IR 05000440/1999004

Insp Rept 50-440/99-04 on 990222-26.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection Program & Radiological Planning for Upcoming Refueling Outage,Which Included Review of Rwps,Alara Reviews & Dose Goals

ML20204D929
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/17/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204D894	List: IR 05000440/1999004 ML20204D889
References
50-440-99-04, 50-440-99-4, NUDOCS 9903240311
Download: ML20204D929 (15)

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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i REGION 111 l i  !

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I Docket No: 50-440 I License No: NPF-58 l l

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Report No: 50-440/99004(DRS)

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Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant i

Location: . P. O. Box 97, A200 ,

Perry, OH 44081  !

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Dates: February 22 - 26,1999 i inspector: Steven K. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Ko o

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L EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l

l Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-440/99004 i This announced inspection included an evaluation of the effectiveness of aspects of the radiation protection (RP)' program. Specifically, the inspection consisted of a review of radiological planning for the upcoming refueling outage, which included a review of radiation work permits (RWPs), ALARA [as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable] Reviews, dose goals, and mock-up training, in addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's self assessment program {

for the RP area and the radiological training given to radiation workes. The report covers a  ;

one-week inspection concluded on February 26,1999, performed by one senior radiation l

- specialist. No violations of regulatory requirements were identifie l l

Plant Support l

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• The RP staff effectively considered radiological hazards in preparing controls and l instructions for the 1999 refueling outage For example, the ALARA Reviews and )

RWPs contained appropriate radiological hold points, anticipated radiological j conditions, and provisions for engineering controls, which were routinely incorporated l directly into the work orders. Extensive system flushes and training via work site mock-ups, which included the use of the Unit 2 facility, were also planned to reduce radiation dose. (Section R1.1)

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The licensee provided thorough rad:ologicai planning and strong oversight of diving work associated with the inclined ftel transfer system. The work instructions and radiological planning documents coltained appropriate radiological controls and lessons leamed from previous diving evolutions. The inspector observed good communications between the RP staff and the diving crew and effective control of the evolution. (Section R4.1)

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The licensee's radiation worker training program was well implemented. Training -

lesson plans provided an appropriate level of radiation safety instruction, which was consistent with NRC requirements. In addition, the licensee conducted training -

exercises which effectively challenged trainees to demonstrate radiological practices and to identify work area problems. (Section RS.1)

The quality assurance and RP staffs performed comprehensive reviews of the RP

' program. The assessments were well planned and of appropriate scope. In addition, the RP staff also performed thorough evaluations of RP performance indicators. The inspector concluded that these assessments and evaluations were effectively used to

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identify an 4 to correct performance issues. (Section R7.1)

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Report Details IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radiofocical Plannino for the 1999 Refuelino Outace j Inspection Scope (IP 83750)

The inspector reviewed the radiation protection (RP) staff's planning for the Spring 1999 refueling outage. Specifically, the inspector discussed the licensee's dose goals

and dose monitoring with the ALARA [as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable) staff;

reviewed selected radiation work permits (RWPs), work instructions, and ALARA Reviews; and discussed the licensee's plans for the use of work area mock-up , Observations and Findinos At the time of this inspection, the licensee was completing the radiological planning for the Spring 1999 refueling outage. Based on the scope of the outage and scheduled

activities, the licensee had established a dose estimate of 247 person-rem. The major scope included the following evolutions / activities

Work Activity Estimated Dose _

(person-rem)

Bioshield Annulus inservice Inspection (ISI) 3 Scaffolding / Insulation Activities 25.8

, Reactor Disassembly and Reassembly 1 Dose Mitigation Activities 1 ,

Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Replacements 15.0 1 Health Physics Activities 1 The inspector reviewed the RP staff's planning for the CRDM replacements and the bioshield annulus ISI. Generally, the inspector noted that radiological concems were well addressed in the planning documents. For example, ihe ALARA Review and RWP for the CRDM replacements documented anticipated area radiation levels and included information for areas having significant radiation level gradients. The ALARA Review also contained radiological hold points (e.g., general area radiation levels exceeding 1000 millirem per hour), required a pre-job briefing and mock-up training, and described the use of engineering controls. In the case of the bioshield annulus ISI activities, the ALARA Review indicated that the reactor pressure vessel nozzles were to be flushed prior to any inspections and described the hazards associated with the active fuel region of the annulus, which included controls to prevent inadvertent access to this area. The inspector also observed that many of the radiological controls were incorporated directly into the work orders and the work instruction . ... - .--- ..- - - - - -.-.- -- - - - ~ ~ -,

