IR 05000327/2020012
| ML20294A177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/2020 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Jim Barstow Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2020012 | |
| Download: ML20294A177 (15) | |
Text
October 20, 2020
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANTS - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000327/2020012 AND 05000328/2020012
Dear Mr. Barstow:
On September 9, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. On August 31, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Scott Hunnewell and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Br 2 Div of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 05000327 and 05000328 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000327 and 05000328
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000327/2020012 and 05000328/2020012
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-012-0012
Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority
Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plants
Location:
Soddy Daisy
Inspection Dates:
June 07, 2020 to August 28, 2020
Inspectors:
P. Braaten, Reactor Inspector
J. Dymek, Reactor Inspector
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Strickland, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Engineering Br 2
Div of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a triennial fire protection inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Allowed Preconditioning of Alternative Safe Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000328/2020012-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.21N.
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program," by providing operators with inadequate surveillance procedures that preconditioned alternative safe shutdown transfer switches and controls.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21N.05 - Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI)
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) Credited for Fire Prevention, Detection, Suppression, or Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Review (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that the following systems credited in the approved fire protection program could perform their licensing basis function:
a. Review deficiencies or open fire protection impairments for the selected system, including any temporary modifications, operator workarounds, or compensatory measures.
b. Verify that operator actions can be accomplished as assumed in the licensees FHA, or as assumed in the licensees fire probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA)analysis and SSA.
c. Review repetitive or similar maintenance work requests which could be an indicator of a design deficiency and could affect the ability of the components to perform their functions, when needed.
d. Ensure that post maintenance and/or surveillance activities are performed as scheduled.
e. Perform a walkdown inspection to identify equipment alignment discrepancies.
Inspect for deficient conditions such as corrosion, missing fasteners, cracks, and degraded insulation.
f. Ensure the selected SSCs that are subject to aging management review (AMR)pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54 are being managed for aging (e.g., loss of material, cracking, reduction of heat transfer) in accordance with appropriate aging management programs. Verify that the licensees aging management program activities (such as, Fuel Oil Analysis or Selective Leaching Aging Management Program) associated with FP equipment are being implemented.
g. If a review of operating experience issues will be completed for the selected inspection sample, verify that the licensee adequately reviewed and dispositioned the operating experience in accordance with their processes.
The team selected the following SSCs as samples.
- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System
- Unit 2 Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves
- Unit 1 12v DC Power System
Fire Protection Program Administrative Controls (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the following fire protection program administrative controls were implemented in accordance with the current licensing basis:
- Combustible Control Program
Fire Protection Program Changes/Modifications (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the following changes to ensure that they did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown post-fire and to verify that fire protection program documents and procedures affected by the changes were updated.
- Engineering Modification to Replace Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Allowed Preconditioning of Alternative Safe Shutdown Transfer Switches and Controls Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000328/2020012-01 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71111.21N.0 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) when the licensee failed to comply with procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program," by providing operators with inadequate surveillance procedures that preconditioned alternative safe shutdown transfer switches and controls.
Description:
To support inspection of the Unit 2 Pressurizer PORVs and their credit for fire safe shutdown, inspectors reviewed records for the last completion of surveillance test procedure 2-PI-OPS-000-010.D, "Verification of Remote Shutdown Transfer Switches." This test procedure verifies the operation of remote shutdown transfer switches and controls that are credited to meet the alternative shutdown requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.3. In reviewing this surveillance test procedure, inspectors discovered a sequence of test steps that appeared to constitute preconditioning of the Pressurizer PORVs under surveillance.
For PORV 2-PCV-68-334, after operators receive authorization from the SRO to perform the surveillance, the test directs operators to cycle transfer switch 2-XS-68-334C at least three times to clean contacts. The next step is to cycle control switch 2-HS-68-334C at least three times to clean contacts.
NRC Technical Guidance Part 9900, Maintenance - Preconditioning of Structures, Systems, and Components Before Determining Operability, gives guidance on the acceptability of preconditioning SSCs before the performance of surveillance testing. This document states that the NRC expects surveillance and testing processes of SSCs to be evaluated in an as-found condition. This guidance is echoed in TVA fleet procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program. NPG-SPP-06.9.2 states, Surveillance sequences and alignment activities that are implemented prior to a surveillance test should be intended to facilitate testing or prevent unnecessary wear and damage to equipment and/or systems.
Test procedure steps that exercise equipment prior to testing activities are not allowed unless they provide a specific benefit, such as improved safety, reduced wear and tear, or facilitate better test methods. The potential of such activities to unintentionally mask degradation must be considered. Cycling electrical contacts repeatedly to clean them does not specifically facilitate test performance or provide any specific benefit. Further, cleaning the contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings of the surveillance could unintentionally mask degradation of the circuit and the contacts.
