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Predecisional Enforcement Conference Rept on 970418.Areas Discussed:Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-440/96-16, 50-440/96-17 & 50-440/96-18 & Corrective Actions
	ML20210H514
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	08/04/1997
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20210H513	List: IR 05000440/1996016; ML20210H512;
References
	50-440-96-16, 50-440-96-17, 50-440-96-18, NUDOCS 9708140056
	Download: ML20210H514 (70)
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U. S.- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111

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Docket No:

50-440 License No:

NPF 58 Licensee:

Centerior Service Company Facility:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

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Date:

April 18,1997 Meeting Location:

Region ll1 Office

801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351 Type of Meeting:

Predecisional Enforcement Conference Inspection:

Perry Plant October 28,1996 through January 24,1997 November 2 - December 20,1996 December 21,1996-February 3,1997 Inspectors:

D. Kosloff, Senior Resident inspector R. Twigg, Resident inspector E. Schweibinz, Project Engineer D. Butler, Senior Reactor Engineer D. Chyu, Reactor Engineer Approved by:

G. C. Wright, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4

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Meetino Summary Predecisional Enforcement Conference on Aoril 18.1997

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- Areas Discussed: Apparent violations identified during the inspections were discussed, along with the corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee. The apparent violations involved fire protection, a defective circuit breaker, and inadequate reactivity control.

9708140056 970804 PDR ADOCK 05000440 G

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Reoort Details 1.

Persons Present at Conference Centerior Service Comoany L. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear R. Arndt, Nonlicensed Plant Operator D. Benyak, Corrective Action Analyst N. Bonner, Director, Nuclear Maintenance Department M. Brogan, Supervising Operator (Reactor Operator)

S. Davis, Shift Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator)

M. Fournier, Procurement, Quality Evaluator H. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs T. Henderson, Supervisor, Licensing Unit V. Higaki, independent Safety Engineering Group Manager R. Kearney, Operations Superintendent (Senior Reactor Operator)

M. Kuntz, System Engineer M. McFarland, Unit Supervisor (Senior Reactor Operator)

L. McGuire, Design Engineering Manager J. Powers, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department P. Przeracki, Maintenance Technician T. Rausch, Director, Nuclear Services Department R. Tadych, Plent Engineering Manager D. Watkins, Maintenance Specialist M. Zeal, System Engineer U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission A. Beach, Regional Administrator B. Berson, Regional Counsel D. Butler, Senior Reactor Engineer D. Chyu. Reactor Engineer H. Clayton, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff J. Grobe, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects J. Hopkins, Project Manager J. Jacobson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4 D. Kosloff, Senior Resident inspector, Perry M. Leach, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (Acting)

R. Twigg, Resident inspector, Perry 11.

Predecisional Enforcement Conference On April 18,1997, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference was conducted in the NRC Region lli Office in Lisle, Illinois. The conference was to discuss apparent violations of

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NRC requirements related to certain motor operated valves (MOV) potentially being unable to perform their post-fire safe shutdcovn sunction (EA 96 482),inoperability of the control room emergency recirculation system (CRER) for periods greater than that allowed by the Technical Specifications (EA 96-542), and inadequate control of reactivity (EA 97-047) at the Perry Plant.

The licensee discussed short and long term corrective action plans to resolve deficiencies

. in control of reactivity. Corrective actions for the other apparent violations were summarizeJ WL.?J i Cslifve's presentation materials and in LERs 440/96-06 and 08.

The NRC informed the licensee that the information provided would be used to determine what enforcement action, if any, would be taken in response to the apparent violations end that the enforcement decision would be transmitted under separate correspondence.

A copy of the licensea's handouts are attached to this report.

Attachments: As stated

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ATTACHMENT

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LICENSEE HANDOUTS

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Perry Xuclear Power Plant

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Pre-Decisional

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s Enforcement Conference Presentation

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U.S. Xuclear Regulatory Commission

ABB Breaker Wiring Issue l

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I April 18,1997

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Discussion Topics

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Desil;a Outcome Jim Powers

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Introduction - ABB Breaker Wiring Issue Jim Powers

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Breaker Description Lori McGuire

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Dave Watkins Mark Zeal Sequence of Events Lori McGuire

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Event Significance

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Russ, Kearney

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Root Cause Jim Powers

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Corrective Actions Jim Powers

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Sununary Jim Powers

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Desired Outcome

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Obtain a common understanding of the facts

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Provide an understanding that site involvement / actions

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were appropriate, thorough, and timely Provide a common understanding of the safety and risk

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associated with this breakerissue Demonstrate that the vendor has a common

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understanding of our concern

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Perry management recognizes responsibility; vendor

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recognizes accountability Page3

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Introduction

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ABB Breaker WiringIssue

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Issue was self-revealing

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Corrective actions were prompt / extensive

