IR 05000389/1983026
| ML20024F627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1983 |
| From: | Blake J, Crowley B, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024F609 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-83-26, NUDOCS 8309090534 | |
| Download: ML20024F627 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES
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fg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
g REGION ll D
- p 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W, SUITE 3100 e
g ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 s...
Report No.: 50-389/83-26 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Docket No.: 50-389 License No.:
CPPR-144 Facility Name: St. Lucie 2 Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida Inspectors:
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WV P.' K/ettisorge Sate Signed AccompanyingPersony1:
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Approved by I
S~/3/ d J. J. BTake, Section Chief A) ate / Signed
Engineering Program Branch
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Division of Engineering and Operational Programs SUMMARY l
Inspection on March 29 - April 2, 1983
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Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 86 inspector-hours on site in the
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areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, containment steel structures, review of "as-builts", licensee identified items, inspector followup
i items, preservice inspection (PSI) completion, and containment walkdown inspection.
Results
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Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas; one apparent violation was found in one area (Violation - Failure to Follow Procedure for Visual Inspection of LPSI and Containment Spray Pump Support l
Welds - Paragraph 3.c.(3)(a)). No deviations were found.
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l 8309090534 830817 PDR ADOCK 05000389 G
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l REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- B. Escue, Site Manager
- E. Dotson, Engineering Project Manager
- E. Preast, Resident Engineer
- J. Parker, Project QC Supervisor
- P. Carrier, Power Plant Engineering - Licensing
- R. Symes, Supervising QA Engineer
- W. Jackson, Welding Superintendent G. Gotch, Section Supervisor Codes & Inspections - PNS P. Heycock, PSI Site Supervisor - PNS J. Behres, QA Supervisor Other Organizations
- P. Grossman, Site Project Engineer, EBASCO Services, Inc R. Virgo, QC Supervisor, U. S. Testing, Inc.
M. Kinney, Construction Completion Supervisor - Civil - U. S. Testing, Inc.
- J. Orlowski, Licensing, Combustion Engineering, Inc.
G. Grace, Licensing Engineer, EBASCO Services, Inc.
NRC Resident Inspectors
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- C. Julian, Project Section Chief
- S. Elrod, SRI
- P. Bibb, RI
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview On April 1,1983, a preliminary exit interview convened with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above to summarize the inspection scope and findings to that point.
(In addition, the Region II office in Atlanta and the Office of Reactor Regulation in Washington D.C., were included by telephone). The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The final exit interview was conducted by Mr. J. J. Lenahan of this office on April 2,.1983, and is described in Report 50-389/83-31.
(0 pen) Violation 389/83-26-01: " Failure to Follow Procedure For Visual Inspection of LPSI and Containment Spray Pump Support Welds" - paragraph 3.c.(3)(a).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 389/83-26-02: " Incorporation of NCR Changes on Drawings" - paragraph 3.c.(3)(b).
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 389/63-26-03: " Augmented ISI of RCP to Pump Welds" - paragraph > 9.b.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 389/83-26-04: "UT Sensitivity for Roll-Bond
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Clad Piping" - paragraph 9.c.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
a.
(Closed) Violation 389/82-43-01: " Failure to Follow Procedures for Inspection and Turnover of Component Cooling Surge Tank."
Florida Power and Light Company's (FP&L). letter of response (L-82-489)
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dated November 8,1982, as amended by FP&L letter (L-82-541) dated December 13, 1982, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
Based on examination of corrective actions as stated in the
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, letter of response, the inspectors concluded that FP&L had determined the full extent of-the subject violation, performed the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the present conditions and developed the.necessary corrective actions-to preclude recurrence of
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similar circumstances. The corrective actions identified in the letter
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(Closed) Violation 389/82-43-03: "Fai,lureito Follow NCR Procedures."
N1orida Power and Light Compahy's (FP&L) letter of response (L-82-489),
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' dated November 8,1982, has been reviewed and determined to be accept-
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able by Region II. Based on examination of corrective actions as
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stated in the letter of response, the inspectors concluded that FP&L had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performed the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the present conditions
and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances. The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
c.
