IR 05000335/1987019

Insp Repts 50-335/87-19 & 50-389/87-18 on 870825-0904.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Evaluation of Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. Exercise Scope & Objectives Encl

ML20235J247
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	09/24/1987
From:	Cunningham A, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235J246	List: IR 05000335/1987019 ML20235J244
References
50-335-87-19, 50-389-87-18, NUDOCS 8710010366
Download: ML20235J247 (31)

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' UNITED STATES I

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

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REGION 11

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' 101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

• t ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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SEP 2 51987

Report Nos.: 50-335/87-19 and 50-389/87-18 j

Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company

_j 9250 West Flagler Street-

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Miami..FL 33101 Docket Nos: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos:

DPR-67 and'NPF-16 i

Facility Name: St. Lucie Inspection conducted. Au ust 25-September 4, 1987 Inspector:

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D6te S'igned-A. L. Cunningham

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L Accompanying Personnel:

G. W. Bethke

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D. R. Brewer C.. R. Bryan W. W. Stansberry l-K.D/ Testa.

r Approved by:-

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T. R. Decker, Chief

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Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section

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Division of Radiation Safety

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and Safeguards SUMMARY

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Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved evaluation of the annual

radiological emergency preparedness exercise.

Results:

No violations or deviations were' identified.

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l REPORT DETAILS I

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Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

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• J. W. Dickey, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

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• J. S. Odom, Site Vice President - Plant Turkey Point

• G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager

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• J. B. Harper, Superintendent of Quality Assurance

• J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent

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• J. J. Maisler, Emergency Planning Manager

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• G. Casto, Emergency Planning i

• R. Sipos, Services Manager

• S. Shaw, Communications Supervisor l

• L. J. Snipes, Communications Manager

• H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics j

• R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor

• C. L. Wilson, Department Head, Mechanical Maintenance j

• J. K. Hays, Director - Nuclear Licensing

• E. Beurrier, Health Physics Supervisor j

• C, Ward, Site Emergency Coordinator A. W. Taylor, Emergency Planning Technician (Turkey Point Plant)-

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craf tsmen, j

engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members;.und l

office personnel.

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NRC Resident Inspector

• H. E. Bibb i

• Attended Exit Interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 27, 1987, with those persons indicated in the paragraph above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

The exercise weaknesses identified in Paragraphs 8 and 14, below, were discussed and clarified with the Site Emergency Coordinator. via

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telephone on September 4, 1987. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection..

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation 50-335, 50-389/87-08-01:

Failure to submit Revision 16 of Radiological Emergency Plan to the NRC within 30 days of the effective date.

Inspection disclosed that the licensee had impismented administrative measures to preclude untimely issuance of REP Revisions.

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Exercise Scenario (82301)

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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements defined in the licensee's emergency plan and organizationpursuantto'10CFR50.47(b)(14), Paragraphia.FofAppendixE to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

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q The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in detail with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.

I The scenario developed for this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization.

The scenario provided sufficient information to the States, counties, local government and federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercise.

The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and

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personnel through 'use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists l

participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance i

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throughout the exercise.

The scenario developed for the medical emergency drill adequately exercised the participating groups of. the licensee's organization and offsite local emergency support agencies.

Both licensee and offsite i

support agencies also demonstrated a significant commitment to training l

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and personnel by use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the medical emergency drill. Neither prompting nor undue j

interaction between controllers and players was observed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)

i This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that

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adequate staff was available to respond to an energency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The inspectors observed that specific energency assignments were made for

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n the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response I

organization was augnented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or

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continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.

Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number

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s of t/ained technical personnel were available for cohtinuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed,y The inspectors also observed act'Sation, staft.hig,iand' operation of'the'

emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency 0perations Facility (EOF), and near-site Emergercy News Center (ENC).

W, e required staffing and assignment of responsibility at.these' facilities were corisistent with the licensee's Energency Plan and approved Implementing Procedures.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

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The licensee's onsite emergency'organiNtiob was observed to assure that j

ig.tunented pursuant to the following requirements were 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of. NUREG-0654:

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unambiguous definition of responsibilities for: emergency response; (2)

prqvision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident

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response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite l

i and offsite support organizational interactions.

The inspectors observed that the initial on ite emergency organization was

adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional j

positions within the organization.

Augmentation of the initial emergency

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response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift and available on-shift personnel.

The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by

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the Station Manager.

Required interactions between the licensee's emergency ' response organization end State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope of the exercise.

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No violations or deviations were 1Jentified.

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Emergency Classification System (82301)

1his area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee i

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, i

specific guidance prorrJ1 gated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance i

recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-28.

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An Emergency Action Level matrix was used to promptly identify and j

properly classify an emergency and escalate it to more severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence progressed.

Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.

Observations donfirmed that the emergency classification system was effectively used and was consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan

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and Implementing Procedures.

The system was observed to be adequate for J'

classification of, the simulated accident sequences..

The ' emergency

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procedures provided for initial.and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.

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'No violations or deviations were identified.

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Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observedz to ' assure that' procedures were established for notification of. State and local response organizations 'and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial: and follow-up'-

messages to response organizations was establ.ished.,This area was further observed to assure. that means to' provide early'. notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D, of Appendix E n to.10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.

