IR 05000440/2023011

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000440/2023011
ML23328A018
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/28/2023
From: Billy Dickson
NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To: Penfield R
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
References
IR 2023011
Download: ML23328A018 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2023011

Dear Rod Penfield:

On October 26, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

November 28, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000440

License Number:

NPF-58

Report Number:

05000440/2023011

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2023-011-0038

Licensee:

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Location:

Perry, OH

Inspection Dates:

October 09, 2023 to October 26, 2023

Inspectors:

J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector

B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector

D. Melendez-Colon, Reactor Inspector

R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The team performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
  • Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The teams assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of chillers related issues. The team also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
  • Operating Experience: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
  • Self-Assessments and Audits: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP promptly and accurately.

The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of the organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. External organizations, including the NRC identified some deficiencies, and the licensee subsequently entered these issues into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized several CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE)

Program. For example, the licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station processes. The licensee entered the identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from the NRC and industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP when they applied to the station.

The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

The team performed a 5-year review of chiller-related issues. Specifically, the team focused on the safety-related chillers of the control complex chilled water system. The team performed system walk-downs and evaluated condition reports for recurring or age-related issues as part of the review. Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee effectively managed problems associated with chillers and identified and entered deficiencies and concerns into the CAP at a low threshold. Corrective actions were adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance. The team did not identify any deficiencies or trends in this area.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Once the licensee identified a degraded or non-conforming issue, the CAP process effectively directed equipment operability or functionality reviews. The licensee used a multi-discipline team, the Management Review Board, consisting of department directors and managers, to verify that the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions adequately addressed the scope and significance of the documented issue. Upon completing the evaluation or action, the Corrective Action Review Board, a multi-discipline team of managers and directors, reviewed those actions to ensure they met the CAP requirements.

During the Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings, the team observed that licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing and screening issues. The team also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. The members came prepared and challenged each other on the disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety significance of the issues. The team did not identify any deficiencies or trends in this area.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a root cause evaluation or other causal evaluation methodologies were resolved following CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations identified by the NRC previously and with licensee event reports. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally timely and commensurate with the safety significance of the problem.

The team also reviewed the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule Program.

Specifically, the team reviewed Maintenance Rule Program procedures and conditions reports. The team selected one of the systems classified as Maintenance Rule (a)(1), reactor water cleanup system (RWCU), for an in-depth review. The team reviewed documentation for scoping the system into the Maintenance Rule program, the systems risk significance determination, performance criteria selection, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluations, action plans, and goals. The team also reviewed the most recent Maintenance Rule (a)(3) periodic assessment. The team determined that the licensee effectively implemented the Maintenance Rule Program with this system. The licensee has identified issues with the system, entered those issues into the CAP, and addressed those issues per the (a)(1) action plan under the CAP.

Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in using Operating Experience (OE) was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, the licensee wrote condition reports and developed and implemented actions to prevent similar issues. The licensee communicated OE lessons learned and incorporated these lessons learned into plant operations. The team observed the licensee using OE information in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, issue reviews, and investigations. The licensee also highlighted selected issues at other Energy Harbor sites in daily meetings or activities.

The team noted that from a licensees self-assessment performed for this PI&R inspection, not all Part 21s listed for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023 were screened in a timely manner. Each department generally reviewed operating experience, including Part 21s from Industry and NRC, for applicability to Perry. Based on this self-assessment finding, the licensee generated action items to ensure the future timeliness of Part 21 screening. The team reviewed the licensee's planned actions and the Part 21s in question and did not identify any concern of more than minor significance.

Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization periodically.

These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team were thorough and intrusive in assessing the underlying topics. These self-assessments and audits identified issues that the station did not previously recognized.

In general, any identified issues were captured, and actions were taken to address in the CAP. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.

Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the Perry 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) survey result for this inspection. The team noted that the survey results revealed some negative responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and departmental SCWE issues. As a result, the team reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey results. The team also interviewed a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors and supervisors from various departments and long-term contractors at the site. The team also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 27 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.