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Potentialindustry testingissue

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Loss of safety function occurred; safety significance and

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risk would have been minimized through operator actions

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Breaker Description

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Breaker overview

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480 vrolt safety-related load center supply breaker

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ol Functional description

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Operation and miswiring effects

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Currenttransformer

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- Function

- Wiring error description

- 1/2 power trip Alarms

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- Overcurrent trip q

- Manualtrip

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Sequence of Events

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12/95-ABB manufactured breakers; procured safety-related

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3/10/96 - ABB K-600S model breaker installed in EF-1-D-09

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breaker cubical to facilitate breaker maintenance during refueling outage Six other new breakers installed in same outage 7/3/96 - Breaker EF-1-D-09 tripped due to personnel error

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while conducting operator training Investigated via formal corrective action process

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No switching associated with this bus performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (also reduced loads on bus)

Did not receive " Bus EF-1-D Breaker Trip" alarm Page 6

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I Sequence of Events (continued)

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9/16/96 - Breaker EF-1-D-09 tripped unexpectedly during

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routine load alignment on bus q

Investigated via formal corrective action process Received " Bus EF-1-D Breeker Trip" alarm 9/17/96 - Breaker EF-1-D-09 was replaced with a refurbished

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breaker from stock and bus declared operable Initial review identified no immediate cause; vendor evaluation / investigation of breaker initiated s

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9/20/96 - Perry personnel identified wiring error; onsite testing

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identified incorrect current transformgr polarity

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9/26/96 - ABB confirmed a reversed polarity current

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transformer would cause a premature trip

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Sequence of Events (continuea)

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9/27/96 - Three recently installed (RFO-5) new ABB breakers

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were visually inspected to the extent possible without removing q'

the breakers, no deficiencies were identified i

10/2/96 - Remaining three new ABB breakers were also

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inspected with no deficiencies identified 10/3/96 - Determined that EF-1-D-09 bus was inoperable under

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configuration of concern i.e., when Fuel Handling Building (FHB) fan and heater aligned to bus NRC notified via 10 CFR 50.72

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Sequence of Events (continued)

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10/10/96

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- Breaker confirmed by vendor to be incorrectly wired causing l

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reduced trip set point based on preliminary review of I

consequences

- Vendor evaluation and lab results received Actual breaker trip setpoint determined Determined not to be a Part 21 condition Further evaluation determined when a Loss of Safety Function and/or Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement exceedances occurred S

10/14/96 - Initiated operating experience report

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10/25/96 - Letter to vendor initiated requesting additional

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justification for issue not being reportable via 10 CFR Part 21 Page 9 l

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Sequence of Events (continued)

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11/4/96 - LER 96-008-00, " Degraded Breaker Results in Loss of

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Safety Function and Exceeding TS Action Statement," submitted to the NRC ql 12/6/96 - Vendor replies to 10/25/96 letter that no other defects

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of this nature have been identified in the past five years Vendor considers this manufacturing error a single isolated occurrence 12/19/96 - Letter to ABB identifying another nuclear facility

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which identified a similar current transformer wiring error on a breaker refurbished by an ABB service center

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1/20/97 - ABB correspondence received indicating reevaluation

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of10CFR Part 21 underway 1/3/97 - Continued evaluation of industry experience

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3/26/97 - ABB submitted notification to NRC under 10CFR

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Part 21 Page10

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Control Room (CR) Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Supply Fan B q i

CR HVAC Return Fan B

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CR Emergency Recirculation (CRER) Fan B Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) Pump Area Ventilation Fan B

MCC switchgear (SWGR) and Battery Room Recirculation Fan B

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MCC SWGR and Battery Room Exhaust Fan B

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Scenario configuration - FHB 'B' exhaust fan / heater aligned to

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EF-1-D-09

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Critical bus configuration - autouatic controls associated with critical bus q

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- FHB exhaust fan and heater response during Loss-of-Offsite Power (LOOP), Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and LOOP /LOCA.

If the fan / heater are running, the fan / heater will automatically sequence back on bus

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If the fan / heater are not running, the fan / heater will not sequence back on bus

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Effects on plant

- Breaker EF4-D-09 inoperable in conjunction with train / divisional outages Page n

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Event Si

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Breaker miswiring causing a premature breaker trip at half the

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trip setpoint l

Technical Specifications impacted O

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Independently

- Breaker EF-1-D-09 Bus

- CR Ventilation system

- ECC system /heatloads Reactor Cooling Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system

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Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system

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- Combustible gas mixing coinpressor

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- H analyzer'B'

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Concurrentwith Divisionaloutage Page12

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Event Si icance n

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(Continued)

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<j Time-motion study

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Performed to ensure reasonable operator actions could be relied upon to perform restoration of bus / vital equipment when required A)