Inspectors noted that the steps for PORV 2-PCV-68-340 were structured the same. The last performance of the surveillance for these two valves was November 23, 2018. Inspectors also reviewed the test procedure for other examples of this test sequence, and found that the surveillances for the 4 Main Steam Isolation Valves, the main Charging Header flow control valve (FCV) 62-93, multiple 6.9kV Shutdown Board feeder breakers, and the FCV for RHR Hot Leg injection to loops 1 & 3 (2-FCV-63-172) all contained the same, or similar steps to clean the electrical contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings of the surveillance.
Corrective Action References: CR 1616116
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to establish adequate surveillance test instructions in accordance with TVA fleet procedure NPG-SPP-06.9.2 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, surveillance test procedure 2-PI-OPS-000-010.D directed operators to cycle transfer and control switches to clean the contacts before performing the continuity checks and resistance readings to determine whether the surveillance acceptance criteria had been met. Those procedure steps constitute unacceptable preconditioning of the SSCs.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to determine the as-found condition of the transfer switches and controls reduced the ability of the licensee to provide reasonable assurance that the licensee's alternative shutdown capability would have been available between tests.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, the inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not adversely affect the ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown/hot standby conditions using the credited safe shutdown success path (Question 1.4.7-C).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, leaders did not ensure that a set of procedures were in place that ensured preconditioning did not take place.
Enforcement:
Violation: Sequoyah Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C(13) requires, in part, that TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program referenced in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Section 9.5.1 of the FSAR states that the Fire Protection System and fire protection features are described in the Fire Protection Report. Part II of the Fire Protection Report is the Fire Protection Plan, and Section 6.0 of the Fire Protection Plan states that the QA program for fire protection uses the applicable parts of the TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan. Fleet procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.5, "Fire Protection QA Program" requires that activities shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable TVA Nuclear Power Group (NPG) programs to provide controls for modification, installation, surveillance, maintenance, operation, and program administration. The NPG Test Program is described in NPG-SPP-06.9, and child procedures.
NPG-SPP-06.9.2, "Surveillance Test Program," requires that Surveillance sequences and alignment activities that are implemented prior to a surveillance test should be intended to facilitate testing or prevent unnecessary wear and damage to equipment and/or systems.
Test procedure steps that exercise equipment prior to testing activities are not allowed unless they provide a specific benefit, such as improved safety, reduced wear and tear, or facilitate better test methods. The potential of such activities to unintentionally mask degradation must be considered.
Contrary to the above, from August 3, 2018 to June 12, 2020, the licensee used a surveillance test procedure that directed operators to exercise equipment prior to surveillance testing activities, without a specific benefit.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the triennial fire protection inspection results to Mr. Scott Hunnewell and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21N.05 Calculations
26D54EPMABBIMPFHA
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Fire Hazards Analysis
Calculation
Rev. 145
2-92743
Seismic Analysis of 24 Ton CO2 Tank
Rev. 0
APS2068
Appendix R - Post Fire RCS Cooldown and
Depressurization
Rev. 2
B25850329800
Fire Protection Pipe Support Calculation for
Cantilevered 1-inch Pipe
03/27/1985
Analysis of the Auxiliary Power System for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R
Rev. 64