An inspector observed that notification methods and ' procedures were established and available for use'in providing information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented ' emergency response organizations, if required.

Inspection also disclosed.that the. licensee consistently failed to-implement prompt notification of the State and counties within the -15-minute time regime following declaration of the

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Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE), Site' Area Emergency, and General

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Emergency.

In the case of the NOUE, delay in notification was traceable i

to the State of Florida's procedural requirement to verify the validity of

the licensee's notification.

This then required the State to call the licensee for verification prior to implementing its notification of the counties and local response agencies.

It was noted'that, although the

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State implements notification of the counties, the. licensee bears -

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i The above finding, and the significant delay in notification of the' Site

Area Emergency and General Emergency in. excess of 15 minutes, was

1 discussed with licensee representatives.during the critique conducted on August 27, 1987, and the telephone conversation of September 4,-1987. The

L licensee committed to review the subject findings and implement indicated'

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c'orrective actions.

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Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-01, 50-389/87-18-01:

Notification of

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emergency classifications within the required 15-minute time regime.

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Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt-

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communications among principal response organizations and emergency j

personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to

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10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.

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The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's

a emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the. offsite environmental monitoring teams and the TSC/ EOF.

The inspectors also observed i

l information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organization.

Emergency communications and communication systems were significantly ' improved, and consistent with emergency response requirements.

I No violations or deviations were identified.

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I 10. Energency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipnent to support an emergency response were provided and maintained j

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50,

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and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.H of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the l

emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therein.

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Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise l

included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support

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J Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.

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Control Room - The Unit 2 Control Room was provided for'the exercise l

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Shift Supervisor and his staff.

Required communications equipment, Control Room procedures and documents were readily available.

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inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the I

sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted l

promptly to initiate required responses to the simulated emergency.

Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.

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personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded

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overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.

The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room operators were cognizant of their duties, responsibilities, and authorities.

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demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system

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and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and

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declare the proper emergency classification.

The Control Room staff demonstrated the capability to consistently

and effectively assess the initial conditions and implement required i

mitigating actions in a timely manner.

It was noted that a detailed

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log of the facility's activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the exercise.

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Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and promptly.

'1 staffed following notification. by the Emergency Coordinator of. the simulated ' emergency conditions leading to the Alert classification.

The facility staff appeared to be cognizant ~ of their' emergency.

duties; authorities, and responsibilities.

Required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly manner.

The TSC.was provided with

adequate equipment for. support of the assigned staff.

.During operation' of.the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as

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required.

Status boards and related-visual' aids were strategically..

j located to facilitate viewing ' by the.TSC staff.

Dedicated communicators were - assigned to : the ' facility.

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discussed in Paragraph 8, above.

Inspection disclosed' the following additional findings, namely:

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(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions were readily implemented and factored-into problem-solving exercises;.

(2) assumption of duties by the Emergency' Coordinator was definite and firm; (3) transfer of certain emergency responsibilities from the

Control Room to the TSC was firmly declared and announced to the TSC staff; (4) briefings of the TSC staff were frequent, 'and consistent a

with changes in plant status and related emergency conditions; (5) accountability, including identifying. missing personnel,. was t

readily implemented within the accepted time regime and ' was

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consistent with the: scope. of the' scenario; (6) TSC Controllers were effective in identifying minor scenario problems and interacted with

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players without prompting.

The transfer' of authority and specific responsibilities by the Emergency. Coordinator to.the EOF Recovery Manager following activation of the EOF was prompt, effective and consistent with the Radiological Emergency Plan and implementing i

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procedures.

Frequent and effective communications occurred between

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the respective facility managers.

l Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC' was' promptly staffed l

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Coordinator.

An inspector observed that teams were promptly-assembled, briefed, and dispatched.

A health physics technician-

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accompanied each team.

The OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities.

During operation.. of this e

facility, radiological habitability was routinely monitored and documented.

The OSC Supervisor demonstrated. effective management and-control practices. -The Coordinator frequently updated his staff.regarding plant status, and thoroughly briefed each investigation and repair

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team prior to.-their deployment to the accident areas.

It was noted by the NRC evaluators and licensee observers, however, that the OSC

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public address system was not activated.

No apparent adverse effects were noted; however, this finding was documented during the licensee's. Controller / Evaluator Critique for review and corrective action, d.

Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) - The E0F was located

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approximately 10.5 miles west of the plant. ' The facilit-was adequately equipped and staffed to support the required ruponse to the simulated emergency.

E0F security was prompty established and was ' included as a routine requirement for preparation and activation of the facility.

Status boards and other related visual aids were. strategically located and were readily accessible for viewing by the EOF staff.

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communications were assigned to the facility, and all required notifications were promptly made.

The E0F principal staff freely interacted with State. and county representatives assigned to the facility.

The subject representatives were routinely informed of plant status, and were consistently factored into the the decision-making process addressing required and proposed protective measures and decisions. Transfer of authority and responsibilities of the TSC Emergency Coordinator to the E0F Recovery Manager, attending activation of the facility, was firm and effective.

The Recovery Manager was updated on the status of the emergency and was thoroughly briefed on previous and proposed mitigating actions.

EOF communications with the Control Room, TSC, and OSC were maintained throughout the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.I of NUREG-0654.

The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status, and an assessment of radiological hazards to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.

