IR 05000416/1981044
| ML20039D259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1981 |
| From: | Andrews D, Jenkins G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039D254 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-81-44, 50-417-81-19, NUDOCS 8112310470 | |
| Download: ML20039D259 (10) | |
Text
arou UNITED STATES
!
o,'n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$
E REGION 11
o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W,. SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
.....
Report Nos. 50-416/81-44 and 50-417/81-19
,
Licensee: flississippi Power and Light Company P
O. Box 1640 Jackson,!!S 39205 Facility Name: Grand Gulf 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417 License Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119 Inspection at the Gra'nd G If site near Port Gibson, flississippi Inspector:
ri f ////u'
fM DLA
/2/WVl Andre (
Date Signed D.
Accompanying Personne fiarston, R. Roemmich, B. Pickett, F. Lomax,
. Cu ip, K. Clark, W. Herrington Approved bg
-
K R. Je k' s, Section Chief Date Signed SUMttARY Inspection on November 3-6, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 182 inspector-hours on site in the area of a coordinated full scale radiological energency exercise.
Results In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
.
<g 8112310470 811210 DR ADOCK 05000
,
-
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- N. L. Stampley, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
- J. P. McGaughy, Assistant Vice President Nuclear Production
- L. F. Dale, Manager of Nuclear Services
- L. R. Mc Kay, Corporate Health Physicist
- P. B. Benedict, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- C. K. McCoy, Plant Manager
- C. L. Stuart, Assistant Plant Manager
- R. F. Phares, Licensing Engineer
- A. M. McCurdy, Technical Superintendent
- R. R. Weedon, Chemistry and Radiation Control Superintendent
- R. A. Anbesino, Nuclear Support Manager
- J. D. Richardson, Manager of Safety and Licensing
- J. R. Elms, Maintenance Superintendent Other licensee employces contacted included 5 construction craftsmen,10 technicians,10 operators, 3 mechanics, 4 security force members, and.5 office personnel.
Other Organizations J. D. Richardson, Federal Emergency Mr.nagement Agency J. E. ftaher, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
'NRC Resident Inspector A. Wagner, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 5,1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not' inspected.
4..
Unresolved Items An unresolved item was identified concerning accountability of onsite personnel during an emergency; this item is discussed in paragraph 1.
.
5.
Exercise Scenario The scenario for the radiological emergency exercise was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise to verify that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria of NUREG 0654, Section N.3 were met.
The emergency exercise scenario, developed by the licensee, met the above requirements and provided for a sequence of simulated events beginning with an Unusual Event and progressing through sequentially escalating classes to a General Emergency. The sequence of simulated events was coordinated in advance with State representatives to provide an opportunity for exercising the State and local emergency response organizations.
The exercise scenario included the following postulated emergency conditions:
a.
A fire in a Radwaste Building exhaust fan is followed by a large leak in an Evaporator Bottom Storage Tank. This results in a release of airborne contamination.
b.
Offgas filter train
"A", which has just been removed from service, explodes.
This results in an airborne radioactive release for two minutes, terminated by isolation of the Radwaste Building HVAC system.
c.
A design basis LOCA sequence occurs (complete break in a recirculation loop) with a simultaneous loss of offsite power. An offsite release takes place through Standby Gas Treatment System Train "A".
6.
Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have beer, specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(1),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.A.
The inspector verified that specific assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization 'and there was adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
7.
Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambigously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are spe:ified as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(2),10CFR50, Appendir. E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.B.
L
__ - ______________
____ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ - _. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _
-
.
The inspector observed that the initial and augmented onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions as described by Section 5 of the Grand Gulf Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure 10-5-01-6.
After the Technical Support Center (TSC) was activated there appeared to be confusion between the Control Room and TSC over who would dispatch personnel from the OSC.
The functional control of the Operations Suppnrt Center, following the activation of the TSC needs to be clarified.
(50-416/81-44-01; 50-417/81-19-01)
8.
Energency Response Support and Resources This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee'_s near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(3), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.C.
a.
When the OEC and his staff decided to leave corporate headquarters to
,
activate the near-site E0F, they did not travel to the site in staged increments, thus the entire staff was out of contact with the plant for about ih hours. This deficiency was identified by the licensee du ing the critique.
b.
Offsite fire support was not demonstrated during this exercise.
Medical support was utilized and is discussed in paragraph 17 below.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. (50-416/
81-44-02;50-417/81-19-02)
9.
Emergency Classification System
'
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(4),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C., and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
The inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in Section 4.0 of the Radiological Emergency Plan and in Implementing Procedures 1-5-01-1 through 5.
