IR 05000440/1997020
| ML20198N563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198N555 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-97-20, NUDOCS 9801210119 | |
| Download: ML20198N563 (11) | |
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-g U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .' ' REGION lll ' Docket No: 50440-
License No: NPF-58 . , Report No: - 50-440/97020(DRS) Licensee: Centerior Service Company
, Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant y . Location: P.O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH - 44081 Dates: December 2-5,1997 _ inspector: James L. Belanger, Senior Physical Security inspector Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety , , 4.. > .9901210119'980112 ~ POR ADOCK 05000440 .G.
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. _ _ _ . _.. - ._ _ __ __ _.. . . EXECUTNE SUMMARY
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Repori 50-440/97020
This inspection included a review of the physical security program. Specifically, the inspection included a review of alarm stations and communications; protected area access control of personnel, packages, material, and vehicles; testing and maintenance; protected area - assessment aids; personnel scarch equipment; security and safeguards staff training and qualification; and a review of two access authorization issues involving falsification of records by individuals seeking unescorted access.
In general, implementation rf the security program was professional and well managed
with improvement noted in r.s working relationship between the security staff and the maintenance support organization. (Section S2.1) A weakness was noted in the Intemal self assessment area. (Section S7.1) ' The plant access authorization staff respondM promptly and effectively to a
determination that a contract employee, wh( d been denied unescorted access at another nuclear plant, falsified a suitable inquay statement to gain unescorted access to the Perry Plant. The employee, who held unescorted access at the Perry Plant from September 11 to 25,1997, was approved for access at Perry based on industry accepted standards and guidelines endorsed by Regulatory Guide 5.66. No breakdowns of the licensee's procedures and practices were identified. (Section S1.1)
The plant access authorization staff responded promptly and effectively to a determination that a contract employee, who had been advised of a positive drug test at another facility while holding unescorted access at the Perry Plant, failed to advise the licensee of this information. The licensee determined that the individual had either falsified or willfully omitted information concerning the possession and use of illega! drugs, as demonstrated by the positive drug result at another nuclear facility. The individual, who held unescorted access at Perry between September 6 and October 8, l 1997, was approved for access at Perry based on industry accepted standards and guidelines endorsed by Regulatory Guide 5.66. No breakdowns of the licensee's procedures and practices were Identified. (Section S1.1) Maintenance support for the security program was timely and effective.
(Section S2.1) ingress search capability improved through an upgrade of the metal detection and e explosive detection equipment in the Primary Access Control Portal. (Section S2.2) The security training program was technically sound, including its lesson plans, records,
and classroom instruction. Special training by the U.S. Army Explosive Ordinance Demolition staff improved the security organization's knowledge in bomb identification.
i (Section S5.1) l
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.v.. . , . .. , .: e' Protected Area perimeter alarm system performance improved Compensatory --
measures related to the roost troublesome alarm zones were greatly reduced, (Section S8._1) _ _ -{ > I ~ , s + 't ,
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' . s Reoort Details IV. Plant Support S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Falsification of Fitness-for-Dutv Records to Gain Unescorted Access Authorization a.
Insoection Scooe , The inspector reviewed the access authorization records of two contract employees whose unescorted access was revoked subsequent to the initial granting of access.
The inspector also reviewed the security loggable event records relating to these two events, which occurred during the recent plant outage, b.
Observations and Findinas Event No.1 On October 1,1997, the licensee's access authorization staff discovered that a contractor employee, who had been granted unescorted access to the Perry Plant, had previously been denied access at another facility. The licensee approved the access based on industry accepted standards and guidelines (NUMARC 89-01) and the individual's favorable termination of unescorted access from New York Power Authority's Indian Point 3. Personnel Access Data System (PADS) records showed that the individual held favorable unescorted access at Indian Point 3 from May 13,1997 until August 14,1997, based on a temporary clearance. The licensee granted unescorted access on September 11,1997, since the temporary clearance had not been in effect for more than 180 days. The individual held unescorted access at Perry until the completion of the contract assignment on September 25,1997.
On October 1,1997, the individual requested unescorted access at Philadelphia Electric Company's Peach Bottom Plant. Access authorization staff at Peach Bottom identified that the individual had previously been denied access at Peach Bottom based on a positive drug test during pre-employment drug screening in October 1996. In November 1996, the individual was notified by certified mail regarding a failure to meet the fitness-for-duty (FFD) requirements. At the time of the positive drug test, Peach Bottom was not a member of the PADS; therefore the positive drug test would not have been known in the industry. When informed that access at Peach Bottom was going to be denied because of the previous positive drug test, the individualinformed Peach Bottom staff that he recently held unescorted access at Mdian Point 3 and Perry Plants. The Peach Bottom access authorization staff then notified Indian Point 3 and Perry staffs of the previous positive drug test.