Based on the individual interviews and a review of the licensee's actions, the team determined that licensee staff could raise nuclear safety and safeguards issues through multiple channels, including ECP, without fear of retaliation and that the CAP effectively addresses quality issues. Therefore, the team found no evidence of challenges to the SCWE at Perry.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On October 26, 2023, the team presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Rod Penfield and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2015-08036

PFA Needed for Site Flooding Issues

06/08/2015

CR-2018-00698

Need to Determine the Classification and Requirements of

the Door in the MB100 Lube Oil Issue Room

01/26/2018

CR-2018-05939

NRC EQ DBAI: Accounting for Heat Rise in EQ Component

Evaluations

06/28/2018

CR-2019-00401

Spent Fuel Pool Level Indicator 1X13R0001 Out of Band

01/15/2019

CR-2020-00830

RFB Pump B Discharge Check Valve Leak Sealant Clamp

TCC-1-N27-LR-001 Not Scoped in 1R18

2/03/2020

CR-2021-00824

M&TE Out of Tolerance Resulted in Exceeding Allowable

Band

2/09/2021

CR-2021-01650

Roll-up CR for Loss of Both RWCU Pumps

03/07/2021

CR-2021-01763

MS-C-21-03-30: FINDING: Ineffective Corrective Actions:

Failure to Meet the Corrective Action Requirements of

CFR 72.172 on Documenting Equipment Failures during

the Spent Fuel Dry Storage Campaign #4

03/12/2021

CR-2021-02894

Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Containment

Isolation Valves (Penetration (P132)) Issues

04/14/2021

CR-2021-05408

21 DBAI POV Inspection: RCIC Steam Supply Isolation

Valves Questionable Calculation Justification

07/15/2021

CR-2021-05435

Addition - 2021 DBAI POV Inspection: JOG Classification of

RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valves

07/16/2021

CR-2021-07175

Control Room Habitability Assessment: Deficiency Exists in

Tracking Control Room Boundary Deficiencies as Potential

Limiting Conditions for Operation

09/24/2021

CR-2021-07423

NRC NCV - Failure to Establish a Program to Ensure Motor

Operated Valves Continue to be Capable of Performing Their

Design Basis Safety Functions

10/05/2021

CR-2021-07479

CCCW Chiller C High Voltage Power Lead Found Degraded

10/07/2021

CR-2021-07840

Unit 2 Safety Bus EH21 Does Not Appear to Meet Class 1E

Requirements

10/18/2021

71152B

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2021-07840

Unit 2 Safety Bus EH21 Does Not Appear to Meet Class 1E

Requirements

10/18/2021

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2021-08059

Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Changed Following Drywell

Ventilation Shift

10/24/2021

CR-2021-08550

Wear Damage on Internal Parts of Filter Dryer for Control

Complex Chiller 'C'

11/09/2021

CR-2021-08630

MS-C-21-11-24: Emergency Preparedness Inventory

Discrepancy

11/11/2021

CR-2021-08632

MS-C-21-11-24: Procedure Issues at the EOF, TSC,

Alternate TSC, and OSC

11/11/2021

CR-2021-09019

ENS Phone Challenges

11/27/2021

CR-2021-09050

Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Not Available for

Surveillance Testing (SVI-R45-T2003)

