IR 05000327/2010003
| ML102100206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2010 |
| From: | Eugene Guthrie Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6 |
| To: | Krich R Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR-10-003 | |
| Download: ML102100206 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES uly 29, 2010
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2010003, 05000328/2010003 and 07200034/2010002
Dear Mr. Krich:
On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on July 7, 2010 with Mr. C. Church and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328,72-034 License Nos: DPR-77, DPR-79,
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000327/2010003, 05000328/2010003, and 07200034/2010002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328,72-034 License Nos.: DPR-77, DPR-79 Report Nos.: 05000327/2010003, 05000328/2010003, and 07200034/2010002 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Sequoyah Access Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Dates: April 1, 2010 - June 30, 2010 Inspectors: C. Young, Senior Resident Inspector M. Speck, Resident Inspector C. Kontz, Senior Project Engineer (1R01, 1R22)
W. Deschaine, Project Engineer (1R22)
R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector (4OA5)
Approved by: Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000327/2010003, 05000328/2010003, and 07200034/2010002, 04/01/2010 - 06/30/2010;
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine quarterly integrated report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a regional inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at approximately 59 percent RTP while conducting repairs to the 2A main feedwater pump. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent RTP on April 3, 2010, and operated there until May 28, 2010, when Unit 2 was manually shut down for a planned outage to facilitate repairs to the 2A and 2B coolant charging pump discharge check valves.
Following the outage, Unit 2 achieved criticality on June 5, 2010. While operating at approximately 85 percent RTP on June 6, 2010, power was reduced to approximately 59 percent RTP to facilitate removing the 2B main feedwater pump from service due to low trip oil pressure. Following repairs, Unit 2 reached 100 percent RTP on June 6, 2010, where it operated for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the annual review of the licensees readiness of offsite and alternate AC power systems prior to the onset of the high grid loading season. The inspectors reviewed procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the licensee to verify that appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system.
The inspectors walked down offsite power supply systems and emergency diesel generators, reviewed corrective action program documents, and interviewed appropriate plant personnel to assess deficiencies and plant readiness for summer high grid loading.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness to Cope With External Flooding
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees readiness prior to the onset of adverse weather that poses a risk of flooding. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed flood design documents and abnormal operating procedure (AOP)-N.03, Flooding, sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.5. The inspectors walked down flood protection barriers in the auxiliary building and verified required temporary spoolpieces and required tools used in station procedures were complete and in their specified locations. The inspectors also verified that infrequently operated flood mode pumps were in good working order, that maintenance and testing was current, and that minor deficiencies were identified in the licensee corrective action program with scheduled completion dates. This review constituted one inspection sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed three partial walkdowns of the following systems to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors focused on identification of discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control system components, and determined whether selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine-driven and Motor-driven A-train During Motor-driven B-train Scheduled Maintenance
- Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System Train A During Train B Maintenance
- Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine-driven and Motor-driven A-train During Motor-driven B-train Scheduled Maintenance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection Tours
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a tour of the seven areas important to safety listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors evaluated whether: combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with the licensees administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Control Building Elevation 685 (Auxiliary Instrument Rooms)
- Control Building Elevation 706 (Cable Spreading Room)
- Control Building Elevation 732 (Mechanical Equipment Room and Relay Room)
- Control Building Elevation 669 (Mechanical Equipment Room, 250 VDC Battery and Battery Board Rooms)
- Control Building Elevation 749 (Reactor MOV Board Rooms, Transformer Rooms, Battery Rooms)
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 690 (Corridor)
- Auxiliary Building Elevation 714 (Corridor)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed one licensed operator requalification program review. The inspectors observed a simulator session on June 10, 2010. The training scenario involved a steam generator tube leak followed by a failure of the reactor to trip when required. Additional anomalies included auxiliary feedwater system failures and a failure of a pressurizer power operated relief valve. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of: communications; ability to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting and verifying alarms; correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high risk operator actions; oversight and direction provided by shift manager, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate Technical Specification (TS) action; and, group dynamics involved in crew performance. The inspectors also observed the evaluators critique and reviewed simulator fidelity to verify that it matched actual plant response. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This activity constituted one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activity listed below to verify the effectiveness of the activities in terms of: appropriate work practices; identifying and addressing common cause failures; scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (b); characterizing reliability issues for performance; trending key parameters for condition monitoring; charging unavailability for performance; classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); appropriateness of performance criteria for structure, system, or components (SSCs) and functions classified as (a)(2); and, appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs and functions classified as (a)(1). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- System 84, Flood Mode Boration, Maintenance Rule (a)
- (1) action plan
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the four following activities to determine whether appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment from service for maintenance. The inspectors evaluated whether risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)( 4), and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed whether plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensees risk assessment tool use and risk categories were in accordance with Standard Programs and Processes Procedure (SPP)-7.1, On-Line Work Management, Revision 12, and Instruction 0-TI-DSM-000-007.1, Risk Assessment Guidelines, Revision 8. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This inspection satisfied five inspection samples for Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control.