Entry into TS 3.8.7 (Electrical Power Distribution System.s -

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Operating), 3.7.3 (Control Room Emergency Recirculation System) and 3.7.4 (Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air conditioning System)

Until breaker replacement and subsequent operability of breaker EF-1-D-09

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.3 Root Cause

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Manufacturing error

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Inadvertent swapping of current sensor leads at terminal block Undetectable by manufacturing testing performed in compliance with ANSI standards Undetected by vendorquality checks

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Testing

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Error not detectable by standard industry receipt and trip device testing

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Corrective Actions

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Long term actions developed

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Safety-related breakers are scheduled to be inspected and/or tested by the

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end of the next refuel outage

Manufacturer evaluation

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Confirmed site conclusions

Additional evaluation and validation of susceptibility of

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other breakers is ongoing

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Summary i

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Event Self-Revealing

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Cause was self-identified by plant staff

Safety Significance

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No fuel movements occurred

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Conservative engineering analyses show vital room temperature heating effects are most limiting concern; however, sufficient time is available to take reasonable operator actions

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Limited time periods during degraded bus configuration

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No accident or system operational demands occurred

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Summary

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Corrective actions promptly identified and implemented

Industry communications

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Operation and actions taken were conservative

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Actions taken to preclude recurrence j

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UNIT 1 DECLARED COMMERCIAL AT 12:00 i

ON NOVEMBER 18,1987 i

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L9 (300 43 HRS)THREE OTHER NEW ABB BREAKERS WERE ALSO INSPECTED WiiH NO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED (10-2)

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ADB CONTACTED AND CONFIRWED A REVERSE POLARITY CURRENT TRANSFORMER WOULD CAUSE A PREWATURE TRIP (9-20)

PERRY PERSONNEL IDENilFIED WIRING ERROR; ONSITE TESilNG IDENTIFIED ihCORRECT CURRENT TRANSFORWER POLARITY (9-20)

E.REAKER EF+0-09 WAS REPLACED WITH A REFURBISHED BREAKER FROW STOCK AND BUS DECLARED OPERABLE (9-17)

BREAKER EF-1-0-09 TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY DURING ROUTINE LOAD AllGNMENT ON BUS (9-16)

BREAKER EF-1-0-09 TRIPPED FROM PERSONNEL iRROR WHILE CONOUCTING OPERATOR TRAINING (7-3)

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DETERWINED THAT EF-1-049 BUS WAS INOPERABLE UNDER CONFIGURATION Of CONCERN l.e.,WHEN FUEL HANDUNG BUILDING (FHB) EXHAUST AND SUPPLY FANS AND HEATER AUGliED T BREAKER CONFIRWED BY YENDOR TO BE INCORRECTLY WlRED CAUS!NG REDUCED TR:P S PREUWINARY REYlEW OF CONSEQUENCES;YENDOR DETERMINED NOT 10 CFR PART 21 REPORTABLE INiilATED OPERATING EXPERIENCE (OE) REPORT (10-14)

LETTER TO VENDOR INITIATED REQUESilNG ADDlil0NAL JU$ilFICAil0N FOR ISSUE NOT BEING REPORTABLE VIA 10 CFR PART 21 (10-25)

LER 96-006-00 ' DEGRADED BREAKER RESUllS IN LOS$ OF SAFETY FUNCil0!

AND EXCEEDING TS ACil0N STATEMENT * SUBMITTED 10 THE NRC (11-4)

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Pre-Decisional

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Enforcement Conference Presentation i

l to the

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Flow Control Valve Inadvertent Movement

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l April 18,1997

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Discussion Topics Desired Outcome Neal Bonner

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Introduction Neal Bonner

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Sequence of Events Russ Kearney

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Immediate Management Response Russ Kearney

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Equipment Performance Issues Russell Tadych

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Marc Kuntz Human Performance Issues Russ Kearney

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Summary Neal Bonner

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Desired Outcome

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Provide thorough understanding of management's

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concerns Safety culture

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Materia 1 condition

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Provide a clear basis for identified causes

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Achieve an understanding of the Shift Supervisor decision

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making process Provide an evaluation of the event's significance

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Identify previous actions taken to address material

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conditionissues Establish confidence that future occurrences will be

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prevented

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Introduction

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Human performance aspects of the event were significant

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Corrective actions taken for human performance have i

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been diverse and thorough j

Thorough root cause evaluation of equipment

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performance deficiencies

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Problem valves replaced with enhanced design

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Sequence of Events

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Saturday, November 9,1996

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0658 - A local power range monitor (LPRM) failed upscale

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causing an erroneous indication of increasing reactor

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power. Automatic closure of the reactor recirculation flow control valves (FCVs) "A" and "B" was initiated due to j

the increased powerindication

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0659 - Operators verified the power indication was in

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error and halted the closure of FCV "A" and "B" in

