IR 05000440/1996009

Insp Rept 50-440/96-09 on 960916-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Performance During Plant Biennial Excercise of Emergency Plan & Implementing Procedures

ML20132A357
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	12/09/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20132A354	List: IR 05000440/1996009 ML20132A350
References
50-440-96-09, 50-440-96-9, NUDOCS 9612160019
Download: ML20132A357 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lll Docket No:

50-440 License No:

NPF-58 Report No:

50-440/96009(DRS)

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Licensee:

Cleveland Electric illuminating Company

Facility:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

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Location:

P. O. Box 97, A200

Perry, OH 44081

Dates:

September 16 through 20,1996

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Inspectors:

Robert D. Jickling, Emerg. Prep. Analyst James E. Foster, Sr. Emerg. Prep. Analyst Eric Duncan, Reactor Engineer Don Kosloff, Sr. Resident inspector Approved by:

James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety i

9612160019 961209 PDR ADOCK 05000440

PDR i

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i

l Perry Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-440/96009 This announced inspection included evaluation of performance during the plant tnei.nial exercise of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection team observed activities in the control room simulator, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.

- Plant Sucoort Overall performance during the 1996 emergency preparedness exercise was very

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good. The exercise was a successful demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plans and procedures.

Overall, performance in the control room simulator was good. Participants were

professional and focused on response to the simulated emergency conditions.

Event classification, offsite notifications and offsite protective action

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recommendations were correct and timely. However, an Inspection Followup Item was identified related to inadequate monitoring of control room panel instrumentation (Section P4.2).

Overall, performance in the Technical Support Center was excellent. The

Emergency Coordinator (EC) demonstrated effective command and control and status boards were well maintained. Technical and operational analysis of plant conditions demonstrated extensive systems knowledge. The transfer of command and control to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was efficient. (Section P4.3)

i Overall, the Operations Support Center (OSC) staff's performance was excellent.

• The facility was promptly activated and the OSC Coordinator effectively maintained j

command and control. Facility personnel were professional and focused on

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emergency response. (Section P4.4)

Overall performance in the EOF was good. However, an Exercise Weakness was

identified concerning the initial notification form for the General Emergency (GE)

declaration being transmitted to the State and county authorities without a P.')tective Action Recommendation (PAR). The EC maintained effective command anu control and frequent facility briefings were concise. The dose assessment group and offsite radiological monitoring teams proactively pursued quantifying the offsite impact of the radiological release. Detailed recovery and reentry discussions were comprehensive. An Inspection Followup Item was identified related to specific status boards not displaying needed information. (Section P4.5)

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Reoort Details IV. Plant Suooort i

i P3 EP Procedures and Documentation i

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P3.1 Review of Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (82302)

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The inspectors reviewed the 1996 exercise's objectives and scenario and

determined that they were acceptable. The scenario provided an excellent j

framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its

emergency plan. The scenario was realistic and challenged each of the licensee's

emergency facilities. The scenario included 13 major equipment failures and a large

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radiological release. Exercise realism was enhanced by the restorution of a majority i

of the equipment when appropriate actions were taken. A number of the specific

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challenges are identified in Section P4.1.

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P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 Proaram Areas Insoected (82301)

The licensee conducted a full participation, two day ingestion exercise on September 17-18,1996. The exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. The licensee activated its emergency response organization and emergency response facilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency evaluated the offsite response capabilities of the State of Ohio and Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties. The Federal Emergency Management Agency willissue a separate report.

The exercise scenario was conducted using the control room simulator. The exercise began at 7:00 a.m. with the plant operating at 100 percent power following completion of a refueling outage. At 7:31 a.m. an Unusual Event was declared due to a safety relief valve which inadvertently opened and failed to close.

A fire in the residual heat removal pump room 'A' caused the pump to trip. An operator responding to the fire, became contaminated and injured at 7:55 a.m. An Alert was declared at 8:04 a.m. due to the fire potentially affecting the pump. A failure of the rod control and information system prohibited the manualinsertion of control rods and at 9:20 a.m., control room annunciators were lost due to a failure in breaker D1 A06. A Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:32 a.m. due to a loss of control room annunciators.

Additional scenario equipment failure's included an instrument air system leak inside containment, loose parts trouble with recirculation pump 'A' and increased steam tunnel temperatures. A General Emergency was declared at 11:27 a.m. based on a loss of two fission product barriers and a loss of the third barrier. Recovery discussions commenced af ter the release had been terminated and the plant was stabilized. The exercise was terminated at approximately 2:53 p.m.

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P4.2 Control Room Simulator a.