(0 pen) Violation 389/82-43-04: " Inadequate Measures to Control Welding
,and Non' destructive Testing of Non-Uniquely' Identified Structural
' Welds".
florica Power and Light Company's (FP&L) letter of response (L-82-489)
has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II. The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been
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iicplemented.
In order to verify the corrective action and determine whether FP&L had determined the full extent of the subject violation,
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performed the necessary survey and followup actions to correct the
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present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to
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preclude recurrence of similar circumstances, the inspectors examined the following:
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(1) Switchgear Monorail - EL 58.33' RAB
The inspectors reviewed Inspection Report (IR) No. CC83-0864 and associated documentation. In addition, the as-installed monorail was observed and compared with drawing 2998-G-821, SH 4.
Welding and bolting were compared with drawing tequirements.
(2) Stairs 2-RA3 - EL.5'-43.0' RAE-The inspectors reviewed IR's CC83-1230, CC83-1231, CC83-1228, CC83-1650, CC-1506, CC83-1229, CC83-1493, CC83-1492, CC83-1494, CC83-1457 and associated documentation.
In addition the stairs was observed and generally compared with drawing 2998-G-822,SH 2
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requirements at EL 29.5' - 43.0'.
(3) LPSI Pump 2B Support - EL.5 RAB
, The inspectors observed the support and generally compared the support with drawing 2998-G-821, SH7 and FCR No. 2-1152.
In addition, the inspectors perfoimed a detailed inspection of the northeast corner of the support This inspection included bolting, structural dimensions, and weld size and appearance.
Although the structure was pain:ed, general weld condition and sizo could be determined. This detailed inspection revealed two problems as follows:
(a) All bolts between the 12" I-beams and the top 5/8" Gusset Plate could not be installed as shown on drawing 2998-G-821, SH7. Therefore, FCR 2-1152 was issued to leave out part of the bolts and increase the size of the fillet welds joining the top 5/8" Gusset Plate to the horizontal 12" I-Beams and the 10" I-Beam Corner Post. The inspectors found that the fillet welds (typically 1", 5/8" and 7/16") covered by the FCR were up to 3/16" undersize. The welds had been inspected and accepted on two separate inspections by the licensee.
First, the welds were documented as being acceptable in 1979 on IR C79-3383.
The second inspection was on February 7, 1983, during re-inspection as part of the " Civil Turnover" where the welds were documented to be 1/16" undersize (IR CC83-0419). The 1/16" undersize condition was accepted by QC and Engineering. After this problera was identified by the inspectors, tho~ licensee re-inspected the welds and confirmed the inspector's findings.
In some cases, the licensee documented welds to be 1" undersize (IR CC83-1834 dtd. 3/31/83). The inspectors inspected the same areas on ccntainment spray pump 2A support (an identical support to the LPSI pump support) and found the same undersize weld
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conditions (see paragraph (4) below). The failure to document the undersize welds correctly is in violation of paragraph 5.2 of QI 17.5, Revision 0, " Instructions for Civil Turnover at St. Lucie", which requires that inspections be performed in accordance with applicable QI's and that as-found conditions be documented on applicable inspection reports.
Paragraph 5.3 of QI 9.1, the applicable QI for visual inspection of welds, requires that the inspector make certain that the size of all welds conform to requirements.
The violation is identified as item No. 389/83-26-01:
" Failure to Follow Procedure for Visual Inspection of LPSI and Containment Spray Pump Support Welds". This violation is an example of inadequacies in the QA program for inspection of structural steel as discussed in paragraph 5. below.
(b) The inspectors noted 4 stiffener plates welded to the North horizontal 12" I Beam that did not appear on the drawing.
After about a day of searching, the licensee identified an NCR (No. 756C) dated 9/25/79 which detailed the stiffeners in
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question. The inspectors raised a question relative to the method of assuring that NCR changes are incorporated on drawings and assuring that inspection personnel have NCR changes to drawings when inspecting a structure or assembly.