During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing plant status and providing recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions required to reduce damage to plant systems and equipment, prevention and/or control of radioactive releases, and prompt termination of the emergency condition.

Radiological assessment activities involved several groups.

An inplant group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant based upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements.

Offsite-

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radiological monitoring' teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the plume.

Radiological effluent data were received in the TSC, where dose calculations were computed and factored into the exercise. All resultant-data were consistent with projected scenario. parameters.

Radiological field monitoring teams were neither observed nor evaluated by j

the NRC; however, inspectors assigned to the TSC and EOF observed dose assessment activities and related coordination and management of field monitoring teams deployed to identify, monitor, and track offsite radiological releases.

Accordingly, the licensee demonstrated effective interaction with State field monitoring teams' and the State. dose assessment group assigned to the EOF.

Dose assessment and projection calculations performed by the TSC, E0F, and State throughout the release period were compared and determined to readily agree within acceptable

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limits.

TSC, E0F, and State Coordinators conducted consistent and effective command and control of field teams throughout the subject phase of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Protective Response (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether guidelines established for protective actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place, and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were promptly implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.

The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the inspectors.

For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant and offsite protective measures were reviewed.

Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the. current Radiological Emergency Plan and the scope and objectives of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that methods for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented consistent with EPA recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) guidelin for emergency workers, and that these methods included exposure (11) and l -

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers.

Periodic radiological. surveys were conducted in the emergency response facilities. _ Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions.

Adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection was available for use as required.

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Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination control, and radiation area access appeared adequate.

Health Physics Supervisors were observed to thoroughly brief. survey, investigative, and repair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.-

Dosimetry was available and effective.ly used.

High-range dosimeters were also available and fully used where required.

i No violations or deviations were identified.

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Public Education and Information (82301)

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This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated j

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emergency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of ' Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

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specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.

Information was provided to the media and the public in advance.of the exercise.

The information included details on how the. public would.be notified and the initial actions which should be taken during an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place.

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An NRC inspector was assigned to observe and evaluate activation.

staffing, and routine operation of the near-site Emergency News Center (ENC). The following evaluations were made:

(1) the number of telephones available to resident press representatives was ' adequate; (2) accurate information was contained in news releases; (3) periodic press briefings and related updates were frequent; (4) visiting media personnel were prohibited from interfering with operation and management of the ENC; (5) information provided to the public was simply stated and readily j

j understandable.

l It was noted, however, that, contrary to Section 4.1 of Procedure 1103 j

(Duties of the Emergency Information Manager), the timing and content of

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all news releases were not formally approved by the Emergency Control

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l Officer prior to actual release.

Only verbal approval was given by the subject officer.

Consistent with Section 4.1 of the cited procedure, approval implies signature or identifiable initials of the cognizant manager or officer.

Licensee management agreed with this finding as

discussed during the Exit Interview conducted on August 27,-1987, and the-

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telephone conversation initiated by the NRC on September 4,1987, to clarify and confirm final NRC inspection findings.

The licensee representative committed to review the subject item and clarify required

approval to indicate formal signature as the sole means of approval of all

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news releases issued from the near-site ENC.

Exercise Weakness 50-335/87-19-02, 50-389/87-18-02:

Failure of ENC l

Emergency Control Officer to properly approve all news releases prior to

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issuance of same to the public.

This item will be reviewed during i

subsequent inspections.

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Recovery Planning (82301)

This area was reviewed pursuant to the requi rements in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), Paragraph IV.H of Appendix E. to 10 CFR 50, and the specific guidance promulgated in Section II.M of NUREG-0654.

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The licensee conducted a recovery planning meeting prior to termination of the exercise.

Licensee planners discussed and established the following:

administrative and logistical support, manpower and engineering services,

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radiological surveillance, development and assignment of a recovery

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organization consistent with the Emergency Plan and Implementing j

Procedures.

A comprehensive review of reentry plans and status was j

conducted.

j No violations or deviations were identified.

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Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were l

brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective-1 l

action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to l

10 CFR 50, and specific guidance - promulgated in Section II.N of l

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NUREG-0654.

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The inspectors observed the licensee's Controller / Evaluator critique

following termination of the exercise.

The subject critique involved a

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detailed discussion and analysis of required improvements, weaknesses, and

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deficiencies identified during the exercise. All findings were documented i

for review and correction.

Positive findings were also discussed and

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I recorded for presentation during the formal NRC/ Licensee critique.

The critique was effectively managed, controlled, and directed to identification / documentation of substantive findings and indicated I

improvements.

The conduct and content of the cited critiques were consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance cited above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Inspector Follow-up (92701)

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(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-335/85-15-01:

Need to send HP and Chemistry procedures implementing Radiological Emergency l

Plan to the NRC in accordance with Appendix E,Section IV of 10 CFR 50.

Inspection disclosed that pertinent health physics and chemistry procedures and revisions thereof will be routinely forwarded to the NRC, as required.

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(Closed) IFI 50-335/86-IN-98, 50-389/86-IN-98:

Offsite medical services.

Inspection disclosed that supplemental or backup medical l

services consistent with the subject IE Information Notice have been provide _.

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(Closed) ! IFI - 50-335/86-12-01, 50-389/86-11-01 (Exercise Weakness):

Delegation of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities without' ensuring

1 that timely information flow / updates are provided to the recipient.'