- Unplanned Loss of 2B MFP Trip Circuit and AFW Autostart Capability Concurrent with CSST-A PCB 998 Out of Service
- Unit 2 Forced Outage Risk Management Actions for 2A and 2B Centrifugal Charging Pump Discharge Check Valve Repairs
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
For the five operability evaluations described in the PERs listed below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability evaluations to UFSAR descriptions to determine if the system or components intended function(s) were adversely impacted. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to determine whether the compensatory measures worked as stated and the measures were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed a sampling of PERs to assess whether the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- PER 218360, Non-conservative Correction Factors Used in Battery Cell Specific Gravity Determinations
- PER 228519, Unit 2 Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction pressure switch failed
- PER 232622, Unit 2 RHR Train A secured in Mode 4
- PER 235395, Rod Insertion Limit Monitor
- PER 232000, Evaluate Adequacy of Temporary Missile Shield Over Diesel Generator ERCW Discharge Header
b. Findings
One licensee-identified violation was identified and is documented in section 4OA7.
1R18 Plant Modifications
.1 Temporary Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification listed below and the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening, and compared it against the UFSAR and TS to verify whether the modification affected operability or availability of the affected system.
- TACF 1-10-007-085, DC Wetting Current Source Added to Unit 1 Rod D4 Following installation and testing, the inspectors observed indications affected by the modification, discussed them with operators, and verified that the modification was installed properly and its operation did not adversely affect safety system functions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests associated with the work orders (WOs) listed below to assess whether procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedure to evaluate whether: the procedure adequately tested the safety function(s)that may have been affected by the maintenance activity; the acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents; and the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved.
The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed the test data to determine whether test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s).
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- WO 07-780042-028, Unit 2 Thermal Power Swings Requiring DFCS Tuning
- WO 110904531, Repair Ground on 2B Main Feed Pump Turbine Trip Bus
- WO 110981293, Unit 1 Eagle 21 LCP board replacement
- WO 07-779996-000, Bridge and Megger 1B-B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motor
- WO 07-778119-003 and 09-780060-000, Unit 2 A and B CCP discharge check valve repairs
- WO 111072527, Verify ABSCE Boundary Following Aux Building Bay Hatch Door Cable Failure/Repairs
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the Unit 2 planned outage that began on May 28, 2010, to repair coolant charging pump discharge check valves, the inspectors evaluated licensee activities to review whether the licensee: considered risk in developing outage schedules; followed risk reduction methods developed to control plant configuration; developed mitigation strategies for the loss of key safety functions; and, adhered to operating license and TS requirements that ensure defense-in-depth. The inspectors also walked down portions of Unit 2 not normally accessible during at-power operations to evaluate if safety-related and risk-significant SSCs were maintained in an operable condition. Specifically, between May 28, 2010, and June 5, 2010, the inspectors performed inspections and reviews of the following outage activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the
. The inspectors performed one sample.
- Outage Plan. The inspectors reviewed the outage safety plan and contingency plans to determine if the licensee had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth.
- Reactor Shutdown. The inspectors observed the reactor shutdown in the control room.
- Licensee Control of Outage Activities. On a daily basis, the inspectors attended the licensee outage turnover meeting, reviewed PERs, and reviewed the defense-in-depth status sheets to verify that status control was commensurate with the outage safety plan and in compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service. The inspectors further toured the main control room and other areas of the plant daily to ensure that the following key safety functions were maintained in accordance with the outage safety plan and TS: electrical power, decay heat removal, spent fuel cooling, inventory control, reactivity control, and containment closure.
- Heatup and Startup Activities. The inspectors observed containment entry controls and reviewed Procedure 0-SI-OPS-000-011.0, Containment Access Control During Modes 1-4, to determine whether all items which entered containment were removed so nothing would be left that could affect performance of the containment sump. The inspectors toured the containment prior to reactor startup to identify debris, if any, that could affect the performance of the containment sump. The inspectors reviewed the licensees mode change checklists to assess whether appropriate prerequisites were met prior to changing TS modes. To evaluate RCS integrity and containment integrity, the inspectors further reviewed the licensees RCS leakage calculations and containment isolation valve lineups. The inspectors observed portions of plant heatup and startup, including reactor criticality.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the six surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors assessed whether the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS surveillance requirements, the UFSAR, applicable licensee procedures, and whether the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.
