IR 05000440/1997015
| ML20197J229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197J220 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-97-15, NUDOCS 9801020116 | |
| Download: ML20197J229 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION til l
Docket No:
50-440 t
License No:
NPF 58
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Report No:
50-440/97015(DRS)
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Licensee:
Cleveland Electric illuminating Company
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
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Location:
Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101
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Dates:
September 22 through October 23,1997 Inspector:
K. Green Bates, Reactor inspector
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Approved by:
J. A. Gavula, Chief, Engineering Specialists Branch 1
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Division of Reactor Safety
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9901020116 971221 POR ADOCK 05000440
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-440/97015 This Inspection focused on inservice inspection (ISI) efforts and installation activities of the suppression pool suction strainer modification. The report covers a five-day on site inspection and a three-day in-office inspection by one regional inspector.
Inservice inspection activities were effectively implemented and in accordance with the
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licensee's program and ASME Section XI,1983 Edition Summer Addenda, requirements (Section M1.1).
The use of Performance Demonstration Initiative examinations and qualified personnel,
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etched weld aantification numbers, and the proactive use of ISI component tags, demonstrated a conservative ISI program focused on safety (Section M1.1).
The licensee's independent evaluation of indications found during ISI exams for
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comparison with the flaw dispositions made by the contractors indicated a strong ISI program commitment to safety and active oversight of ISI contract personnel (Section M1.1).
Overall, the section strainer hardware installation was well executed with proper
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procedural adherence and active management and engineering oversight (Section E2.1).
The initial receipt inspection for suction strainer components did not identify openings
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larger than the design criteria or a weld that was not complete. The licenseo committed to evaluate the process and procedures for procuring items for major modifications and repairs, including Quality Assurance program oversight during fabrication and installati6n phases (Section E7.1).
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Report Details
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11. Maintenance
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M1 Conduct of Maintenance i
M1.1 Qbservation of inservice insoection (ISI) Activities l
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Insoection Scone (IP 73753. IP 73052)
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The inspector observed inservice inspection work-in-progress, interviewed personnel, and reviewed data associated with General Electric Nuclear Energy inspection Services (GE) personnel performing the following activities:
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Liquid penetrant examinations of feedwater welds.
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Enhanced visual examinations of foreign material found inside the reactor
pressure vessel downcomer annulus.
Automated ultrasonic examination of reactor vessel welds,
i In-vessel visual inspections of jet pump restrainer adjusting screw assemblies.
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Ultrasonic examination (UT) of main steam and feedwater line welds.
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Ultrasonic equipment calibration prior and post performance of examinations.
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Visual examination (VT) of a residual heat removal system snubber.
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b.
Observations and Findingt Licensee and contractor personnel adhered to procedural requirements and demonstrated the knowledge and skills necessary for the examinations observed. The inspector noted that a licensee Level lll examiner had been assigned to each type of nondestructive test activity to provide active oversight of Level lil contractor personnel.
The licensee personnel made Independent evaluations of indications found during ISI examinations and compared their results with the flaw dispositions made by the Level lli contractors. Any discrepancies were discuss 9d in depth and resolved, The enhanced visual examinations inside the reactor pressure vessel downcomer annulus identified a bolt lodged between the jet pump diffuser and the outside surface of the shroud. The inspector reviewed the VT video tapes and verified that adjacent areas and other components within possible bolt flow paths did not appear damaged. The licensee concluded that the bolt originated from outside the reactor vessel but was not able to determine its origin.
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Personnel performed a UT of main steam line weld 1821-0129 in accordance with approved procedures. No difficulties were encountered in the examination and no rejectable indications were detected.
For feedwater system weld 1N27 P414-WA, the dye penetrant examination was performed in accordance with procedural requirements. Two indications were identified and recorded; no rejectable indications were detected.
The VT of snubber 1E12-H0016 used the cco,ponent support assembly drawing to check for missing parts, thread engagement and damaged spherical bearings. No discrepant conditions were identified. A special metal ISI identification tag was attached as part of a proactive ISI effort to assure proper examinations for fature ISI inspections.
