IR 05000440/2023003
| ML23284A173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry |
| Issue date: | 10/11/2023 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DORS/EB1 |
| To: | Penfield R Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp |
| References | |
| IR 2023003 | |
| Download: ML23284A173 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2023003
Dear Rod Penfield:
On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On October 5, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Chris Elliott, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
October 11, 2023 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000440
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-003-0055
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Perry, OH
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023
Inspectors:
J. Beavers, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
T. Hooker, Health Physicist
V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Fuel Bundle Contact with Reactor Vessel During Fuel Handling Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000440/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71153 A Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was self-revealed on March 19, 2023, when the licensee failed to implement procedures required by Section 2.L, "Refueling and Core Alterations," of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Step 2.43 of Standard Operating Instruction-F15, "Refueling and 360 Platforms," which directed specific movements of the refueling bridge when loading a fuel bundle into a peripheral core location to prevent catching the bottom of a fuel bundle on the core shroud's steam dam while lowering the bundle into position. As a result, the bottom of fuel bundle (S/N# 18P305) caught the bottom of the shroud's steam dam as the licensee attempted to lower the bundle into position. Once this occurred, the licensee took corrective actions to place the bundle in a safe location in the RP-1 storage pool and selected an alternate fuel bundle for placement in the reactor core.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On August 10, 2023, the unit was automatically shut down due to a reactor protection system trip. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on August 17, 2023, and operated at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of summer readiness for the following systems on July 25, 2023:
- switchyard, transformers, main generator, and steam tunnel cooling
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
(1)reactor protection system on September 7 and 8, 2023 (2)control room emergency ventilation on September 27, 2023
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire zone at the 635' elevation, off-gas area on July 5, 2023 (2)fire zone at the 620 elevation, off-gas area on July 5, 2023 (3)fire zone at the control complex chiller area on August 1, 2023 (4)fire zone at the remote shutdown room on August 2, 2023 (5)fire zone at the 620' elevation, Unit 1 Division 1 electrical switchgear room on August 2, 2023 (6)fire zone at containment on August 28, 2023 (7)fire zone at the emergency service water pump house on August 29, 2023 (8)fire zone at control complex on September 5, 2023
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the performance and training of the on-site fire brigade during observation of the following drill activities:
(1)an unannounced fire protection drill on July 26, 2023
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding mitigation protections in the areas with external outside vulnerability on August 28, 2023.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during reactor plant automatic shutdown on August 10, 2023.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Crew evaluation in the simulator on July 31, 2023.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)emergency diesel generator planned outage between July 31 and August 5, 2023 (2)reactor protection system power transfer switch failure on August 10, 2023 (3)actions characterizing potential trending issues associated with the 16 local power range monitors bypassed on September 7, 2023
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)reactor recirculation circuit breaker 4A continuity bulb challenge on July 24, 2023
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)functionality review of the Division 2 emergency diesel generator ventilation system after challenges on August 1, 2023 (2)operability review after issues related to the hydraulic control unit 14-51 and the associated accumulator level switch failure on September 5, 2023
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines were updated in accordance with the Boiling Water Reactor generic severe accident technical guidelines and validated in accordance with NEI 14-01, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, Revision 1 on September 20, 2023.
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated automatic reactor trip forced outage activities from August 10 to August 13, 2023.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(1)replacement of a 5V power supply as part of the rod control and information system monitor system on June 26, 2023 (2)replacement of mounted auxiliary contact related to the emergency closed cooling water pump July 28, 2023 (3)replacement of the Division 3 emergency diesel generator engine fuel pump and coupling spider on August 8, 2023 (4)replacement of the reactor protection system transfer switch after the August 10, 2023, SCRAM on August 31, 2023 (5)replacement of the level switch associated with the control rod drive hydraulic control unit 14-51 on September 8, 2023
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
(1)evaluation of the vibrations of the residual heat removal A pump on June 21, 2023 (2)traversing in-core probe system run on July 20, 2023
- (3) Division 3 diesel generator testing on August 4, 2023
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)reactor core isolation quarterly pump and valve operability on July 25, 2023
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
- Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period from August 2021 to August 2023
- Weekly alert notification system (siren) tests for the period from August 2021 to August 2023
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Response Organization.