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accordance with plant instructions. Reactor power j

stabilized at 98%

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Sequence of Events

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Saturday, November 9,1996 (Continued)

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0715 - Nightshift Shift Supervisor (SS) called the

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Operations Superintendent at home to communicate the event and current plant status 0741 - During the restoration from the FCV runback, a

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blown fuse was identified in the hydraulic power unit (HPU) subloop "Al" 0748 - Operator control of FCV "B" was restored

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0805 - Operations Superintendent called and spoke with

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nightshift Unit Supervisor (US) about current plant statu.s

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Sequence of Events

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Saturday, November 9,1996 (Continued)

~0830 - Shift Technical Advisor (STA) attempted to

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contact Mechanical System Engineer and Electrical System Engineer at home; messages requesting call-backs were left 0850 - US left to perform administrative duties outside the

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Control Room 0900-1058 - A restart plan was developed by the SS and

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STA for subloop "Al" and discussed with the System Engineers who called in from offsite Decision was made to start HPU subloop "Al" with the blown fuse I%;y 7

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Sequence of Events

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l Saturday, November 9,1996 (Continued)

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i 1058 - HPU subloop "Al" was started and FCV " A"

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moved in the open direction for 12 seconds at a rate of 1%

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per second

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1100 - Technica1 Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for

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Operation (LCO) 3.4.1 condition A was entered due to

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i reactor recirculation loop flow mismatch of ~ 8%

1110 - Operations management notified if the event

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1110-1230 - Recovery plan was developed by the Control

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Room staff and Operations management 1230-1254 - Recovery plan was implemented

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Immediate Management Response Operations Manager, Operations Superintendent, and

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Plant Manager responded to plant Investigation team formed

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Category 2 Potential Issue Form (PIF)

Upgraded to Category 1 by Operations Manager Operations Superintendent interviewed Shift Supervisor

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Valve replacement performed

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Equipment Performance Issues

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Function ofisolate/ operate valve

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Dual coil solenoid operated directional control valve

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Prevents FCV motion in " Isolate" position Pennits FCV motion in " Operate" position n

Spring return to center " Isolate" position I

Factors which affect Fyrquel Hydraulic systems

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Moisture interaction with phosphate ester (Fyrquel) fluids Oil quality, phosphate ester (Fyrquel) high acid levels cause plate-out of

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phosphorus salts at high temperature locations (brown varnish material)

Localized heat sources

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Equipment Performance Issues

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(Continued)

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Perry Design

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Air Breather Filters (desiccant)

Acid neutralizing filters (Fullers Earth)

L Oil coolers Contributors to Perry Event

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Oil quality, fluid acidity excursions Vendor supplied increased valve coil strength / higher temperatures

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- Non-safetycomponent

Brown varnish build up on valve stem caused valve binding

- Failed in " Operate" position

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- Isolate coil energizes, overheats, shorts out and blows fuse when given isolate signal

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Ecuipment Performance Issues

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(Continued)

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Corrective Actions Taken for Previous Valve

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Failures status Check for <200 psig on idle subloop following shutdown Complete Full system flush during RFO5 Complete Acid neutralizing filter replacement frequency changed from 12 months to 6 months Complete Air Breather Filter replacement task created Complete Developed an effective hydraulic fluid chemical control program Complete Subloop swaps every week Complete Procedure step to check for blown fuses prior to subloop Complete

start

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Equipment Performance Issues

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(Continued)

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Corrective Actions for 11/9/96 Event status

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Replaced valves with improved design, less susceptible to varnish build up and sticking Complete Reviewed Turbine Control system for applicability Complete Industry notification through Nuclear Network (event and equipment causes)

Complete Developed monitoring program for coil currents due to Complete reactivity management concerns Planned removal and inspection of new valve design after 9 months of service Scheduled after RFO6

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Page 13

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Human Performance Issues

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m Root Cause

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Supervisory Oversight Contributing Causes

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Procedure Compliance Communications Corrective Actions

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Operating shift crew

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Communicated management expectations

- Conservative decision making (consensus decision making)

- Command and control

- Operability and restoration of plant equipment

- Team work

- Resource management

- Assessment of plant problents.