Attachment to EBASCO letter: E22-SL-2-81-224 dated June 30, 1981, outlines the procedure for review of NCR's for incor-poration on drawings. This assures that eventually NCR changes are incorporated on drawings. However, there is no time frame for revising drawings to incorporate NCR's.
For the stiffeners in question, the drawing has not been revised since 1979. Therefore, unless someone using a drawing just happens to know about NCR's that have not been incorporated, he is not aware of the latest design changes. This matter is identified as inspector followup item 389/83-26-02: "Incor-poration of NCR Changes on Drawinns". This will be reviewed further during future inspections.
(4) Containment Spray Pump 2A Support - El.5 RAB The inspectors observed the support and generally compared the support with drawing 2998-G-821, SH7 and FCR No. 2-1152.
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addition, the inspectors performed a detailed inspection of the northeast corner of the support. This inspection included bolting, structural dimensions and weld size and appearance.
See paragraph (3) above for the results which are identical to the results for the LPSI pump 28 support.
(5) Safety Injection Tank 2B1 Support - El 62.0' RCB See paragraph 6 below for inspections in this area.
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(6) Floor Structure - Zone 30 - El 45.0' RCB The inspector observed welding and bolting relative to the following connections on drawing 2998-G-795 SH4:
Plate 54M5 to Embed Plate 54M5 to Beam 54M4 Plate 54M5 to Beam 60M2 Beam 60M2 to Embed A detailed inspection was not possible due to installed floor grating.
IR's CC82-108, CC82-218, and C80-2630 were reviewed.
Non-unique weld traveler dated January 8, 1980, was reviewed.
Within the areas inspected, no violation, except as noted in paragraph 3.c.(3),ordeviations,wereidentified.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inadequacies in the QA Program for Inspection of Structural Steel Since September 1982, Region II has identified a number of problems relative to inspection of seismic structural steel at St. Lucie Unit 2.
All of the problems, when examined collectively, indicate significant inadequacies in the QA program for structural steel and insufficient corrective actions by FP&L to preclude further noncompliance in the same functional area. The following summarizes the problems:
a.
RII Report Number 50-389/82-43 (1) During the inspection conducted September 7-10, 1982, three violations and an inspector followup item were identified as follows:
(a) Violation A - 10 CFR, Appendix B, Criterion V In violation of SQP 64 and QI 10.13, the Component Cooling Water Surge Tank had been turaed over to "Startup" without being bolted to its foundation and without receiving an installation inspectio,
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(b) Violation B - 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX Measures were inadequate to control welding and nondestruc-tive testing of non-uniquely identified structural welds in that:
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The control system did not have provisions for identifying the status of inspection, i.e., when welds were ready for inspection or whether welds had been inspected.
The Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Support to embed
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welds had been completed and painted without final visual inspection and were not of acceptable quality.
The Component Cooling Surge Tank Support to embed welds
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had been made without a weld traveler.
During an inspection the week of October 4, 1982, documented on RII Report 50-389/82-45, another example of violation B was found.
For a welded support installed for the push button station serving valve V-3656PB, the required non-unique weld traveler could not be located and welds were of insufficient length for welds covered by FCR 2-31300.
(c) Violation C - 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V NCR 1627M for the Component Cooling Surge Tank Support had been closed out and all corrective action had not been completed.
In addition, a weld traveler to cover welding on the NCR could not be located.
(d)
In addition to the violations, the inspector opened an inspector followup item relative to civil / structural turn-over. The licensee stated that only unique identified items are included in their turnover procedures and therefore civil items are not included. They further stated that civil items will be turned over, possibly room by room or building by building, but procedures are not planned to cover this process.
(2) The licensee responded to the above violations in letters dated November 8 and December 13, 1982. The following summarizes the planned corrective action as stated in the letters:
(a) Violation A - NCR's 4528ME and 4529ME were issued. To prevent recurrence, FP&L proposed to review a sample of similar tanks which were installed without construction process sheets and review turnover packages for correct documentatio,
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(b) Violation B - FP&L stated that it had been their intent to turnover civil structures including status of inspections per SQP -64.
They further stated that at the time of this inspection, the program had not been scoped and fully defined.
