IR 05000440/2023011

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Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000440/2023011
ML23328A018
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/28/2023
From: Billy Dickson
NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To: Penfield R
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
References
IR 2023011
Download: ML23328A018 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2023011

Dear Rod Penfield:

On October 26, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.November 28, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000440

License Number: NPF-58

Report Number: 05000440/2023011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-011-0038

Licensee: Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Location: Perry, OH

Inspection Dates: October 09, 2023 to October 26, 2023

Inspectors: J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Melendez-Colon, Reactor Inspector R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The team performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
  • Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The teams assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of chillers related issues. The team also reviewed the corrective actions for selected NRC non-cited violations and findings.
  • Operating Experience: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.
  • Self-Assessments and Audits: The team assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program

Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was generally effective and supported nuclear safety.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the CAP. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the CAP promptly and accurately.

The team noted that issues were being identified by all levels of the organization and with varying degrees of safety significance. External organizations, including the NRC identified some deficiencies, and the licensee subsequently entered these issues into the CAP for resolution. The licensee also utilized several CAP support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit processes and the Operating Experience (OE)

Program. For example, the licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Nuclear Oversight audits to identify issues in station processes. The licensee entered the identified deficiencies and improvement opportunities into the CAP for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from the NRC and industry OE programs and entered them into the CAP when they applied to the station.

The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low-level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the CAP to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

The team performed a 5-year review of chiller-related issues. Specifically, the team focused on the safety-related chillers of the control complex chilled water system. The team performed system walk-downs and evaluated condition reports for recurring or age-related issues as part of the review. Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee effectively managed problems associated with chillers and identified and entered deficiencies and concerns into the CAP at a low threshold. Corrective actions were adequate and timely, commensurate with their safety significance. The team did not identify any deficiencies or trends in this area.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Once the licensee identified a degraded or non-conforming issue, the CAP process effectively directed equipment operability or functionality reviews. The licensee used a multi-discipline team, the Management Review Board, consisting of department directors and managers, to verify that the condition report categorization, evaluation method selection, and other actions adequately addressed the scope and significance of the documented issue. Upon completing the evaluation or action, the Corrective Action Review Board, a multi-discipline team of managers and directors, reviewed those actions to ensure they met the CAP requirements.

During the Management Review Board and Corrective Action Review Board meetings, the team observed that licensee staff were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing and screening issues. The team also observed healthy dialogues and good interactions among the members of the respective groups. The members came prepared and challenged each other on the disposition of the identified conditions. Actions were prioritized based on the safety significance of the issues. The team did not identify any deficiencies or trends in this area.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in corrective action implementation. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems requiring the performance of a root cause evaluation or other causal evaluation methodologies were resolved following CAP requirements. The team sampled assignments associated with violations identified by the NRC previously and with licensee event reports. The team determined that the corrective actions sampled were generally timely and commensurate with the safety significance of the problem.

The team also reviewed the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule Program.

Specifically, the team reviewed Maintenance Rule Program procedures and conditions reports. The team selected one of the systems classified as Maintenance Rule (a)(1), reactor water cleanup system (RWCU), for an in-depth review. The team reviewed documentation for scoping the system into the Maintenance Rule program, the systems risk significance determination, performance criteria selection, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) evaluations, action plans, and goals. The team also reviewed the most recent Maintenance Rule (a)(3) periodic assessment. The team determined that the licensee effectively implemented the Maintenance Rule Program with this system. The licensee has identified issues with the system, entered those issues into the CAP, and addressed those issues per the (a)(1) action plan under the CAP.

Assessment 71152B Use of Operating Experience

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance in using Operating Experience (OE) was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC OE information for applicability to the station. When applicable, the licensee wrote condition reports and developed and implemented actions to prevent similar issues. The licensee communicated OE lessons learned and incorporated these lessons learned into plant operations. The team observed the licensee using OE information in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, issue reviews, and investigations. The licensee also highlighted selected issues at other Energy Harbor sites in daily meetings or activities.

The team noted that from a licensees self-assessment performed for this PI&R inspection, not all Part 21s listed for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023 were screened in a timely manner. Each department generally reviewed operating experience, including Part 21s from Industry and NRC, for applicability to Perry. Based on this self-assessment finding, the licensee generated action items to ensure the future timeliness of Part 21 screening. The team reviewed the licensee's planned actions and the Part 21s in question and did not identify any concern of more than minor significance.