The licensee's access authorization staff conducted a review of the individual's records along with the information received from Peach Bottom and determined that, while requesting unescorted access at Perry, the individual either falsified or willfully omitted
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. . information un his FFD/ Suitable Inquiry Infom1ation Sheet concerning a previous access denial at Peach Bottom. He had answered "no" to the question if he had ever tested positive for drugs or the use of alcohol. Without evidence of rehabilitation, had the individual's access authorization history been known, the licensee stated that it would have denied the individual access to the Perry Plant.
The licensee updated its site access computer system on October 1,1997, to ensure that the individual would be informed of the denial determination should he return to the Perry Plant. The licensee also determined that Indian Point 3 staff entered the - information about the positive drug test into the PADS system in response to the event.
Event No. 2 On October 10,1997, the licensee identified, as a result of a telephone call from the Turkey Point Plant's FFD Coordinator, that a contractor employee, who held unescorted access at the Perry Plant from September 6 to October 8,1997, did not provide information to the Perry Plant concerning a positive drug test result at Turkey Point. The Turkey Point FFD Coordinator informed the licensee's access authorization staff that an employee had tested positive for marijuana during an August 1997 pre-employment screening test at Turkey Point, but that the employee did not pass general employee training and had left the site prior to leaming the results of the drug screening. The Turkey Point Medical Review Officer discussed the results of the drug test with the individual on September 17,1997, while the Individual held access at Perry. On October 10,1997, the Turkey Point access authorization staff contacted the employee and informed " 7 that his unescorted access at Turkey Point was denied. During this conversation, me Turkey Point FFD Coordinator leamed that the employee had held unescorted access at the Perry Plant and immediately notified the licensee's access authorizatior, staff by phone.
The inspector's review of the employee's access authorization file showed that the licensee granted the employee unescorted access based on the successful completion of an interim background investigation conducted in accordance with established access l authorization procedures and the discovery of no adverse information. FFD drug i screening results were negative. The notification of a positive drug test by the Turkey ' Point Medical Review Officer to the employee occurred after the interirn temporary access authorization was granted.
When the licensee's access authorization staff leamed of the access denial at Turkey Point and realized that the individual was notified of the positive drug test while holding unescorted access at the Perry Plant, they reviewed the access files of this employee and determined that the employee did not inform the licensee's access authorization staff of this positive drug result notification. The licensee concluded that the individual either falsified or willfully omitted information concerning the possession and use of illegal drugs, as demonstrated by the positive drug result at Turkey Point. The individual responded "no" to the question on his FFD/ Suitable Inquiry concerning the sale, use, or , l l
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O l possession of illegal drugs in the past five years. The licensee determined that it would have denied unescorted access to the employee,if this prior positive drug test information been known with no evidence of rehabilitation.
On Octooer 10,1997, the licensee updated its End the PADS with the access denial information.
c.
Conclusio_ns b Two individuals gained unescovd access to the Perry Plant by falsifying or wilfully omitting information canceming suitable inquiry information. Ho'vever, the licensee had complied with its access authorization program's procedures.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Maintenance Suocort for the Security System a.
Insoection Scoce (81700) The inspector reviewed the licensee's records pertaining to the tracking and trending of security equipment performance during 1997, and interviewed the Administrative Coordinator and the Fix It Now (FIN) supervisor responsible for security maintenance.
b.
Observations and Findinos The interviews indicated an excellent working relationship between security staff and the technical maintenance staff supporting the security systems. _The working relationship appeared to be based on good communications and program ownership on the part of both the security organization and FIN team.
Security maintenance records indicated that work requests were appropriately prioritized. The majority of work requests were completed within one to three days.
A review of compensatory hours required for failed equipment showed a significant decrease in 1997 in comparison to 1966. For example, compensatory measures for failed perimeter alarm zones for the period of June through November 1997 totaled 108.4 hours compared to 1001.8 hours for the same period in 1996. For the pcriod of January through May 1997, compensatory measure hours totaled 1117.2 hours compared to 3037.7 hours during the same period in 1996. Compeasatory measure hours required for failed Closed Circuit Television cameras also significantly decreased, being 147.6 hours for the period of June through November 1997, compared to 355.2 for the same period in 1996. Interviews indicated that these reductions in compensatory measures resulted from the benefits of teamwork, improved communications, revisions to the preventive maintenance program, close coordination with the alarm system vendor, and installation of nine new board cameras in 1997.
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I ' - .. . The inspector's review of the security loggable events showed that the majority of.the : ] ' -~ events involving cameras and perimeter alarm zones were sun glare and weather
- related, respectively.iThe records also showed few' problems relating _to the security
- computer, ingress search equipment, or security doors.
c.
Conclusions I I ' . Maintenance support for the security program was effective, j
- S2.2 : Imoroved Inareas Search Canability -
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Inspectior Scope (81700) t - The inspector observed ingress search activities in the Primary Access Control Portal-(PACP) ar.d interviewed security staff regarding the operability and reliability of ingress search equipment. The observations were made between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 k.m. on December 3 4,19g7, during peak personnel ingress.
. b.
- Observations and Findinos - ' . The inspector obser/ed that the licensee completed an upgrade of metal detection and explosive detection equipment in the PACP and that such equipment was of top quality.