During ultrasonic equipment system calibration in preparation for a UT of feedwater line weld 1N27-0025, the GE personnel correctly identified the refracted angle of the transducer, verified the amplitude linearity of the machine, and established the distance amplitudo correction curve in accordance with the appropriate procedure. For the UT, the inspector verified that the scanriing parameters were appropriate and that the correct acceptance criteria were used for indication evaluations. Weld locations were clearly identified with an etched identification number. The inspector considered that this proactive effort contributed to safety by providing positive verification of the weld being examined. No relevant Indications were detectod.
The UT of the reactor vessellongitudinal shell weld )B13 BB was performed with the General Electric Reactor Inspection System automated ultrasonic inspection system.
For this examination, the inspector verified that scan parameters, which included scanning speeds, scanning level gain settings, and transducer frequencies were in accordance with the GE procedure no. UT PER 702VO No Code reportable indications were detected for this weld.
Visual inspections of reactor vessel internals were completed using an underwater video camera. The inspector reviewed portions of the tapes of the jet pump restrainer adjusting screw assembly examinations which looked for gaps in accordance with the GE RICSIL No. 070. The licensee's VT Level ill ISI engineer had previously reviewed this activity, demonstrating active contractor oversight. Pictures were very clear due to effective backlighting. Six of the adjusting screws were not in contact with the jet pump inlet mixer. No vibration induced damage or wear was observed where these gaps occurred. The gaps were identified as reportable indications and Potential Issue Form (PlF) 97-1632 was generated to evaluate and disposition the discovered indications.
ASME Section XI, Appendix Vill, requires demonstration of th9 effectiveness of UT ISI procedures, equipment, and personnel. To date, Appendix Vill has not been mandated by the NRC; however, the licensee proactively elected to perform applicable ISI ultrasonic examinations using Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDl) procedures and personnel. These exams were demonstrated to the Authorized Nuclear Inservice incpector (ANil) as required by ASME IWA-2240,
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Conclusions The inspector observed good preplanning, preparation, and demonstrated knowledge of the examinations performed. Contracted personnel correctly implemented the licensee's ISI program. Additionally, the inspector considered the licensee's use of PDI examinations and qualified personnel, etched weld identification numbers and the proactive use of ISI component tags, to dernonstrate a conservative ISI program focused on safety. The licensee's independent evaluation of indications found during ISI exams indicated a strong ISI program commitment to safety and active oversight of ISI contract personnel.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 inservice inspection Procedurcs a.
inspection Scoce (IP 73753. IP 73051. IP 73052)
The inspector reviewed and evaluated the following ISI documents, program procedures and ISI personnel certifications for compliance with technical specifications, ASME Code, NRC requirements and American Society for Nondestructive Testing SNT TC 1 A recommendations:
PNPP (Perry Nuclear Power Plant] Procedure No. NQl.0941, " Liquid Penetrant
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Examination," Revision 7 2, August 21,1997.
PNPP Procedure No. NQl 1042," Visual Examination,"
Revision 6-1, August 12,1997.
PNPP Procedure No. NQl-0944," Ultrasonic Examination,"
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Revision 5-4, September 14.1997.
PNPP Procedure No. NQl 1003, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Pipe Welds,"
Revision 5, April 25,1997.
PNPP Procedure No. PAP 1001," Inservice Examination Program,"
Revision 2, July 20,1997.
GE Procedure No. UT PER 702VO,' Procedure for GERIS 2000 Ultrasonic
OD Examination of RPV Assembly Welds", Revision 0, January 31,1996.
ISI Personnel Certifications for: T. O' Banner, P Shamblin, S. McElderry,
A. Frieler, P. Bailey, J. Breza, R. Liggett, J. Ryder, H. Schlortt, D. Williams and T. Harrell,
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ObservallDDs and Findinas The licensee's VT, UT and dye penetrant examination data reports and evaluation documentation comp!)ed with ASME Code Section XI requirements. Prior to performing the ISI inspection, GE Identified deviations in the licensee's procedures from the UT variables performed per the PDI procedures, The ISI Program Manager initiated the j
necessary corrective action to address the deviations from procedure requirements.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action, which included demonstration to the ANil and modification of procedures. All code requirements appear to have been met.