Inspection of the welds in question were documented on inspection report C82-3391 and NCR 4864. FP&L stated that the civil turnover program was currently underway and expected to be complete by October 29, 1982. To ensure adequate control over non-uniquely identified structural welding, FP&L proposed:
Turnover of all civil structures using a formal turnover
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system As part of civil turnover, verify that all required
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inspections have been performed and properly documented Walkdown civil structures to the latest revised drawings
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documenting and dispositioning discrepancies.
Complete all civil turnover packages including
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inspection status prior to core load.
(c) Violation C - NCR 4528ME was issued and inspection and supervisory personnel instructed in the necessity for ensuring that the disposition of a discrepancy report is completely understood prior to performing inspections to
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verify implementation, b.
RII Report 50-389/83-06 (1) During the inspection conducted January 10-27, 1983, a followup inspection on civil turnover was performed. The inspector found that a construction completion group had been formed to complete the construction of civil items and accomplish formal turnover of
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civil structures to the power operations group. Responsibilities l
of the construction completion group include an audit of completed inspection reports (i.e., reports which record results of
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inspections have been satisfactorily performed, a review of all field change requests, design change notifications, and noncon-formance reports to verify that work required by these documents had been completed, and a walkdown of completed structures to identify discrepancies. Two violations and one unnsolved item were identified as follows:
(a) Violation A - 10 CFR 10, Appendix B, Criterion V
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During a walkdown of the component cooling building and examination of records documenting structural steel l
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inspections performed by the construction completion group, the inspector identified the following:
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In violation of QI 10.5, inspection of the connection of member 14A12 to 9ASA and the connection of member 4A1 to 9A8 failed to detect that one bolt in each connection had not been tightened and that the bolts and nuts were not resting squarely.
In violation of EBASCO drawing 2998-G-841, nuts on
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anchor bolts through column numbers 1A1, 1A3, 1A4 and 1A5 were not wrench tightened.
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In violation of QI 10.5, inspections for structural steel connections were improperly documented on the inspection forms in that the identification of some connections inspected were erroneous on the inspection forms.
(b) Violation B - 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V The inspector reviewed the procedures being used by QC personnel in the construction completion group. The procedures controlling the QC work consisted of a flow-chart and existing applicable civil quality instructions (QIs).
Review of the flow-chart and discussions with the QC personnel disclosed that the flow-chart was not an appro-priate instruction or procedure since the scope of inspection requirements was not defined, inspection criteria were not clear, and the criteria for documentation of discrepancies were not clear.
(c)
In addition to the above violations, discussions with the completion group responsible for auditing the completed inspection reports disclosed that approximately 20 to 30% of the structural steel may not have been inspected during originial construction or that inspection records could not be located. At the time of the inspection, the records were still being searched. This was identified as an unresolved item.
(2) After the January 10-27, 1983 inspection, a management meeting was held on February 3,1983, in the Region II office. The following concerns were discussed with the licensee relative to the civil turnover program:
(a) The licensee initially failed to establish a formal documen-ted procedure to control the work of the civil turnover program. The licensee stated that, since this problem was
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identified by an NRC inspector, a formal documented procedure has been prepared and approved. This procedure will be implemented to control the civil turnover program.
(b) The apparent lack of QA records documenting inspection of 20 to 30 percent of structural steel erection was discussed.
The lack of records documenting these inspections indicates that the inspections were mt accomplished during construc-tion as required by QC procedure and NRC Regulations (Appendix B to 10 CFR 50). The licensee was asked to discuss the reason for this problem, and whether it has occurred in other areas.
The licensee stated that a detailed review of the QA records is in progress to determine if the missing records were misfiled. The licensee indicated that this problem is limited to structural steel inspections. The licensee will inform Region II of the reason why this problem occurred following their investigations.
(c) After turnover of the Unit 2 component cooling building was completed, an NRC inspector identified problems with bolted connections in the structure and with records documenting final inspection and turnover of the structure. The licensee acknowledged that these problems occurred and stated that to prevent recurrence of these problems in the future, the new civil turnover procedures require an independent review of the final inspection, and turnover records, and a final walk-down after all work is completed in the structure immediately prior to turnover.
