IR 05000440/1998003
| ML20217E462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217E443 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-98-03, 50-440-98-3, NUDOCS 9803310048 | |
| Download: ML20217E462 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No:
50-440 License No:
NPF-58 Report No:
50-440/98003(DRS)
Licensee:
Centerior Service Company Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Location:
P. O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH 44081 Dates:
February 23 - 27,1998 Inspectors:
Robert D. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst James E. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst Donald E. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Thomas J. Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator Donald C. Kosloff, Sr. Resident inspector Billy C. Dickson, Resident inspector l
Approved by:
James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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9803310048 980326 PDR ADOCK 05000440 G
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i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-440/98003 This inspection consisted of evaluation of the licensee's performance during the plant's biennial
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exercise of the Emergency Pian. It was conducted by regional emergency preparedness j
inspectors and resident inspector staff from Perry and Dresden. Also, the inspectors evaluated l
plant personnel response to two actual emergency plan activations. No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
Plant Sucoort The licensee's classifications were appropriate and offsite notifications were made within
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the required times for the two declared Unusual Events. Plant personnel emergency
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response appeared to be effective. (Section P1.1)
Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated
that emergency plan implementation was effective. (Section P4.1.c)
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Overall, emergency response performance in the Control Room Simulator was adequate. Emergency classifications were declared in a timely manner, and offsite l
agencies were notified within the required times. (Section P4.1.c)
l The licensee effectively addressed and initiated corrective actions for inadequate entry
conditions for a Plint Emergency Instruction, identified in the Control Room Simulator.
(Section P4.1.c).
The Technical Support Center staff's responses were effective. Emergency
classifications and priorities were effectively established and changed as plant
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conditions changed. (Section P4.1.c).
l Overall performance of Operations Support Center management and staff was very e
competent. Facility personnel maintained their focus and were professional throughout the exercise. (Section P4.1.c)
The Public Information Response Team effectively prepared an accurate press release
prior to activation of the Joint Public Information Center. Effective communications were
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maintained with the Technical Support Center. (Section P4.1.6)
Personnel performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was effective. The facility e
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was rapidly activated and the transfer of emergency command and control was
effectively accomplished after actions associated with the General Emergency l
declaration were completed. (Section P4.1.c)
Fire brigade and medical response were effective. The fire brigade responded rapidly
and communicated appropriately. Medical response personnel demonstrated
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noteworthy teamwork and proper priorities were established for radiological and medical conditions. (Section P4.1.c)
Licensee critiques following termination of the exercise were self-critical and included e
controllers and exercise participants. (Section P4.1.c)
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Reoort Details IV. Plant Support P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities i
P.1.1 Actual Emergency Plan Activations a.
Insoection Scoce (82701)
The inspectors interviewed personnel, reviewed records, and examined documentation packages regarding plant personnel responses to two actual emergency events which occurred during 1998.
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Observations and Findings An Unusual Event was declared and terminated at approximately 1:15 a.m. on
February 9,1998, due to a call from the local telephone company reporting that all commercial communications to the plant had been lost for approximately 25 minutes. A fiber optic line had been cut by the telephone company and Perry's phone circuits had failed to transfer to a backup circuit. After the lines were restored, telephone company staff called the control room and reported the problem.
The shift supervisor appropriately classified an Unusual Event using Emergency Plan implementing Instruction EPI-A1, " Emergency Action Levels" (EALs) for a transitory event which was classifiable but no longer met the criteria for any event at the time of declaration. The shift supervisor appropriately selected EAL KU2 for significant degradation of offsite communications capabilities for declaration. Further evaluation by the telephone company determined that only one means of offsite communications had been affected. Several other methods of communicationc continued to be operational.
Consequently, on February 26,1998, the licensee notified the NRC that the Unusual Event criteria for a major loss of communications capability had not been met.
An Unusual Event was declared at 3:10 a.m. on January 23,1998, due to release of toxic gases in the protected area, which were deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant. A report of a strong chemical odor in the Offgas Building had resulted in surveys and evaluation by a safety technician who determined that a spill of l
trichloroethylene had occurred and was of potentially toxic concentrations. The shift supervisor actively pursued the determination during the hour and a half it took the j
safety technician to respond, survey, evaluate, and determine the gas was of toxic concentrations. After their determination was communicated to the Shift Supervisor, he appropriately declared an Unusual Event using EAL MU1 for toxic gas concentrations detected within the protected area impeding normal plant operations due to access l
restrictions.