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During a review of the RWPs and ALARA Reviews, the inspector observed that the

' planning documents did not contain specific instructions conceming workers' dosimetr For the CRDM replacements and the bioshield annulus ISI, the ALARA Reviews and  ;

RWPs contained a generic statement that remote monitoring dosimetry and cameras were available. In the case of the CRDM work, the ALARA Review also indicated that

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dosimetry was to be placed at the location of the greatest whole body dose, as i determined by the RP staff. However, neither the RWPs nor the ALARA Reviews specified the location of dosimetry or the type of dosimetry (i e., remote monitoring, j multiple, or extremity) to be used. An ALARA planner indicated that the dosimetry

options were discussed in the planning documents but that the final decisions were the

responsibility of the RP technicians in the field. Since the ALARA Reviews provided the comprehensive review of the work activity and lessons learned from previous '

evolutions, the inspector observed that the reliance on the technicians in the field to i make these decisions represented a potential vulnerability in the licensee's conirol ;

For example, incomplete work area tumovers or understanding of management

expectations could potentially result in performance problems. The RPM indicated that '

he expected these documents to provide clear direction to the technicians in the field

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and that the RP staff would evaluate the inspector's observations (Condition Report No.

99-0514).

j The licensee had also begun planning for the cleaning of the jet pump mixers on the

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reactor recirculation system. The ALARA staff performed an evaluation of the potential

radiation levels associated with the evolution. Based on the licensee's historical data

$ and on applicable industry experience, the ALARA staff esi! mated that contact radiatior, i levels could reach 10,000 rad per hour (rad /hr) on the jet pump slip ring and 400 rad /hr

on the jet pump body. Although the evolution was completed under water, the sta'

recognized and evaluated the effect of the anticipated evolution on the workers who 4 were expected to be performing bioshield annulus ISI. The staff performed a thorough l review of the radiological potentials and identified risks associated with '.he bellows area of the reactor cavity and with the reactor penetrations, which would provide a

! notable decrease in shielding between the jet pumps and the ISI workers. Based on this review, the licensee planned to provide provisions to ensure that the jet pumps

were maintained at a safe distance from these areas. In the planning for this evolution, i an ALARA planner indicated that the following issues would be considered

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communications between the reactor refueling floor personnel (moving the jet i pumps) and the drywell personnel, who monitored and controlled evolutions in the annulus region; l

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radiological hold points to allow RP personnel to survey the jet pump mixers (as

they were removed) to ensure that the above assumptions were not exceeded; I

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evacuation of the annulus and upper drywell areas during the removal of the l first jet pump mixer to ensure that the licensee's evaluation was correct; and l

. additional precautions and controls in the ALARA Review and RWP for the l bioshield annulus ISt.

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Based on the review of the ALARA staff's evaluation and discussions with the ALARA planner, the inspector concluded that the licensee was properly evaluating the evolution and considering the associated radiological hazard The inspector also observed a high level cf management commitment to dose reduction initiatives for the refueling outage. As noted above, the licensee planned to conduct mock-up training for a number of work evolutions, including the bioshield l annulus ISI, CRDM replacements, safety relief valve boot replacements, and reactor l water cleanup (RWCU) system corrosion exams. For a number of these mock-ups, the licensee was preparing areas of the unfinished Unit 2, which had previously been abandoned. The inspector recognized that the use of these areas would provide l workers with valuable training, with no associated radiological impacts, in addition, the licensee planned to implement an aggressive flushing plan to reduce dose rates associated with the reactor recirculation system, RWCU system, and the residual heat l removal system. The ALARA staff indicated that the system flushes were identified in l the licensee's outage schedul Conclusions l

The RP staff effectively considered radiological hazards in preparing contro!s and instructions for the 1999 refueling outage. For example, the ALARA Reviews and j RWPs contained appropriate radiological hold points, anticipated radiological

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conditions, and provisions for engineering controls, which were routinely incorporated directly into the work orders. Extensive system flushes and training via work site mock-l

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ups, which included the use of the Unit 2 facility, were also planned to reduce radiation dos I R4 Staff Knowledge and Perfcrmance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry l R Plannina and imolementation of Divina Activities Associated with the inclined Fuel l Transfer System (IFTS) Inspection Scope (IP 83750) q The inspector reviewed the radiological planning for diving work associated with the 4 inclined fuel transfer system (IFTS).- Specifically, the inspector reviewed the ALARA l Review, RWP, work order, and diving procedure; discussed the evolution with an RP supervisor and technician; and observed diving in the upper fuel poo Q)servations and Findinas During ibis inspection, the licensee was performing diving to replace proximity sensors