(3) The licensee responded to the above violations in a letter dated March 30, 1983. The following summarizes the corrective action as stated in the letter.
(a) Violation A - The errors in inspection reports were caused by lack of attention of detail and poor blue print quality.
FP&L contended that the loose bolts were a result of not having performed the final walkdown. Their inspection personnel attested that the bolts were tight when originally inspected.
DR 873CC was issued to document the physical discrepancies in the Component Cooling Building. All errors were corrected.
At the time of the le 'er FP&L stated that all bolting reports from incepth of the Construction Completion Group to February 18, 190, were being reviewed for clerical errors.
Subsequenc reports were receiving dual review for accurac,
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FP&L issued QI 17.5 to insure that all work was complete in accordance with the latest revision of the design documents and that no completed work had been modified.
(b) Violation B - QI 17.5 was issued to provide instructions for turnover of civil items covering:
Review of existing inspection reports and the latest
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revision of design documents.
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Preliminary walkdowns to determine actual construction status.
Generation of inspection work packages to include any
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additional inspections or reverifications to be per-formed.
Final walkdowns to ensure that all work is complete and
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in accordance with the latest revision of the design documents.
Direction for the. toper documentation discrepancies
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noted during all phases of the work.
c.
RII Report 50-389/83-16 During the inspection conducted February 22-25, 1983, the inspector made a followup inspection relative to the unresolved item of inspection report 50-389/83-06 concerning documentation of structural steel erection QC inspections and missing inspection documentation.
One violation was identified as follows:
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion X and XIV During inspection number 83-06 (January 10-27,1983) the inspector reviewed records of inspections performed during erection of structural steel. This review and discussions with construction completion group personnel who were auditing the structural steel inspection records disclosed that approximately 20 to 30 percent of the structural steel may not have been inspected during the original construction (i.e.,
records documenting inspection of 20 to 30 percent of structural steel connections were missing).
During inspection 83-06, QC personnel were in the process of conducting a search of inspection records in the QA records vault to determine if the missing records had been misfiled.
Some additional records were discovered during this search. However, a
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large percentage of the records were still missing during the 83-16 inspection. The inspector concluded that these seismic Class 1 structural steel connections (those for which inspection records are not available) were not inspected during original construction.
Discussions with QC personnel disclosed that the apparent cause of this problem was the fact that there was no system for maintaining the inspection status for structural steel constructions to preclude inadvertent bypassing of inspections required by FP&L Quality Instruction 10.5, " Structural Steel Inspection". The failure to inspect all seismic Class 1 structural steel and maintain the status of a
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the seismic Class 1 structural steel inspection program was identified to the licensee as a violation.
Discussion of this violation with QA personnel disclosed that during FP&L audit Number 80-49, an audit finding identified the fact that a formal documented system was not being implemented to determine the inspection status of some systems and structures as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV and the FP&L QA program. This audit finding was resolved by FP&L QA management personnel who erroneously concluded that inspection status did not have to be documented during construction, as long as it was determined at time of turnover of the structure from constructuon to the power operation group.
In addition to the violation, in RII letter dated March 25, 1983, concern was expressed relative to the implementation of management control systems that allowed the violation to occur. The letter requested justification for resolution of the sudit finding identified in FP&L audit QAC-PSL2-80-49 relative to lack of procedures to preclude bypassing required inspections. The resolution was contrary to FP&L QA program and NRC requirements.
As of this writing, the response to this violation had not been received.
d.
RII Report 50-389/83-26 As a result of the violations identified in reports 50-389/82-43 and 50-389/83-06, QI 17.5 was issued to provide instructions for turnover of civil items.
As part of this program, some steel structures, that had inspection reports available from previous inspections, were re-inspected under QI 17.5. The LPSI pump supports were in this category. During the current inspection, in the process of performing inspections to attempt to close out the violation B of report 50-389/82-43, the inspectors performed a detailed inspection of a portion of LPSI pump support 2B.