The inspector also noted that a new configuration of the search area promoted a more Leffective personnel screening. A review of equipment performance related records showed that system reliability improved.
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Conclualons ! i ^ New metal detectors and explosive detectors and a new equipment layout improved the R efficiency and reliability of the ingress search process.
Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 Security Trainino Procram t a.
Insoection Scone (81700) - - The inspector reviewed Individual Qualification Records for consistency with security <l plan commitments; monitored two classes for effectiveness and quality of instruction; reviewed instructor lesson plans for 10 CFR 73.55, Appendix B - related subjects; and C - interviewed the Supervisor, Security Training regaMing recent developments in security training.
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Observations and FindirtQS Security training lesson plans were current, detailed, and well written. An annual review of lesson plans by training supervision assured that the lesson plans were current.
The inspector monitored two security requalification training classes given by security training personnel relating to contingency equipment and implementation of the site emergency plan by security personnel. The quality of instruction was very good. The inspector verified that the instructor covered the material in the relevant lesson plan.
The Supervisor, Security Training stated that in 1996, the security training staff initiated "Simmunitions" with the duty weapon and shotgun, and that this program's use of simulated ammunition added realism to drills and forced security officers to consider cover and concealment.
In May 1997, the US Army Explosive Ordinance Demolition team from Wright Patterson Air Force Base conducted special training for all security personnel in bomb identification. The supervisor indicated that locallaw enforcement agency staff also participated in the training.
The inspector's review of sixteen randomly selected Individual Qualification Records showed that security officers were requalified in accordance with the training and qualification plans. The inspector noted that the records were properly maintained and reflected current qualifications.
c.
Conclusions The security training program was effective.
S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Weakness in Evaluating Warehouse Package Search Activities a.
lusoection Scoce (81700) The inspector interviewed the Quality Assurance Auditor responsible for the most recent annual security /FFD audit. The inspector reviewed records relating to the internal security drill program and the recently implemented Plant Protection Section's internal self-assessment program.
b.
Observations and Findings The inspector identified that the contraband detection drill program administered by the training section evaluated the effectiveness of ingress search activities within the PACP; however, the program did not evaluate package searches conducted by security personnel in the warehouse that are destined for protected area entry. The licensee
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- acknowledged that the weakness existed and, at the exit meeting, indicated that the drill program would be revised to include warehouse searches.
The incpector noted that having contraband detection drills in the warehouse was a program enhancement in the area of self assessment / performance evaluation and_not a security plan commitment. Therefore, no violation of security plan requirements was identified.
c.
Conclusion. The licensee's contraband detection drill program was weak in that the program did not evaluate the effectiveness of warehouse package searches conducted by security personnel. The licensee agreed to incorporate warehouse searches into its drill program. This planned revision to the security drill program is an inspection Follow :p item (IFl 50-440/97020-01).
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues S8.1 (Closed) IFl 50-440-97005-01: The reliability of three specific alarm zones was questionable because of excessive alarms. The significance of the excessive alarms was that compensatory measures were used extensively for these zones.
The licensee developed an action plan, dated April 16,1997, to address these specific perimeter alarm zones. Work included wirs replacement /retensioning, insulator cleaning and repair, and inspection of grounds. Additionally, the licensee obtained technical assistance from a vendor. The retensioning, insulator cleaning, and weed control improved performance. Lessons leamed were incorporated into the preventive maintenance tasks. As a result of the effort, alarm rates and compensatory hours for these zones were significantly reduced. A total of 5.5 hours were expended on compensatory measures for these zones during the period of June through November 1997, compared to 351.5 hours during the period of January through May 1997. This item is closed.
V. Management Meeting X1 Exit Meeting Summary On December 4,1997, the inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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. .. 'l . PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED - IdGADAtt J. Bahleda, Audit Unit Supervisor-C. Elberfeld, Compliance Engineer-J. Gorman, Supervisor, Security Training, Site Protection Section (SPS) ' L T. Henderson, Compliance Supervisor L. Lindrose Jr., Administrative Coordinator, SPS T. Mahon, Manager, SPS P. Paine, Security Analyst, SPS - > J. Palinkar, Security Shift Supervisor, SPS R. Rose, General Supervisor, Nuclear Operations SPS J. Slike, Access Authorization Unit Supervisor, SPS 88G J. Clark, Resident inspector, Division of Reactor Projects D. Kosloff, Senior Resident inspector, Division of Reactor Projects ) . INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-440/97020-01 IFl Weakness in Contraband Detection Drill Program , Closed 50-440/97005-01 IFl High Alarm Rate and Excessive Compensatory Measures for ' Specified Perimeter Alarm Zones , ,-
. . - - .. -. ..:. .. .. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ' CFR Code of Federal Regulations . DRS ~ DMalon of Reactor Safey - .FFD; Fitness for Duty) FIN : Fix It Now '. .IFl. Inspection Followup Item PACP Primary Access Control Portal - - PADS Personnel Access Data System ' PDR-Pabile Document Room SPS - Site Protoction Section i ! . .
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