The inspector reviewed GE personnel qualification and certification records and determined that they met the SNT TC-1 A Recommended Practice and the ASME Code, 1983 Edition Summer Addenda,Section XI requirements. These certifications had been rev!ewed and accepted by the ANil.
All observed ISI examination procedures were approved and accepted by the ANil. The NRC inspector reviewed the ISI procedures used for the examinations observed, and determined that the procedures met the required ASME Section XI and Section V requirements, c.
Conclusions The ISI documents, procedures and personnel certifications reviewed during this inspection complied with ASME Code requirements and no violations or deviations were identified. The inspector considered the ISI p!an particularly well organized and documented. Prompt corrective action was taken to address licensee identified procedural deviations.
M3.2 Elow Accelerated Corrosion fFAC) Proaram Review a.
lDSoection Scone (49001)
In 1996, NRC inspectors nnted that the components in small bore piping systems (2 inch diameter and smaller), assessed by the licensee as "hl h risk" susceptibility to
FAC, had not been evaluated for incorporation into the program (Inspection Report 50-440/96007). The FAC Program Manager acknowledged this potential opportunity for further improvement of the program and indicated that the licensee would evaluate and incorporate "hlgh risk" small bore piping components into their FAC program.
The inspector reviewed the FAC pipe wall thickness monitoring program procedure to verify consistency with NUREG 1344, " Erosion / Corrosion - Induced Pipe Wall Thinning in U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," and with the licensee's responses to Generic Letter 89-08, * Erosion / Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning,* and Bulletin 87-01, " Thinning of Pipe / Walls in Nuclear Power Plants."
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Observations and Findirca Plant Admir'istrative Procedure No. PAP 1002, ' Pipe Wall Thickness Monitoring
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Program " Revision 4, dated May 15,1997, added small bore components to the FAC
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program. In addition, clarifications were added to improve the 4 inch pipe wall thickness monitoring programs.
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Conclusions Changes to the FAC pmgram to include small bore piping have been made which bring
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the Perry FAC program up to the current industry standards and demonstrates
increased support for this program. No violations or deviations were identified.
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liluingineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment i
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E2.1 Observation of Sonoression Pool Suction Strainer InstaUailon ActMtina a.
lDaoection Scooe (IP 37828)
The inspector assessed onsite activities, hardware, and the recelpt inspection associated with the suppression pool suction stralner modification. The inspector reviewed acpects of the suction strainer installation, under Design Changa Package No. 96-0042, Revision 0, *ECCS Suction Strainer Roplacement," and * Emergency i
Closed Cooling System Suction Strainer RFO6 Work Plan," Revision 1, dated March 26,
1997. This included review of selected procedures and documentation associated with the work activities, as well as discussions with dive personnel, maintenance workers, quality assurance personnel and engineers. Standard strainer segment and tee segment dimensional checks and weld repair observations were made.
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b, Observations and Findings All work observed by the inspector was performed with the work package present and in active use. Supervisors, dive technical support personnel, maintenancs personnel and health physics (HP) personnel actively monitored the work progress and were familiar with the requirements of the work package.
The inspector observed several sections of the new strainer being moved into place.
Assemblies were handled and rigged in accordance with Plant Administrative Procedure PAP 1313, Revision 0. With the exception of a low pressure core spray tee strainer segment, no problems were encountered during strainer transportation. The metal gasket of the tee segment was damaged after hitting a scaffold pole but was appropriately repaired.
Strainer segment installation consisted of bolted construction and no welding was required. The inspector observed the strainer being assembled underwater by divers,
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where segments were bolted together and supported with lateral compression supports.
Diver support platforms were established on the grating floor above the suppression pool to oversee activities and were manned by a diver technical support person, a maintonance representative, an HP technician and a quality control representative at all times of inspector observation, c.