11/28/2021

CR-2021-09065

Control Complex Chilled Water Chiller C Temperature

Sensor Failures

11/29/2021

CR-2021-09379

Slow Steady Rise in Reactor Recirc A Pump Outer Seal

Pressure

2/11/2021

CR-2021-09454

One Radiation Protection Technician Did Not Respond to the

Unannounced Call-In Test in a Timely Manner

2/14/2021

CR-2021-09462

Changes Made by ECP Were Not Incorporated into

Calculation M25-000

2/14/2021

CR-2021-09536

Compressor Discharge Temperature Sensor Part

Interchangeability Evaluation (PIE) Did Not Identify Change

to Wire Sleeve Effecting Installation

2/16/2021

CR-2022-00376

Impact on Perry from the DB NRC NCV for Failure to

Analyze NIX System and Identify the System as a CDA

01/18/2022

CR-2022-00764

Debris Captured during Condensate Storage Cleaning

2/01/2022

CR-2022-00764

Debris Captured during Condensate Storage Cleaning

07/16/2021

CR-2022-00784

RWCU Pump A Confirmed Thermal Neck Failure

2/02/2022

CR-2022-04231

Relay Contacts 3 to 5 Indeterminate for Relay 0P47Q7024

05/19/2022

CR-2022-04267

RHR Pump B Seal Replacement Scheduling Decision

05/20/2022

CR-2022-04425

Emergency Notification System Phone in the Control Room

Not Functioning Properly

05/26/2022

CR-2022-04679

Work Order 200860078 to Inspect RWCU Return Header

Outboard Isolation Valve Not to be Performed as Required

by CA-2021-02894-001

06/07/2022

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2022-05107

LPCS Minimum Flow Valve Blew 2 Main Line Fuses

06/24/2022

CR-2022-05808

Configuration Control Committee: Identified Development of

a Trend Relative to Components Installed outside of

Approved Engineering Processes

07/26/2022

CR-2022-05861

Residual Heat Removal Pump B to Feedwater Line Flush

Check Valve Leaking

07/22/2022

CR-2022-06077

Rise in Drywell Unidentified Leakage

08/07/2022

CR-2022-07267

Control Complex Chiller C (P47C) Chiller Oil Level High

09/26/2022

CR-2022-07297

ERO Drill - Unplanned Controller Injects

09/28/2022

CR-2022-07396

Low Oil Level - Control Complex Chiller C

10/02/2022

CR-2022-07407

Rise in Unidentified RCS Leakage

10/03/2022

CR-2022-07485

Drywell Unidentified Leakage Classified as RED (>= 1.0

GPM) per PYBP-SITE-0029

10/06/2022

CR-2022-08252

Contamination Found in Clean Area During Walkdown in

HB60002 - LHRA due to Steam Leak

10/31/2022

CR-2022-08498

Reactor Recirculation Pump A Seal Leakage

11/07/2022

CR-2022-08733

Installed Time-Delay Relays Discovered to Certain Digital

Components

07/25/2022

CR-2022-09009

Control Complex Chiller C - Oil High

11/24/2022

CR-2023-00877

23 Pre-NRC Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection

(CETI) Inspection: Non-Timely Follow-Up Action Resolution

to OE-2021-0208-1

2/08/2023

CR-2023-00893

During the Fix It Now (FIN) Minor Work Screening Process, a

Conditional Single Point Vulnerability Was Missed

2/08/2023

CR-2023-01054

23 Pre-NRC CETI Self-Assessment: Diesel Generator

SVIs for Voltage and Frequency Do Not Account for

Measurement Uncertainty

2/15/2023

CR-2023-01158

Elevation: Events with Significant Plant Impact within the

Past Six Months

2/20/2023

CR-2023-01409

Improvement Opportunities with Scaffold Conditions

2/28/2023

CR-2023-01744

Storage Level B Areas Not Monitored by Calibrated

Temperature Sensing Devices

03/09/2023

CR-2023-01994

Faulty Accumulat3ed Dose Alarm Received by work

03/15/2023

CR-2023-02047

1R19 LLRT: Main Steam Line Penetrations Leakage

03/17/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Exceeds SVI-B21-T9000 Step 5.3.4 Acceptance Criterion