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Responses to these events were reviewed and detailed evaluations were effectively documented by the EP staff. The documentation packages contained event
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l observations, control room log printouts, and a " potential issue" form which contained the identification and evaluation of a question relating to the timeliness of the second classification. Documentation included in the packages indicated that offsita notifications had been made in a timely manner following the classifications.
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Conclusions The inspectors identified that the licensees classifications were appropriate and offsite notifications were made within the required times for the two declared Unusual Events.
Plant personnel emergency response appeared to be effective.
P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the 1998 exercice objectives and scenario and determined that they acceptably exercised major elements of the licensee's onsite emergency plan. The scenario provided a challenging framework to support demonstration of the licensee's l
capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a radiological release and several equipment failures.
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 ffL98 Evaluated Biennial Emercency Preoaredness Exercise a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
On February 24,1998, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving partial pcrticipation by the State of Ohio and full participation by the counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.
The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:
- Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operations Support Center (OSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the l
post-exercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's self-
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assessment of exercise performance.
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Emergency Resoorg. Facility Observations and Findinos b.1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The operating crew's emergency response performance was adequate. Using simulated plant conditions, the shift supervisor conservatively classified the initial emergency using the emergency action levels and made the declarations in a timely manner. The initial notifications to the State, counties, and NRC were completed within the regulatory time limits. Throughout the exercise the inspectors noted that the crew effectively used the plant computer system which included the use of the " power-to-flow map" and in-plant radiation levels to track plant parameters. Emergency plan implementing procedures were correctly used by the shift supervisor during the exercise.
The inspectors observed good communications between the control room crew and other emergency response staff including the Health Physics Department staff.
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However, simulator control room personnel were inconsistent in the use of repeat-backs and acknowledgments in their internal communications.
Generally, the Shift Supervisor and the control room crew promptly identified abnormal plant conditions and implemented corrective actions. However, the inspectors observed one instance in which the control room simulator crew was slow to identify the loss of an exhaust fan after the manual reactor scram and a subsequent main turbine trip. It took approximately 15 minutes to identify the loss of a Turbine Building exhaust fan due to the loss of power to its electrical bus. The loss of tne building exhaust fan and resultant loss of airflow past radiological sensors reated the potential for an unmonitored radiological release.
The scenario's leak from the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system steam supply line failure resulted in an unisolable leak and a slow reactor depressurization. The reactor slowly depressurized from greater than 800 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) to 500 psig over a period of approximately two hours, when the RCIC inboard isolation valve was closed. During this period, neither the control room simulator crew nor the TSC staff were able to determine a procedural method to emergency depressurize the reactor vessel to reduce the radiation release to the environment. The licensee's review identified that Plant Emergency Instruction PEl-D17, " Radioactivity Release Control," directed control room personnel to emergency depressurize the reactor pressure vessel when offsite radioactivity release rates approached or exceeded the release rate that required a General Emergency classification. PEl-D17's entry criteria, " abnormal radiological effluent requiring an Alert declaration," did not take into account that it was possible to declare a General Emergency based on an offsite dose projection and not meet or exceed the Alert radiological effluent release value.
Potential Issue Corrective Action No. 98-0375, dated March 4,1998, indicated that appropriate corrective actions, in the form of revision of the entry criteria for PEl-D17 to l
specify " Abnormal radiological effluent which requires an Alert, Site Area Emeroencv. or
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General Emergency," should be completed by June,1998. Also, appropriate training for emergency response organization personnel would be completed by April 1998.
The procedure icdequacy of PEl-D17 is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions. Procedures and Drawings. in that a safety-related procedure was
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inadequate. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, (NCV 50-440/98003-01(DRS)).
b.2 Technical Sucoort Center (TSC)
l Overall performance in the TSC was effective. The facility was efficiently activated following declaration of the Alert. Facility managers appropriately accepted emergency responsibilities within forty-five minutes of the public address announcement requesting facility activation. The Emergency Response Data System was properly activated during the activation sequence.
Initial briefings effectively defined plant status and provided guidance to the TSC staff on current priorities. Status boards were detailed and continuously updated throughout the exercise.
The Emergency Action Level (EAL) Index was pro-actively reviewed during the facility's activation to ensure that the current event classification was correct. Possible events that could lead to higher emergency classifications were noted on the index and discussed by the staff.
Priorities were established for the TSC staff, and OSC teams, and properly adjusted as the scenario's emergency conditions changed. Priorities were rapidly communicated to the CRS and OSC. In general, TSC staff's communications were good and use of
" repeat backs" to avoid miscommunications was observed.