! associated with the IFTS and to perform other underwater maintenance activities. The inspector reviewed the ALARA Review, RWP, and work order, which were prepared for the diving evolution. The inspector concluded the planning documents contained appropriate radiological controls for the evolution, which were consistent with NRC

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guidance and industry lessons leamed. For example, the licensee required that the

[. diver be equipped with multiple dosimeters, which included remote transmitting i

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':lectronic dosimetr). and that the diver be restrained so that he could not stray from the

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diving area. A bther provided an acceptable means of preventing the diver from accessing unauthorized wen of the pool, which had dangerous radiation levels. In

! addition, the licensee required continuous visual observatior, d ;he diver and continuous communicaticas wiih M $sr The RP staff also properly posted and controlled the entrance to the fuel pool as a high radiation are The inspector observed that the licensee had incorporated lessons learned from problems with previous diving evolutions (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-440/97014 (DRS))into the planning documents and briefings. For example, within the ALARA briefing, the licensee provided detailed instructions concerning the events resulting in a suspension of all diving activities, which included an explanation of the loss of dosimetry and communications. As described above, the RP staff also maintained continuous visual observations of the diver to ensure that the diver's position was well known and that the diver was within authorized area During this inspection, the inspector observed diving activities in the upper fuel poo Prior to the evolution, the RP staff performed a complete survey of the area and ,

identified a localized area within the diving location having contact radiation levels of j 40 rad /hr. The licensee conservatively evaluated the location and provided lead '

shielding which reduced radiation levels to about 500 millirad /hr. During the evolution, the inspector observed good communications between the RP staff and the diving crew. The RP staff provided effective control of the diver and properly monitored the diver's dosimetry and location. The work activities in both pools were completed without any radiological problems, and the total dose for the evolution (about 200 millirem) was within the licensee's original dose estimate of 432 millire c. Conclusions The licensee provided thorough radiological planning and strong oversight of diving work associated with the IFTS. The work instructions and radiological planning documents contained appropriate radiological controls and lessons leamed from previous diving evolutions. The inspector observed good communications between the ,

RP staff and the diving crew and effective control of the evolutio l R5 Staff Training and Qualification in Radiation Protection and Chemistry i

R Radiation Worker Trainina

, Inspection Scope (IP 83750)

The inspector reviewed the instructions given to personnel who perform work within the radiologically restricted area. Specifically, the inspector reviewed training lesson plans and the licensee's computer based training program, observed a training exercise, and discussed the program with members of the training staff.

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? . Qbservations and Findinas The licensee provided general training to all personnel in accordance with procedure TMP-2102 (Revision 1), " General Access Training Program." Prior to obtaining unescorted access to the radiologically restricted area, procedure TMP-2102 required personnel to successfully complete radiological controls training (initial, site specific, or

' requalification training, as applicable). Initial training consisted of classroom training and a practical exercise. Site specific and requalification training consisted of 1 l abbreviated instructions and a practical exercise, as applicable. Following initial and requalification training, the procedure required the successful completion of a written j examination to gain or to maintain unescorted access to the radiologically restricted l area, respectively. The inspector noted that the licensee had appropriate provisions to ;

! address test failures and to ensure that incorrect responses were understood by the trainee The inspector reviewed the lesson plans for the classroom training, which were consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 19. The lesson plans included

~ information that was contained in 10 CFR Part 20 and in the licensee's RP progra For example, the lesson plans reviewed basic atomic structure, types of radiation, biological effects of radiation,10 CFR Part 20 dose limits, the licensee's ALARA program, and the licensee's access control and RP requirements. The inspector also

observed a demonstration of the licensee's computer based training, which was planned to be implemented as an alternative to requalification training, and noted that the training included the information discussed in the conventional classroom training.

l Overall, the inspector concluded the content of the training provided reasonable instructions in radiological safet The inspector also observed a session of the training practical exercise, which was performed by incoming contract employees. Within the exercise, the training staff prepared a simulated radiologically restricted area and challenged the workers to demonstrate access to the area, work within a contaminated area, and egress from the area, which included the removal of equipment from a contaminated area. The inspector observed that the training provided an effective tool to both provide instruction and to evaluate the trainees' abilities to review RWPs and radiological surveys, to properly don and remove protective clothing, to perform personal

. radiological surveys, and to properly practice ALARA principles.' The trainees were also

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required to identify errors within the simulated areas, both radiological and industria The instructors indicated that a failure of the exercise resulted in additional instruction ;

and a repeat of the practical. During the demonstration, the inspector observed the .i

instructors properly correcting improper RP practices and evaluating the trainee Conclusions The licensee's radiation worker training program was well implemented. Training

. lesson plans provided an appropriate level of radiation safety instruction, which was I l' consistent with NRC requirements. In addition, the licensee conducted training l~ exercises which effectively challenged trainees to demonstrate radiological practices and to identify work area problems.