Assessment 71152B Self-Assessments and Audits

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed departmental self-assessments and Quality Assurance audits throughout the organization periodically.

These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team were thorough and intrusive in assessing the underlying topics. These self-assessments and audits identified issues that the station did not previously recognized.

In general, any identified issues were captured, and actions were taken to address in the CAP. The team did not identify any concerns in this area.

Assessment 71152B Safety Conscious Work Environment

The team reviewed the Perry 2022 Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) survey result for this inspection. The team noted that the survey results revealed some negative responses regarding the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and departmental SCWE issues. As a result, the team reviewed licensee actions to address the negative survey results. The team also interviewed a representative cross-section of licensee personnel, including individual contributors and supervisors from various departments and long-term contractors at the site. The team also interviewed the ECP manager and reviewed selected ECP case files. A total of 27 licensee personnel were interviewed during this inspection.

Based on the individual interviews and a review of the licensee's actions, the team determined that licensee staff could raise nuclear safety and safeguards issues through multiple channels, including ECP, without fear of retaliation and that the CAP effectively addresses quality issues. Therefore, the team found no evidence of challenges to the SCWE at Perry.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On October 26, 2023, the team presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Rod Penfield and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152B Corrective Action CR-2015-08036 PFA Needed for Site Flooding Issues 06/08/2015

Documents CR-2018-00698 Need to Determine the Classification and Requirements of 01/26/2018

the Door in the MB100 Lube Oil Issue Room

CR-2018-05939 NRC EQ DBAI: Accounting for Heat Rise in EQ Component 06/28/2018

Evaluations

CR-2019-00401 Spent Fuel Pool Level Indicator 1X13R0001 Out of Band 01/15/2019

CR-2020-00830 RFB Pump B Discharge Check Valve Leak Sealant Clamp 02/03/2020

TCC-1-N27-LR-001 Not Scoped in 1R18

CR-2021-00824 M&TE Out of Tolerance Resulted in Exceeding Allowable 02/09/2021

Band

CR-2021-01650 Roll-up CR for Loss of Both RWCU Pumps 03/07/2021

CR-2021-01763 MS-C-21-03-30: FINDING: Ineffective Corrective Actions: 03/12/2021

Failure to Meet the Corrective Action Requirements of

CFR 72.172 on Documenting Equipment Failures during

the Spent Fuel Dry Storage Campaign #4

CR-2021-02894 Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Containment 04/14/2021

Isolation Valves (Penetration (P132)) Issues

CR-2021-05408 2021 DBAI POV Inspection: RCIC Steam Supply Isolation 07/15/2021

Valves Questionable Calculation Justification

CR-2021-05435 Addition - 2021 DBAI POV Inspection: JOG Classification of 07/16/2021

RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valves

CR-2021-07175 Control Room Habitability Assessment: Deficiency Exists in 09/24/2021

Tracking Control Room Boundary Deficiencies as Potential

Limiting Conditions for Operation

CR-2021-07423 NRC NCV - Failure to Establish a Program to Ensure Motor 10/05/2021

Operated Valves Continue to be Capable of Performing Their

Design Basis Safety Functions

CR-2021-07479 CCCW Chiller C High Voltage Power Lead Found Degraded 10/07/2021

CR-2021-07840 Unit 2 Safety Bus EH21 Does Not Appear to Meet Class 1E 10/18/2021

Requirements

CR-2021-07840 Unit 2 Safety Bus EH21 Does Not Appear to Meet Class 1E 10/18/2021

Requirements

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CR-2021-08059 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Changed Following Drywell 10/24/2021

Ventilation Shift

CR-2021-08550 Wear Damage on Internal Parts of Filter Dryer for Control 11/09/2021

Complex Chiller 'C'

CR-2021-08630 MS-C-21-11-24: Emergency Preparedness Inventory 11/11/2021

Discrepancy

CR-2021-08632 MS-C-21-11-24: Procedure Issues at the EOF, TSC, 11/11/2021

Alternate TSC, and OSC

CR-2021-09019 ENS Phone Challenges 11/27/2021

CR-2021-09050 Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Not Available for 11/28/2021