Staff in the TSC properly determined that events met the criteria for declaration of a Site Area Emergency, and likewise properly declared a General Emergency later in the exercise. Both of these classifications were conservative, and prior to the scenario development team's anticipated classification time. TSC staff appropriately discussed the criteria in the EAL Index and fission product barrier matrix for each declaration. The default Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) was properly issued on the General Emergency initial offsite notification form. Notifications to offsite authorities and the NRC were timely and adequately detailed. Communicators kept track of notification times and the times required for followup notifications.
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l Procedures were effectively used throughout the exercise and event classification checklists were appropriately completed following each emergency classification.
During the exercise, lists of liems and issues were maintained which would need to be addressed during the recovery phase were developed. The reentry and recovery procedure was reviewed and discussed, and the criteria to be met to oeclare recovery were reviewed with the TSC staff.
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Simulated loss of a non-safety related bus caused loss of turbine bay / heater bay ventilation equipment, halting vent airflow. The lack of air flow through the vent (supplied by the turbine bay / heater bay fan) was first discussed at approximately 9:27 a.m. and it was noted that the lack of this airflow would render the vent radiation monitor readings invalid, negatively impac ing performance of dose assessment. They
I determined that there was no immediate need for this system, and system restoration j
was initially made the sixth of six priorities. This initial prioritization was considered
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correct, considering the more urgent need to restore other pieces of plant equipment necessary for reactor safety. Licensee procedures do not provide a required time for restoration of the associated electrical bus or fan equipment. As the scenario j.
progressed, it became more evident that a release was possible (or imminent) and that dose projections would be needed. The priority for establishing vent airflow increased to priority 5 and then to priority 3. However, actions to aggressively attempt to restore vent flow were not taken until approximately 10:36 a.m. with fan restoration taking place at l
approximately 11:15 a.m. Vent airflow was restored prior to the major release, so this delay had minimal impact on response to the exercise scenario,
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The TSC staff was advised by the Operations Manager to consider the effect of initiating
shutdown cooling on radiation levels in the plant, well prior to the need to initiate the l
system. This direction demonstrated good anticipatory concern for the elevated inplant l
radiation levels which would result from this evolution,' due to high radiation levels in the i
b.3 Ooerational Sunoort Center (OSC)
The overall performance of OSC management and staff was very competent. The OSC l
was fully staffed and operational within minutes following the Alert declaration. The l:
dedicated OSC was maintained in a state of readiness which aided in the quick activation of the facility.
Personnel maintained their focus and were professional throughout the exercise. A good sense of urgency was displayed by eli participants and they were generally
attentive to briefings by the OSC coordinator and TSC. OSC coordinator briefings were adequate but of a very short duration, from 30 to 60 seconds, and did not provide for an l
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overall discussion of OSC priorities or participant feedback. TSC briefings, which could be heard on a speaker in the OSC, was an enhancement to OSC effectiveness.
Plant condition status boards were consistently maintained and effectively used to track changing plant conditions, priority work orders, status of emergency teams and accumulated dose with one minor exception. The exception was the lack of an estimated repair time on the OSC Team Status Board. The failure to list the estimated
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repair times was identified and corrected by the TSC Maintenance Supervisor and used the remainder of the exercise.
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l-Team dispatch was effective. All teams dispatched from the OSC were timely and given
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thorough briefings which emphasized the need for personal safety and minimizing radiation exposures, the expected routes of travel and activities, and the reporting back
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of any unusual findings. A health physics supervisor arrived to augment OSC staff and provided extensive radiological briefings to repair team members which demonstrated that they were specifically detailed for each team. The inplant repair teams maintained effective communication with the OSC.
Health physics staff support to the OSC and repair teams was very good. Health physics technicians showed proper use of instrumentation and radiological control
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practices. Team members stayed out of higher radiological exposure areas while surveys were being conducted and until the dose rates and location of equipment to be worked on were discussed. Accumulated dose were constantly being tracked and updated by the OSC staff, and a listing was maintained of significant radiological issues identified, such as potential high dose areas. Habitability surveys of the OSC were periodically conducted and participants were routinely asked to check their pocket dosemeter readings.
l b.4 Emeraencv Ooerations Facility (EOF)
Following the Alert declaration, the Public Information Response Team (PIRT) convened in a room near the EOF. The PIRT Manager effectively led his staff to prepare an accurate press release regarding the Alert declaration.
The PIRT Manager and Technical Liaison maintained effective communications with TSC staff and kept PIRT staff wellinformed of changes to plant conditions and i
emergency actions. PIRT staff kept their manager wellinformed of their contacts with offsite agencies, information in the agencies' initial press releases, and the identities of j
the State's and counties' public information spokespersons.