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Human Performance Issues (Cooeom.d3

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Operations Section

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Defined expectations regarding communications of correctiw action plans and operational troubleshooting plans Developed a process for resobition of risk significant and risk conMbutor system / component problems Re-emphasized the independence of the STA in decisien making and corrective action plan development

Communicated details of the solenoid operate / isolate valve failure and the reactivity event, and lessons leamed Communicated management expectations for Operations personnel who interface with senior reactor operators

Conducted simulator scenarios on conservative decision naking, l

teamwork, and resource management l

i Evaluated non-operational SRO tasks

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Determined if any additional precautionary operator actions are necessary j

when manipulating components that could affect reactivity i

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O Human Performance Issues (ceetienca)

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Plant Personnel

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Clarified management expectations regarding communication between the Control Room and plant staff Maintain a questioning attitude

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Request all relative information from the Control Room when participating in

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decision making and insure information provided is thoroughly understood

- Share the ownership of the results of the decision making process Communicated details of the solenoid operate / isolate valve failure and the reactivity event, and lessons learned Communication External to Plant

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INPO presentation Davis Besse presentation

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CNRB review

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I Summary l

Corrective actions taken for human performance have

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been diverse and complete The equipment performance deficiencies were

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aggressively addressed through repairs, component replacement, and design enhancements Majority of corrective actions have been implemented

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l Sequence of Events

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Saturday, November 9,1996 i

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Operator response to LPRM instrument

?ailure Identification / diagnosis / response meets management expectations i

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Sequence of Events Saturday, November 9,1996

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Shif:' change and initial problem

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identification i

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Sequence of Events

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j Control Room Shift Supervisor and

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Engineering Support personnel

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Sequence of Events

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Saturday, November 9,1996 l

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Hydraulic Power Unit start-up and

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inadvertent flow control valve i

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movement

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Sequence of Events Saturday, November 9,19%

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Management notifications and plant

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recovery actions

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Human Performance Issues

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Root Cause

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Contributing Causes

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Euman Performance Corrective Actions

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i Operating shift crew

Operations section personnel and

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Operations section policy 2-9, i

Operational Activity Evaluation Plant support personnel

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= OW CO

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08' 5-0850 SHIF

Dayshift crew assu 0658 INSTRUMENT FAILURE

'h8h".'li20Mid tn

Average Po,*er Range Monitor (APRM).A Indicates increased

US leaves to perforri reactor power as a result of the LPRM failure.

Maintenance and Pla

Automatic Flow Demand Limiter (AFDL) Initiates a to discuss the posa Heactor Recirculation flow controlvalve (FCV) runback.

A priority 2 Work Orde

Reactor power decreases as FCV A and B close.

,

Off Normalinstruction (ONI)-CS1 Unplanned Change in Reactor Power or Reactivity,is enterea.

0659 OPERATOR RESPONSE

Operators vert that APRM A isited upsceh s.*d ha ti.; dawa of the FCYs shutting down the FCV hydraulic power units

R(eactor power stabilizes at 98L HPUs) A and 0715 MANAGEMENT NOTIFICATIONS

Nightshift Shift Supervisor (SS)d current plant status. calls the Opera to communicate the event an

' HPU restoration is planned before shift turnover.

I

Restoration to fullpower to be conducted by the dayshift.

)

0741 HPU STARTUP

)

Hydraulic power unit (HPU) subloop B1 is started successtu

A controlpower fuse check for the HPU A1 controllogic ret by System Operat.g Instruction (S01)-B33 determmes th; fuse #5 is blown.

l Start-up of HPU A is suspended pending 4esolution of the b

'

I 0805 MANAGEMENT N

Operations Superintendent calls and speaks to the Nightshift U about current plant status.

Operations Superintendent is tol is being developed for HPU A

Operations Suporintendent reque when the restart plan is compt

This request was not conveyed -

i30 :35 i40 i45 ISO :55 :00 :05 :10 :15 :20 :25 :30 :35 :40 :45 :50 :55 :00 :05 :10 :15 :20 :25 f30 :35 f40 TO600#

0700 0800

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u-SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 9,1996

'1058 F

0 SHlFT CHANGE lUE*1'

SS direci

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l rr;w casumes shif t responsibilitlea.

that the l Technical Advisor (Eno)neer at home: messages loft to return call.

SS notics STA calls the MechanicalSystem Engineer

US returi i Electrical System i

An SO :

D 13 pert:rm adminisIrative duties outside of the Control Room, noe rnd Planning personnelare called to the Control Room shuts dt

) s tiio p:ssibility of replacing the blown fuse.

S0 at th

,2 Work Order was determined to be required to replace the fuse.

Reactor g

ONI-C51 l

0850-0900 INITIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 1100

!

SS desires to restore the plant to 100% power.

Technl<

'

SS uncomfortable with loss of automatic FCV runback capability, due it

SS realizes that the Work Order would require, call-ins for engineering and planning support.

Tw

SS has seen the HPU subloop run with a blown fuse in the past.

one o

SS decides to investigate other options before directing the production of a work order.

~0900 CONTROL ROOM - ENGINEERING COMMUNICATIONS

MechanicalSystem Engineer calls the ControlRoom and recommends replacement of the isolate coiland blown fuse.

SS questions the ability to start the st. bloop with the blown fuse.

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MechanicalSystem Engineer states that he has no knowledge of starting the HPU with a blown tuse.