Surveillance Testing (SVI-R45-T2003)

CR-2021-09065 Control Complex Chilled Water Chiller C Temperature 11/29/2021

Sensor Failures

CR-2021-09379 Slow Steady Rise in Reactor Recirc A Pump Outer Seal 12/11/2021

Pressure

CR-2021-09454 One Radiation Protection Technician Did Not Respond to the 12/14/2021

Unannounced Call-In Test in a Timely Manner

CR-2021-09462 Changes Made by ECP Were Not Incorporated into 12/14/2021

Calculation M25-000

CR-2021-09536 Compressor Discharge Temperature Sensor Part 12/16/2021

Interchangeability Evaluation (PIE) Did Not Identify Change

to Wire Sleeve Effecting Installation

CR-2022-00376 Impact on Perry from the DB NRC NCV for Failure to 01/18/2022

Analyze NIX System and Identify the System as a CDA

CR-2022-00764 Debris Captured during Condensate Storage Cleaning 02/01/2022

CR-2022-00764 Debris Captured during Condensate Storage Cleaning 07/16/2021

CR-2022-00784 RWCU Pump A Confirmed Thermal Neck Failure 02/02/2022

CR-2022-04231 Relay Contacts 3 to 5 Indeterminate for Relay 0P47Q7024 05/19/2022

CR-2022-04267 RHR Pump B Seal Replacement Scheduling Decision 05/20/2022

CR-2022-04425 Emergency Notification System Phone in the Control Room 05/26/2022

Not Functioning Properly

CR-2022-04679 Work Order 200860078 to Inspect RWCU Return Header 06/07/2022

Outboard Isolation Valve Not to be Performed as Required

by CA-2021-02894-001

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CR-2022-05107 LPCS Minimum Flow Valve Blew 2 Main Line Fuses 06/24/2022

CR-2022-05808 Configuration Control Committee: Identified Development of 07/26/2022

a Trend Relative to Components Installed outside of

Approved Engineering Processes

CR-2022-05861 Residual Heat Removal Pump B to Feedwater Line Flush 07/22/2022

Check Valve Leaking

CR-2022-06077 Rise in Drywell Unidentified Leakage 08/07/2022

CR-2022-07267 Control Complex Chiller C (P47C) Chiller Oil Level High 09/26/2022

CR-2022-07297 ERO Drill - Unplanned Controller Injects 09/28/2022

CR-2022-07396 Low Oil Level - Control Complex Chiller C 10/02/2022

CR-2022-07407 Rise in Unidentified RCS Leakage 10/03/2022

CR-2022-07485 Drywell Unidentified Leakage Classified as RED (>= 1.0 10/06/2022

GPM) per PYBP-SITE-0029

CR-2022-08252 Contamination Found in Clean Area During Walkdown in 10/31/2022

HB60002 - LHRA due to Steam Leak

CR-2022-08498 Reactor Recirculation Pump A Seal Leakage 11/07/2022

CR-2022-08733 Installed Time-Delay Relays Discovered to Certain Digital 07/25/2022

Components

CR-2022-09009 Control Complex Chiller C - Oil High 11/24/2022

CR-2023-00877 2023 Pre-NRC Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection 02/08/2023

(CETI) Inspection: Non-Timely Follow-Up Action Resolution

to OE-2021-0208-1

CR-2023-00893 During the Fix It Now (FIN) Minor Work Screening Process, a 02/08/2023

Conditional Single Point Vulnerability Was Missed

CR-2023-01054 2023 Pre-NRC CETI Self-Assessment: Diesel Generator 02/15/2023

SVIs for Voltage and Frequency Do Not Account for

Measurement Uncertainty

CR-2023-01158 Elevation: Events with Significant Plant Impact within the 02/20/2023

Past Six Months

CR-2023-01409 Improvement Opportunities with Scaffold Conditions 02/28/2023

CR-2023-01744 Storage Level B Areas Not Monitored by Calibrated 03/09/2023

Temperature Sensing Devices

CR-2023-01994 Faulty Accumulat3ed Dose Alarm Received by work 03/15/2023

CR-2023-02047 1R19 LLRT: Main Steam Line Penetrations Leakage 03/17/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Exceeds SVI-B21-T9000 Step 5.3.4 Acceptance Criterion