Conclusloill The supprossion pool suction strainer installation activities were propeiiy performed and controlled. Technicians and divers performing these activities appeared experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Supervisors and engineering staff provided good oversight of modification activities.
E2.2 Jet PurnajeLSctew. Dana; a.
InspecilonScopa.f.lP 73753)
The inspector reviewed and evaluated the following engineering support documents, related to dispositions of recordable indications resulting from nondestructive ISI examinations of the jet pump assemblies:
PNPP " Jet Pump Set Screw Gaps PlF NCC 971632 Use As Is Disposition,"
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October 1997.
PNPP USAR Change Request No.97-080 for USAR Section 3.9.2.3.1,
October 6,1997.
PNPP 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation No. 97-0096 *USAR CR 97 080 and
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Use As Is Disposition for PlF NCC 97-1632," October 8,1997.
GE engineering document GENE DRF# B13-019091, * Pony Jet Pump Set
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Screw Gap Vibration Analysis," September 1997.
GE engineering document GENE DRF# B13-01909 2, * Perry Jet Pump Set
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Screw Gap Structural Analysis," October 1997, b.
Observations and Findingh As a result of visual inspections of Jet pump restrainer adjusting assemblies, the licensee issued PIF 97-1032 to report gaps between the set screw of the jet pump restrainer bracket and the mixer section of the jet pump on six Jet pumps. Two of the gaps exceeded the acceptance enteria as detailed by a 1996 GE engineering document GENE DRF# B13-01909 ret screw gap ovaluation.
Additional GE engineering documents evaluated the existing set screw gaps and determined that the cumulative fatigue usage factor of 1.0 would not be exceeded for
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one additional operating cycle. Alljet pumps were considered operable and no hardware modific9tions were performed.
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Per PNPP commitment identification forms B00929 and 801083, and Section 6.0 of the
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inservios Examination Program, jet pump set screw examination for tack weld integrity l
and mixer contact are scheduled to be performed overy refueling outage. Any gaps t
discovered require additional engineering evaluation in order to ensure continued compliance with the 1.0 fatigut limit, c.
Conclusions
The licensee's evaluation adequately justified jet pump operation for one additional fuel cycle. The appropriate ISI documentation will be revised to implement the inspections of set screw gaps in future refueling outages. Alllicensee proccdural requiremonts, and NRC regulatory requirements were met in a timely nanner. No violations or deviations were identified.
_ uality Assurance in Engineering Activities E7 Q
E7.1 8ecelot insoection of Supptassion Pool Suction Stralner a.
lDagggtion Scone fIP 3]j28)
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After receiving information from River Bond Nuclear Power Station, the licensee performed an informal inspection of the suction strainer and Identified areas where the maximum allowatt,e hole size was exceeded. The licensee generated PIFs 971525 and 971554, and formally inspected all remaining segments. In addition to unacceptable strainer holes, an unacceptable incomplete weld was also identified on segment B7. The licensee determined that resolution was required prior to strainer installation as these conditions could potentially compromise the designed function of the strainer. The weld and hole repair was performed by the fabricator using appropriate welding procedures, techniques and heat sinks for thin-wall matarials. The inspector reviewed the associated HF for adequacy of correction actions and root causes, b.
Oh1BIY&tions and Findingo
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The inspector noted that PIFs 971525 and 971554 did not consider generic implications of contractor controllssues. For each case, the apparent root cause stated
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only that the inspections performed by the fabricator did not meet the requirements of procurement specification, and that inspections were Insufficient to identify and correct the problems.
The corrective actions were limited to assuring that repair activities brought tho strainer into conformance with the design criteria for the straim t hole size and the repair of the incomplete weld. Licensee involvement or responsibility for receipt inspection of safety-related equipment was not identified nor were quality assurance methods to prevent future occurrences addressed. The inr.pector's questions, in this regard, prompted the licensee to issue PIF 97-2253 on October 23,1997. Tne PlF documented that the
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events, which occurred within the strainer modification, could be an indication that the licenset should increase their involvement in plant modifications to assure that vendors remain in conformance with specification requirements, it recommended evaluating the process and procedures for procuring "new construction" items, including provisions for increasing the owner's oversight during fabrication and installation phases.