MechanicalSystem Engineer senses that the SS's intention was to not replace the fuse or isolate coil and suggests resistance readings of the isolate coil be taken to determine it it failed.

,

SS re ects taking readings due to the need for a Work Order.

SS In unres about starting subloop A2 which had a known high vibration problem.

Mech calSystem Engineer does not want to use subloop A2 due to the vibration problem.

SS requests a start or fix recommendation,

nr i gc re ulted

"*

" " * * *

determines that plution of the blown fuse.

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MechanicalSystem Engineer calls back and recommends placing subloop, A2 in mainten MENT NOTIRCATIONS to preclude this subloop's operation and starting subloop A1.

II

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0915-1058 CONTROL ROOM - ENGINEERING COMMUNICATI0t t e'tt calls the Control Room i N htshift Unit Supervisor (US)

SS and STA use drawings and reference materialto validate starting the HPU with a b

sta us.

Electrical System Engineer calls and talks to STA.

tendent is told that a restart plan

STA relates the plan for HPU A restart.

l}

d for HPU A.

Ii t:ndent requests to be called

Electrical System EnDineer, uncomfortable with the plan, recommends monitoring for post ilan is c mplete.

movement during HPU start-up.

I 1

STA does not pass Electrical System Engineer's message of concern of FCV movement te et conveyed to the dayshift crew.

Following plan validation. SS presents the plan to the Supervising Operators.

30 :35 i40 :45:50:55 :00:05 :10 :15 :20:25:30:35:40:45 :50 :55 :00 :05 11 0 i15 :20 :25 :30 :35 f40 i45 ISO iS5 :00 :05 00=

0900 c1000M W 9 t '

30 :35 (40 :45 ISO :55 :00 :05 :10 :15 :20 :25 :30l:35 :40 :45 :50 :55 iOO :05' :10 !15 :20 :25 :30 :35 i40 i45 f50 iS5 :00 :05

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HPU STARTUP P directs startup of HPU A.

pre-evolution brief conducted.

> SO dispositions a procedure step as not required to test fuse inteority due to knowledge

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ist the step was completed on the prior shift and a blown fuse had'been identified, i t. urns to Control Room, tic's C

kng r h

en ction and mute down the HPU.

I at the controls reduces reactor power by closing FCV B.

iactor power stabillzes at 99.4%.

ti-C61 is re-entered.

00 TECH SPEC ENTRY

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TechnicalSpecification (TS) Umiting Condition lof Operation (t.00)5%

due to Reactor Recirculation loop flow mismatch of greater than 3.4.1 Condition A la entered Two hour action statement la entered to restore mismatch to !::: ti.sh u eqito #. cr chutdown

.

one tf the recirculation loops.

1110 MANAGEMENT NOTIFICATIONS

-

SS cails the Operations Superintendent to describe the event and the actions taken.

Operations Superintendent provides the following direction:

luse.

Ensure the plant is stable.

Callin Reactor Engineering personnel,

US review actions to trip the Reactor Recirculation pump, e.

Develop a plan for recovery within the LCO time.

oil 1120 MANAGEMENT NOTIFICATIONS

Operations Superintandent notifies the Operations Manager of the event.

Operations Manager notified the Plant Manager of the event.

NS 1200-1220! MANAGEMENT NOTIFICATIONS tinten:nc2 Operations uanager arrives and discusses piant siaius and recovery pian.

I

Operations Superintendent arrives and discusses plant status and recovery plan.

fl0NS 1230-1254 RECOVERY PLAN 4 a b1:wn tuse.

Op r*tgr,s gegmege a power reduction using l

ontr 9

possible FCV

Power stabillzes at ~ 88%.

FCV B is opened to match reactor recirculation system i

loop flows within 5%.

cnt to the SS.

Reactor power stabilizes at 92%.

LCO 3.4.1 exiled.

ONI-C51 exited.

i:05:10 :15 :20:25:30 :35:40 :45:50:55 :00 iOS i10(15i20i25 i30 i35 i40 i45 :50 iS5 1100

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INE OVERSPEED FORCED: MS UNE DRAIN LEAK (

FLANMED)

l FW CONTP0L SYSTEM FAILURE FOBCED:FEEDWATER CONTROL TRIP B33 PUMP SEAL REPLACEMENT FORCED: AUX TRANSFORMER FAULT LPLANNED WAINTENANCE OUTAGE FORCED:EHC LEAK ON f2 CONTROL VALVE PUMP DOWNSHIFT FORCED: WFP AND STEAM LEAK

\\TER PlPE BREAK PLANNED: TURBINE OVERSPEED TEST LEAKING FUEL REPAIR DW COOLER FANS WAIN TURD. TRIP,TGOP LOW LUBE OIL PRESS.

