IR 05000302/1979024
| ML19309F621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1979 |
| From: | Bradford W, Martin R, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F605 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-79-24, NUDOCS 8004300187 | |
| Download: ML19309F621 (13) | |
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k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
UNITED STATES
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REGION 11
Report No. 50-302/79-24 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South
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St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at C stal River Site near Crystal River, Florida
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Inspectors:
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D. Quick (
Date Signed lb'04d [
9l/Ph9 o
W. Bradfor Dite Signed d
Y D.~ Hinckley
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'Date Signed T / 7 ~7 9
- J. Skolds Date Signed
9IL'&/79
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Approved by:
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R. D.' Martin, 'Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on July 2, 1979 - August 3, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 296 ' inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant operations, procedure review, precritical testing, licensee event followup, administrative controls, operator training, system alignment, followup on previously identified items, radiation controls, and plant tours.
Results
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Of the ten areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in eight areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in two areas (Failure to control a high radiation area, paragraph 5.c - Infraction, Failure to properly control equipment clearance, paragraph 5.f - Deficiency).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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G. P. Beatty, Jr., Plant Manager P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent W. R. Nichols, Operations Superintendent G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent J. Cooper, Jr., Compliance Engineer G. M. Williams, Plant Engineer J. L. Harrison, Chemical / Radiation Protection Engineer W. E. Kemper, Technical Specification Engineer S. W. Johnson, Inservice Inspection Engineer J. R. Wright, Chemical / Radiation Protection Engineer G. L. Clarr, Planning Coordinator G. L. Boldt, Performance Engineer Supervisor T. A. Miller, Training Specialist K. F. Lancaster, Compliance Auditor L. A. Hill, Compliance Auditor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechan-ics, and office personnel.
2.
Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 6,13,20,27, and August 3, 1979 with those persons listed in Paragraph 1 above. Items discuss-ed included the licensee's acknowledgement of two items of noncompliance.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Infraction (302/79-13-02): Failure to perform surveillance a.
requirement on containment sump. The licensee's response to this infraction (W. P. Stewart letter of June 22,1979) maintained that no violation existed in that the Reactor Building sump was monitored as required and recorded as "off-scale high" on the shift logs for the time span in question. The inspector discussed this response with-plant management and pointed out that although the narrow range sump level indicator was off-scale high, the reactor operator's log for the period of time in question indicated that the wide range indicator of sump level was on scale and could have'been used to meet the surveil-lance requirement. The licensee committed to sending the NRC a revised response within ten days.
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4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussedinparagrapp13.
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5.
Plant Operations Plant operations were reviewed by the inspector to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements and technical specifications.
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Daily Activities
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The inspector maintained daily awareness of plant status and signifi-cant activities through discussions with members of the plant staff and operating personnel.
Selected portions of the various daily log books and control room data sheets were examined on a daily basis during the report period.
The inspector made several plant tours in selected areas of the turbine and auxiliary buildings. The control room was visited on a more frequent basis than other portions of the plant. Observations included instrument readings and recordings, housekeeping and status of operating systems and components.
Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities and status of equipment. Questions developed by the inspect-
.or were satisfactorily answered.
Interviews with a number of plant operations personnel were held on the day and night shifts. During the period of observationi the plant was made critical and brought to power to perform tests. Supervisors and control operators actions were observed. Their actions and activities were responsive to the activities in progress. Operator's were responsive to annunciator alarms and appeared to be cognizant of plant status, b.
Technical Specifications, listed below, were verified to be in compli-ance.
T. S. 3.5.1, Core Flood Tank Level and Pressure
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T. S. 3.1.2.9, BWST Level
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T. S. 3.4.7, RC System Chemistry T. S. 3.4.6.2, RC System Leakage I. S. 3.1.3.1, Safety and Regulating Rods c.
Plant Tours
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As part of the plant operations review, the inspector toured accessi -
ble portions of the plant. During the tour observations were made regarding the general plant housekeeping and cleanliness and radia-tions control practices.
In general, housekeeping and cleanliness were found to bc satisfactory.
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On one plant tour it was noted that the Miscellaneous Waste Evaporator
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Room hcd a High Radiation Level sign to the side of the doorway vice
barricading the doorway. This item was brought to the attention of
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licensee personnel and was immediately corrected. On two other separate occasions on July 8, 1979, the inspector found the block orifice room in the auxiliary building posted as a high radiation area but the l
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barricade that was put up was no longer barricading the entrance.
