IR 05000335/1985010

Insp Repts 50-335/85-10 & 50-389/85-10 on 850409-0513. Violation Noted:Failure to Have Established Procedure to Properly Realign Instrument Air Portion of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve

ML20127M039
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/30/1985
From:	Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127M016	List: IR 05000335/1985010 IR 05000409/2005013 ML20127M014
References
50-335-85-10, 50-389-85-10, IEIN-83-75, IEIN-84-06, NUDOCS 8507010063
Download: ML20127M039 (9)

Text

f pK40 UNITED STATES 9t o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ -

g

", REGloN il 101 MARIETTA STREET, j

• ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

%*..../

Report Nos.: 50-335/85-10 and 50-389/85-10 Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 9 - May 13, 1985 Inspection at St. Lucie site, near t. Pierce, FL Inspectors: .

~

NM (

Dat'e Sligned R. V. gle{Fak, Senio Nu YQ)ResidentIglspector n .cluid H . E .- 1 R ident Inspector y Date S'igned Approved by: Avev W LLA /[ b 6 [1 k [

S. A. Elrod, Section Chief J Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 260 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical Specification (TS) compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control activities, surveillance activities, station battery and potential strike preparation Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified, paragraph , PDR ADOCK 05000335 G PDR

. .

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees K. Harris, Site Vice President D. A. Sager, Plant Manager

• J. H. Barrow, Operations Superintendent T. A. Dillard, Maintenance Superintendent L. W. Pearce, Operations Supervisor R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor

• C. F. Leppla, Instrument and Control Supervisor

• C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)

E. J. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor (Acting)

H. F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor J. G. West, Security Supervisor J. Scarola, Assistant Plant Superintendent-Electrical

• N. G. Roos, Quality Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 14, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors conducted plant tours periodically during the reporting interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required; equipment was properly tagged; operations personnel were aware of plant conditions; and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established; critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures; excess equipment or material was stored properly; and combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During

. .

tours the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component ' positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration dates. Some tours were conducted on backshift The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control roo During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted a complete walkdown in the accessible area of the 2A Diesel Generator to verify that the lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and that equipment material conditions were satisfactor Additionally, the inspectors performed a more extensive survey of the Units 1 and 2 component cooling water (CCW) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

area Several items were identified and referred to the licensee for further evaluatio Corroded CCW piping, supports / restraints and bolted connections -

Unit 1, Restraint mounting plates (2) not flush against wall - Unit 1 CCW, Fouled (paint and corrosion) spring boxes - Unit 1 CCW, Junction box covers removed, S-199-A and B-197-A, Unit 1 CCW, Several pressure gauges (ex. PI-14-278) not properly restrainted, i.e.,

supported by the gauge line - Unit 2 CCW, and Thermal overload junction box doors left open - Units 1 and 2 AF Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors periodically, during the reporting interval, reviewed shift logs and operations records including data sheets, instrument . traces and records of equipment malfunctions. This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and equipment tagout record The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator performance and response actions were observed and evaluate The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level. Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie .

. .

7. Technical Specification (TS) Compliance (Units 1 and 2)

During this reporting interval, the inspectors verified compliance with selected limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and the results of selected surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions and switch positions and by review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with selected LC0 action statements was reviewed concerning selected occurrences as they happene Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements. The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities we're accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as require Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding _ jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipmen Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Units 1 and 2)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to determine that TS were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost consideration by the license The following LERs were considered closed:

Unit 1: 335/85-02*

335/85-03 335/85-04*

Unit 2: 389/85-02*

• In-depth review performed On April 8, 1985, at approximately 8:00 a.m. a reactor trip occurred from 15 percent power when a turbine trip was initiated by high steam generator (SG)

water leve . .

