IR 05000440/1998006

Insp Rept 50-440/98-06 on 980128-0310.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML20216B800
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/01/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216B784	List: IR 05000440/1998006 ML20216B776
References
50-440-98-06, 50-440-98-6, NUDOCS 9804140112
Download: ML20216B800 (11)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No: 50-440 License No: NPF-58 Report No: 50-440/98006(DRP)

Licensee: Centerior Service Company Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant l

Location: P. O. Box 97 A200 Perry, OH 44081 l

Dates: January 28 - March 10,1998 l Inspectors: C. Lipa, Senior Resident inspector (SRI)

i D. Kosloff, SRI

!. J. Clark, Resident inspector Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief l

Reactor Projects Branch 4 l

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Perry Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report No. 50-440/98000(DRP)

This inspection included a review of aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, and engineering. The repost covers a six-week period of resident inspectio Operations

.- The inspectors coiuluded that shift tumovers and briefings were thorough, emergent equipment issues were usually addressed in a timely manner, and the overall conduct of operations was professional with appropriate focus on safety (Section 01.1).

. The failure to establish and maintain an adequate verification process resulted in an operator error during control rod manipulations (Section O1.2).

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. ' The quality and frequency of control panel walkdowns continued to be of concem to the ,

inspectors; Although a licensed operator identified that a containment isolation valve had failed, he did not report this condition to management. In addition, other operators failed to identify the condition auring panel walkdowns for four hours (Section 01.3).

Mainte0AD_ca

. Work control was not fully effective in two instances. During repair of the combustible gas compressor, poor communications between engineering and maintenance personnel resulted in the installation of the wrong part. During work on a hydraulic control unit, q loose items were not properly controlled within the suppression pool swell region (Sections M1.1 and M1.2).

. Licensee personnel did not always adhere to scaffolding storage and installation

' instructions which led to scaffolding being stored improperly and erected in close proximity to safety-related equipment (Section M2.1)

Enoineerina

. The licensee identified that environmental qualification program recommendations to disassemble and inspect residual heat removal and low pressure core spray system motors every ten years were not appropriately implemented. Once identified, the issue was thoroughly evaluated (Section E2.1).

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j Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant was operated at full power throughout the inspection period, with the exception of )

normal powr reductions for periodic valve testing and control rod manipulation '

l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01,1 General Comments (71707)

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The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of plant operations through observations of routine control room activities, reviews of system tagouts, performance of panel walkdowns, and attendance at shift tumovers, crew briefings, and activity briefing Specific events and noteworthy observations are discussed in the sections below. The inspectors concluded that shift tumovers and briefings were thorough, emergent equipment issues were usually addressed in a timely manner, and the overall conduct of operations was professional with an appropriate focus on safet .2 Control Rod Movement Error Inspection Scope (71707. 92901. and 93702)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and corrective actions for a personnel error during a control rod exercise surveillance tes Observations and Findinas On January 30,1998, at about 9:45 p.m., the control room shift supervisor observed an error dering his oversight of Surveillance Instruction (SVI) C11-T1003A, " Control Rod Exercise (Part 1)," Revision 1. He directed the operators to stop the SVI and determined that they had inadvertently tested control rod 14-35 twice. The SVI reqaired the operators to test rod 18-35 after testing rod 14-3 The licensee notified the inspectors that a control rod movement error had been made and an inspector responded to the control 7om to observe the midnight shift turnover meeting and resumption of the SVI. The inspector observed that the off-going shift supervisor presented lessons learned training to the oncoming shift. The lessons learned Nd been prepared by the shift technical advisor (STA) who had been involved in the rod raovement error. The inspectors observed that the personnel assigned to the oncoming shih appropriately prepared for the continuation of the SVI and used verification techniques so that the SVI was completed with no further errors. Operations management removed the STA and the reactor operator from shift duties pending the

. completion of remediation training. In addition, the shift supervisor was counseled on his failu a to identify the inadequate verification process before the error was made. The failure to test the correct rod in accordance with the SVi was a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, which requires that written instructions be implemented for

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testing of control rods. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50 440/98006-01(DRP)). Qpnclusions The failure to establish and maintain an adequate verification process resulted in an operator error during control rod manipulations. Licensee actions in response to this event were appropriat .3 Eailure to identifv Inoperabie containment Isolation valve in a Timelv Manner Inspection Scope (71707. 92901)