Insoection Scone (82301-03.02)

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The inspectors observed and evaluated the control room simulator staff as they

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performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario conditions. These tasks j

l included detection and classification of events, analysis of plant conditions, notification of offsite authorities, and adherence to the emergency plan and l

implementing procedures. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan

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implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and notification forms generated during the exercise.

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b.

Observations and Findir)ng

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The unit supervisor and operators were focused and well coordinated throughout

the exercise. Communications were well maintained in the control room simulator

and were crisp and concise. The inspectors observed good use of repeat backs and j

acknowledgements.

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The shift supervisor promptly recognized the Unusual Event (UE), Alert, and Site

Area Emergency (SAE) entry conditions. Initial notifications were made to the State and local authorities within 15 minutes for the UE and Alert emergency declarations.

The inspectors identified inadequate monitoring of control room panel instrumentation when annunciators were lost. Two instances were observed where control room operators were slow to identify displayed conditions. First, operators took approximately 27 minutes to identify that the instrument air header was depressurized after the annunciators wem restored. Secondly, operators were slow to identify low tube oil pressure on the motor feed pump. The slow identification of low lube oil pressure resulted in an unnecessary Operations Support Center (OSC)

response team being sent to the motor feed pump breaker to investigate the trip.

Corrective actions by the licensee for the panel monitoring problems will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (50-440/96009-01(DRP)).

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Conclusions Overall, emergency response performance by the control room crew was good.

The emergency classifications were declared in a timely inanner, and offsite agencies were notified within the required times. The control room personnel demonstrated crisp, concise communications. Inadequate monitoring of control room panels was observed on two occasions.

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P4.3 Technical Sucoort Center a.

Insoection Scooe (82301-03.03)

l The inspectors observed and evaluated the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff as l

they performed tasks necessary to respond to the exercise scenario conditions.

l These tasks included staffing and activation, facility management and control,

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accident assessment, classification, dose assessment, protective action decision making, notifications and communications, assistance and support to the control room, evaluation of post-accident sarnpling results, and dispatch and coordination of monitoring teams. The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures, logs, checklists, status boards, and computer-generated forms and work sheets.

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Observations and Findinas The Emergency Coordinator (EC) demonstrated good command and control of the

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j facility and effectively guided the TSC staff's emergency response. Periodic facility briefings included concise inputs by key staff members for each of their areas. The EC effectively kept the staff focused on the overall emergency response. The

inspectors observed extensive use of procedures, including the activation and classification checklists.

l The TSC's status boards were effectively used to display reactor parameters and radiation levels, and to track onsite emergency activities. The "Out Of Service"

status board was continuously updated to list inoperable equipment. Personnel

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continually analyzed emergency priorities and modified them as conditions changed.

These priorities were effectively established, discussed, and posted on facility status boards.

Notifications to the State, counties, and NRC were made within the required times.

A communicator, wearing a cordless headset, effectively maintained continuous communications with the NRC from the TSC on the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

I Technical and operational analysis of plant conditions demonstrated extensive

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systems knowledge. An example was a decision to not open the auxiliary building roll up door as part of the alternate boron injection procedure because opening the

door could result in an unmonitored release pathway.

t Transfer of command and control to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was smooth and efficient. The TSC appropriately retained responsibility for communications with the NRC over the ENS and Health Physics Network.

Af ter the exercise, detailed reentry and recovery discussions were conducted. A recovery organization was outlined and a comprehensive list of short term and long

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term reentry / recovery issues were developed.

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The inspectors noted the public address announcements made for the SAE and GE i

did not include the reason for upgrading the emergency classifications, incoming

questions from the plant personnel could severely tie up control room phone lines l

which would prevent offsite communication and notification.

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Conclusions

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Overall performance in the TSC was excellent. The EC demonstrated effective i

command and control and status boards were well maintained. Technical and operational analysis of plant conditions demonstrated extensive systems

knowledge. The transfer of command and control to the EOF was efficient.

P4.4 Qoerations Sucoort Center

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Inspection Scoce (82301-03.05)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the OSC's staff as they performed tasks in

j response to the scenario conditions. These tasks included functional staffing, inplant emergency repair team dispatch and coordination in support of control room and TSC requests. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan

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j implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and forms generated during the exercise.

b.

Observations and Findinas

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The OSC was promptly staffed with qualified personnel upon activation. The OSC i

l Coordinator maintained firm control of OSC activities while allowing sufficient i

individual latitude for effective emergency response team function. OSC staff l

activities observed indicated a strong individual commitment to restoration of the plant to a safe condition while considering safety of plant personnel.

Team tracking was effectively maintained for the 32 response teams dispatched

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throughout the exercise. TSC priorities for OSC response teams were updated continually as the emergency conditions changed.