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The EOF was declared to be fully operational within one hour of its activation. A prudent decision was made, however, to delay the transfer of command and control of
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the licensee's response until TSC staff completed actions associated with the TSC Emergency Coordinator's (EC) General Emergency declaration. The subsequent transfer of lead emergency responsibilities to the EOF's EC was orderly and clearly communicated to emergency responders. The decision to delay was sound and
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demonstrated effective control.
EOF status boards were effectively maintained to help keep EOF personnel informed of plant conditions, related inplant response actions, and protective measures implemented by offsite officials.
EOF staff assumed control of the licensee's offsite radiciogical monitoring teams after the EOF's EC assumed overall command of the licensee's response. The teams were l
kept adequately informed of changing plant conditions and release status. Team
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members' exposure histories were closely tracked. Acceptable turn back exposure rate l
limits were established and revised as the scenario progressed. Two teams were l
adequately deployed to locate and track the simulated plume. An actual radio communications equipment failure was effectively overcome through the use of backup equipment.
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Regulatory liaison staff satisfied the information needs of State and county liaisons who reported to the EOF. In contrast, the inspectors obcerved the regulatory liaison that provided an adequate initial briefing to members of a simulated NRC initial Site Team could not give detailed answers to a number of their questions. This liaison could only assure the NRC Site Team that the requested information would either be visible on
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EOF status boards or could be obtained by questioning key EOF responders. Key EOF responders were readily accessible to the Site Team members and were responsive to their information needs.
The EOF protective measures staff developed a procedurally correct, revised PAR when a wind direction shift was detected, later in the exercise. This revised PAR was approved and communicated to offsite officials within an adequate time after the wind direction shift was identified.
EOF habitability was closely monitored throughout the exercise. A simulated false alarm from an area radiation monitor was soon verified as such by an Health Physics (HP)
technician. Habitability surveys within the EOF were prudently increased in frequency while the alarm was being assessed and for some time after it was verified as being a malfunction.
b.5 Fire Brioade and Medical Resoonse The fire brigade rapidly arrived at the fire scene and effectively establi;ned a command post at the entrance to the Radiological Restricted Area (RRA). Brigade members at the scene wore fire fighting gear and used self-contained breathing apparatus.
Brigade members at the fire scene competently attacked the simulated fire. Though they wore full fNe respiratory protection, brigade members effectively communicated with each other. They radioed progress reports and damage assessments to the Fire Brigade Leader (FBL) and CRS crew, while overcoming several periods of heavy radio traffic and static.
While searching nearby rooms for collateral damage, a brigade member was postulated to have sustained a contaminated, open wound on his left hand. The victim was quickly removed from a simulated smoke-filled room to a safe area by his partner. A first aid team and HP support were quickly requested.
Three security officers formed an effective first aid team. An HP supervisor and two HP technicians provided on scene radiation protection support. Their arrivals were timely and their teamwork was noteworthy. Proper priority was given to the victim's medical condition, and the victim was never left unattended. His injuries and contamination were properly identified and reported to the FBL and the CRS crew. After giving onscene medical treatment, it was prudently decided to transport the victim to a local hospital i
without wasting time attempting onsite decontamination of his wounded hand.
The victim retained his dosimetry and was carefully escorted to the comrnand post established at the RRA where he was efficiently surveyed for possible additional
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contamination. At the RRA, a first aid team member and HP technicians efficiently and correctly briefed the ambulance crew on the victim's medical and contamination status.
Proper precautions were taken to avoid the spread of contamination as the victim was transferred to the ambulance crew's care. An HP technician was assigned to accompany the victim to the hospital.
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The area around the accident scene was conservatively cordoned off as a potentially I
contaminated area while the victim was readied for transport to the RRA. An HP technician was assigned to survey the route from the RRA taken by the victim and responders, b.6 Licensee Self-Critioues The inspectors attended the license's self-critiques in the CRS, TSC, OSC, and EOF that occurred efter the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited inputs from participants in addition to providing the participants with the controllers' initial assessments of participants' performances. The inspectors concluded that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in close sgreement with the majority of inspectors' observations.
b.7 Scenario arstEwrcise Control The scenario was challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's emergency response espabilities. A number of equipment mockups were used which enhanced
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realism and timing for some of the OSC's repair teams. The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test basic emergency capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives.
Overall control of the exercise'was adequate. No significant controller prompting or major exercise control problems were identified.