- This was brought to the attention of the on shift health physics technician who corrected the problem on both occasions.
10 CFR 20.203(c) states in part that each entrance or ac' cess point to
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a high radiation area shall be equipped with a control device and a conspicuous visual or audible alarm. Radiation Control Procedure
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RP-101, Radiation Protection Manual Section 4.2.2.a states in part that "in lieu of the control device or alarm signal each high radia-
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tion area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 100 I
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mrem /hr but less than 1000 mres/hr shall be barricaded and conspicu-
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ously posted as a high radiation area... The failue to have the high
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radiation area barricaded is considered to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 20.203(c) (302/79-24-01).
While touring the Hot Machine Shop, the inspector noted three bags of various parts and materials were setting on a cart. One bag had been opened while the other bags were taped closed. The bags were not labeled nor were they in a roped off or posted area. The inspector requested that an HP Technician measure the radiation levels on contact with the bags. The radiation levels were reading 20-30
mrem /hr on contact.
10 CFR 20.203(f) states in part that "each container of licensed material shall bear a durable, clearly visible label identifying the radioactive contents, and further the required label shall bear the radiation caution symbol and the words " CAUTION, j
RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL" or " DANGER, RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL". During inspection 50-302/79-15 the licensee was issued on item of noncomp1 >
ance concerning failure to have procedures which addressed the
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concerns of 10 CFR 20.203(f). The licensee's response to this item of noncompliance dated June 18, 1979 stated that procedures were being generated and full compliance would be achievad by September 1, 1979.
Since the compliance date had not arrived, tia discovery of the enmarked
. bags of radioactive material in the hot machine shop is an examp;e of the item of noncompliance identified in Report 302/79-15.
d.
Surveillance The inspector also witnessed preparatory operations for perform!nce of SP-414, High Pressure Injection Flow Verification. The test procedure and results were also reviewed.
It was verified that the test results meet the ECCS Acceptance Criteria of at least 350 gpm flow for any three of the four flow paths (highesc ~ flow excluded).
Plant Jumper Log
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The inspector reviewed the Plant Jumper Log Book to verify tha*.
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jumpers placed on equipment during the refueling outage were controlled and that a safety evaluation had been performed on each
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jumper. The inspector noted that there were a number of jumpers which had been installed previous to the refueling outage, and which had not
been cleared. Some of these jumpers date back to April 25, 1977. Some
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of the jumper log sheets were marked " unknown" in the jumper expected removal date slot; some jumper log sheets were marked "non-applicable" in the jumper expected removal slot; and some of the jumper expected removal dates were past due. This item was discussed with the licensee during the exit interview. The licensee stated that he was aware of this condition and that the jumper log will be reviewed and outstanding jumpers will be cleared.
This item is designated as open item no. 50-302/79-24-02 and will be reinspected on a subsequent inspection.
f.
Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders The inspector reviewed the Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Order logs to verify that equipment or components, required for the plant mode of operation at the present time (Mode IV), were available for operation as required by Technical Specifications and that the clearance logs were properly filled out and completed as per CP-115,
"In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders".
Several of the clearance logs were not filled out correctly.as required by section 6.2.6 of CP-115, "In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders" which states in part that the equipment / system to be tagged will be identified by the complete name of the equipment, not with just the equipment identification number. Enclosure 1A of the above procedure identifies the correct method of completing the clear-ance log.
An apparent item of noncompliance was identified in that several of the active clearance logs examined on July 26, 1979 were not filled out correctly. The equipment / system clearance logs did not contain the complete name of the equipment / system and were identified by equipment number only.
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This item is an item of noncompliance (50-302/79-24-03.)
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Non-Conforming Operations Reports (NCOR)
A review of the non-conforming operations reports index was conducted to verify that investigations were performed and that events required to be reported to the NRC, were reported. The review covered 259 events that occurred between January If 1979 and July 31, 1979. Only the reports not reported as LER's were reviewed.
There were no discrepancies identified. Questions regarding details of the events and the reportability of the events were discussed with
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licensee management. Each question was resolved satisfactorily.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Other Observations During reactor heatup, while in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown, less than 200
degrees F primary coolant temperature), the decision was made by plant staff to run a main coolant pump without flow indication (due to i
mechanical problems with the flow indicators). The inspector informed i
the plant staff that though this did not appear to be a violation of Technical Specifications it was viewed as an unusual plant condition and that the period of time without indication should be minimized.