On March 8,1998, the licensee identified that a containment sump inboard isolation valve had lost power. The inspectors reviewed TSs, interviewed involved personnel, and reviewed operator logs associated with this issu Observations and Findinos The containment equipment drain sump inboard isolation valve G61-F0075 was identified at 3:57 a.m. on March 8,1998, as having no position indication. The licensee determined that the control power fuse was blown, which had rendered the valve incperable. The fuse was replaced and the valve was declared operable at 5:53 a.m. the same da Through interviews, the inspectors determined that the loss of ir.dication had actually been observed earlier, but no action had been taken. A licensed operator stated that he had observed the loss of indication at approximately midnight the morning of March 8 and forgot to report the condition to the Unit Supervisor. The Shift Supervisor from the previous afternoon shift observed normalindication for G61-F0075 at approximately 11:00 p.m. on March The inspectors determined that appropriate action was taken to correct the condition once it was reported at 3:57 a.m. on March 8. However, the inspectors had three concems:

. The licensed operator who discovered the condition at midnight on March 8 failed to report the condition or take action to correct the condition. The loss of indication was then discovered by an operatorjust coming on shift at 3:57 a.m. on March . For approximately four hours between midnight and 3:57 a.m., no other operators identified the condition. This is a further indication of inconsistent implementation of operations management expectations on the quality and frequency of panel walkdowns. This issue was initially identified during a conduct of operations inspection and discussed at the March 5,1998 exit meeting for that inspectio The operators' performance did not meet management expectations as described in Operations Department Policy 1-6, " Control Room Monitoring." The policy

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states that the operator at the controls should perform an hourly walkdown of horseshoe panels. The loss of indication was actually visible on two panels, one in the control room horseshoe and the other in the back panel are . The loss of power would typically have been annunciated immediately: however, the corresponding alarm was already locked-in due to another containment isolation valve deficiency. Since October 19,1997, a failed containment monitoring system isolation valve had been deenergized as required by TS. This resulted in the "NS4 Inboard Isolation Out of Service" alarm being locked-in for an extended period of time. This prevented early identification of the failure associated with G61-F0075 on March 8,199 Conclusions The quality and frequency of control panel walkdowns continued to be of concern to the inspectors. Although a licensed operator identified that a containment isolation valve had failed, he did not report this condition to management. In addition, other operators failed to identify the condition during panel walkdowns for four hours, l!. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Wrona Part Used for Combustible Gas Comoressor Maintenance Due to Poor Communications Between Enaineerina and Maintenance Inspection Scope (62707) ,

l The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with a repeat failure of combustible gas compressor M518. The inspectors reviewed the drawing, work order, operability evaluation, and corrective actions associated with this even Observations and Findino i

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Combustible gas compressor M51B failed to start dunng routine surveillanc e testing on February 17,1998. The overloads were found in tha tripped condition. Duting post-maintenance testing, the compressor tripped again on overload Engineering personnel reviewed the overload set points and motor informatioa and attributed the first trip to an inadvertent operation of the overloads. The second failure was caused by maintenance personnelinstalling the incorrect overload relay. A " slow trip" overload relay had been incorrectly replaced with a " standard trip" relay. Due to the starting current characteristics of the compressor, the overload configuration required a

" slow trip" overload rela The inspectors interviewed the maintenance technicians and were told that there was a miscommunication between the angineering and maintenance personnelinvolved. This led to the installation of the incorrect part. The licensee subsequently successfully restored and tested the compressor. The other division's compressor was checked to ensure the correct overload configuration.

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M1.2 Control of Gratina Durina Maintenance on Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Accumulators Inspection Scope (62707) l l

The inspectors reviewed a licensee-identified concern associated with work on a HCU accumulator on February 22,199 Observations and Findinas i

On February 22,1998, the licensee swapped out an HCU accumulator as part of planned maintenance. During the maintenance, grating sections and other items were temporarily stored in the " pool swell region" of the containment without an engineering analysis first being performed to determine possible effects on the existing pool swell analysis. One potential conce/n is that during a postulated accident with pool swell, loose parts could j impact and damage safety related components within the " pool swell region." l l

Although this issue was licensee-identified, the inspectors were concemed that pre-job planning and the work control process did not ensure a review of the potential concem prior to authorization of the work. The grating and HCU maintenance was completed by February 23,1998, and the condition of the suppression pool swell region was properly restored. The inspectors planned to review the licensee's analysis in Potential Issue Form 98-351 and determine whether adequate controls exist in the work planning process to prevent recurrence. Pending further review by the inspectors, this is an unresolved item (URI 50-440/98006-02(DRP)).