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Emergency Preparedness drill on August 3,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
(1)turbine building supply plenum drain (2)nuclear closed cooling system
- (3) Unit 1 and 2 ventilation (4)off-gas system
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
(1)compensatory sampling of off-gas vent while the effluent monitor was inoperable (2)compensatory continuous sampling of Unit 2 vent radiation monitor (3)liquid composite sampling process (4)gaseous effluent sample from Unit 1 vent
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
(1)batch liquid release; discharge # 22-012L (2)monthly dose assessment for March 2021 (3)monthly dose assessment for February 2022
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
(1)auxiliary boiler liquid batch release in February 2022
- (2) Nuclear Closed Cooling continuous liquid release in
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)elevated groundwater tritium readings on July 10, 2023
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a refrigerant leak and licensees performance and response on July 18, 2023.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated an automatic reactor trip and the licensees performance and response on August 10, 2023.
Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance and response to a fuel bundle to reactor vessel contact event on April 18,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Elevated Groundwater Tritium Readings 71152A In May of 2023, the licensee developed a sampling strategy to understand the underdrain system activity following a refueling outage. Sampling discovered elevated tritium in plant piezometers 6, 14, and 21. A cross functional team was formed, and an action plan developed to determine source of tritium.
In June 2023, tritium activity in piezometer 21 exceeded 20,000 pCi/L (40,200 pCi/L), and state, local, and Federal notifications were made as required. The cross functional team expanded and incorporated problem-solving processes. During this time, the tritium sampling plan expanded to include piezometers 5, 6, 9, 14, 15, 16 and 21 as well as underdrain manholes 20, 23, 10, and 11. Third party subject matter expert vendor assistance was established.
Three failure modes were investigated that included: degraded plant building and piping integrity, degraded underground piping with reactor interface, and existing source from past leakage. Proximate buildings, building interfaces with pipe penetrations, rattle spaces, and floor drains were inspected. No active leaks were identified. Condensate storage tank lines and radwaste discharge piping are buried pipes of interest. Eight soft drill wells were performed in the vicinity of these lines, which did not identify any licensee radioactive material.
In July 2023, Environmental Resource Management recommended to begin low volume continuous pump out of plant piezometer 21 at 4 gallons per day. This was developed as a strategy to determine active leak versus cyclic leak from the previous refueling outage. In September 2023, the licensee was still investigating the potential leak with piezometer 21 pump downs. Activity steadily decreased over the pump down period, which the site and vendor determined that the leak was not active. Once activity reaches < 5,000 pCi/L, the licensee plans to shut off the pump but continue daily sampling of piezometer 21 to trend activity. Normal non-investigative sampling will continue with in-plant piezometer tubes 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11 sampled semi-annually for gamma isotopic and tritium baseline monitoring. All other locations will be as required to support plume characterization assessment when radioactive contamination is identified. Manholes 20 and 23 will continue to be sampled on a quarterly basis for tritium and isotopic.
The inspectors evaluated the tritium identification and problem-solving efforts following the plant refueling outage. Data indicated no active leak in the underdrain system nor migration of the tritium outside of the underdrain system. No more than minor findings were identified with the licensees identification and response efforts.
Fuel Bundle Contact with Reactor Vessel During Fuel Handling Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000440/2023003-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71153 A Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was self-revealed on March 19, 2023, when the licensee failed to implement procedures required by Section 2.L, "Refueling and Core Alterations," of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Step 2.43 of Standard Operating Instruction-F15, "Refueling and 360 Platforms," which directed specific movements of the refueling bridge when loading a fuel bundle into a peripheral core location to prevent catching the bottom of a fuel bundle on the core shroud's steam dam while lowering the bundle into position. As a result, the bottom of fuel bundle (S/N# 18P305) caught the bottom of the shroud's steam dam as the licensee attempted to lower the bundle into position. Once this occurred, the licensee took corrective actions to place the bundle in a safe location in the RP-1 storage pool and selected an alternate fuel bundle for placement in the reactor core.
