IR 05000302/1979045
| ML19260C891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1979 |
| From: | Donat T, Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260C885 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-79-45, NUDOCS 8002060363 | |
| Download: ML19260C891 (7) | |
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%.....o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3o303 Report No. 050-302/79-45 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility: Crystal River 3 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at:
Crystal River site, Crystal River, Florida Inspector: 7b uc.s 6-.-r b u 23,/97f T. J. Dona '
Date Signed Approved by:
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R. D.' Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Dat/Sifed SUMMARY Inspection on October 22-26, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection invo1.';ed 30 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of audits of plant operations, operations records review, siesmic restraint modification and plant tour.
Results Of the 4 areas inspected, no appirent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 3 areas; I apparent item of noncompliance was found in 1 area.
(Infraction - failure to properly set the alarms of radiation monitors in accord-ance with the release permit prior to initiating a reactor building ventilation purge. The purge was secured when the radiation levels reached the higher set points).
1933 057 8002060 3b3
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contact ed Licensee Employees
- G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager
- W. A. Cross, Operations Engineer
- J. Cooper, Jr., Nuclear Quality Assurance / Quality Control Compliance Manager
- R. W. Kennedy, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor
- L. A. Hill, Nuclear Compliance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 26, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector identified the apparent infraction defined in paragraph 6.C at this meeting.
Station management acknowledged the inspector's findings and identified the proce-dure changes which had been approved to prevent reoccurrance in the future.
The inspector acknowledged that the licensee had taken prompt remedial action and that no additional corrective action was identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.,
(Closed) Infraction (302/79-04-08):
Failure to follow procedures.
The licensee committed in his response dated 6/15/79 to revise CP-114,
" Procedures for Control of Permanent Modifications and Deviations" to require that the Nuclear Shift Supervisor sign the Jumper permit to indicate that a Safety Analysis has been performed. The inspector reviewed revision 23 to CP-114, dated 10/17/79, which contains a revision 22 (8/30/79) Enclosure 2, Jumper Record Form.
This Jumper Record Form contains a sign off on the bottom of section IID, " Safety Analysis, Jumper Approved for Installation" and the procedure requires, in step 5.2.2.2, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor to make this signoff once he has reviewed the jumper form and concurs that a safety review is not required. This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Infraction (302/79-29-01):
Failure to review and approve changes implemented in surveillance and test procedures for safety related equipment.
The inspector verified that the licensee had
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briefed all maintenance supervisors on the requirements of station instructions AI-400 sections 5.0 and 5.3 and AI-600 section 4.3.4 to use only copies of PRC approved procedures for the operation, mainten-ance and testing of safety related equipment. This item is closed.
1933 0158
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-2-(Closed) Infraction (302/79-30-05): Failure to input RTD normalization c.
constants into the IBM-5100 Heat Balance II routine as required by PT-100, Enclosure 1, Step 12. The inspector reviewed revision 4 to PT 100, " Controlling Procedure for Precritical Testing", dated 8/30/79.
Enclosure 2 has been revised in step 12 to state " Input the new C valves obtained from step 11 into the IBM-5100 " Heat Balance" and
" Bench Fetch" routines by internally changing the respective program formats per the IBM-5100 Instruction Manual." This item is closed.
d.
(Closed) Deficiency (302/79-12-02): Inadequate inspection criteria in Fuel Handling Procedure FP-302. The inspector reviewed fuel handling procedures FP-302, FP-304, FP-305, which were generated from the original FP-302 procedure.
The new version of FP-302, "New Fuel Assembly Unloading, Inspection, and Storage, and Container Reclosing",
contains as Enclosure 5 New Fuel Receipt Inspection criteria.
The criteria specifies characteristics for scratches such as depth and length as well as for dente,, blemishes, and other defects which must be reported. This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Unresolved (302/79-32-01):
Switching between Vital Buses caused an inadvertent ES actuation. The inspector reviewed revision 9 to OP-703, dated 10/8/79. Section 10.3 titled " Transfer of Vital Bus Power Supply" had been revised to include subsections 10.3.3 through 10.3.6 which reset the reactor protection system, ES actuation system, and radiation monitor panel bistables.
Step 10.3.2 has the operator close the alternate supply breakers and reset the bistables in accordance with the appropriate subsection. Based on the revised procedure this item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved icems were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (77-20-01) Lack of Technician signoffs on inplant instru-ment calibration data sheets. The inspector reviewed eleven of the twelve surveillance procedures used to calibrate plant instrumentation and control equipment. All eleven had been revised to require technician and/or super-visor signoff of the data.