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I Inspection disclosed that. required transfer 'of responsibilities. from the Emergency-Coordinator to. the recipient 'was : decisively 1 and '

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effectively implemented and included detailed information updates Las

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.(Closed) IFI 50-335/87-EP-01, 50-389/87-EP-01:

Verify audibility off i

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' alarms in high-noise areas (Bulletin 79-18).

The inspector land:a

cognizant licensee-representative requested the Shift Supervisor-actuate site alarms as a. routine practice. _ Having located themselves-

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in the maximum noise' area of.the, plant' (plant; cooling water intake'

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pumps), both persons determined that the subject alarms were readily l

audible.-

18. Federal: Evaluation Team Report-l The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional; Assistance Committee.

and Federal Emergency Managenent Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the i

activities of offsite' agencies during this exercise will be forwarded'by-

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separate correspondence.

Attachment:

Exercise Scope and Objectives

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT EVALUAT.ED EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AUGUST 26,1987 A.

General Objectives 1.

Notification of Emergency Response Personnel a. Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify and communicate information to NRC, State and local authorities.

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Emergency Response Facilities, Equipment, and Communications Demonstrate the ability to staff the Technical Support Center (TSC),

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the Operations Support Center (OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Emergency News Center (ENC).

b. Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC.

c. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of designated emergency response equipment.

d. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communication equipment.

3.

Direction and Control a. Demonstrate the ability of each emergency. response facility manager to maintain command and control over the emergency response activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.

b. Dernonstrate the ability to gather, assess, and disseminate information to the public and governmental officials regarding the status of the emergency conditions and the status of emergency response activities per regulatory time restraints.

c. Demonstrate the ability to initiate and coordinate emergency response activities in an efficient and timely manner.

EP3:2 RPTS.

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I d. Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to execute the S t.

Lucie Plant Radiological Emergency Plan through ~ its

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associated Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.

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Accident Assessment a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to

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analyze current plant conditions, and their potential consequences, and i

provide recommendations for mitigating actions, j

5.

Radiological Assessment U

a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site, in-plant, and off-site

.i radiological monitoring activities.

j b. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the TSC and ' EOF dose assessment activities.

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I c. Demonstrate the ability to. control and coordinate - the. flow of '

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Information regarding off-site radiological consequences between j

radiological assessment personnel stationed at the TSC and the EOF.

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6.

Protective Response j

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a. Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to.

on-site emergency workers.

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b. Demonstrate the ability for the Emergency Coordinator and/or

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Recovery Manager to determine Protective Action Recommendations -

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for the public per regulatory time restraints.

l 7.. Training & Exercise-(

a. Demonstrate the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness training j

program through the critique of trained participants'in a practical demonstration.

b. Demonstrate the effectiveness of actions. taken to correct past j

identified weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program.

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c. Demonstrate the ability of participants and controller / evaluators to-i evaluate and' critique their exercise performance.

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EP3:2 RPTS.

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E.i.. m.,, s.

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Pagn 3.l

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Specific objectives for those activities conducted from the ' Control Room. -

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- Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center.

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Direction and Control

!

l L a. Demonstrate.the precise and, clear transfer of Emergency. Coordinator :

responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC.,

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b. - Demonstrate ithe abilliyf of! each/ facility) manager to' periodically:

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inform facility personnel ' f the status of the emergency situation and

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the plant conditions..

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.c. Demonstrate the ability to timely and. accurately transfer,information1 j

between ' emergency response.f acilities.'

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S d. Demonstrate.- the-ability? of-the l TSC1 and OSC to coordinate the

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deployment of emergency teams.

2.

' Accident Assessment a. Demonstrate the ability of the Control Room staff to mAke a timely

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determination of the probable cause of lthe incident,' and perform mitigating actions to place ' the affected unit 'in a safe, stableL

- condition.

b. Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to s'upport the Control Room (

efforts to identify the probable cause of.an incident, mi_tigate the consequences of that incident,'and place the affected unit in a safe,.

i stable condition.

'l H

c Demonstrate. the ' abilit'y' of theE NuclearM Plant LSupervisor Land -

j

. Emergency Coordinator to classify an emergency condition. -

-Jl 3.

Radiological Assessment

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a. Demonstrate.the ability of the TSC to direct and, OSC _to deploy on-I site and off-site radiological monitoring teams in a timely manner.,

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b. Demonstrate the ability.; off the on-site surveyL team 1 personnel to-l efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures: to perform. dose.

rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other j

prescribed on-site and in-plant radiological monitoring activities..

'

c. Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments and projections-

)

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~f on-site ' and ' off-site radiological. conditions' to:. support the;

o formulation of protective action recommendations.-

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d. Demonstrate the: ability ' to assess.1$ formation available Lfrom the -

h containment and effluent high-level radiation monitoring systems and

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respond accordingly.

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i EP3:2 RPTS.

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Prge,4 d

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e. Demonstrate the ability to analyze samples drawn from the. in-plant-t normal and post-accident sampling systems, and assess the. resultant.

data.

i 4.

Protective Response

'a. Demonstrate the ability : to ' formulate. and implement' ' on-site

-

protective action' measures in a timely manner.

C.

Specific' Objectives for those' Activities Conducted ~ from the Emergency -

Operations Facility and Ernergency News Center.