EDQ0009992017000385FHA Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Fire Hazards Analysis
Calculation -
FSSD Compliance Mitigation Strategy
Rev. 3
MDN000NA2019000628
SQN Fire PRA - Fire Risk Quantification
Rev. 1
MDQ0026-97001
Motor Driven Fire Pump Replacement Sprinkler
Calculation
06/25/2018
MDQ0026-97001B
Control Valve(s) 0FCV-26-151 & 0FCV-2066
HPFP Sprinkler Calculation
2/03/2013
MDQ0026-97001D
Flow Testing to Support Pipe Degradation
2/24/1997
MDQ0026-980041
HPFP Sprinkler Calculation, Boric Acid Tank
Room, 690.0' AB, Sprinkler Addition
2/16/1998
SQN-APPR-1
Analysis of AC/DC Instrument & Control (I&C)
Power Systems to Identify Associated Circuits -
CFR 50 Appendix R
Rev. 20
SQN-APS-003
480VAC APS Class 1E Load Coordination
Study
Rev. 108
SQN-DC-V-10.7
Design Criteria Document - 10CFR50, Appendix R, Type I,II, & III Circuits
Rev. 4
SQN-DC-V-24.0
Design Criteria Document - Fire Protection for
Appendix R Requirements
Rev. 10
SQN-DC-V-43.0
Design Criteria Document - High-Pressure Fire
Protection Water Supply System
Rev. 9
SQN-DC-V-7.5
Design Criteria Document - Fire Protection
Rev. 14
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Systems
SQN-DC-V-7.6
Design Criteria Document - Proprietary
Protective Signaling Systems for Fire Alarm and
Supervisory Service
Rev. 4
SQNAPPR10
Appendix R Hot Short Analysis for Non
High/Low RCS Pressure Interfaces and Non-
High Impact Circuits
Rev. 25
XDN00000020110001
OMAs for 10 CFR Appendix R III.G.2
Compliance
1/27/2014
Corrective
Action
Documents
1072726
Appendix R Fire Concern Regarding Smoke
Migration
8/7/2019
1440822
Appendix R Control Building Issue for RHR
Pumps
08/20/2018
1581033
NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (TFPI)
Readiness Self-Assessment
2/24/2020
1610002
Appendix R Lighting Deficiency Created by
Design Change
6/8/2020
27936
Light heads misaimed
8/4/2020
Corrective
Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
1590413
SA-1581033 2020 TFPI Deficiencies in testing
for remote shutdown transfer switches
06/09/2020
1613748
Alternate shutdown transfer switch testing
deficiencies
06/10/2020
1616116
NRC identified issue related to transfer switch
testing
06/12/2020
CR1632843
Fire Door C-22 Missing Screws from Plate on
Door
08/25/2020
CR1632915
Abandon Office Chair Staged in Auxiliary
Building Equipment Room
8/26/2020
Drawings
1,2 45W1699-50
Conduit & Grounding, Floor El.734.0, Details
Sheet 12
Rev. 3
1,2 46W-455-1
Architectural Door Frames and Details
Rev. 1
1,2 46W454-4
Architectural Door and Hardware Schedule
Rev. 1
1,2 46W454-7
Architectural Door and Hardware Schedule
Rev. 0
1,2 47W494-4
Fire Protection Compartmentation-Fire Cells
Rev. 15
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Plan El. 734.0'
1,2 47W494-6
Fire Protection Compartmentation-Fire Cells,
Plan El. 669.0' & 685.0'
Rev. 7
1,2 47W850-27
Flow Diagram-High Pressure Fire Protection
Rev. 11
1,2-45N639-1
Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System
Schematic Diagrams Sh-1
Rev. 3
1,2-45N639-2
Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System
Schematic Diagrams Sh-2
Rev. 3
1,2-45N639-3
Wiring Diagrams CO2 Fire Protection System
Schematic Diagrams Sh-3
Rev. 15
1,2-45N703-1
Wiring Diagrams - 125V Vital Battery Board I
Single Line Sheet 1
Rev. 85
1,2-45N703-2
Wiring Diagram - 125V Vital Board Battery
Board II Single Line Sheet 2
Rev. 45
1,2-45N703-3
Wiring Diagrams - 125V Vital Battery Board III
Single Line Sheet 3
Rev. 49
1,2-45N703-4
Wiring Diagrams - Vital Battery Board IV Single
Line Sheet 4
Rev. 51
1,2-45N749-1
Wiring Diagrams 480V SD Board 1A1-A Single
Line
Rev. 54
1,2-47W801-1
Flow Diagram - Main & Reheat Steam
Rev. 120
1,2-47W813-1
Flow Diagram-Reactor Cooling System
Rev. 58
1-3591A12
Breaker Setting Sheet 480V S/D Bd 1A1
Rev. 3
1-3591A13
Breaker Setting Sheet 480V Shutdown Board
1A1
Rev. 4
2-47W809-1
Flow Diagram - Chemical & Volume Control
System
Rev. 77
Engineering
Changes
2644
Replace Pressurizer PORVs Due to Current
Valves Being Obsolete and Reaching End of
Life
07/18/2018
Engineering
Evaluations
Fire Protection Report
Rev. 37
Fire Plans
Aux 0-734-02
Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Auxiliary Building El.
734.0
Rev. 9
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
AUX-0-734.00
Fire Protection Pre-Plan Auxiliary Building El.
734.0
Rev. 4
Aux. 0-734-01
Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Auxiliary Building
Elevation 734.0'
Rev. 10
CON 0-685-00
Fire Protection Pre-Plan, Control Building El.
