IR 05000416/1981002
| ML20003C822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1981 |
| From: | Coley J, Herdt A, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003C815 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-81-02, 50-416-81-2, 50-417-81-01, 50-417-81-1, NUDOCS 8103180508 | |
| Download: ML20003C822 (5) | |
Text
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9'q UNITED STATES r~(f
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.. SUITE 3100 o,
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FEB 101931 Report Nos. 50-416/81-02 and 50-417/81-01 Licensee:
Mississippi Power and Light Company Facility Name: Grand Gulf License Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119 Inspection at: Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, Mirsissippi
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Inspected by:,J. L. Coley Date Signed
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@ anDoorn-Da'te S'igned
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Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed Inspection on January 21-23, 1981 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of review of previously identified items concerning radiography and follow-up of licensee. identified items.
.lesults Of the two areas inspected, no apparent violations or deviations were identified.
'810'3180508
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- G. B. Rodgers, Jr. Site Manager
- J. W. Yelverton, Q. A. Field Supervisor
- S. F. Tanner, Q. A. Representative
- J. M. Kelley, Q.A. Representative Other Organizaticits
- Bechtel Power Corporation; M. R. Lf a.dsey - Bechtel Q.A.
Southwest Research Institute; S. A. Wenk - Consultant NRC Resident Inspector L. W. Garner
- Attended Exit Interview 2.
- Exit Interview The' inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 23, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors discussed the-radiography-follow-up inspection in detail. The inspectors indicated that certain minimum additional actions would be necessary to close the open items. The actions consisted of additional sample review of Safety / Relief valve radiographs, additional sample review of Unit 2 G.E. vendor radio-graphs and review of all radiographs of G.E. vendors unique to Unit 2.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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This inspection was performed to follow-up on radiographic discrepancies reported in the following open items:
a.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-416, 417/79-23-01, " Radiographic - Film Discrepancies for Ractor Coolant Safety Relief Valves".
L-b.
(0 pen) Infraction 50-416/79-34-01, " Failure to Follow Specifications
' for Radiography" c.
(0 pen) Licensee Identified Item 50-416/80-13-01 and 50-417/80-09-01,
" Inadequate sensitivity of Radiograph Cilm". :(This is a 50.55(e) that pertains to the licensee's expanded inspection of discrepancies reported by NRC in item (b) above).
Since code discrepancies noted-in radiographic density and technique have been adequately ' documented in ' items' a, b, & c above, the intent of this inspection was to review the extent of the licensee's radiographic review J
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and to evaluate the technical disposition for acceptance of tne components represented by these radiographs.
The licensee had requested that NRC perform this inspection at this time because the licensee's consultant was available to dis. cuss open item (a) above and MP&L's technical disposition for acceptance of the Dikker's Reactor coolant system safety and relief valves.
-The licensee had reinspected 100 percent of the radiographs for 3 Dikkers valves. Two of these valves were for Unit 1 and one was for Unit 2.
The inspectors alsu read 100 percent of another Unit 1 Dikker's valve No.
Q1821-F051 S/N 160814, which consisted of a to tal of 80 radiographs.
Selected radiographs of the body for this salve nad been previously reported as representing some of the worse cases of density and radiographic technique ciscrepancies.
In addition to the 3 valves that MP&L reviewed 100 percent, they had also read selected radiographs on other valves, performed some stress analysis and re-radiographed some accessible areas of other Dikker valves. The additional radiographs and the results of the stress analysis were not available for review at this time. However, the inspect-ors and MP&L concluded that of the total 320 radiographs for the 4 Dikker valves reinspected 100 percent all the film could be read and any defect that would be rejectable if densities and technique were within code requirements would also be detected and rejected under the cresent conditions. It should be noted that a great deal of this film had a 2-1T quality level when ' double viewing was employed.
The inspectors requested that MP&L sample review additional Dikker's valves for Unit 1 and Unit 2, concentrating their review on the areas that have been the basis of most concern as a result of the 100 percent radiographic review conducted on 4 valves.
In addition, the inspectors notified the licensee on January 27, 1981 that MP&L's radiographic review should include selected radiographs from the eight spare Safety & Relief valves whose radiographs have not been available for review at the site.
The licensee agreed to perform this additional radiographic review and stated that a final report would be forwarded to NRC
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for review addressing the extent of MP&L's review for the Dikker's valve problem.