A violation was found relative to undersize fillet welds as detailed in paragraph 3.c(3) of this report. An identical support for core spray pump 2A, which was not re-inspected under QI 17.5 but had an original construction inspection report, was found to have the same condition.
This was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
6.
Containment - Steel Structures and Supports (480538 and 55055B)
The inspectors observed completed work and reviewed records as described below relative to structural steel supports for safety injection tank 2Bl.
The applicable code for this work is AWS Structural Welding Code D1.1.
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a.
The following structural steel connections were observed and compared with drawings 2998-7676-E1A and 2998-G-795 SHl. A detailed inspection was not possible due to installed floor grating.
Beam 7J2 to Embed (welds)
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Beam 7H4 to Embed (welds)
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Beam 125J2 to Embed (welds & bolting)
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Beam 2J3 to Embed (welds & bolting)
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Beam 2J3 to Column (belting)
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b.
RI's CC83-0297, C80-6466 and C80-7107 relative to the above connections were reviewed, c.
Non-Unique Weld Traveler for drawing 2998-G-795 dated 11/26/79 relative to the above connections were reviewed.
d.
Welder qualification records for welders IGD, IFF, and ICH relative to the above connections were reviewed.
e.
QC inspector training and qualification records for three QC inspectors involved with the above connections were reviewed.
f.
Receipt Inspection Reports (RIR's) R-80-412 and R-79-1683 relative to beam material for the above connections were reviewed.
g.
Receipt Inspection Reports and Welding material certification records for the following heats of material were reviewed:
RIR R-80-1330
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3/32" E7018: Ht. No. 412L2041 RIR R-80-1484
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1/8" E7018: Ht. No. 412L8271 5/32" E7018: Ht. No. 422L1153 The above observations and records were examined in the areas of:
Receipt Inspection
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Installation / Erection
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NDE and Inspection Utilization of qualified Inspection personnel
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Visual & dimensional inspection records of welds
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Weld history
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Heat treatment
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Weld Material Control
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Welder Qualification
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Within trie areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
. Review of As-Builts (370518)
This inspection was conducted to determine whether as-built design and construction drawings / specifications correctly reflect the as-built condi-tions of the plant, changes from the original design were properly reviewed and approved, and plant seismic and other stress calculations are based on as-built conditions.
The inspectors compared final detail construction drawing and specification requirements with the actual installations to determine whether final design drawings and specifications reflected as-built conditions for the areas indicated below.
a.
Piping systems The below listed isometric drawings were chosen for examination in the following areas:
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Supports-location, type, and configuration
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Pipe welds-location and identification Piping-location, size, and configuration
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Isometric Drawing No.
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SI-N-2 b.
Structures The below listed structures were chosen for examination in the following areas:
Structural assembly configuration conforms to final design.
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Joint location / orientation, dimensions and configuration conforms to final design.
Structures Switchgear Monorail at Elevation 58.33'
Safety Injection Tank 2B1 - Elevation 62.0' - Beams 7J2, 7J4, 125J2, 2J3
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Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Identified Items a.
(Closed) Item 389 CDR 81-009: " Failure to Follow Radiographic Proce-dure" (10 CFR 50.55(e)).
On February 12, 1981, the licensee notified IE:II of a 50.55(e) item concerning failure of a QC inspector to follow established radiographic procedures. The final report was submitted on June 24, 1982. The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by IE:II. The inspectors held discussions with responsible licensee and/or contractor representatives, reviewed supporting documentation, and observed repre-sentative samples of work to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed.
b.
(Closed) Item 389 CDR 82-017: "Und rsize Fillet Welds" (10 CFR 50.55(e)).
On September 30, 1982, the licensee notified IE:II of a 50.55(e) item concerning the failure to properly inspect socket welds. The final report was submitted on April 1,1983. The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by IE:II. The inspectors held discussions with responsible licensee and/or contractor representa-tives, reviewed supporting documentation, and observed representative samples of work to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed.
c.
(Closed) Item 389 CDR 82-020: " Lack of Documentation on Class 1 and 2 Nuts and Bolts" (10 CFR 50.55(e)).