685.0'
Rev. 7
Miscellaneous
FOR 200283
Fire Protection Impairment Permit
7/15/2020
FOR 200302
Fire Protection Impairment Permit
08/03/2020
FOR 202030
Fire Protection Impairment Permit
1/28/2020
QIR-SPQ-SQN-88-182
CO2 Discharge Times Pre-Operational Test
2/11/1988
SQN-VM-4085
Vendor Manual for Protect-O-Wire Special
Hazards Application
Rev. 1
SQN-VM-4534/VD-P115-
4534
Peerless Pump Vendor Manual
Rev. 6
TCE 2020-12
Transient Combustible Permit
05/01/2020
TCE 2020-20
Transient Combustible Permit
10/03/2020
TCE 2020-21
Transient Combustible Permit
10/03/2020
Procedures
0-MI-FPU-000-001
General Maintenance Instructions for Fire
Protection Systems
Rev. 15
0-PI-FPU-317-537.Q
Fire and Medical Emergency Equipment
Inventory
Rev. 23
0-SI-EBT-250-100.1
Vital Battery Quarterly Inspection
4/9/2020
0-SI-EBT-250-100.3
Vital Battery I and Charger Annual Inspection
8/6/2018
0-SI-EBT-250-100.6
U0 Spare 125 v Vital Batt Charger #1
Performance Test
5/24/2016
0-SI-FPU-0026-002.Y
Auxiliary and Diesel Generator Building System
Flow Test
09/26/2019
0-SI-FPU-0026-200R
Diesel Engine RPM Factory Test Settings (2100
RPM)
11/11/2000
0-SI-FPU-0026-201R
Flow Test Surveillance for Motor-Driven Fire
Pump
01/19/2018
0-SI-FPU-013
Fire Detection Panel 0-L-632 Test
Rev. 13
0-SI-FPU-026-201R
Flow Test Surveillance for Motor-Driven Fire
Pump
06/25/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0-SI-SXV-000-206.0
U2 PMT for Vlvs During Refueling
4/10/2020
0-SI-SXV-068-201.0
U2 Stroke Pzr PORVs
11/2/2018
119684884
0-SI-FPU-026-200.R Diesel Driven Fire Pump B
Month Flow Test
06/22/2019
2-PI-OPS-000-0033.0
Periodic Stroking of U2 Time Critical Valves
10/28/2018
Fire Safe Shutdown
NPG-SPP-01.3
Housekeeping
Rev. 8
NPG-SPP-03.6
Fire Protection Program Change Regulatory
Reviews
Rev. 10
NPG-SPP-06.9
Testing Programs
Rev. 2
NPG-SPP-06.9.1
Conduct of Testing
Rev. 12
NPG-SPP-06.9.2
Surveillance Test Program
Rev. 9
NPG-SPP-09.3
Plant Modifications and Engineering Change
Control
Rev. 33
NPG-SPP-18.4.5
Fire Protection Quality Assurance
Rev. 3
SI-237.1
Powerhouse CO2 Fire Protection System Test
09/30/2019
TVA-NQA-PLN89-A
Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan (NQAP)
(Quality Assurance Program Description)
Rev. 38
Self-
Assessments
DCP-SQN-18-011
Fire Protection Program Regulatory Review for
DCN-SQN18-011 (Detection)
Rev. 0
None
Fire Protection Program Health Report
06/30/2020
None
System Health Report (System 26) HPFP
03/31/2020
QA-SQ-19-013
Off-Year Fire Protection Assessment
08/23/2019
Work Orders
115342170
0-PI-FPU-026-122.Y HPFP Yard Flow Test
08.06/14
116401835
2-PI-OPS-000-010.B Verification of Remote
Shutdown Transfer Switches
2/10/2015
117675098
2-PI-OPS-000-010.C Verification of Remote
Shutdown Transfer Switches
05/23/2017
118187526
0-PI-FPU-026-122.Y HPFP Yard Flow Test
06/10/2017
118573914
0-SI-FPU-026-202.R Diesel Fire Pump 18
Month Inspection
05/31/2018
118573915
0-SI-FPU-026-200.R Diesel Driven Fire Pump B
Month Flow Test
07/23/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
119198061
2-PI-OPS-000-010.D Verification Of Remote
Shutdown Transfer Switches
2/04/2019
119684878
0-SI-FPU-026-202.R Diesel Fire Pump 18
Month Inspection
06/14/2019
2027921
0-SI-FPU-026-193.M Motor Driven Fire Pump B
Mini-Flow Test
2/06/2020
203140059
2-PI-OPS-000-010.A Verification of Remote
Shutdown Transfer Switches
05/02/2020
20403941
0-SI-FPU-026-192.M Motor Driven Fire Pump A
Operability Test
03/12/2020
20469066
0-SI-FPU-026-193.M Motor Driven Fire Pump B
Mini-Flow Test
04/09/2020
20501411
0-SI-FPU-026-192.M Motor Driven Fire Pump A
Operability Test
04/16/2020
Power House CO2 Fire Protection System test
Visual Inspection of Fire Dampers for 0-SI-FPU-
031-001R