Description:
Step 2.43 of Standard Operating Instruction (SOI)-F15, Refueling and 360 Platforms, states, When loading fuel into peripheral locations, the Refuel Bridge will index the location and lower the bundle to the ELEVATION LOADED position (~300) which is slightly above the top of the core shroud. The Bridge/Trolley should be moved toward the center of the core approximately 1 cell width to prevent catching the bottom of the bundle on the shrouds steam dam while lowering. With the bundled lowered to 320" - 350, the Bridge/Trolley should be realigned to the indexed location.
On March 19, 2023, the station was in Mode 5 with core alterations in progress. While performing Step 290 of the 1R19 Refuel Fuel Move Checklist, the fuel bundle (S/N#18P305)contacted the steam dam inside the reactor vessel. The fuel bundle was in the process of being lowered into location 19-60 at the peripheral of the core when contact occurred. The unit supervisor and outage control central were contacted immediately. Criteria to enter ONI-J11, "Fuel Handling Accidents," was not met as no immediately identifiable damage nor rising rad levels or fission product bubbles were identified. The refueling bridge operators were removed from duties and the human error checklist performed. The affected fuel bundle was placed in a safe location in the RP-1 fuel storage pools in the containment building. No damage to the steam dam was identified. Reactor engineering permitted core loading to continue without inserting this bundle. Calculation and selection of another twice burned bundle for that location was completed using updated fuel movement sheets, and the decision was made that the affected bundle would not go back into the reactor core. The licensee's investigation determined that the bridge was not moved toward the center of the core prior to lowering the fuel bundle below the steam dam per Step 2.43 of SOI-F15 for this peripherally located fuel bundle.
Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included suspension of core alterations and completion of required management notifications. No indication of clad failure through visual or gaseous release was immediately identified. The licensee performed a stand down with the refueling bridge operators and operations management. Emphasis was placed on SOI-F15, Step 2.43 that provides direction on how to avoid fuel bundle contact with the steam dam. Engineering evaluated potential damage to the affected bundle and identified an alternate bundle to install into the core, which included updating the fuel movement sheets.
The affected bundle was moved to the spent fuel pool and replaced with an equivalent bundle. Document change request #ATA-2023-5737 was also written to revise Step 2.43 to, When loading fuel into peripheral core locations, the Refuel Bridge should be taken out of automatic operation prior to indexing on peripheral core locations. This should be done when approximately 2 cells out and toward the center of the core. The fuel bundle should then be lowered to Z position 320" - 350 followed by indexing onto the peripheral location. This prevents inadvertent contact with the steam dam (located ~ 300) by not allowing the fuel bundle to be positioned above the steam dam. Approach the peripheral location in a slow controlled manner to prevent the fuel bundle from swinging into the steam dam. This action is due December 27, 2024, which is prior to the next refueling outage.
Corrective Action References: CR-2023-02103, Fuel Bundle Made Contact with Steam Dam
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to position the bridge/trolley toward the center of the reactor core to prevent catching the bottom of the bundle on the shrouds steam dam when lowering the bundle as required by Step 2.43 of SOI-F15. As a result, fuel bundle S/N#18P305 contacted the steam dam when being lowered into the core. This potential was specifically addressed in standard operation instruction for the refueling platform.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Cladding Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Per IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 3, Question A, the finding related to fuel handling issues, which then directs the inspector to evaluate the issue using IMC 0609, Appendix A. Per IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," Question 4, the finding resulted from a fuel handling errors, but was determined to be a Green finding since the fuel handling error did not challenge fuel cladding integrity or result in a release of radionuclides.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. The individuals failed to follow the standard operating instruction specifically written to prevent this event.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 2 addresses General Plant Operating Procedures, and Section 2.L requires procedures for refueling and core alterations.