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1.

Emergency Response Facilities and Communications

]

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a. Demonstrate real time. activation of. the EOF' from the Juno Beach

'

'

c Office and staff in a timely manner.

j l

b. Demonstrate.that adequate communications exist between ' FPL and-offsite agency emergency facilities.

,

i 2.

Direction and Control

1 a. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of the responsibility' to notify offsite agencies, and issue Protective Action Recommendations from the Emergency Coordinator to the ' Recovery Manager.

3.

Accident Assessment

.i

'i a. Demonstrate the ability of the EOF staff to support the on-site efforts to identify the cause of an incident, mitigate the consequences of that i

incident, and place the affected unit in a safe, stable condition.

b. Demonstrate as necessary, the abilityito 'obtain vendor and other

outside resources to assist accident analysis and mitigation efforts.

4.

Radiological Assessment i

l a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate FPL ' off-sitej radiological-l monitoring activities with those conducted by the State.

b. Demonstrate the ability to perform assessments and projections of

!

off-site radiological conditions to support the timely, formulation _of'

l protective action recommendations.

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L

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c. Demonstrate the ability.to' coordinate and compare FPL off-site dose'

j assessment activities with those conducted by the State.'

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I EP3:2 RPTS.

a

=L_

o c...,..,..,

Psg25

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d. Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the'. flow of

' information regarding off-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel.'

I 5.

Protective Response a. Demonstrate that decisions.can be made in a timely; manner regarding

!

protective action recommendations for the geaerai public within the Plume Exposure (10-mile) Emergency' Planning Zone (EPZ), and can be

,

communicated to State and local authorities within regulatory time i

l restraints.

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6.

Public Information

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1 a. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the' preparation, review and release of information with State and local government _ agencies as appropriate; and provide : accurate, clear and timely. information releases to the news media.

D.

Specific Portions of the Emergency Response that will not be tested.

- 1 l

1.

Site evacuation.

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2.

Real time activation of the Emergency News Center.

l 3.

Real time response by the Emergency Information Manager.

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EP3:2 RPTS.

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,j$9c'; ' ',

j FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COM*ANY l

'I

TIMELINE ard MINI-SCE2MRIOS i

J

_ PEOPLE.. SERVING PEOPLE i

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ST LUCIE EVALUATED ^ EXERCISE i

Revisionc7/07/87

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Unit 2.

.Irii tial? Conditions The! Unit'hau justLreturned to.;100% powerLfo11owing:

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an uncomplicated l trip...(Unit -returned' toipower on' August ~25 at 10:OO;pm).

.end-of-lif e with120 da9511ef ti l before.

Unit 2 ' is'-near scheduled ref ueling.

l.

RCS activi'ty has shown an increase-sinceEreturning:to-t operation.

Initiallactivity[:upon returnfto.powed;was

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4 uci/ml I-131 DEO.

The. 8:00 am? sample. indicated

.9."

p uci/m1' I-131 DEO.:

2-A Auxiliary feedwater, pump-is..outiofiserv' ice for inboard bearing replacement.

Estimated time)-to re'pairy is 7' hours.

2-B Charging' pump is out of service'to replace packing.

Estimated time,to ' repairE is 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.:

A small primary / secondary-tube leak i ri.S/G 2-A was.

detected upon. return

._to power;

. leak.has remained'

steady at. approximately.06 gpm.

Periodic' containment' anomaly check is.due. this s'hift'

coordinated with HP to begins at 10:15 am.

'. Cont ai nment '

mini purge is in - progress at this time.

1 PORV block. valve is out of ; service,. ' cl osed ' and '

" ~de-energi:ed"due to burned-out. motor.

Estimated ~ time-to repair is twelves hours.

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Unit 1 Conditions Unit 1 is at 100% power--120 ' days into < current : cycl e.

All equipment operablefand available.

Meteor ol ogi c al. conditions ~

1ar e '

typical-

-for.> South

..

Florida.

Thegpresent: temperature.is.83 degrees-F.-

and the wind is variable at.1 to 3' mph.

Forecast for today'is partly cloudy; winds from the east to south-east at approximately 5 mph.

There is'a 50% chance'of.

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thunderstorms.

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10:00 Exercise commences.

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10:15 Nuclear Operator (NO)

and Health Physics Tech. (HP)

enter containment for anomaly check.

10:30.

NO calls control rocm from containment asking permis-sion to backseat manual letdown isolation valve V-2593 a

and informs NPS that backseating this valve has worked j

!

in the past.

10:40 NPS or ANPS grants permission for backseat.

10:50 NO has no success backseating valve using reach red so i

he takes it upon himself to enter cubicle and physical-

)

ly backseat valve using a valve wrench.

HP objects but

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cannot stop NO.

When NO applies pressure to valve,

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bonnet cracks, releasing l ar ge amounts of steam.

NO is j

scalded, jumps away, hits head on angle iron, and is

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knocked unconscious (which will lead to fatality).

j Cracked bonnet creates a.85 gpm primary system leak.

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10:55 HP calls control room for help after pulling uncon I scious operator from the valve area and carrying him to i

personnel hatch.

Burns to the HP's face and wrists are l

received in the process.

11:00 While dragging the operator out of the containment the HP cuts the face of the inner door seal causing inner door seal failure.