-SCRAM-INADVERTENT RCIC INITIATION SCRAM-FW CONTROL SYS ERROR ON SU SCRAM-INADVERTENT RCIC INITIATION b [UM RWLACE

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PROGRAM EFFECTiv E MECHANISM NOT IDENTIFIED.

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ROR CITH NO FCV MOVEMENT.

/

0 F6038 TWICE. FIRST REPLACEMENT VALVE FAILED.

/

403D FUSE FOUND BLOWN AFTER 24 HOURS OF SERVICE.

UAL COIL SOLENOID VALVES IN THE RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM.j-2/It97 - 1B33F06038 REPLACED VALVE WITH NEV/ WET COIL DESIGN, 2/1497 - 1833F0603A Rt LACED VALVE WITH NEW WET Colt DESIGN.

2/2747 - 1833F0604R REPLACED VALVE WITH NEW WET COLL DESIGN.

3747 - 1833F0604A REPLACED VALVE WITH NEW WET COIL DESIGN.

395 - 2/96 FYRQUEL OUT OF SPECIFICATION i

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PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT df3 0MTRSY"

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EHC LEAK B33 PUMP B33 SYSTEM UNISOLABLE LEAK PLANNED MAlb B33 PUMP DOWNSHit

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PLANNED OUTAGE-LEAKING FUEL

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N21 PIPE LLAK RFP CONTROL OIL LEAK

I V i v i e s: V !!!!YI? n ea : V U t d i s t V e e a l t s t !!!i v e g a : V V 1!!!i V i 1990 1991 1992 1993

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7/2694 - 1833F0603B DURING SUBLOOP STARTUP, FCV WENT FROM 95% TO 3% OPEN. BLOWN FUSE FOUND PRIOR 10 EVENT.-

1G7094 - NEW CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM EFFE

,

3GS5 - 1833F0603B BLOWN FUSE AND SHORTED Coll, SPECIFIC FAILURE MECHANISM N

'

%95 - 1B33F0604A BLOWN FUSE IN SUBLOOP A2. LOOP A HAD A 7% SERVO ERROR WITH N0 f

,

1t2895 - 1833F06038 VALVE WAS FOUND SHORTED WITH A BLOWN FUSE, REPLACED F603B TWICE.

2696 - 1833F06038 FUSE FOUI

,

IW96 - 1833F0603A REPEAT FAILURES OF DUAL Colt SOLEN i

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UNIT 1 DECLARED COMMERCIAL AT 12:00

- [,'L63" ON NOVEMBER 18,1987

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1R EMillMEME Em PLANT STATUS

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PLANNED OUTAGE MAIN TRAF N62M64 REPAIRS OVERSPEED '

MSIV INOP EHC LEAK MSR Hi DRAIN TANK LEVEL SCRAM-OVERSPEED TEST TEST TAP CRACK SCRAM-SPURIOUS PLANNED OUTAGE MSR HI DRAIN TANK LEVEL EHC LEAK SCRAM-OPERATOR ERROR IN27-F560A REPAIRS H2 SEAL TRAP

ELECTRICAL SWITCHING ERROR BLOWN FUSE DURING B21 SVI Ibll!!kYl$lf$lll$lhl$ d!5k5hhk!$h$d[5kf$hklkh$dl5k5$Y$lkU$$kl 1986 1987 1988 1989

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BSt9 - 1833F0603A VALVE SHORTED OUT AND FAILED IN THE OPERATE POSITION.-

Si&S3 - 1833F0603A VALVE STUCK IN OPERATE POSITION AND FLOW CONTROL VALVE OPENED,1NCREASING POWER TO 105%.

t

LEGEND:

PLANT ONLINE E

1 PLANT OFFLINE E

VALVE STATUS J

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e : \\m is o \\m ur g a n \\ e os-vi v -t a is-wi e t. d o n

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Muclear Power Plant Pre-Decisional Enforcement Conference Presentation to the U.S. Xuc~ ear Regulatory Commission 10CFR50 Appendix R Issue

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April 18,1997 GNTERIOR ENERGY Page1

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Discussion Topics

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Desired Outcome Jim Powers

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Introduction-10CFR50 Appendix R Lori McGuire

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" Hot Shorts" Issue

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Sequence of Events Lori McGuire

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Event Significance Russ Kearney

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Root Cause Lori McGuire

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Corrective Actions Lori McGuire

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Summary Jim Powers

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Desirec. Outcome

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f Obtain a common understanding of the facts, significance

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of the issue, missed opportunities, root cause, and

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corrective actions Demonstrate that the PNPP organization has been pro-

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Introduction

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Apparent Violation 50-440/ 96016-01 Failure to meet

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10CFR50 Appendix R requirements for alternative shutdown capability is considered an apparent violation

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of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 t-In the absence of a 3-hour fire rated barrier, Appendix R,

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Section III.L is applied and an alternate shutdown path