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I L R7 Quality Assurance in Radiation Protection and Chemistry R7.1 Quality Assurance Audits and Self-Assessments

! Inspection Scope UP 83750)

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's self assessments of the RP program that were l

performed by the RP and quality assurance organizations. In addition, the inspector also reviewed the RP organization's analysis of radiological trends (e.g., personnel dose, contamination events, work observations, and condition reports). Observations and Findinas The RP staff implemented the assessment requirements found in Section 6.10 of PAP-0114 (Revision 3), " Radiation Protection Program," which requires annual reviews of the following program areas:

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the ALARA program and ALARA training;

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the respiratory protection program;

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locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas; and

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the dosimetry program (i.e., monitoring for intemal and external dose).

The inspector reviewed the 1998 assessments of the above program areas. The assessments were well planned, of acceptable scope, and of sufficient depth. In the case of the ALARA program review, the RP staff obtained the assistance of an individual, who was a member of another NRC licensee's RP staff, to provide an independent review of that program area. In the remaining assessments, the individuals responsible for the areas performed the assessments. During discussions with the inspector, the RP staff recognized the lack of independence of these reviews and planned to evaluate the level of independence in future assessments. The inspector also noted that the quality assurance organization provided an excellent i review of the above assessments and identified additional areas for improvement. In many cases, the quality assurance review indicated that the RP assessments were limited to compliance with procedures and regulations and did not evaluate how areas could be enhanced, how areas compared to management expectations, or how areas compared to industry bench-marking results. The RP organization indicated that the assessment program was being reviewed to broaden the scope of the planned 1999 assessment The inspector also reviewed the quality assurance audit of the RP program, which was performed in early 1998. The quality assurance staff performed a broad review of the RP program, including the implementation of the ALARA program, the qualification of personnel, adequacy of surveys and radiological postings, and radioactive material control. Overall, the audit concluded that the RP program was well implemented.

i However, the audit documented problems in the control of high radiation areas and the

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need for increased management attention to radioactive material control. As noted in ,

previous NRC inspection reports, the licensee has taken actions to address these issue ,

During discussions with the RP and quality assurance staffs, the inspector observed  ;

that the licensee did not have a systematic means to ensure that all pertinent aspects i

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of the RP program were reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1101(c). Over a 2-year period, the licensee performed several reviews of the RP program via quality assurance audits and surveillances, industry assessments, and RP staff assessment .

However, the licensee was not tracking the scope of these assessments to ensure that the RP program was fully reviewed e an appropriate frequency. The inspector noted that the 1998 quality assurance audit had a similar observation. As an action from this ;

audit, a recommendation was assigned to the RP staff to annually compile and i document the reviews of the RP program (i.e., to ensure compliance with the  !

requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101(c)). During this inspection, the RP staff was i developing actions to address the recommendation. Nonetheless, the RPM initiated a i

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condition report (No. 99-0513) to document the above vulnerability and to evaluate the inspector's observatio The RP staff also performed effective evaluations of radiological trends. The inspector reviewed quarterly trend reports for the 3rd and 4th Quarter of 1998 and found the reports to be a thorough analysis of performance indicators. The reports compiled the results of field observations, dose performance, personnel contamination events, condition reports, and training observations. Within the reports, the RP organization assessed common root causes of RP performance problems and identified any similar or repetitive errors. Overall, the trending report did not identify any repetitive problems

' or programmatic weaknesses. However, in the 3rd Quarter of 1998, the RP staff identified a decline in the percentage of field observations which documented performance problems. After discussions with the RP technicians, the staff concluded that the decline resulted from a reluctance of the RP technicians to document all personnel errors that were corrected in the field (i.e., to prevent further actions to the individuals) and from an unfamiliarity with the field observation program, which had i recently been expanded to the RP technicians. The staff took actions to ensure that I the RP technicians were properly documenting these problems, so that performance could be accurately assessed. In the 4th Quarter of 1998, the staff noted some improvement in the statistics; however, the staff acknowledged that additional analyses were necessary. In 1998, the RP staff also observed some decline in radiation worker practices and dose control, which was partially attributed to the increased number of individuals who had limited experience at the licensee's facility. The licensee was taking actions to address this declin Conclusions The quality assurance and RP staffs performed comprehensive reviews of the RP program. The assessments were well planned and of appropriate scope, in addition, the RP staff also performed thorough evaluations of RP performance indicators. The inspector concluded that these assessments and evaluations were effectively used to identify and to correct performance issue . .. - -- . .-- - . ~-. . .. .-