The HP is extremelv excited about the condition of operator and fails to close the inner docr befcre opening the outer door.

The ringfeeder (clutch) which shculd not allow this to occur has become corroded (due l

to a l ack of pm) and is not wori:ing properl y.

The HP succeeds in opening the outer door with the inner door open, but in doing so shears the Geneva latch plate (at

--a defective area, i.e.

manufacturing flaw) and the outer door cannot be l atched.

r Alarm in the Control Room will indicate that the personnel hatch is open.

Ops should curtail miqi purge at this time reali:ing that a potential primary leak is in progress.

Neither butterfly valve completely rescats.

Ops should be I

unaware of this leak path due to open airlock centri-buting'to any increase in plant vent monitor.

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11:05 First aid team arrives at personnel hatch and finds HP Tech. semi-conscious and NO dead.

11:10 Centrol room receives call 'from first aid team on the

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status of i n.i ur i e s and that both hatch doors are open.

11:15 A NOTIFICATION of UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared for contaminated. injured worker prior to first aid vehicle leavina site f or hospi tal.

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I Control' room leak rate procedure indicates a total.95 gpm primary leek.

NPS sends in a second containment entry team to verify that pressure boundary leakage enists.

Operations d ep ar t <nent secures inner hatch door and informs Technical group to_do a. seal test on inner. door, (outer door will not lock down).

Within approximately 15 minutes of being made aware that both hatch doors are left open the NPS should declare an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a loss of containment

integrity.

'

11:30 Tech group begins eeal test on inner personnel hatch.

l 11:40 Verification from containment entry team that pressure boundary leakage enists causes the NPS to institute shutdown at 1% per minute.

11:45 Tech aroup test the inner door seal and fir.ds-the Icakaae to be 15. 000 SCCt1.

12:00 The Mechanical maintenance department checks with stores and finds there are spare Geneva plates and they inform the HPS they will have the personnel hatch repaired in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

l 12:15 V-2593 leak increases to 55 gpm.

12:20

- ~At 60%

power, shutdown rate increases to 2% per minute to address recognition of the larger leak rate.

I 12:30

.. Media rumors of unconfirmed number of deaths and major reactor problems at St. Luci e pl ant.

i At approximately this. time,. EC should declare ALERT f

based on >50 gpm mismatch between charging and letdown with other indications of primary leak in containment.

• 12:40 During controlled shutdown, NPS/EC attempts to' swap A

.

and D Aun-Transformer breakers to start-up position (offsite power).

2B f ails to swap but remains closed.

Ops will attempt to start B diesel which will~ fail tc start.

12:55 Reactor at appr oni mat el y 20%

power and holding to

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complete repairs to B Aun

.ransformer breaker and B j

diesel, i

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12:00 Contingency message may be given at this time to ECO

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to activate EOF due to increased media attention.

1!:10 2-D Start-up breaker is repaired.

Cause was a loose

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connector on cont'ol power fuse block.

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r Shutdown resumes, t

13:15 Bonnet-on V-2592 ":ippers" off valve, increasing leak f

j rate to approximately 4550 gpm.

Reactor trips.

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l 13:10 Start-up breaker reopens and 2B diesel generator still not repaired causing loss of all B-side power, includino 29 Aun. feed pumps.

C Aux feed pump used to

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supply feed water to A and B steam generators; trips on l

overspeed.

Ops must get T. D.

to reset overspeed latch.

Upon reset, 2C Aux feedwater pump starts but tqips j

again on overspeed.

T.O.

reports oil level in gov.

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control low and coes out to find oil.

In the meantime, RCS is indicating saturated conditions.

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t All B-side saf eguards are of f.

13:5S Pe-sonnel hatch is repaired but the seal has not yet been confirmed bv a satisfactory leak test.

Mini-purgo is still leaking but it is not obvious to the Control Room that the valves did not seat or that any addi-tional leakpath from containment exists.

As containment pressure increases, release exits containment through mini-purge and escapes into the environment.

90% of the release is taken up by the Auxiliary Building Supply Fans-(directly above the area where the mini-purge is located);

10% escapes

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unmonitored into the environment.

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core uncovered at this time.

A GENERAL 13:45 I Reactor EMERGENCY should be declared shortly af ter the reccani-tion of the loss of

fission product barriers.

Protective Action Recommendations should be:

Evacuate 0-2 miles.

complete radius; Evacuate 2-5 miles, complete radius; shelter 5-10 miles, compl ete radius.

Sectors N,P,0 affected WNW sector.

A SITE AREA EMERGENCY may initially be declared due to the primary leak being areater than charging pump capacity.

This should be escalated short1v af ter ccre uncovery.

13:55 T.O.

puts oil in 2C Aun feedwater pump.

Pump start is successful and feeding steam generators.

Total time

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without AFW approximately y 30 minutes.

I 2B Start-up Transf ormer br eaker is repaired and B-side power is restored.

14:00 EOF should be operational at this time.

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14:15 H2-Analv:.or indicating 1.0% H2 in containment.

14:30 Due to increased pressure in containment, airborne

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r =idicacti ve r el ease f rom containment via the mini-purge intake increases.

Release exits the Aun Building.

j unmonitored, and'is picked up by the Auxiliary Building ventilation intake.

Increased' activity is detected by radiation monitors throughout the Aun Building and through the plant vent.