On October 13, 1982, the licensee notified IE:II of a 50.55(e) item concerning the lack of traceability of ASME Class 1 and 2 nuts, bolts and studs. The final report was submitted on January 26, 1983. The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by IE:II. The inspectors held discussions with responsible licensee and/or contractor representatives, reviewed supporting documentation, and observed representative samples of work to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been completed, d.
(Closed) Item 389 CDR 83-019: " Bent Small Bore Piping" (10 CFR 50.55(e)).
On October 13, 1982, the licensee notified IE:II of a 50.55(e) item concerning the failure to provide procedures and inspect approximately 240 pipe bends. The final report was submitted on March 18, 1983.
This report stated that all 240 bends had been inspected and in some cases analyzed. As a result of the inspection and analysis, it was verified that the stresses were within acceptable limits of ASME Code,
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Section III, and if left uncorrected would not have created a safety hazard. The report further stated that there was a breakdown in the QC program, but the conditions, if left uncorrected, did not pose a significant safety hazard, and therefore, the matter was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). The inspectors held discussions with respon-sible licensee and/or contractor representatives, reviewed supporting documentation, and observed representative samples of work to verify that the corrective actions identified in the report have been comple-ted.
The inspectors do not concur that the above matter is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). The failure to provide procedures for inspection and hence the failure to perform code required inspections is truly a significant breakdown in the licensee's QA program, and thus reportable. Because there was a 100 percent reinspection and evalua-tion with no hardware deficiencies noted this matter is considered closed.
9.
Inspector Followup Items a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 389/82-20-04: "Preservice Inspection Records for UT of Weld Joint SI-127-FW-2 Appear Inadequate".
This item pertained to an apparent mixup between UT records for shop weld 2 and field weld 2.
The licensee confirmed that a mixup in records did exist. The records have been corrected. There are no further questions on this matter, b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 82-20-05: " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Not Designed for Inservice Inspection".
This item pertains to the fact that the reactor coolant loop to pump welds cannot be inspected in accordance with ASME Section XI due to configuration. This problem was presented to the NRC as a relief request. Appendix "C" to the St. Lucie 2 SSER approved the relief request but stated that the possibility of an augmented inservice inspection progrom will be evaluated during review of the initial 10-year inservice inspection program.
For followup purposes, Inspector Followup Item 389/83-26-03: " Augmented ISI of RCP to Pump Welds," is opened.
c.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 389/82-13-07: " Calibration Notch Requirements for Roll-bond Clad Calibration Blocks".
This item raised a question relative to ultrasonic testing sensi-tivity for roll-bond clad reactor coolent piping. This problem has been evaluated by NRR (see ltr. from Darrell G. Eisenhut to John A.
Olshinski dated February 18,1983) and determined not to be a safety significant/ problem for the PSI. The letter states that NRR
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will evaluate the issue of an appropriate UT sensitivity during reviewing of the initial inservice inspection program.
For followup purposes, Inspector Followup Item 389/83-26-04: "UT sensitivity for Roll-bond Clad Piping", is opened.
d.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 389/82-19-01: " Issue of FP&L PSI Program and Plan Descriptions".
FP&L PNS-CIG Document #002-1, Revision 0, "Preservice Inspection Plan",
which combines the Program and Plan Descriptions has been completed.
The administrative requirements of the program are covered by site procedure QI 10 PR/PSL-2, Revision 1, " Pre-Service Inspection (ISI)".
There are no further questions on this matter.
10. PreserviceInspection(PSI) Completion The inspectors reviewed a FP&L letter (L-83-186) dated March 28, 1983, which summarizes the completion status of the PSI.
In summary, all inspections except the reactor coolant pump (RCP) studs and flywheels have been completed and all code rejectable indications repaired. The RCP studs were in the process of being inspected and the flywheels will be inspected prior to the next milestone when the pumps are required to be operational.
11. Containment Walkdown Inspection The inspectors conducted a general walkdown inspection of the containment.
Details of this inspection are discussed in report 389/83-31.
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