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R8 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry issues (IP 92904)

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l R8.1 - (Closed) Violation No. 50-440/98017-01: The radiological, environmental, and chemistry section (RECS) staff performed an inadequate evaluation of the radionuclide i

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scaling factors used to determine the activities of the non-gamma emitting

! radionuclides contained in four radioactive shipments. In addition to the completed corrective actions described in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-440/98022(DRS), the

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inspector reviewed the following licensee actions to prevent recurrence:

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The licensee prepared revision 2 to procedure RPl-1102, "10CFR61 Compliance Sampling Program," which was to go into effect on March 4,199 The inspector noted that this revision provided instructions concerning the

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review of sample data, described the actions to take if sample data anomalies l

were identified, and included waste stream trending. The procedure also

, contained a caution regarding the manipulation of sample data, i.e., introducing

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correction factor The licensee completed revisions of radioactive waste and material shipping procedures to correct obsolete references and to provide better instructions to l the user The RECS staff initiated a training assistance request to develop a qualification card and a formal training program for the radwaste shipping coordinator position. In the interim, the RECS staff was training additional individuals to provide support to the radwaste shipping coordinator, in accordance with the i requirements of Subpart H of 49 CFR 17 On December 30,1998, the licensee performed a self assessment of the  !

radioactive shipping are Based on the completion of these corrective actions, this violation is closed. The review of the implementation of these procedures and training will be completed as a routine aspect of future NRC inspections of this are R8.2 (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item 50-440/98022-01: The licensee planned to evaluate PASS quality control (QC) criteria and resolve a dilution problem concerning the RWCU inlet and reactor recirculation sampling points. At the time of this inspection, the licensee had completed a review of the PASS comparison methodology, which l included extensive discussion with other NRC reactor licensees. Based on this review, j the licensee revised current procedures and instituted the following provisions: ;

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- samples were not to be filtered;

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for each comparison, similar sample counting geometries were to be used; ,

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selected isotopes were to be compared, including cobalt-60, iodine-131, iodine-134, xenon-133, and xenon-135; and

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a written justification was to address any discrepancies in the test result The inspector reviewed the licensee's most recent QC tests (i.e., comparisons between samples obtained at the PASS panel and at routine sampling points) and noted that the comparisons were performed properly and that the comparisons yielded acceptable result In E,ddition, the licensee also corrected the problem associated with the "A" RWCU system outlet valve, which had crer.ted a dilution to other PASS panel input Following this repair, the licensee identified a leak on the outlet valve associated with the "B" RWCU system outlet valve, which introduced a similar dilution to the PASS panel. However, the RECS staff indicated that the manual isolation for this system was more accessible (i.e., in a much lower radiation field) and, as such, did not introduce the same problem for the QC testing. The licensee had scheduled the repair of the "B" RWCU system valve for the week following the Spring 1999 refueling outage. This item is close V. Management Meeting i

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X1 Exit Meeting Summary

On February 25,1999, the inspector presented the inspection results to licensee managemen The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee

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whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, l

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED N. Bonner, Director, Perry Nuclear Maintenance Department R. Collings, Manager, Quality Assurance

- J. Duffield, Manager, Perry Training D. Forbush, Radiological Engineer K. Freeman, Radiological Analyst ]

E. Gordon, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Operations  !

H. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Assurance W. Kanda, Plant Manager ,

S. Lee, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Program l R Lieb, Radiological Engineer j B. Luthanen, Compliance Engineer J. Lynch, Radiological Analyst

. .J. Mack, Chemistry Operations Lead - l l M. Medakovich, Shipping Specialist 1 J. Sears, Manager, Radiation Protection Section 1 A. Schwenk, Radwaste Operations Supervisor

.M. Tullai, ALARA Coordinator  :

L. VanDerHorst, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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l IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure L IP 92904 Follow-up - Plant Support l

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! ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED l

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50-440/98017-01 VIO Inadequate radionuclide scaling factors used in radioactive waste l

, characterization (Section R8.1).