The licensee established Standard Operating Instruction SOI-F15, "Refueling and 360 Platforms," Revision 28, to address refueling and core alteration activities. Procedure SOI-F15, Step 2.43, states, "When loading fuel into peripheral locations, the Refuel Bridge will index the location and lower the bundle to the ELEVATION LOADED position (~300)which is slightly above the top of the core shroud. The Bridge/Trolley should be moved toward the center of the core approximately 1 cell width to prevent catching the bottom of the bundle on the shrouds steam dam while lowering. With the bundled lowered to 320" - 350, the Bridge/Trolley should be realigned to the indexed location.
Contrary to the above, on March 19, 2023, the licensee failed to implement procedures recommended in Section 2.L of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, the licensee did properly implement Step 2.43 of SOI-F15 while moving fuel bundle S/N#18P305 to a peripheral location to prevent catching the bottom of the fuel bundle from catching on the shroud's steam dam while lowering the bundle.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 5, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Chris Elliott, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 17, 2023, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Rod Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 21, 2023, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to Rod Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
none
Certification of Summer Readiness
06/23/2023
SOI-C71
RPS Power Supply Distribution
09/08/2023
Procedures
SOI-M25/26
Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculating System
08/31/2023
0EW-1A and 1B
Emergency Service Water Pumphouse
09/14/2018
Unit 1 - Div. 1 4160V and 480V Switchgear Room 620' - 6"
Elev.
08/02/2023
Unit 1 - Remote Shutdown Panel Room 620' - 6" Elev.
08/02/2023
1RB-1C-1A, 1B,
1C, and 1D
Containment 599', 620', 642', 652', 664', and 689'
09/14/2018
FZ 1CC-1c
Unit 1 - DIV 1 4160V and 480V Switchgear Room 620 - 6
09/05/2023
OCC-1C
Control Complex Chiller Water System 574-10 Elevation
01/08/2023
OG - 620 01
Off Gas Bldg Elev. 620 01
07/05/2023
Fire Plans
OG - 635 02
Off Gas Bldg Elev. 635 02
07/05/2023
CR-2023-06575
ONI-ZZZ-1 Flood Barrier Storage is Not Organized to
Support Efficient Implementation if Needed
08/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2023-06672
Potential Flood Barrier Installation Issues Per ONI-ZZZ-1
Required Doors
08/26/2023
Miscellaneous
Simulation Guide,
Cycle 202303
Evaluation Scenario Guide OTLC-305820303-PY-SGCG
Copy 4/6
FTI-A-0001
TIP Operation
Procedures
SVI-C51-T5351
LPRM Calibration
200807714
SVI-E22T1319 HPCS D/G Start and Load
08/05/2023
Work Orders
200913922
SVI-C51T5351 TIP Run LPRM Calibration
07/27/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2023-05744
Reactor Recirc Circuit Breaker 4A Trip Coil Continuity Light
Not Lit
07/23/2023
CR 2022-01390
Div 2 DG Exhaust Dampers Indicate Dual Position with
Supply Fan Running
2/22/2022
CR 2023-03551
Div. 2 DG Exhaust Louvers Show Dual Indication during
Start
04/27/2023
CR 2023-05795
Div 2 DG Supply Fan Dampers Failed to Open
07/25/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2023-05909
Division 2 DG Room Exhaust Louver Indication Issues
07/28/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR 2023-06855
CRD Accumulator Level Switch Failed to Actuate
09/05/2023
Drawings
2-0619-00000
Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System
S
SAMG-1
RPV Control Severe Accident Management Guidelines
Procedures
SAMG-2
Containment and Radioactivity Release
23-05670
TIP drawer 1C51J0001E Ready Light Stuck on Not
Collecting Data
07/20/2023
23-05690
Local Power Range Monitors (LPRM) Outside of
Acceptance Criteria After Calibration
07/21/2023
23-06215
Automatic Reactor SCRAM and MSIV Closure Following
RPS Bus Shift from ALT to NORM B
08/10/2023
23-06281
Minor Insulation Damage Found on Power Source Selector
Switch Wire
08/21/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2020-08144