There are apparent incon-sistencies in the procedures for escalating emergency classes. Thresholds are set too low for some initiating conditions.
Procedures are vague for either declassifying emergencies or entering the recovery / reentry mode.
The area of Emergency Action Levels and Emergency classification will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-416/81-44-03; 50-417/
81-19-03)
-
_
-
_
-
-
.
10. Notification tiethods and Procedures This area was observed to detemine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and Local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations has been. established as required by 10CFR 50.47(b)(5),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.E.
The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
It was noted that Plant infomation being provided to the E0F did not appear to be distributed to the Offsite Emergency Coordinator and his staff promptly upon receipt. This resulted in the staff passing infomation to offsite agencies which had already been changed by plant update. The area of infomation flow within the E0F and from the E0F to offsite agencies will be. reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-416/81-44-04; 50-417/81-19-04)
11.
Emergency Communications This area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.F.
The inspector verified that primary and alternate means of communications among the various response organizations were provided.
It was noted that upon TSC activation, the transfer of communications from the Control Room to the TSC went very smoothly. Some problems noted with comunications were:
a.
Some of the radios used to communicate between the onsite support teams and the OSC, the TSC and the Control Room failed to operate properly.
Also the telephone system between the CEC in Jackson and the E0F did not function properly. The licensee identified these problems during the critique of the exercise and stated that appropriate corrective actions will be taken.
l
'
b.
The NRC area of the Technical Support Center had not been completed and adequate communications systems were not available. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
c.
There was very little feedback of information to the Control-Room, and the OSC was not kept up-to-date on plant status by the TSC. The TSC should keep the Control Room advised of accidcnt assessment activity and should periodically brief the OSC on plant conditions to keep support teams informed of potential hazards in the plant. _ The need for better infomation flow from the TSC to the Control Room and OSC was identified by the licensee during the exercise critiqu.
12. Public Education and Information This area was observed to detennine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(7),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.G.
The News tiedia Center was activated upon the declaration of a General-Emergency.
Information concerning the plant and the simulated emergency was provided news media representatives for dissemination to the public. The inspector noted that information concerning offsite actions, including evacuation and sheltering in Louisiana was not timely and appeared to be incomplete in some cases.
Better coordination among Mississippi, Louisiana and i1P&L spokesmen is needed. This problem was identified by the licensee during the exercise critique.
13. Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(8), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.H.
a.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activiattd and staffed in a timely manner upon notification by the Emergency Director. The TSC facility was small but appeared to be adequate for the number of persons assigned. Additional space is available immediately outside the TSC should it be needed for increased staffing. An NRC area, under construction at the time of the exercise, was provided for NRC use in addition to designated space within the TSC proper. The inspector had the following comments concerning the TSC:
(1) NRC participants in the TSC were isolated from the decision-making group and had some difficulty getting prompt information concerning the simulated emergency. The designated NRC space was not appropriately located within the TSC. Licensee represent-atives had objected to having designated NRC space at the operations table but agreed to consider designating at least one space at the operations table and at least one space near the dose assessment area.
(2) Communications systems had not been installed in the designated NRC work area which is being constructed in a room separate from, but near, the TSC. Communication requirements, including designated portable radios utilizing the plant operations network were discussed with licensee representatives.
It is intended by MP&L that the NRC area be ready for immediate use at all times.
(3) The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) had not been installed at the time of the exercise but was discussed with licensee
-
.
representatives prior to the exercise. During the exercise status boards were used effectively in place of the SPDS.-
The above areas will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-416/81-44-05;50-417/81-19-05)
b..
Operations Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was located in the maintenance building.and appeared to have adequate space and equipment.
Support teams assembled at the OSC promptly upon notification and were dispatched as needed throughout the exercise. Plant drawings and specifications were available in the engineering area for use by repair / corrective action teams as necessary. A number of communications problems were noted when portable radios did not work properly, telephones between the TSC and the OSC were inoperable for short periods and the inplant paging system at the Radwaste building was not functioning properly. The communi-cations system problems were identified by the licensee during the exercise critique.
c.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
ihe E0F utilized for the exercise was a temporary facility located in the training building adjacent to the plant. A parmanent facility is under construction nearby and is expected to be completed prior to October 1982. Overall the EOF appeared to be acceptable for an interim facility; however, a few operational problems were observed.
(1) Status boards at the E0F were' considered inadequate in that they were too small and difficult to read from a distance, there were not enough plant data displayed, there was no trending of important plant parameters and the board was not.kept up-to-date.
(2) The physical arrangement of the E0F isolated the Offsite Emergency l
Coordinator (0EC) from his staff and from State and local
'
government representatives. A result of this isolation was that there was too little discussion among the E0F and offsite agency.
representatives concerning protective action recommendations.