This report would note code violaticas as related to the radio-graphy and _ provic'e MP&L's technical justification for acceptance of the components. Item (a) will remain open.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions to date on items (b) and (c) above. Both items concerned radiographic film discrepancies noted with
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General Electric vendors other than Dikkers. The licensee has reviewed all vendor film for Unit I which represent over 10,000 radiographs.
The inspectors reviewed the following sample of Unit 1 radiographs:
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MP&L Reader RT Area &
' Reader Sheet No.
MP&L NO.
Component I.D.
Discrepancy Pipe Weld 6-7 & 9-0
Q1B21-G001 G010-B1,WE Below 2.0 exceeds +30
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Pipe Weld 4-5 & 5-6 029 Q1821-G001 G010-B1,WF Below 2.0 above 4.0 Pipe Weld 5-6, above 4.0 162 Q1833-G001 G010-B1,WF 6-7, above 4.0 Pipe Weld 4-5 4.0 164 Q1833-G001 G010-B1,WL 0-1 4.0 +30 1-2-15%
Pump Case-15%
277 Q1833-C001 741-S-1276 5-6-15%
Pump discharge Nozzle 313-Q1833-C001 741-S-1277 0-1-15%
Pump Casting Case 320 Q1833-C001 741-S-1277 17-18 1.0 Pump Casting Case 1.0-326 Q1833-C001 741-S-1277 27-28 -15 + 30 Valve Casting 418 Q1833-F023 E6020-3-3 22-23 1.0 Valve Casting 36-37 1.0 - 15-423~
Q1833-F023 E6020-3-3 45-46 4.0 + 30-Casting' Valve Body 42-43 1.0
'451-Q1833-F067 E6020-2-2-43-44 -15 Valve 7-8
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474 Q1821-F0228 5-561 19-20 Valve End Preps 122-123
_4. 0 486 Q1821-F022A 4-561
- 128-129-15+30
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Valve Body-33-34 1.0 466-Q1821-F028 8-561 35-36-15 Pump Suction Barrel Penny / Shim
'525 Q1E12-C002 741-5-1401-5-6 in Weld 2.0 757.
Q1E12-B0024 Heat Exchanger 7-8.
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The licensee's position on Unit I radiographs was that the film could be interpreted with the exception of isolated cases, for example when complete coverage was not obtained and radiographs of weld end preps.
In both of these situations, supplemental inspection was performed either by Ultra-sonics or in the case of weld end preps, radiography after the weld joints have been completed with satisfactory results.
The inspector's review appeared to confirm the licensee's assumptions. The inspectors indicated that as a minimum, the licensee should review a representative sample of Unit 2 radiographs.
In addition, the licensee was requested to nerform a 100 percent radiographic review of any new G.E.
vendor unique to Unit 2.
The licensee concurred to perform this review and to forward NRC a final report on the extent of their review, the discre-pancies noted and their technical justification for acceptance. Items (b)
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and (c) will remain open.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved' items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e) Follow-up
.a.
(Closed) Item 416/80-23-04, 417/80-14-04, Indicator valves.
The licensee determined that this item was not reportable on November 12, 1980.
This determination was based on the fact that the affected valves were not located in a safety related, dedicated system for the construction phase and routine maintenance prior to and during the operation phase would have identified the problem. The failure of the valves was caused by lack of routine maintenance during construction.
The inspector reviewed documentation of the above and considers licensee actions acceptable.
b.
(Closed) Item 416/80-12-04, 417/80-08-02. Valve stem protectors cause valve misoperations. This item was inadvertently assigned two numbers.
Therefore, this number is closed and followup will be performed against Item ' 416/80-27-01, 417/80-17-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
(Closed) Item 416/80-12-17, 417/80-08-03.
Instrument Calibration.
This1 item was inadvertently assigned two numbers.
Therefore, this number is closed and followup will be performed against Item 416/80-23-03 and 417/80-14-03.
6.
New Licensee Identified Item (50.55(e)).
Item 416/81-02-01,~ 417/81-01-01.
Undersize Socket Welds. Socket welds do not meet minimum code size requirements.
(MP&L No. 80-43, identified 8/15/80).
This - report assigns the above number for record purposes.
No inspection of this item was performed.