Freedom Series Auxiliary Contact Found Failed on
EF1A08-C
10/21/2020
Drawings
208-0070-00006
Leak Detection System
Engineering
Changes
23-1145-002
Temporary MOD for Removal of Jumper on Panel
1H13P0710E
08/10/2023
GEI-0029
Testing of Mold Case Circuit Breakers and Overload Heater
Relays
GEI-0138
Freedom Bucket Maintenance
PMI-0078
Division 3 HPCS Diesel Generator Fuel System
Maintenance
SVI-C11-T0009
Control Rod SCRAM Accumulator Pressure Detection
Functional/Calibration for HCU Accumulators
Procedures
TAI-2000-2
Vibration Monitoring
200789681
Support SVI-C11T0009 Contingency
09/08/2023
200805508
Take Vibration Data - RHR Pump A (EQ) Take Vibration
Data - RHR Pump A (EQ) Take Vibration Data - RHR
pump A (EQ) PM Planning Complete*
06/21/2023
200807397
Replace Div. III Engine Fuel Pump Order Will Also Replace
The Coupling Spider and Credit Maintenance Plan #25319
08/08/2023
200807920
Perform EMI Testing Div 3 HPCS DG *PM Planning
Complete
08/04/2023
Work Orders
200816150
No work description issued
07/26/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
200913280
Fix TIP machine Common Channel/CR
07/20/2023
200921639
Replace RPS Transfer Switch Py-1C71S0701
CR 2023-6215
08/31/2023
Replace 5V Power Supplies 1E31N0700B
06/26/2023
CR 2021-07941
Perry Siren Backup Activation Point Failure
10/21/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2022-09852
22 Siren Pole Top Siren Maintenance
2/29/2022
Federal Signal Models 2001-130, Equinox, and 508-128
Sirens Installation, Operation, and Service Manual
A5 0117
Federal Signal DCB, DCFCB, and DCFCTB Models Battery
Operated Mechanical Siren Control System Installation,
Operation, and Service Manual
LO 1015
Tempest T-112/ T-121 Omni-Directional Siren Installation,
Operation, Maintenance and Parts Manual
H
Perry EPZ Siren System PI Test Schedules
01/01/2021 -
2/31/2023
Perry EPZ Siren System Test Data
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Perry EPZ Siren Annual Maintenance Records
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Prompt Alert Siren System
(PASS) Design Report
Miscellaneous
FEMA Approval of Perry Nuclear Power Plant Prompt Alert
Siren System (PASS) Design Report Update
07/17/2015
NOBP-LP-5018
Siren Testing and Maintenance
Procedures
NOP-LP-5005
Siren Testing and Maintenance
CR-2022-00532
ERO Unannounced Communication Test Results 1/22/22:
No Response Recorded for One On-Duty Individual
01/24/2022
CR-2022-04357
Untimely Response for 5/23/22 ERO Scheduled
Communication Test
05/23/2022
CR-2022-08800
Off Duty Individual Did Not Respond to ERO Unannounced
Communication Test
11/16/2022
CR-2023-03481
On Duty ERO Member Did Not Respond to Weekly
Notification Test
04/25/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2023-06141
Emergency Response Organization Notification System
08/07/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
(ERONS) Weekly Notification Test Issue
Emergency Response Organization Roster
08/29/2023
Quarterly Testing of Emergency Pager System Records
08/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Miscellaneous
PNPP ERO On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report
NOP-LP-5006
Emergency Response Organization Training Program
NOP-LP-5503
Emergency Notifications
NOP-LP-5505
Facility Activation, Operation and Deactivation
PTI-GEN-P0003
Quarterly Testing of the Emergency Pager System
Procedures
PYBP-ERS-0037
Notification of Key Plant Personnel
CR-2022-04909
Inconsistencies in NOP-LP-5503, Emergency Notifications
procedure
06/16/2022
CR-2022-08718
Backup Method for ERO Notification Failed Testing
11/14/2022
CR-2023-00828
ERO Duty Transfer Issue
2/06/2023
CR-2023-05038
Loss of Power to Plant Emergency and Fire Alarms
06/23/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2023-05362
ERO Training Issue
07/06/2023
Monthly Testing of Emergency Response Telephone
Systems in Onsite Emergency Response Facilities
(Completed Survey Records)
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Emergency Operations Facility Equipment Checklists