CR-2023-02100 Individual Received Un-Briefed Dose Rate Alarm 03/19/2023

CR-2023-03180 Irregular Calibration Factor on Dosimeters Causes Faulty 04/18/2023

Alarms

CR-2023-03677 Possible Degrading Trend of Control Complex Chilled Water 05/01/2023

Train C

CR-2023-03720 Reactor Water Clean-Up Roll-Up CR 05/02/2023

CR-2023-03943 Armed Security Officer Outside of Their Area of 05/10/2023

Responsibility

CR-2023-03997 Control Complex Chilled Water "C" Chiller Trip 05/12/2023

CR-2023-04447 Loss of Network Resulting in Loss of NRC ENS Line and 05/30/2023

ERDS

CR-2023-04821 Drywell Identified Leakage Step Change Improvement 06/15/2023

CR-2023-04907 Faulty Self-Reading Dosimetry 06/19/2023

CR-2023-05010 Loss of Network Resulting in Loss of NRC ENS Line and 06/23/2023

ERDS

CR-2023-05021 Yokogawa Recorder Found With "Media not Inserted" 06/23/2023

Message on Screen on Hydrogen Recombiner

CR-2023-05319 Emergency Notification System Phone (Red Phone in 07/05/2023

Control Room) is Not Working

CR-2023-05433 Motor Control Center Drawing Updates not Performed 07/11/2023

CR-2023-05433 Motor Control Center (MCC) Overloads Drawing Updates Not 07/11/2023

Performed for Overload Relays

CR-2023-05467 Emergency Telecommunication System Phones Inoperable 07/12/2023

CR-2023-05801 M&TE Probe Missing 07/25/2023

CR-2023-05901 MS-C-23-07-08: Condition Report Categories Incorrectly 07/28/2023

Assigned for M&TE Condition Report and Inadequate Details

in Condition Report to Fully Identify the Issue

CR-2023-06088 NRC Minor Violation: Non-Conforming Condition due to 08/04/2023

Incorrect Gasket Installation in the Standby Liquid Control

(SLC) System

CR-2023-06345 DC Bus ED-1-A Ground Fault Alarm 08/15/2023

CR-2023-06399 Fire Door IB-108 Will Not Latch 08/17/2023

CR-2023-06607 Degrading Trend in Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean Up System 08/24/2023

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CR-2023-06649 Grid Disturbance Observed During Severe Thunderstorm 08/25/2023

CR-2023-07969 Illuminate Implementation Delay 10/23/2023

CR-2023-07969 Illuminate Implementation Delay 10/23/2023

Corrective Action CR-2023-07676 2023 PI&R Inspection: Incorrect Document Provided to 2023 10/11/2023

Documents NRC Inspection Team

Resulting from CR-2023-07945 2023 PI&R Inspection. CR-2023-03180 Was Incorrectly 10/23/2023

Inspection Classified as NC Instead of AF

CR-2023-07964 2023 PI&R Inspection: CA-2022-05808-008 Identified Closed 10/23/2023

Without Objective Evidence

CR-2023-07994 2023 NRC PI&R Inspection: CR-2021-09379 Was Incorrectly 10/24/2023

Classified as An NC Instead of n AC

Drawings 40-0425-00004 Gate Valve Assembly 1E21F0011 A

Engineering EER 601214678 Develop TCC Package to Replace TMod 06/11/2019

Evaluations OE-2021-0105-7-Berried Cast Iron Fire Protection Piping 09/22/2023

IN2020-01

OE-2021-0471-1 Nine Mile Point; Safety-Related Service Water Discharge 06/30/2022

Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Failed to Open

OE-2022-0276-1 Limerick Reactor Pressure Rise Caused by Turbine Control 02/16/2023

Valve Position Oscillation

OE-2022-0361-3 RIS-2022-02; Operational Leakage 04/10/2023

OE-2023-0022-1 Watts Bar Hotwell Pump Upper Motor Bearing Failure 08/16/2023

OE-2023-0032-1 River Bend High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperable 07/25/2023

due to Transformer Feeder Malfunction

OE-2023-0091-1 IN-2023-01; Risk Insights from High Energy Arcing Faults 08/05/2023