.Conclusiora The current PNPP receipt inspection program did not identify that the strainer failed to meet the licensee's acceptance criteria. The inspector's questions prompted the licensee to issue a PlF to recommend evaluating the process and procedures for procuring "new construction * ltems/ services for future modifications and repairs, including provisions for increasing owner oversight during fabrication and installation phases.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues E8.1 Inspector Review of Updated Safety Analysis Reoort (USAR)
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IDSoection Scope (IP 3?EQ)
While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the USAR relating to the areas inspected.
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Chiervations and Findings As discussed in section E2.2 of this report, a GE analysis determined that the as found gaps between the jet pump set screws and the jet pump would not result in unacceptable fatigue loading of the jet pump. The maximum member stresses due to vibratory loading was calculated to be 12,040 pounds per square inch (psi). Although this value did not exceed the ASME Code allowable value of 13,600 psi, USAR Section 3.9.2.3.1 stated that the maximum allowable stress from cratory loading to avoid fatigue failure was 10,000 psi. This stress limit is part of the vibration acceptance critoria for reactor intomal components described in Section 14.2.12.2.30 of the USAR.
The licensee performed Safety Evaluation No. 97-0090 to address this deviation and determined that a submittal to the NRC was not required. Change Request No.97-080 was processed to provide a more complete description of the correlation between component stress levels and the fatigue usage factor then that currently stated in Chapter 14 of the USAR. The inspector verified that the PNPP Safety Evaluation Report did not mandate the 10,000 psi maximum allowable stress due to other considerations.
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Conclusions The licensee's safety evaluation was acceptable and no discrepancies with the USAR were identified that required NRC approval.
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'/. Management Meetinan l
l X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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On September 26, and October 23,1997, the inspector conducted a preliminary and final j
telephone exit with licensee representatives identified herein and summarized the scope and findings of ths inspection, At each exit, the inspector questioned licensee personnel as to the
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potential for proprietary information within the inspection report material discussed at the exits.
One item of proprietary information was identified concerning data within the set screw evaluation package and the appropriate disposition of the item was discussed.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Clgyaland Eindric IHuminatina Comnany l
J.'Bahloda Procurement Quality Supervisor
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'R. Collings, Manager - Quality Assurance -
'T. Henderson, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor i
- M. Johnson, CEl Project Manager
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- W. Kanda, Plant Manager - CEI S. Moffitt, Manager - PES
- P. Nichols, Mechanical Unit Supervisor
'J. Powers, Manager DES
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'R. Schrauder, Director PNED
'C. Wirtz, ISI Program Manager
'L. Zerr, Regulatory Assurance
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General Electric M. Allison, Refueling Floor Project Manager
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P. Bailey, IWI Levellli J. Hewett, ISl Project Manager
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iLS. Nuclear Regulatorv Commission J. Clark, Resident inspector, Division of Reactor Projects D. Kosloff, Senior Resident inspector, Division of Reactor Projects
' Denotes those present at the September 26,1997 on site exit interview.
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 37828:
Installation and Testing of Modifications IP 49001:
Inspection of Erosion / Corrosion Monitoring Programs IP 73753:
Inservice inspection IP 73052:
Inservice Inspection, Review of Procedures IP 73051:
Intervice inspection, Review of Program
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Ll8T OF ACRONYMS USED
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ANil Authorized Nuclear Inservice inspector
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ASNT American Society for Nondestructive Testing
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FAC Flow Accelerated Corrosion i
GE'
General Els::tric Nuclear Energy HP Health Physics ISI Intervice Inspection
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PDI Performance Demonstration Initiative PIF PotentialIssue Form PNPP Perry Nuclear Power Plant psi -
Pounds per Square Inch USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report UT Ultrasonic Examination
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VT Visual Examination
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