In i
addition, there was a delay in receiving plant information from
'
the staff which resulted in superceded information being passed to offsite agencies.
The above areas were discussed with licensee representatives and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-416/81-44-06; 50-417/81-19-06)
14. Accident Assessment This area was observed to determire that adequate methods, systems and equipment assessing and monitoring Octual or potential offsite consequences
.
L_
.
of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(9), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment group in the TSC had ready access to plant drawings and specifications and adequate references to assess plant condition as postulated by the exercise scenario. The dose assessment team performed projections based on data provided by the scenario through the control room.
Onsite and offsite monitoring teams had adequate equipment and perfomed surveys as directed. The inspcctor noted the following deficiencies:
offsite monitoring teams from the corporate office were not familiar
-
with the area around the plant site and required assistance from the MP&L observer / controller in finding designated monitoring points.
At least one of the survey instruments of the onsite team was found to
-
be non-operational. The inspector noted that the instruments at the plant have not yet been placed on a routine maintenance and calibration schedule.
-
Survey results were not recorded by the onsite team and, although a record was kept by offsite teams, there was no fomat for the records.
A standard survey fomat should be developed for both onsite and offsite monitoring teams to insure all pertinent data is recorded.
-
The offsite monitoring team dispatched from the plant had no capability for field estimates of radiciodine concentration and were required to take samples to the EOF for evaluation. Offsite teams from the corporate office had adequate capability.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-416/81-44-07; 50-417/81-19-07)
15.
Protective Responses This area was obse 'ved to detemine that guidelines for protective actions during an emergenc3, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protectiie actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(10) ant. specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
An evacuation and limited accountability of non-essential site personnel was accomplished within a reasonable time; however, procedures were still in the development stage for accountability of construction personnel and the plant's security computer system was not in use during the exercise. As previously discussed with licensee representatives, a full site assembly and accountability shall be demonstrated prior to full power operation. This is an unresolved item (50-416/81-44-08; 50-417/81-19-08)
_
_
.
.
_-.
.
.-
16.
Radiological Exposure Control
,
This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Energency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides as required b 10CFR50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.K.
Dosimetry was issued to all emergency workers and periodic surveys within the emergency response centers were performed. Onsite support teams were provided adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection devices.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
17. Medical and Public Health Support This area was observed to determine that arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(12),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.L.
A simulated medical emergency was initiated on Wednesday, November 4,1981 which included a contaminated person and a request for offsite assistance.
The Clairborne County Hospital in Port Gibson participated by providing ambulance and emergency room services. The inspector noted that in using a four man search and rescue team, there was a considerable delay while all team members dressed out and gathered equipment. When a delay in finding _
the missing man was obvious, an ambulance was requested on the assumption that medical service would be needed. An operator was dispatched to the gate to direct the ambulance to the proper location.
The injury was simulated to be a compound fracture using a wound kit (moulage), but was initially reported by the rescue team as a " laceration."
The first aid team seemed to be more concerned with the local exposure rate than with the injury.
Hospital personnel appeared unfamiliar with contamination control techniques and were frequently reminded by the MP&L observer / controller of the correct methods.
The inspector attributed the abcve noted problems to inadequate' training which is discussed in paragraph 18.
18. Radiological Emergency Response Training This area was observed to determine that radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(15),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section 11.0.
i
_ __
.
.
.
The inspectors noted throughout the exercise that there was a lack of understanding of contamination control and general health physics practices.
A licensee representative stated that some training in these areas had been
,
done but that the training program was not complete. Training has been provided to offsite support agencies but, as noted in paragraph 17, some additional training is indicated. Overall the licensee's observers / controllers performed adequately; however, in a few cases the controllers tended to aid the players. The inspector stated that controllers must be given some training in their assigned functions prior to an exercise. Training will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(50-416/81-44-09; 50-417/81-19-09)
,
19. Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were. formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
10CFR50.47(b)(14),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.
The exercise critique was held on November 5, 1981 with key exercise participants, licensee managment.and NRC attending. Deficiencies and weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency preparedness program as a'
result of the exercise were presented by licensee representative. Most of the items identified by NRC observers were also identified by licensee observers; these items will M tracked by the licensee for resolution. The remaining NRC identified items were discussed at the critique, and are tracked in this report.
Follow up of corrective actions will be accomplished through subsequent inspections.
,
Federal Evaluation Team Report The observations of the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV staff)
concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise is included as an attachment to this report.
4
,
,e
,
y
-
e
+
-
.
y v---
,
w-py--