M1.3 Conclusions on Conduct of Maintenance The inspectors concluded that work control was not fully effective in two instance During repair of the combustible gas compressor, poor communications between engineering and maintenance personnel resulted in the installation of the wrong par During work on a hydraulic control unit, loose items were not properly controlled within the suppression pool swell regio M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Concems With Control of Scaffoldina 1 Inspection Scope (62707 and 92902) l The inspectors toured areas of the plant with safety-related equipment to assess the effectiveness of ongoing maintenance activitie Observations and Findinas On February 13,1998, the inspectors observed that scaffolding was in close proximity to the valve stem area of the emergency service water (ESW)"A" sluice gate. This scaffolding was being used for maintenance on the inoperable ESW "B" sluice gat Section 5.5.5.1 of General Construction Instruction (GCl) 16, " Scaffolding Erection, Modification Or Dismantling Guidelines," Revision 1, requires that scaffolding be greater

than 3 inches from safety-related equipment. In this case, two parallel scaffolding l

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! sections were centered around the valve stem area, about 6 inches apart from each other. The scaffolding sections had approximately 1 inch clearance on each side from the valve stem protective cover, and approximately 2 inches clearance on each side from the actual stem area. Although personnel did not properly adhere to GCl 16, this instruction was not required by TS and therefore, this issue was not a violation of regulatory requirements.

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This issue was brought to the attention of the shift supervisor and PlF 98-271 was-initiated. Several other scaffolding issues were raised during this report perio Instances of improper scaffolding storage were identified by the inspectors and tey licensee personnel. An additional case of scaffolding erected in close proximity to safety related equipment was identified by licensee personne . Conclusions l Licensee personnel did no; always adhere to scaffolding storage and installation l instructions which led to scaffolding being stored improperly and erected in close

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proximity to safety-related equipmen . Enaineerina

l E2- Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment '

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- E Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Emeroency Core Coolina System (ECCS) Pumo Motors

! Inspection Scope (37551. 61726. and 92903)

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of an operability determination of ECCS pump motors that had not been disassembled and inspected at the frequency recommended by l the licensee's environmental qualification repor Observations and Findinas On March 4,1998, the licensee determined that the low pressure core spray (LPCS)

pump and the three residual heat removal (RHR) pump motors had not been disassembled and inspected every ten years as recommended by Equipment Qualification Report Auditable File Package E-301-S01-00. Potential Issue Form (PlF)

98-0408 was generated to address the potential discrepancies. The licensee promptly addressed pump operability concems and then planned to determine why the tasks were not scheduled and complete The inspectors reviewed the associated operability det ermination and the EQ report which recommended pump disassembly and inspection. The maintenance activities that had been performed on the motors and the available motor monitoring data were used to extend the EQ disassembly requirement beyond the ten-year period and provide the

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. Conclusions

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The licensee identified that EQ program recommendations to disassemble and inspect

RHR arid LPCS motors every ten years were not appropriately implemented. Once

' identified, the issue was thoroughly evaluated.

l V. Manaaement Meetinas i-X1 _ Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspectors presented the ' inspect;on results to members of licensee management at l- the conclusion of the inspection on Mt 'ch 10,1998. The licensee acknowledged the L

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- findings presented. The inspectors .ned the licensee whether any materials examined -

, during the inspection should be con:,idered proprietary. No proprietary information was

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee L. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear H. Bergendahl, Director, Nuclear Services Department

' N. F,onner, Director, Nuclear Maintenance Department W. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department

' F. Keamoy, Superintendent, Plant Operations J. Messina, Operations Manager T. Rausch, Director, Quality and Personnel Development Department R. Schrauder, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department J. Sears, Radiation Protection Manager

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation

IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities :

IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities-IP 92901: Follow-up - Plant Operations IP 92902: Follow-up - Maintenance IP 92903: Follow-up - Engineering l IP 92904: . Follow-up - Plant Support

. ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-440/98006-01 NCV Control Rod Movement Error j 50-440/98006-02 URI Loose Grating in Containment

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS CFR Code of Federal Regulations DRP Division of Reactor Projects i ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System i ESW Emergency Service Water EQ Environmental Qualification HCU Hydraulic Control Unit IR inspection Report LER Licensee Event Report

! LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray

. NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDR Public Document Room PlF Potentialissue Form RHR Residual Heat Removal l RI Resident inspector l SRI Senior Resident Inspector

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STA Shift Technical Advisor SVI Surveillance instruction TS Technical Specification URI Unresolved item VIO Violation i

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