06/2023

NOP-ER-3001-2 Failure Mode Analysis -Reactor SCRAM of Loss of 00

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Feedwater

NOP-OP-1015-01 Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet EN # 56298 01/05/2023

PER-08816 Functional Test: Basler Electric Voltage Regulator: Model 04/20/2021

SR8A2B15B3A; Serial H00139161

PER-08817 Functional Test: Basler Electric Voltage Regulator; Model 04/20/2021

SR8A2B15B3A; Serial 24760

PNPP No.10187 Post SCRAM Restart Report Perry Nuclear Power 01/05/2023

Plant - SCRAM No. 1-23-01

Work Orders WO 200471326 Field Power Voltage Regulator 05/20/2021

WO 200856675 Field Power Voltage Regulator 06/04/2021

26