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c.

Conclusions Overall, the OSC staff's performance was excellent. The f acility was promptly activated and the OSC Coordinator effectively maintained command and control.

Facility personnel were professional and focused on emergency response.

P4.5 Emeraency Ooerations Facility a.

Insoection Scooe (82301-03.04)

The inspectors observed the EOF's staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included facility activation, event classification, notification of state and local response agencies, development and issuance of protective action recommendations, dose assessment and coo dination of field monitoring teams,

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analysis of plant conditions, and direct interactions with offsite agency response

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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Command and control by the EC was effective and facility briefings were frequent and concise. EOF advisors were given opportunities to comment on the current status of emergency response for their areas of responsibility.

Notifications for the GE were made to the offsite agencies in a timely manner.

Communications were continually maintained between the EC and the offsite agencies representatives in the EOF.

The dose assessment staff proactively ran numerous dose projections and calculations. Offsite radiation monitoring team tracking and control was effectively maintained. Three offsite monitoring teams were dispatched and actively tracked the radiological plume.

The Perry emergency plan implementing instruction EPl-A5, " General Emergency" required a protective action recommendation (PAR) on the general emergency initial notification form. The initial notification form for the GE was transmitted to the offsite agencies without a PAR. Multiple opportunities to identify the omission were ineffective in preventing the transmission of this notification form to offsite officials without the PAR. The error was identified and corrected by the licensee within a short time. The transmittal of the General Emergency notification form to offsite officinis without a PAR is s an Exercise Weakness (50-440/96009-02(DRS)).

The status toards for licensee protective action recommendations (PARS),

protective actions recommended to the counties by the State, and protective j

actions taken by the counties were not completely utilized. Also, the radiological release pathway line item was left blank for the duration of the exercise and the radiological release duration was identified " unknown" instead of using the default value or an estimated time. Additionally, the status board in the display room had labeled line items for offsite radiological monitoring team data and trends including dose rates, times, and locations. These were designated with "NA" and never used. Logs did document this information: however, State officials and NRC personnel in the facility would have to interrupt the licensee to obtain this information that was not displayed on the status boards. Corrective actions developed by the licensee for improved status board usage will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (50-440/96009-03(DRS)).

Extensive recovery discussions were conducted in the EOF after termination of the exercise. Detailed lists of short and long term issues were developed. Discussions included identification of offsite agencies that would be involved in response to the emergency and what resources would be needed to support them, quarantined equipment, NRC incident responsa, and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center operations.

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c.

Conclusions Overall performance in the EOF was good. The initial notification form for the GE declaration was transmitted to the State and county authorities without a PAR.

The EC maintained effective command and control and concise facility briefings were frequent. The dose assessment group and offsite radiological monitoring teams proactively pursued quantifying the offsite impact of the radiological re:~1se.

Detailed recovery and reentry discussions were comprehensive. Status boards in the EOF were continuously updated; however, specific status boards did not display needed information.

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P4.6 Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and q

realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercise.

The inspectors determined that the scenario was appropriate to test emergency capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. Control of the exercise was good and no problems were identified.

P4.7 Licensee Self-Critioue

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Insnection Scooe (82301-03.13)

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The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's post-exercise facility critiques to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.

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Observations and Findinas Facility critiques immediately following the exercise termination were quite self critical and participants and controllers provided comprehensive comments and issues that were captured for later evaluation and disposition.

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Conclusions The licensee's self-critique process effectively identified areas for corrective action.

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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meetina Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 19,1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proyn t Jry information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i

Licensee

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R. Brandt, Perry Nuclear Power Plant Director W. Kanda, Nuclear Quality Assurance Director

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L. Worley, Nuclear Services Director J. Powers, Design Engineering Manager J. Kloosterman, Regulatory Affairs Manager

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i R. Collings, Quality Control Manager M. Wesley, Outage Planning and Cost Manager

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M. Roseum, Emergency Planning Supervisor J. Anderson, Onsite EP Coordinator INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302 Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED Opened 50-440/96009-01(DRP)

IFl Inadequate monitoring of control room panel instrumentation when annunciators were lost.

50-440/96009-02(DRS)

IFl initial Notification Form for the GE was transmitted to the offsite agencies without a PAR.

50-440/96009-03(DRS)

IFl Specific status boards in the EOF did not display needed information.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator ENS Emergency Notification System

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EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness EPl Emergency Plan Instruction GE General Emergency IFl Inspection Followup Item IP inspection Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operational Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation PDR Public Document Room SAE Site Area Emergency SS Shift Supervisor TSC Technical Support Center UE Unusual Event

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