Control Rocm becomes aware of'

the existence of another release' path.

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14:45 With 'H2 recombiners in operation, hydrogen is sigwly being reduced in containment.

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15:00 Small doses are being measured beyond 2 miles from*the l

plant.

Doses are not significant enough to prompt further PARS.

15:20 Containment pressure continues to reduce as plant regains control of incident.

l Plant goes into recirculation phase-at approximately

!

this time.

When this occurs, dose rates and air

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acti vi ty in the Aun.

Building increase significantly due to cases in RCS escaping from LPSI pump leaks.

Some addi ti on al activity is released through the plant l

vent.

16: 00 Pl ant reaches shutdown cooling temperature.

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1 6': 3 0 i

Emergency repair crews succeed in securing mini-purge

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% isolation value, terminating the release f rom contain-

ment.

17:30 Containment hydrocen further reduces, plant conditions appear stable.

10:00 Exercise is ter minated.

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MINI-SCENARIO #1 i

CONTAMINATED INJURY AND DEATH

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10:15 am Nuclear Opera' tor, with Health' Physics coverage, enter '

Unit 2 containment to perform periodic. anomaly check.

Once inside. containment, NO gets a pipe wrench from the rack at the base'of the stairway and begins rounds of the outside of biowall area of containment.

HP tech.

performs typical rad surveys (beta / gamma and neutron) and finds normal readings.

1 10:30 Upon reaching the regenerative heat exchanger area, l

the NO hears a

steam leak coming from the letdown isolation valve cubicle.

NO calls the NPS to get permi s si on to backseat the -leaking valve JV-2593) !

which has a

wisp of steam releasing from the steam !

area.

The NO has had personal experience w(th this valve leaking before and has stopped leaks there simply by backseating using the reach. rod.

The NPS concurs and allows the NO to attempt backseating this,

valve.

l 10:50 The NO tries to backseat the valve with no success.

He is irritated that this failed because he convinced the NPS that he could stop the leak and now f eels that the NPS will think less f avorably of his expertise.

While

the HP has his back to the NO to set down the REM ball I (survey meter),

the NO grabs the pipe wrench and i enters the cubicle to manually backseat the valve.

HP yells at the NO and orders him to exit the cubicle.

The NO' hooks up the pipe wrench to give one hard pull

on the valve and does so.

This cracks the bonnet and releases a burst of steam.

The startled NO gasps and knhales the superheated steam as it scalds his face. i

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He jumps back, strikes a piece of angle iron with

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his head, falls back over the valve and onto the floor.

The.HP tech. enters the cubicle and. pull s out the NO,

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burning an exposed area of his neck and both wrists in l

the process as his PC's part at tape down points.

10:55 The HP tech, extremely excited and in pain from his burns, manages to pick up the NO over his shoulder in a firemans carry and get him up the stairs and to the

personnel batch area.

He sees the PA next to the hatch and calls the control room requesting help.

The HP tech.

opens the inner per sonnel hatch dcor and drags the NO in (cutting the inner door seal in the process)

and now begins to feel the pain from his burns greatly increasing.

He becomes more panicked and somewhat disoriented and fails to close the inner

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hatch before opening the outer hatch.

The ringfeeder

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i 15: 45 A maintenance team is organized to secure the release.

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Dose rates in the area 'will prompt authori:ation of ij emergency exposure considerations.

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16:30 The' release is terminated' as the maintenance team l

finds a way to secure the release.

(It is anticipated

that a

blind flange will be placed over the release

{

path.)

j-l Messages associated with this mini-scenario are:

1,10,12,17 l

l l

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h l

l l

l c

or

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MINI-SCENARIO #2 I

,

l BROKEN PERSONNEL HATCH

j 11:00 am Alarm in the Control Room will indicate that the personnel hatch is open but it will not immediately be known that both doors are open.

This alarm will stay I

on until someone is sent to investigate.

f 11:15 When someone responds to close the doors, the inner

!

door will close but the outer door will not lock.

The

Tech. Department will be called to do a leak test on I

the personnel hatch to verify that the inner door is

'j sealed.

'

11:45 Tech.

Department will report that 15,000 SCCM is leaking between the inner door, the outer door cannot

,

be closed and locked, therefore, a loss of containment'

i integrity exists.

The plant should enter Tech. Dpec.

action statement 3.6.1.1.

(

12:00 Mechanical Maintenance inspects the door, finds the problems (corroded ringfeeder and sheared Geneva l

plate),

and finds spare part for Geneva plate in stores.

They estimate that they can fix the door in two hours.

J 13:35 Maintenance fixes the outer personnel hatch door.

!

When the Tech.

Department comes-to check the leak i

rate, the first test fails but the tester finds oil in the flow gauge and has to go get other leak rate test equipment in order to perform the test.

14:00 Tech.

Department finds equipment, returns to the personnel hatch, and retests to find personnel hatch sealed.,.

It should become apparent to the Control Room

--

q)... b y this time that another containment failure exists

-

j[,y, as activity is still being released via the plant vent t. ' and ECCS.

4.

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Messages associated with this mini-scenario are:

10,13,16,17,18 26,47 l

_ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _

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(clutch),

which would nor mal l y prevent this from occurring, breaks due to_ lack of preventive maintenance and the outer per sonnel hatch opens, shearing the.