Flow indication was returned prior to reactor coolant temperature exceeding 200 degrees F.
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6.
Training The inspector reviewed the Phase II Small Break examinations given to
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licensed personnel. Two separate examinations were reviewed. The inspect-or graded the examinations and in all cases the grades assigned by the licensee and the inspector were within + or - 5%. The inspector noted that
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3 licensed personnel had not yet successfully completed the Phase II exami-l nations. The licensee indicated that these personnel would complete the
training and examination within approximately the next week. The. inspector
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then verified that all operating personnel had successfully completed the j
training.
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7.
Review of Plant Procedures The following procedures were reviewed to ensure that revisions had been
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made to the procedures which incorporated items identified by another inspector on a prior inspection:
AP-102, Control Room Annunciators, Revision 14 OP-202, Plant Heatup, Revision 24
OP-203, Plant Startup, Revision 22
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OP-204, Power Operation, Revision 15
OP-404, Decay Heat Removal, Revision 24 OP-405, Reactor Building Spray System, Revision 13
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OP-408, Nuclear Services Cooling, Revision 13 SP-347, ECCS and Boration Flow Path, Revision 12 EP-104, Steam Generator Tube Failure, Revision 8 EP-106, Loss of Coolant, Revision 19 AP-113, Reactor Colddown by Natural Circulation PT-123, Emergency Feedwater Flow Verification and Manual OTSG Level Control Independent of ICS with the Reactor at Power,
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Revision 1 The inspector reviewed Revision 14 to AP-102, " Control Room Annunciators".
_ The changes were verified to be correct for new annunciators in the control room.
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The inspector reviewed OP-202 " Plant Heatup" and indicated to the licensee that a step to place the main feed pump - EFW auto start bypass switch in
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normal was missing.
It was discovered that this step was in OP-203 " Plant Startup". The licensee amended OP-202 and placed a step in the procedure to return the main feed pump - EFW auto start bypass switch back to
" normal" af ter a main feed pump is running and pressure in the OTGS is greater than 200 psig.
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Special Tests The inspector reviewed logs and/or witnessed special tests conducted in accordance with the post TMI Commission Order.
Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Testing a.
The inspector reviewed operator logs to verify that the motor driven feedwater pump had been operated for at least 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> as part of the acceptance criteria committed to by the licensee for SP-349, Emergency Feedwater System Operability Determination.
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Emergency Feedwater Test
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The inspector witnessed the emergency feedwater test, performed on July 31, 1979. The test verified that the turbine driven and the motor driven emergency feedwater feed pumps will deliver an adequate flow to both steam generators. The test also verified that emergency feedwater flow could be controlled without dependence on the integrat-ed control system.
The test was performed per test procedure PT-123, " Emergency Feedwater Flow Verification and Manual OTSG Level Control Independent of ICS with the Reactor at Power". Reactor power was at about 5% during the test and the procedure was followed as prescribed. The test was considered successful in that the acceptance criteria were met. The throttled position of feedwater valves FWV-161 and 162 was determined, Surveillance Procedures SP-300, and SP-301 were revised to incorporate a periodic check of the position of FWV-161 and 162.
No problems were identified with the performance of the test.
On July 26 the inspector witnessed the performance of PT-106 " Diesel c.
Load Test" to assure the capability to start the motor driven emergen-cy feed pump if necessary after unloadi.ng other equipment not required The test was satisfactory.
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9.
Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed selected LER's for consistency with the requirements
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ing LER's were reviewed:
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(Closed) LER 79-003, Feedwater Block Valve FW-30 Failed to Close a.
Following Turbine Trip The valve failure to close was attributed to the valve being stuck on its back seat.
The valve was manually taken off its bac1c seat and
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cycled. There has been no reoccurrence of the problem.
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(Closed) LERs79-017, 79-030, and 79-032, Heat Trace Recorder Inopera-ble There have been several problems with heat trace recorders. An engi-neering evaluation (PD 378) has been initiated to determine appropriate corrective action.
(Closed) LER 79-018, Reactor Building Inner Airlock Door Unlatched c.
A request for an engineering evaluation has been initiated to deter-mine corrective actions to be taken.