Miscellaneous Maintenance Rule System Basis Document - System G33 0

NIX Upgrade Project Management Plan 0

Perry 2022 SCWE Survey 09/2022

CR-2022-06020 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Evaluation Form for System 11/29/2022

PY-G33

CR-2022-08509 Manual Trip of Main Turbine During Startup 11/07/2022

CR-2023-03747 10CFR Part 21 Communications: Failure of the Control Rod 05/03/2023

Drive Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld

CR-2023-06100 10CFR Part 21 Notification: P21-08032023-IN from Paragon 08/04/2023

Energy Services Regarding Safety Contactors Failing in the

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Energized Position

CR-2023-06141 Emergency Response Organization Notification System 08/07/2023

(ERONS) Weekly Notification Test Performed Incorrectly

CR-2023-06215 Automatic Reactor SCRAM and MSIV Closure Following 08/10/2023

RPS Bus Shift from ALT to NORM B

CR-2023-06871 General Electric Hitachi (GEH) Issued Non-Reportable 09/05/2023

10CFR Part 21 Impacting Control Blade Lifetime Limits

MS-C-21-11-24 Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Emergency 10/22/2021

Preparedness

MS-C-22-03-01 Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Operations 03/07/2022

MS-C-22-11-24 Quality Assurance Multi-Site Audit of Emergency 11/16/2022

Preparedness

MS-C-23-01-13 Quality Assurance Audit Report Design Control/Engineering 02/21/2023

Programs/ASME

MS-C-23-02-16 Quality Assurance Audit Report Procurement Program 03/23/2023

QFO-2021-0015 2021 Maintenance and Work Management Audit 10/07/2021

QFO-2022-0003 2022 Maintenance and Work Management Audit 07/01/2022

QFO-2023-0003 Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Audit, 2023 07/21/2023

QFO-2023-0006 Cyber Security Audit, 2023 07/21/2023

Procedures NOBP-ER-3003 System Performance Monitoring Program 10

NOP-ER-3004 Maintenance Rule Program 6

NOP-LP-2001 Corrective Action Program 50

NOP-OP-4205 Dose Assessment 11

PYBP-PES-0001 Maintenance Rule Reference Guide 16

Self-Assessments Periodic Assessment of the Maintenance Rule Program 08/24/2023

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Cycle 19 April 09, 2021 through

April 20, 2023

ATA-2021-12905 Pre-NRC In-Plant Airborne and Occupational Dose 12/17/2021

Assessment

ATA-2022-2193 PNPP Site Protection 2022 Safety Assessment 09/19/2022

ATA-2022-2379 Radiation Waste Shipping and Processing Assessment 06/17/2022

ATA-2022-7625 PY Equipment Performance Testing and Maintenance

Inspection Self-Assessment (Security)

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

ATA-2023-0594 Perry 2022 Annual Self-Assessment on Clearance Process, 02/23/2023

Procedures and Practices

ATA-2023-10673 Pre-NRC Inspection on Problem Identification and Resolution08/22/2023

ATA-2023-12406 2023 PY Pre-NRC EP Self-Assessment Plan 08/15/2023

ATL-2020-0084-Perform an Assessment on the Plant Health Committee 12/28/2021

ATA-31

ATL-2021-0401-Ops Fundamentals Self-Assessment 10/01/2021

ATA-55

ATL-2021-0768-Work Order Closure Effectiveness Review 09/06/2023

ATA-29

CR-2021-04919-Past Reportability Review Assessment 07/11/2022

ATA-04

CR-2023-01022 2023 Pre-NRC Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection 02/14/2023

(CETI) Self-Assessment; Follow-Up to Previous Part 21

Notifications not yet Addressed

CR-2023-05964 Receipt of Vendor Technical Information is Not Always 08/01/2023

Tracked Per NOP-CC-1003

Work Orders 200776963 Calibrate Meter 1X13R001 02/22/2019

200785743 Rebuild/Replace Mechanical Seal Reactor Recirc Pump "A" 01/19/2023

200887747 T/S Repair Valve Replace Blown Fuses - LPCS Pump 08/12/2022

Min-Flow Valve

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