This was accomplished by witnessing testing and/or reviewing the test data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed six samples.
Routine Surveillance Tests:
- 1-SI-IFT-092-N44.4, Functional Test Of Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System, Channel N44 Revision 25
- 2-SI-IFT-099-90.8A, Reactor Trip Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test (SSPS)
Train A, Revision 16
- 0-SI-OPS-092-078.0, Power Range Neutron Flux Channel Calibration by Heat Balance Comparison, Revision 21 (Unit 1)
- 0-SI-OPS-000-011.0, Containment Access Control During Modes 1-4, Revision 34 (Unit 2 forced outage)
In-Service Tests:
- 1-SI-SXP-074-201.A, Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A-A Performance Test, Revision 14
- 2-SI-SXP-003-201.S, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-S Performance Test, Revision 25
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the three PIs listed below for the period from January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2010 for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, were used to determine the reporting basis for each data element in order to verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours The inspectors reviewed selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and portions of operator logs to verify whether the licensee had accurately identified the number of scrams and unplanned power changes that occurred during the previous four quarters for both units. The inspectors also reviewed the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported and the licensees basis for addressing the criteria for complications for each of the reported scrams. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new PER and attending daily management review committee meetings.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and other associated programs and documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also included licensee trending efforts and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of January through June 2010, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. Specifically, the inspectors consolidated the results of daily inspector screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1 into a log, reviewed the log, and compared it to licensee trend reports for the period in order to determine the existence of any adverse trends that the licensee may not have previously identified. The inspectors also independently reviewed RCS leakage data for the six-month period of January through June 2010. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample for Semi-annual Trend Review.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. In general, the licensee had identified trends and appropriately addressed them in their CAP. The inspectors evaluated the licensee trending methodology and observed that the licensee had performed a detailed review.
The licensee routinely reviewed cause codes, involved organizations, key words, and system links to identify potential trends in their data. The inspectors compared the licensee process results with the results of the inspectors daily screening and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends that the licensee had failed to identify.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Installation (ISFSI) at
Operating Plants (60855.1, Revision 0)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee and vendor activities, including management oversight and radiation protection, regarding aspects of the ISFSI operation with respect to evacuating water from the canister containing the spent fuel assemblies and vacuum drying the canister using the forced helium dehydration (FHD)process in preparation for backfilling the canister with helium prior to sealing the canister and placing it on the ISFSI pad. This represented the first time that the licensee ISFSI loading campaign included the removal of high heat load (greater than 28.74 kilowatts)spent fuel assemblies and high burn-up fuel assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pool to the ISFSI for dry storage. The removal of the high heat load fuel required the use of the FHD and a supplemental cooling system (SCS) to keep the temperature of the spent fuel within the acceptance criteria so that the spent fuel and related fuel assemblies would not be damaged. This review was conducted to verify that these systems worked as demonstrated during their preoperational phase in February, 2010. The inspectors also reviewed the final approved procedures for the operation of the FHD and SCS to verify that they were consistent with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), Technical Specifications (TSs), and 10 CFR 72, and that they had been approved in accordance with the licensee's administrative programs.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed four evaluations completed by the licensee for compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, tests, and experiments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
An entrance meeting for the ISFSI inspection was conducted on May 29, 2010 with licensee management. An exit meeting was held via telephone with licensee management on June 1, 2010. Comments by the inspector with respect to observed activities were discussed with the site Vice President and other members of the licensees staff.
On July 7, 2010, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Chris Church and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- S. Bowman, Licensing Engineer
- C. Church, Site Vice President
- R. Detwiler, Director Safety and Licensing
- J. Dvorak, Outage and Site Scheduling Manager
- D. Foster, Performance Improvement Manager
- J. Furr, Quality Assurance Manager
- Z. Kitts, Licensing
- R. Krich, Licensing Vice President
- K. Langdon, Plant Manager
- T. Marshall, Maintenance and Modifications Manager
- S. McCamy, Radiation Protection Manager
- M. McDowell, Corporate Project Manager
- W. Nurnberger, Chemistry/Environmental Manager
- D. Porter, Operations Procedures
- R. Proffitt, Licensing Engineer
- P. Simmons, Operations Manager
- R. Thompson, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- B. Wetzel, Director, Safety and Licensing
- K. Wilkes, Operations Superintendent
- J. Williams, Site Engineering Director
- S. Young, Site Security Manager
NRC personnel
- W. Rogers, Region II, Senior Reactor Analyst
- S. Lingam, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
None