The power ascension during which the trip occurred followed a short outage for steam generator maintenance. During the outage, Mechanical Maintenance completed plug and seat work on the 2A Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV) and returned the valve to Operations. Prior to reactor restart, Operations requested that Instrument and Control (I&C) Maintenance perform a calve stroke test to verify valve travel. I&C responded and verified proper stroke by temporarily connecting an air supply directly to the actuator cylinder taps and alternately pressurizing either side of the actuator di'aphragm while observing valve stem movement. Following the test I&C inadvertently failed to open the normal air supply manual isolation valve and failed to close the actuator equalizing valve. There was no established procedure for properly realigning the system after testing. This is violation 50-389/85-10-0 .

After completing the maintenance and testing described above, a normal reactor start-up was performed with the feedwater regulating system in manual control. At 15 percent power, feedwater flow is normally redirected from the 15 percent bypass valves through the MFRV. With the 2A MFRV air supply isolated and the actuator cylinder equalizing valve open, the MFRV failed open when the block valve was opened. The feed control operator immediately observed a rapidly rising water level in the 2A SG and attempted to reclose the block valve, but was unable to when the breaker to the motor operator trippe SG water level continued to rise, initiating a turbine trip and subsequent reactor tri On April 17, 1985, at 7:55 a.m. the St. Lucie Unit 2 reactor was at 99.26 percent power with the turbine Digital Electro-Hydraulic control system (DEH) in MANUAL for maintenance. At approximately 7:55 a.m. all four turbine intercept valves (IV) closed, apparently, due to a spurious close-intercept-valve (CIV) signal which was generated when a maintenance technician reenergized the digital portion of the DEH. The CIV caused the moisture separator reheater (MSR) relief valves to open. The control room operators determined that the entire turbine steam flow was relieving to atmosphere (after passing through the high pressure turbine) and initiated a manual reactor trip to prevent the loss of secondary water inventory through the open MSR relief valve Prior to the event on April 17, 1985, the DEH had been drifting while operating in the AUTOMATIC or " digital control" mode. The DEH was placed in MANUAL operation while the I&C group analyzed the faulty digital circuitr Circuit schematics show sufficient electrical independence such that any maintenance action taken on the digital portion should not affect the DEH manual circuitry central processing unit (CPU) portio When the I&C technician completed his repairs and reenergized the CPU, a simultaneous CIV signal closed all four IVs. The closed IVs shut off steam flow from the high pressure turbine to the low pressure turbine and caused all four MSR steam relief valves to lif The purpose of the CIV signal is to prevent the generator frequency from increasing during a 8 to 10 cycle fault in the 240 kV lines. By design, the CIV should close the IVs just long enough to keep the generator frequency in step with the 240 kV frequency and allow any excess steam inventory in the

., .

MSR to relieve to the atmosphere via the MSR reliefs. For reasons not yet determined, the IVs did not return to the full open position following the spurious CIV on April 17. Control room operators stated that they observed the IVs attempting to reopen but then closing again and oscillating in this manner, until the manual turbine trip was initiate The manual turbine trip and reactor trip was a precautionary measure on the operators' part to prevent the loss of secondary water inventory and automatic trip due to low SG water level. The plant response to the trip was normal with all automatic equipment actuating as required for existing plant conditions. The anticipated SG water level shrink from a trip at this power level resulted in an auxiliary feedwater system automatic actuation as expecte Subsequent investigation of the event found no component failures, personnel errors or procedural violations which could have caused the CIV signa Evaluation of the DEH electrical schematics found no physical connection between the CPU circuitry being worked and the CIV circuitr The conclusion drawn was that the electrical " spike" caused by reenergizing the DEH CPU module caused the spurious CIV signal. DEH vendor assessment of both the spurious CIV signal and the subsequent cycling of the IVs is still continuin In summary, no specific problem could be identifie The spurious CIV signal is believed to have originated in a voltage spike caused by shutting the circuit breaker to repower the digital computer after maintenanc Based on the above, the plant was returned to power with the stipulation that nonroutine DEH maintenance will not be permitted at power, and the continued desirability of the CIV feature would be evaluate The CIV feature was subsequently removed from the DEH circuitry for both S Lucie units with a Facility Review Group approved jumper, pending further evaluation of the CIV system by Engineerin This event generated a great deal of public concern due to the exteremely loud noise generated by the open MSR relief valve Consequently, a licensee news release was made on the event and RII issued a preliminary notification (ref. PNO-II-85-39).

10. Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews during the reporting interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

, facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included verification of

'

the organization of the security force; that gates, doors and isolation zones were established and maintained in the proper condition; that access control and badging was proper; and that procedures were followe Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie :

. - _-_ -. _

.

. .

11. IE Notices - Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues The purpose of the inspection was, primarily, to determine the actions that the licensee has taken to address selected safety issues. These issues, steam binding of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps and mispositioned control rods, had been identified in IE Information Notices 84-06 and 83-75, respectively, and in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOER). Secondarily, the inspection was to determine the actions the licensee had taken in response to recommendations in INP0's SOERs. It should be noted that INP0 recommen-dations are not regulatory requirements and that this survey does not involve checking responses simply because they are INPO recommendation Only key items that were central in resolving safety concerns were selected for the surve The inspectors completed the inspection of the licensee's corrective actions and responses to the issues of AFW pump steam binding and mispositioned control element assemblies (CEA). With respect to AFW pump steam binding, the inspector noted licensee actions which require shiftly monitoring of the affected AFW components; additionally, the issue of steam binding was added to the operator training progra The associated AFW system check valves are disassembled and inspected periodically. With respect to CEA misposi-tioning, the inspectors verified that the licensee has appropriate procedures in place which address CEA mispositioning and loss of CEA position indication. Also, the issue of mispositioned CEA's was included in the operator training progra In summary, the inspectors verified that both issues were reviewed by the licensee, and the corrective actions for concerns addressed in IE Notices 84-06 and 83-75 and INP0 SOERs 84-2 and 84-3 were incorporated into the licensee's training program and plant procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Station Battery Operation, Maintenance and Inspection (Module 61726)

In response to Regional Office Notice No. 2201 dated March 18, 1985, the inspectors conducted an in-depth inspection of the station batteries for Units 1 and The inspection encompassed surveillances, installation, service tests, capacity tests, battery chargers, cell maintenance, construction, chemistry and record keepin The following documents were reviewed:

1-0960060 125 Vdc System Periodic Test and Maintenance 2-0960060 125 Vdc System Periodic Test and Maintenance 1-0960062 Safety Battery 1A Emergency Load Profile Test 2-0960062 Safety Battery 2A Emergency Load Profile Test 1-0960063 Safety Battery IB Emergency Load Profile Test 2-0960063 Safety Battery 28 Emergency Load Profile Test

. .

1 C&D Batteries type LC-33 Manual No.12-333 C&D Battery Charger Manual No. RS-421 The procedures were reviewed for technical accuracy, conformance with the technical manual, compliance with TS requirements, periodicity of surveil-lance testing and proper record keepin , The inspection of station batteries covered two inspection periods. Several discrepancies, rack construction and correction of specific gravity recording, were discussed in a previous inspection report (ref. IE Report 50-335,389/85-08).

13. Potential Strike of Security Guards On April 24, 1985, the resident inspectors were informed by the St. Lucie security supervisor of a possible strike by the plant security guard Wackenhut Corporation, a private contractor, has the contract for providing security staff manning at the St. Lucie site. The guard force at the site is unionized with the current union contract at St. Lucie due to expire at midnight on April 30. Negotiations on a new contract have been underway but without results. On Monday, April 29, a federal negotiator arrived on site o in an effort to mediate a settlemen If negotiations are unsuccessful, FPL will set in motion their contingency plan which would augment plant security staffing with the necessary levels and quality of personnel to assure continued plant operation and securit The inspector reviewed the licensee's plans in accordance with inspection procedure 92709 and found them to be in complianc Subsequently, a vote by union members extended the present contract to a new date in November. The inspectors will provide follow-up at that tim Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation During the inspection period, the inspectors verified plant operations were in compliance with selected TS requirement Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, containment pressure, control room ventilation and AC and DC electrical source The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspectors personally observed portions of the following surveillances:

. _ -

. .-

I&C 2-1400052, Rev. 7 - Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel Functional Test OP 2-2200050, Rev. 7 - Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identifie .