CR-2023-02100

Individual Received Un-Briefed Dose Rate Alarm

03/19/2023

CR-2023-03180

Irregular Calibration Factor on Dosimeters Causes Faulty

Alarms

04/18/2023

CR-2023-03677

Possible Degrading Trend of Control Complex Chilled Water

Train C

05/01/2023

CR-2023-03720

Reactor Water Clean-Up Roll-Up CR

05/02/2023

CR-2023-03943

Armed Security Officer Outside of Their Area of

Responsibility

05/10/2023

CR-2023-03997

Control Complex Chilled Water "C" Chiller Trip

05/12/2023

CR-2023-04447

Loss of Network Resulting in Loss of NRC ENS Line and

ERDS

05/30/2023

CR-2023-04821

Drywell Identified Leakage Step Change Improvement

06/15/2023

CR-2023-04907

Faulty Self-Reading Dosimetry

06/19/2023

CR-2023-05010

Loss of Network Resulting in Loss of NRC ENS Line and

ERDS

06/23/2023

CR-2023-05021

Yokogawa Recorder Found With "Media not Inserted"

Message on Screen on Hydrogen Recombiner

06/23/2023

CR-2023-05319

Emergency Notification System Phone (Red Phone in

Control Room) is Not Working

07/05/2023

CR-2023-05433

Motor Control Center Drawing Updates not Performed

07/11/2023

CR-2023-05433

Motor Control Center (MCC) Overloads Drawing Updates Not

Performed for Overload Relays

07/11/2023

CR-2023-05467

Emergency Telecommunication System Phones Inoperable

07/12/2023

CR-2023-05801

M&TE Probe Missing

07/25/2023

CR-2023-05901

MS-C-23-07-08: Condition Report Categories Incorrectly

Assigned for M&TE Condition Report and Inadequate Details

in Condition Report to Fully Identify the Issue

07/28/2023

CR-2023-06088

NRC Minor Violation: Non-Conforming Condition due to

Incorrect Gasket Installation in the Standby Liquid Control

(SLC) System

08/04/2023

CR-2023-06345

DC Bus ED-1-A Ground Fault Alarm

08/15/2023

CR-2023-06399

Fire Door IB-108 Will Not Latch

08/17/2023

CR-2023-06607

Degrading Trend in Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System

08/24/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-2023-06649

Grid Disturbance Observed During Severe Thunderstorm

08/25/2023

CR-2023-07969

Illuminate Implementation Delay

10/23/2023

CR-2023-07969

Illuminate Implementation Delay

10/23/2023

CR-2023-07676

23 PI&R Inspection: Incorrect Document Provided to 2023

NRC Inspection Team

10/11/2023

CR-2023-07945

23 PI&R Inspection. CR-2023-03180 Was Incorrectly

Classified as NC Instead of AF

10/23/2023

CR-2023-07964

23 PI&R Inspection: CA-2022-05808-008 Identified Closed

Without Objective Evidence

10/23/2023

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2023-07994

23 NRC PI&R Inspection: CR-2021-09379 Was Incorrectly

Classified as An NC Instead of n AC

10/24/2023

Drawings

40-0425-00004

Gate Valve Assembly 1E21F0011

A

EER 601214678

Develop TCC Package to Replace TMod

06/11/2019

OE-2021-0105-7-

IN2020-01

Berried Cast Iron Fire Protection Piping

09/22/2023

OE-2021-0471-1

Nine Mile Point; Safety-Related Service Water Discharge

Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Failed to Open

06/30/2022

OE-2022-0276-1

Limerick Reactor Pressure Rise Caused by Turbine Control

Valve Position Oscillation

2/16/2023

OE-2022-0361-3

RIS-2022-02; Operational Leakage

04/10/2023

OE-2023-0022-1

Watts Bar Hotwell Pump Upper Motor Bearing Failure

08/16/2023

OE-2023-0032-1

River Bend High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperable

due to Transformer Feeder Malfunction

07/25/2023

Engineering

Evaluations

OE-2023-0091-1

IN-2023-01; Risk Insights from High Energy Arcing Faults

08/05/2023

Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - System G33

NIX Upgrade Project Management Plan