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(Closed) LER 79-019, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Pressure Gauge Out of Calibration j
The pressure gauge damping snubber was replaced and the gauge calibrated.
j (Closed) LER 79-023, Reactor Coolant System Chloride Concentration e.
Above Technical Specification Limits The corrective actions taken by the licensee were appropriate.
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(Closed) LERs79-024 and 79-036, Temperature Monitoring Instrument at Meteorological Tower 175 Foot Elevation Inoperable The cause of these two events was attributed to a loose terminal correction.
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(Closed) LER 79-026, Absolute Rod Position Indication Inoperable Cause was due to a stuck reed switch which is a common problem caused by magnetization. Application of a variable AC frequency to the reed switch circuit eliminated the magnetic field and restored operability.
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(Closed) LER 79-028, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Pressure Gauge Inoperable Gauge failure was attributed to excessive vibration and pressure surges resulting from emergency feedpump operation. The failed gauge (
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was replaced with a glycerin-filled gauge to reduce the effects of vibration and pump starting pressure surges.
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(Closed) LER 79-029, Makeup Pump Stopcheck Valve MUV-2 Improperly Position I
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Procedure OP-402, Makeup and Purification System, has been revised to correct the problem.
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(Closed) LER 79-034, Reactor Coolant Systems Leak Detect, ion System Inoperable Correction action taken by the licensee was appropriate.
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(Closed) LER 79-037, Reactor Coolant Sample Valve CAV-2 Failed to Close A request for engineering evaluation (REI 79-5-6) has been initiated.
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(Closed) LER 79-038, Chemical Addition Containment Isolation Valve CAV-3 Failed to Close A request for engineering evaluation (REI 79-5-6) has been initiated.
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(Closed) LER 79-040, Containment Purge Supply Valve AHV-IC Failed to m.
Open The purge valve right angle drive assembly was cracked. The' motor and drive assembly were replaced, (Closed) LER 79-041, Reactor Building Charcoal Filter Bank Efficiency n.
Less Than Technical Specification Limits The charcoal filter bank efficiency was rechecked and found to be within limits.
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(Closed) LER 79-042, Fire Service Tank Low Water Level o.
Procedure SP-365, Fire Pump Operability has been revised to provide guidance to prevent reoccurrence.
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(Closed) LER 79-043, surveillance Test (SP-190) of Fire Protection Instrumentation Not Performed Within Specified Time Frame Surveillance testing was verified as being performed.
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(Closed) LER 79-044, Concentrated Boric Acid Flow Path Inoperable Corrective action evaluation pending c mpletion of system modification (MAR 78-10-4) short term corrective actions were verified.
(Closed) LER 79-045, Core Flood Tank Valve (CFV-5) Annunciator r.
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Inoperable Corrective action was comp 1eted on 7/11/79.
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(Closed) LER 79-047, Boric Acid Storage Tank Concentration Exceeded s.
Technical Specification Limits Cause of event was attributed to inadequate design. Recirculation and agitation of the boric acid storage tanks has produced inaccurate sample results. A Request for Engineering Information (REI 79-5-11)
has been initiated for determination of proper corrective action.
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(Closed) LER 79-049 No comment.
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(Closed) LER 79-050 No comment.
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(Closed) LER 79-051 No comment.
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(Closed) LER 79-052 No comment.
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(Closed) LER 79-053 No comment.
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(Closed) LER 79-054 No comment.
(Closed) LER 79-057 Diesel Tripping Problems
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It appears there are three different problems that could have caused this event.
Tests were conducted with results as follows; 1).
If speed droop control is left on 0 during parallel operation diesel will shed load and trip on reverse power.
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If voltage droop switch is in the unit position during parallel operation it is possible for the 6ait to slowly absorb reactive load ~ causing true load to shed until unit trips on reverse power if a voltage change occurs on the grid.
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If voltages are not properly matched when unit is syne;ronized it
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is possible for the unit to shed true load until it trips on reverse power if grid voltage changes. This mismatch ccscern is more pronounced if voltage droop switch is left in the unlt position.
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Conclusions:
1). The reverse power relay tripped the diesels.
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2). Any one of the above or a combination of the above contributed to the trips.
3). Plant personnel were unaware of voltage droop switch and the
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procedures did not address it therefore apparently all past parallel operation was conducted with this switch in the " unit" position.
4). The fast start portion of SP-347 did not address placing speed droop control at 60 in the past.