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j $0-440/98022-01 IFl Licensee to evaluate PASS QC acceptance criteria and resolve dilution problem concerning the RWCU inlet and reactor recirculation system sample points (Section R8.2).  ;

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism DRS Division of Reactor Safety l IFl inspection Follow-up Item IFTS Inclined Fuel Transfer System l IP Inspection Procedure

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IR inspection Report

ISI inservice inspection NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PASS Post Accident Sampling System PDR Public Document Room QC Quality Control RECS Radiological, Environmental, and Chemistry Section RP Radiation Protection l

RPM Radiation Protection Manager l RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup System RWP Radiation Work Permit TS Technical Specification VIO Violation

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_ PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

} Audit Report No. PA-98-04,'" Radiation Protection Program," dated April 2,1998.

i l~ ALARA Reviews:

i i ' ARN-99-015-0, " Perform Corrective Maintenance for F42 (IFTS)," associated with RWP i No. 990028; j ARN-99-043-0,"Bioshield Annulus Activities," associated with RWP No. 99-6119; and

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ARN 99-044-0,"Undervessel Activities," associated with RWP No.99-612 *

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j Condition Report No. 98-2631.

{ Perry Plant Work Orders:

97-003105-000, Revision 00, " Clean Inner Surfaces of Jet Pump Inlet Mixers of Deposits;" ,

97-004149-00, Revision 00, " Perform Corrective Maintenance on F42 Items Found

, During the Performance of RF06;" and

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j- 98-000760-000, Revision 00, " Remove & Install T.I.P. Tubing for RF07."

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Procedures:

GMI-0067 (Revision 4), " Installation and Removal of Control Rod Drives and Thermal Sleeve Using GE Exchange Equipment," effective date November 11,1998; _

HPI-C0005 (Revision 5), " Radiation Work Permit Preparation and Surveillance,"

effective date December 3,1998; HPI-C007 (Revision 3), "ALARA Program," effective date December 3,1998; HPI-C008 (Revision 3), "In-Line Review of Work Orders," effective date July 20,1998; PAP-0114 (Revision 3), " Radiation Protection Program," effective date February 11, 1999; PAP-1118 (Revision 0), " Post Accident Sampling Program," effective date May 26, 1998; REC-0200 (Revision 0), " Packaging Radioactive Material and Waste for Shipment,"

effective date February 1,1999;_

REC-0201 (Revision 0), " Radioactive Material and Waste Shipping Papers," effective date February 1,1999; REC-0202 (Revision 0), "NRC Advanced Notification Requirements and Shipment of Highway Route Controlled Quantity," effective date February 1,1999;

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REC-0203 (Revision 0), " Characterization of Radioactive Material / Waste," effective date February 2,1999; RPI-0504 (Revision 2), " Radiologically Restricted Area Diving Program," effective date February 8,1999; RPI-1102 (Revision 2), "10CFR61 Compliance Sampling Program," effective date March 4,1999;

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RPI-1103 (Revision 2), " Chemistry Analysis and Rounds Logs," effective date December 1,1998; and TMP-2102 (Revision 1), " General Access Training," effective date September 10,199 .

PTS Lesson Plans:

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l GEN 1002-007-01, " Radiological Controls Training - Radiation Fundamentals," dated May 7,1997; GEN 1002-007-02, " Radiological Controls Training - ALARA," dated May 7,1997; l GEN 1002-007-03, " Radiological Controls Training - Contarnination Control," dated

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May 7,1997; and GEN 1002-007-04, " Radiological Controls Training - Module 04 Access Control," dated l May 7,1997, I

l Radiation Protection Section 1998 Binning Report.

l l Radiation Work Permits Nos. 990028 (Revision 0), 996119 (Revision 0), and 996120 (Revision l 0).

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Radiological Survey Report Nos. 9461026 (dated April 18,1994),9900641 (dated February 2, 1999), and 9900974 (dated February 22,1999).

" Radiological Trend Analysis Report, Third Quarter of 1998," dated November 28,1998.-

l Self Assessments:

l "ALARA Program," (No. 083-RPS-98), dated November 23,1998; l " Locked High Radiation Area Controls,"(No. 087-RPS-98), dated December 15,1998;

'

"Radwaste Shipping,"(No. 067-REC-98), dated December 30,1998; i " Respiratory Protection Program,"(No. 088-RPS-98), dated December 10,1998; and

'

"Self Assessment of Dosimetry Monitoring,"(No. 085-RPS-98), dated December 16, 1998.

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