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provided; the Remote Shutdown panel i

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Secuence of Even:s

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February 28,1992, NRC issued Information Notice (IN)

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92-18, " Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire" April,1992, PNPP Engineering initial evaluation

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determined structuralintegrity of MOVs acceptable based on available information August,1994, information was available from MOV

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testing / design development to assess vulnerability to IN

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92-18 scenario

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May 31,1996, IN 92-18 review was re-opened to confirm i

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initialassessment

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Secuence 0: 5 Events (continued)

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. uly 8,1996, Potential Issue Form (PIF) initiated to

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document systematic evaluation of MOVs for IN 92-18 scenario July 18,1996, twelve MOVs identified as most susceptible

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to IN 92-18 scenario. Fire impairment issued August 19,1996, LER 96-006 submitted

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September 9,1996, additional guidance was developed

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and implemented to assist operators Page 6 I

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Sequence of Events (continued)

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l November 1,1996, weak link and actuator capability

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evaluations completed for twelve susceptible MOVs. List reduced to eight susceptible MOVs

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December 2,1996, LER 96-006-01 submitted to update

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NRC on evaluation and corrective action development results

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Event Significance

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Fire Protection Program relies on Defense in Depth

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Continuously manned Automatic detection Automatic suppression Actions Taken

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Fireimpairment Alternate Flow Paths developed Operators trained

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Root Cause

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Design deficiency identified during MOV GL 89-10

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programimplementation Contributing factor for missed opportunity (August 1994)

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was that the integrated review of modifications by

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interfacing disciplines was not required by the modification process. Re-engineered modification process now includes this review.

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Corrective Actions

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Fire impairmentissued

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Weaklink evaluations completed

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Alternate flow paths developed l

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Eight (8) affected MOVs scheduled for modification by j

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end of RFO6 or outage of sufficient duration

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Summary

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Violation of 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements

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Issue identified by PNPP

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Strong design and program features to mitigate fire

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Timely comprehensive corrective actions taken

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i APPENDIX t

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UN!T 1 DECLARED COMMERCIAL AT 12:00 ON NOVEMBER 18,1987 PLANT STATUS

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1992 1993 6RX25e#Q!VU86iXA5ee9RV68

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[!11 april,1992, PNPP ENGINEERING INITIAL EVALUATION DETERMINED STRUCTUR/

INTEGR!TY OF MOVs ACCEPTABLE BASED ON AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

FEBRUARY 28,1992, NRC ISSUED INFORMATION NOTICE (IN) 02-18. " POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY DURING A CONTROL ROOM Fi i

F LEGEND:

PLANT ONLINE E

PLANT OFFLINE E

APPENDIX R ISSUES E

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STRUCTURAL TION.

AUGUST,1994,INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE FROM MOV TESTING 0ESIGN

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DEVELOPMENT TO ASSESS VULNERABILITY TO (IN) 92-18 SCENARIO.

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' POTENTIAL MAY 31,1996, (IN) 9?-18 REVIEW WAS RE-OPENED TO CONFIRM INITIAL ASSESSMENT. !

)L ROOM FIRE"

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JULY 8,1996, POTENTIAL ISSUE FORM (PIF) INITIATED TO DOCUMENT SYSTEMATIC ~

EVALUATION OF MOVs FOR (IN) 92-18 SCENARIO.

j JULY 18,1996, TWELVE MOVs IDENTIFIED AS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO (IN) 92-18 SCENARIO.

FIRE IMPAlRMENT ISSUED.

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AUGUST 19,1996, LER 96-Gu6 SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION J REPORTING REQUIREMENT 5.6.6.a j

j SEPTEMBER 9,1996 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WAS DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED TO ASSIST OPERATORS IN RESPONDING TO THE ISSUE IN THE EVENT THAT MOV CONTROL CIRCUlTRY WAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE POSTULATED CONTROL ROOM FIR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

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APRll 18,1997, PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE.

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I FEBRUARY 4,1997, NRC ISSUED INSPECTION REPORT 50-44096016 I

(DRS) IDENTIFYING THE APPARENT VIOLATION.

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DECEMBER 2,1996, LER 96-000-01 SUBMITTED TO UPDATE NRC ON EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION DEVELOPMENT RESULTS.

NOVEMBER 1,1996, WEAK LINK AND ACTUATOR CAPABILITY EVALUATIONS COMPLETED FOR TWELVE SUSCEPTIBLE MOVs. LIST REDUCED TO EIGHT SUSCEPTIBLE MOVs.

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v t e Inspection Report - Perry - 1996016
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \| 25 \|
1996 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(0) 8(0) 9(0) 10(0) 11(0) 12(0) 13(0) 14(0) 15(0) 16(0) 17(0) 18(0) Security Operator Exams Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000440/1996016

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