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Overall Conclusions The exercise was a competent demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures.
Overall perforrranco during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise
demonstrated that emergency plan implementation was effective. (Section P4.1.b)
Overall, emergency response performance in the Control Room Simulator was e
adequate. Emergency classifications were declared in a timely manner, and offsite agencies were notified within the required Umes. (Section P4.1.b.1)
The licensee effectively addressed and initiated corrective actions for an issue
identified in the control room simulator relative to inadequate entry conditions for a Plant Emergency Instruction. (Section P4.1.b.1)
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l The Technical Support Center staff's responses were effective. Emergency e
classifications and priorities were effectively established and changed as plant l
conditions changed. (Section P4.1.b.2)
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e Overall performance of Operations Support Center management and staff was very competent. Facility personnel maintained their focus and were professional I
throughout the exercise. (Section P4.1.b.3)
The Public Information Response Team effectively prepared and accurate press e
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release prior to sctivation of the Joint Public Information Center. Effective communications were maintained with the Technical Support Center. (Section P4.1.b.4)
Personnel performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was effective. The e
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facility was rapidly activated and the transfer of emergency command and contro! was effectively accomplished after actions associated with the General Emergency declaration were completed. (Section P4.1.b.5)
Fire brigade and medical response were effective. The fire brigade responded e
rapidly and communicated appropriately. The medical response personnel demonstrated noteworthy teamwork and proper priority was taken for radiological l
and medical conditions. (Section P4.1.b.6)
i Licensee critiques following termination of the exercise were self-critical and e
included controllers and exercise participants.
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P8 Miscellaneous EP issues
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l P8.1 (Closed) Non-Cited Violation item No. 50-440/98003-01: During the 1998 emergency exercise, entry criteria for PEl-D17 was determined to be inadequate, preventing emergency depressurization at the General Emergency classification since dose rates
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L did not meet or exceed the Alert radiological effluent release rate. Corrective act:ons indicated that a revision of the entry criteria for PEl-D17 to specify " Abnormal
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l radiological effluent which requires on Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency" would be performed. Also, appropriate training for the identified emergency l
response organization personnel would be completed. This item is closed.
P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-440/96009-02: During the 1996 emergency l
l exercise the licensee failed to provide a PAR on the General Emergency notification l
form. During this exercise the default PAR was properly issued, by the TSC, en the General Emergency initial offsite notification form. This item is closed.
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P8.3 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-440/96009-03: During The 1996 emergency exercise specific status board in the EOF did not display needed information. During this exercise EOF status boards were effectively maintained to help keep EOF personnel informed of plant conditions, related inplant response actions, and protective measures implemented by offsite officials. This item is closed.
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V. Manaaement Meetings l
l X.1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings l
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Anderson, Onsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator P. Arthur, Perry Operations Unit Supervisor H. Bergendahl, PNSD Director N. Bonner, PNMD Director D. Cleavenger, Emergency Planner R. Collings, Quality Assurance Manager M. Ginn, Emergency Planner J. Gorman, Security Training Supervisor H. Hegrat, RAS Manager T. Henderson, Compliance Supervisor D. Ipoletta, Radiation Protection Supervisor W. Kanda, Plant Manager R. Luse, Nuclear Skills Training Supervisor S. Mcffitt, Plant Engineering Manager A. Okorn,ISEG Acting Manager J. Powers, Design Engineer Manager T. Rausch, Quality / Personnel Developement Director j
M. Roseum, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor i
R. Schrauder, PNED Director J. Sears, Radiation Protection Manager J. Slike, Access Authorization Supervisor L. VanDerHorst, Health Physics INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS CLOSED Closed 50-440/98003-01 NCV Inadequacy of entry conditions in PEl-D17 which prevented emergency depressurization during the 1998 EP exercise.
50-440/96009-02 IFl Failure to provide a PAR on the General Emergency
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notification form during the 1996 EP exercise.
50-440/96009-03 IFl Specific status boards in the EOF did not display needed information.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Simulator DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator EOF Emergency Operations Facility ENS Emergency Notification System EP Emergency Preparedness EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ERO Emergency Response Organization FBL Fire Brigade Leader HP Health Physics IFl Inspection Followup Item IP Inspection Procedure NCV Non-cited violation NRC Nuclear Regu'atory Commission NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OSC Operations Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDR NRC Public Document Room PEI Plant Emergency Instruction PlRT Public Information Response Team PSIG Pounds per square inch guage RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RRA Radiological Restricted Area SS Shift Supervisor TSC Technical Support Center
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