Perry 2022 SCWE Survey

09/2022

CR-2022-06020

Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form for System

PY-G33

11/29/2022

CR-2022-08509

Manual Trip of Main Turbine During Startup

11/07/2022

CR-2023-03747

10CFR Part 21 Communications: Failure of the Control Rod

Drive Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld

05/03/2023

Miscellaneous

CR-2023-06100

10CFR Part 21 Notification: P21-08032023-IN from Paragon

Energy Services Regarding Safety Contactors Failing in the

08/04/2023

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Energized Position

CR-2023-06141

Emergency Response Organization Notification System

(ERONS) Weekly Notification Test Performed Incorrectly

08/07/2023

CR-2023-06215

Automatic Reactor SCRAM and MSIV Closure Following

RPS Bus Shift from ALT to NORM B

08/10/2023

CR-2023-06871

General Electric Hitachi (GEH) Issued Non-Reportable

10CFR Part 21 Impacting Control Blade Lifetime Limits

09/05/2023

MS-C-21-11-24

Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Emergency

Preparedness

10/22/2021

MS-C-22-03-01

Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Operations

03/07/2022

MS-C-22-11-24

Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Emergency

Preparedness

11/16/2022

MS-C-23-01-13

Quality Assurance Audit Report Design Control/Engineering

Programs/ASME

2/21/2023

MS-C-23-02-16

Quality Assurance Audit Report Procurement Program

03/23/2023

QFO-2021-0015

21 Maintenance and Work Management Audit

10/07/2021

QFO-2022-0003

22 Maintenance and Work Management Audit

07/01/2022

QFO-2023-0003

Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Audit, 2023

07/21/2023

QFO-2023-0006

Cyber Security Audit, 2023

07/21/2023

NOBP-ER-3003

System Performance Monitoring Program

NOP-ER-3004

Maintenance Rule Program

NOP-LP-2001

Corrective Action Program

NOP-OP-4205

Dose Assessment

Procedures

PYBP-PES-0001

Maintenance Rule Reference Guide

Periodic Assessment of the Maintenance Rule Program

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Cycle 19 April 09, 2021 through

April 20, 2023

08/24/2023

ATA-2021-12905

Pre-NRC In-Plant Airborne and Occupational Dose

Assessment

2/17/2021

ATA-2022-2193

PNPP Site Protection 2022 Safety Assessment

09/19/2022

ATA-2022-2379

Radiation Waste Shipping and Processing Assessment

06/17/2022

Self-Assessments

ATA-2022-7625

PY Equipment Performance Testing and Maintenance

Inspection Self-Assessment (Security)

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

ATA-2023-0594

Perry 2022 Annual Self-Assessment on Clearance Process,

Procedures and Practices

2/23/2023

ATA-2023-10673

Pre-NRC Inspection on Problem Identification and Resolution

08/22/2023

ATA-2023-12406

23 PY Pre-NRC EP Self-Assessment Plan

08/15/2023

ATL-2020-0084-

ATA-31

Perform an Assessment on the Plant Health Committee

2/28/2021

ATL-2021-0401-

ATA-55

Ops Fundamentals Self-Assessment

10/01/2021

ATL-2021-0768-

ATA-29

Work Order Closure Effectiveness Review

09/06/2023

CR-2021-04919-

ATA-04

Past Reportability Review Assessment

07/11/2022

CR-2023-01022

23 Pre-NRC Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection

(CETI) Self-Assessment; Follow-Up to Previous Part 21

Notifications not yet Addressed

2/14/2023

CR-2023-05964

Receipt of Vendor Technical Information is Not Always

Tracked Per NOP-CC-1003

08/01/2023

200776963

Calibrate Meter 1X13R001

2/22/2019

200785743

Rebuild/Replace Mechanical Seal Reactor Recirc Pump "A"

01/19/2023

Work Orders

200887747

T/S Repair Valve Replace Blown Fuses - LPCS Pump

Min-Flow Valve

08/12/2022