(Completed Survey Records)
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Operations Support Center Equipment Checklists
(Completed Survey Records)
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Technical Support Center Equipment Checklists (Completed
Survey Records)
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Letters of Agreement / Memorandums of Understanding with
Agencies Supporting Emergency Preparedness
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Reports
(Sample)
09/01/2021 -
08/31/2023
Emergency Response Organization Training and
Qualification Records (Sample 15 records)
09/21/2023
Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Miscellaneous
KLD TR-1228
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Development of Evacuation Time
Estimates
05/09/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
KLD TR-1319
Perry Nuclear Power Plant 2023 Population Update Analysis
05/08/2023
MS-C-21-11-24
Quality Assurance Audit Report of Emergency
Preparedness
2/07/2021
MS-C-22-11-24
Quality Assurance Audit Report of Emergency
Preparedness
2/20/2022
Procedures
PSI-0018
Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment
Miscellaneous
ERO tabletop
23 3rd Quarter ERO Table - Top Drill TSC-EOF 8/3/2023
through 8/31/2023
CR 2022-07529
MIDAS Software Calculation Deviation
10/07/2022
CR 20223-03554
Elevated Nuclear Closed Cooling Radiation Monitor
04/27/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 2023-03569
Short Lived Gamma Activity Detected at NCC from RWCU
B Pump
04/27/2023
CR 2023-06377
NRC RP Inspection Identified: The Required ODCM Lower
Limit of Detection, LLD, Misapplied in the 2022 Annual
Radioactive Effluent Release Report
08/16/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-2023-06408
NRC Identified: SVI-D17-T5268 Does Not Include All
Required ODCM Documentation
08/17/2023
06-Sep-22-10013
Floor Drain Sample Tank Gamma Spectrum Analysis
09/06/2022
06-Sep-22-10014
Floor Drain Sample Tank Gamma Spectrum Analysis
09/06/2022
2103030021
MIDAS Report for February 2021 Monthly Summary of
Maximum Individual Doses
February
21
208310953
MIDAS Report for Nuclear Closed Cooling
10/02/2022
208310953
MIDAS Report for Release 22-001L
08/31/2022
209010057
MIDAS Report for Release 22-002L
09/01/2022
209081259
MIDAS Report for Liquid Discharge 22-012L
09/08/2022
28-Feb-21-10010
OGVP NG, MDS Gamma Spectrum Analysis
2/28/2021
31-Jan-22-10008
NCC Week 5 Composite Gamma Spectrum Analysis
01/31/2022
21 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report
04/27/2022
Miscellaneous
22 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report
04/26/2023
CHI-0053A
Counting Gamma Spectroscopy Samples Using Apex
NOP-SS-3300
Records Management Program
Procedures
SOI-D17
Airborne Radiation Monitoring System (Effluents)
Work Orders
200777498
SVI-D17T5268 Eff Smpl/Analysis & Dose
2/23/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
200777499
SVI-D17T5268 Eff Smpl/Analysis & Dose
03/29/2021
200814178
SVI-D17T5268 Eff Smpl/Analysis & Dose
03/02/2022
200892277
Liquid Radwaste Release Permit Package
09/06/2022
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency
Preparedness - ERO Readiness
07/01/2022-
06/30/2023
NRC Performance Indicator Data; Emergency
Preparedness - Alert and Notification System Reliability
07/01/2022-
06/30/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC
Performance
Indicator Data
Emergency Preparedness - Drill/Exercise Performance;
07/01/2022-
06/30/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2023-05037
Tritium Groundwater Readings Elevated
06/23/2023
CR-2023-02103
Fuel Bundle Made Contact with Steam Dam
03/19/2023
CR-2023-05607
Entered ONI-ZZZ-5 due to Containment Vessel Chiller A
Refrigerant Leak
07/18/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-2023-06215
Automatic Reactor SCRAM and MSIV Closure Following
RPS Bus Shift from ALT to NORM B
08/10/2023
Miscellaneous
LER
05000440/2022-
001-00
Low Pressure Core Spray Inoperable due to Loss of
Minimum Flow Valve
06/27/2022