5). The voltage control meters are too sensitive with respect to field adjust potentiometer making it very difficult to balance voltage properly prior to synchronization.
6). All parts of SP-347 have been revised to address all three above items.
7). An REI has been generated to upgrade the voltage control and indication capability.
8). The licensee agreed to submit a revised LER addressing all of the problems described here and has since done so.
The inspector has no further questions at this time.
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10. Exhaust Manifold Fire on "B" Emergency Diesel While attempting to start the "B" diesel for surveillance testing on July 24, 1979, an exhaust manifold fire occurred which caused the diesel to be declared inoperable. The plant was in mode 5 at the time. The licensee utilized the services of the diesel manufacturer to evaluate the problem on site. The inspector witnessed this testing and maintenance to restore the diesel to an operable status. Apparently the cause of the fire was a combination of oil and soot buildup in the exhaust manifold and an abnormally rich fuel / air mixture which was caused by intake manifold air leaks. These air leaks would lead to a rich mixture and resultant abnormally high exhaust temperatures. The diesel representative thought the exhaust screens might i
also be clogged but these were not cleaned it this time. The intake manifold air leaks were repaired and the diesel tested to restore it to operability. Apparently no damage was caused by the fire.
Further maintenance on injectors and exhaust screens will be accomplished to opti-mize the diesel's performance as soon as parts are available. SP-347 was
- performed satisfactorily on July 25, 1979 (IFI 79-24-04).
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11. Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Problems On' July 28, 1979 the inspector noted that the third stage seal pressure had decreased from approximately 700 psi to 340 psi, and the leak rate increas-ed to approximately.6 gpm. This occurred when the pump was shutdown and then restarted. Apparently number 3 seal has been damaged but numbers 1 and 2 appear to be intact at this time. A Babcock-Wilcox pump seal specialist was on site at the time of this occurrence. A decision was made by the licensee and B&W to continue operation of the pump since the leak rate is within acceptable limits and stable at this time. The inspector will continue to monitor this situation closely.
12. Farr Company Carbon Cells The Farr Company reported to the NRC that they detected a defect in their chromotograph test equipment used for leak detection of NPP-1 carbon cells for the Crystal River Nuclear Station under purchase order no. A-22056.
The cells were shipped on April 29, 1977.
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This item was brought to the attention of licensee management. Followup of licensee management. Followup revealed that these carbon cells were used in the Crystal River Nuclear Station Reactor Building purge system. Florida Power Corporation performs their own in place testing which would detect defective carbon cells. This test was performed in October, 1977. The inspector reviewed the test results and the test results are satisfactory.
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations identified during this review.
13.
Administrative Controls and Procedures
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The inspector verified that Administrative Controls and check lists had been established for returning safety-related systems and/or components to operable status which had undergone maintenance or had been disturbed during the refueling outage. Plant startup procedures were reviewed to verify adherence to technical specifications as they pertain to startup
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testing and power operation prerequisites.
The inspector conducted a walk-through inspection of the emergency feed water system, a portion of the main feed wa.ter system, and the high
pressure injection system using the appropriate valve check list and flow
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diagrams to verify that valve line ups had been completed and that the valves had been placed in their prescribed position.
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On July 24, 1979 the faspector noted that the reactor was in Mode 4 opera-
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tion with the "B" makeup pump in operation.
The "A" 'nd "C" makeup pumps a
were out of service and tagged and the four high pressure injection isolation valves to reactor coolant loops "A" and "B" were closed and tagged as'per the requirements of the Technical Specification to preclude overpre suriza-tion of the reactor coolant system. The makeup valves, NUV-73 for the "A"'
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l train and MUV-58 for the "B" train, which are the suction valves from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to the make up pumps were in the closed position with power to the valve operators. The operator in the control room had control of these valves and they were available for operation.
The valve check list for Surveillance Procedure No. SP-347, "ECCS and Boration Systems Flow Path" requires that MUV-73 be closed on the "A" train and MUV-58 be opened on the "B" train. The licensee stated that these valves should not be open at this time due to the "A" and "C" make up pumps and the four high pressure injection valves into "A" and "B" reactor cool-ant loops being out of service in this mode of operation.
The licensee stated that a procedure change would be made which will make the valve check list conform to the conditions imposed by the technical specifications.
This item is unresolved item no. 50-302/79-24-05 pending the review and approval of the revised procedure. This item will be inspected on a subse-quent inspection.
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