Geneva plate in the process.

11:00 The HP tech. collapses af ter pulling the NO out of the airlock and down the stairs.

. Security-is at the personnel hatch and tries to ai d by. calling via the.

<

security radio to get first aid.

The First aid / Decontamination

' Team responds, taking care of the injured HP and doing'whatever they can for the already dead NO, until offsite medical assi st ance arrives.

Offsite medical assistance will transport the contaminated / injured HP tech. to Lawnwood Hospital and leave the dead NO on site.

4,6,8,h,20,21, Messages associated with this mini-scenario are

,

23(7), 24 t

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l l

l

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$

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s:.

N9 g;

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1 MIN 1-SCENARIO #'3

MEDIA ATTENTION ADDRESSING DEATH AT-SITE-Revised 7/7/87,

,

11:30 am Police scanner report is overheard by.a reporter.at Stuart News.

l Rumors about the death onsite begin. to. spread a'round-L the plant, workers.

A' contract l aborer. overhear s and calls WTVX (Channel 34).

saying that he thinks someone

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died.inside. the' reactor at~the' plent.

He: won ' t give his name and. upon' being-questioned,l getsynervous andL hangs up.

A camera. crew that 'is on the' beach -filming '

tourists is cent.to the site.

11:45 The Stuart.

News reporter,-

being knowledgeable' of-protocol with the_' press by 1FPL, calls Corpo(ate l

Communications to get some verification of'this story.

12:00 The WTVX camera crew finds a plant worker, an apprent--

ice electrician, who is leaving'the -site to move 1 bis pregnant wife out of. their, beach-front' condo 2 miles south of the site.

'The plant. worker was in the control room area around 11:00'

am' and heard the annunciators and some talk of-the injuries and the primary leak in containment.

As : rumors spread ' amena other workers about the death-of the,NO.'the' apprentice elec trici an becameL worri edi and' left to' evacuate his.

wife.

When approached by the news crew, the electri-cian gives a.

seemingly. accurate, but-not truthful, account of the events in progress.

12:20 More rumors are generated byf the 2 ambulance.staf f. af ter, arriving'at Lawnwood.

An ER : nurse overhears the talk

^~~of ddaths at St.

Lucie and call s her. husband. who '.i s ' a J., printer at The Fort Pierce.NewsgTribune.

He,.in turn,

,

,

j5. perpetuates the rumor that dead ' workers.are being

,

d.; brought into the hospital from a'

radioactiveLexplosion at the plant and thel ambulance.had toLleave; people

Lehind, probably because they were radioactive.

12:30 A reporter from 'The?. Fort Pierce News Tribune calls Corporate Communications to get at story on'the' deaths at St1 Lucie.- A news crew is:en the-way to the ENC as well as TV crews. from' Palm-Beach. Channel 124.and'

.

Channel 5: who have called the: paper f or finf ormation.~

12:55 It is expected that,.in light of the degraded' condition at the plant and the increased media attention over the death, the EOF will initiate activation.

Personnel will leave the Juno Beach Of fice by this time.

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Messages associated with this mini-scenars.o.are:

23, 33,3,4 I

i

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b I'

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MINI-SCENARIO #4 RELEASE FROM MINI-PURGE (VALVES 1-FCV-25-26, 2-FCV-25-36)

10:00 am Containment purge is in progress for normal venting and anticipation of anomaly check scheduled for 10:15.

11:00 Once primary leak is realized by Control Room, the containment purge will be terminated.

When mini purge isolation valves (1-FCV-25-26, I-FCV-25-36)

shut, neither close completely.

Due to lack of' preventive maintenance, one valve han a corroded seal area and the other locks up slightly open.

Initial switches indicate closed in the Control Room as the valves actuate enough toward the closed position to trip the closed switch.

Release path is not detectable until acti vi ty in containment, combined with high containment-pressure, force release'through mini-purge.

.

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13:15 Bonnet on letdown i sol ati on val ve (V-2593)

comes off I

"

initiating a

small break LOCA.

As RCS flashes to steam and releases to containment, containment pressure

.

increases.

l 13:30 The core is uncovered, causing a

major release of.

i radioactive materials into containment as fuel cladding

'

f ail s.

Containment pressure at 10 psig f orces radio-active release out of containment vi s mini purge, i

This release goes f rom the purge room outside contain-j ment, out the intake filters, and into the area i

between the Auxiliary Building, Containment, and the j

l Fuel Handling Building.

The HVS-4-A/B fans pick up l

the majority of the radioactive release (90%) and carry it back into the Auxiliary Building and out the i

plant vent.

CIAS causes the Fuel Handling Building

- Supply fans to stop so the release is not taken up by

,g t; hose fans.

.

~

,%

1The majority of the release is dispersed f airly evenly

' throughout the Auxiliary Building and exits to the

'

environment, monitored by the plant vent and ECCS A and B effluent monitors.

The remaining 10%

of the release not taken up by the Auxiliary Building Supply fans (HVS-4-A/B) disperses to the environment f rom its exit outside of containment.

.

15:15 An HP team is sent from the TCS to do a survey inside the RCA and outside the Auxiliary-Building.

When they reach the area near the release, they get indications of plume inversion.

Upon further investigation, they hear a whistle sound (air passing through the mini-purge isolation valses).

J

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