One procedure, SP-169, " Plant Instrument Calibration", was in the process of being revised and submitted to the Plant Review Committee for approval.
It was also noted that each of the procedures reviewed also contained steps to notify the nuclear shift supervisor when removing equipment from service and when the equipment has been returned to service. This item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-22-01) Operation of Terry Turbine hydraulic governors after shutdown to prevent subsequent overspeeding. The inspector verified that warning labels had been installed on the main control board and at the local control station stating " Bleed Governor After Use", to remind the operators that the speed control governor cylinder must be bled after use to prevent overspeeding when restarted. Also reviewed was revision 17 to 1933 059
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-3-SP-349, " Emergency Feedwater System Operability Demonstration", dated 9/20/79 which now contains instructions to bleed off the control governor and then reset it to the correct position in section 6.0.
Based on these actions this item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-30-02) Surveillance procedure SP-102 allows rod drop time to be measured in a nonconservative manner. The inspector reviewed revision 4 to SP-102, " Control Rod Drop Time Test", dated 8/9/79. Step 6.9 of this procedure has been revised to measure the rod drop time from when
"120VAC trace just starts to drop" until the " center of the 25% withdrawal pulse", whereas the procedure had previously measured the drop time from the first zero crossing of the reference waveform following the opening of the control rod breaker. Based on the procedure change this item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-30-03) A noncalibrated piece of test instrumentation (Visicorder) was used in a surveillance test of safety grade equipment.
The inspector verified that the Visicorder had been calibrated in August of 1979 and was rescheduled for calibration in February of 1980. The presence of a calibration sticker on the Visicorder stating " cal" and " cal due" dates was verified. Also the plant's calibration schedule computer program was reviewed to ensure that the Visicorder was included in the scheduling.
Based on these actions this item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-30-04) Discrepancy between SP-103, " Moderator Tempera-ture Coefficient Determination at Startup After Refueling", and other startup test sequence procedures.
Procedure SP-103 revision 1,
dated 9/13/79 nos refers the operator in step 6.1 to PT-114, " Moderator and Temperature Coefficients Determination at Hot zero Power" to measure the core's temperature coefficient of reactivity.
This change plus the deletion of the first fuel cycle reactivity calculation procedure, originally in SP-103, results in only one method for calculating the temperature coefficient of reactivity being available for licensee use, the method in PT-114. Based on this, the item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-30-01) Failure to insure that control rod drop items met technical specification requirements prior to changing modes.
The inspector reviewed revision 4, dated 8/9/79, of SP-102, " Control Rod Drop Time Test".
Section 6.0 requires a 60HZ timing trace be placed on each Visicorder chart used to measure control rod drop times, in addition to the recorder's own internally generated 0.01 see timing marks.
Since the licensee has taken action to insure the control rod drop time is being accurately measured this item is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (79-24-02) Jumper Log had many old entries which resulted in difficulties for the licensee to ascertain which had safety significance.
The inspector reviewed the jumper log on October 26,1979 and it's status was as follows:
A total of forty-five active entries, four from 1977, four from 1978, three from 1st quarter of 1979, thirteen from 2nd quarter of 1979, fourteen from 3rd quarter of 1979, and seven issued since October 1, 1979.
1933 060
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-4-The inspector reviewed the jumper log entries for 1977 and 1978 and noted that all eight were awaiting approval of MAR's to have permanent corrective actions performed. The three from the 1st quarter of 1979 were also reviewed.
Two are awaiting replacement equipment to arrive onsite and once installed they will be removed.
One is being used to trouble shoot a waste gas compressor control circuit problem.
Based on the number of outstanding jumper log entries and the reductions made to date, this item is closed.
6.
Audit of Plant Operations a.
Control Room Logs The inspector reviewed the control room operator's log, the nuclear shift supervisor's log, the instrument technician's log, and the operations daily summary for the period between October 19 and October 26.
The initialing of entries by the site personnel and the signing that preceeding entries had been read prior to shift turnover was also observed. The inspector had no comments on the manner in which control room logs were being maintained.
b.
Seismic Restraint Modifications The inspector was notified at 1555 on October 22, 1979, that three Nuclear Service Water System seismic restraints (SWR) did not meet the safety factor requirements of IEB 79-14.
These restraints were SWR 490, 517, and 521 which had safety factors of 1.62, 0.89, and 1.72, respectively. On October 23, 1979 the licensee notified the inspector that a seismic restraint in the spent fuel pool cooling system (SFR-25)
had a safety factor of 1.4 which in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14 would also have to be upgraded. Modification of these seismic restraints was to be accomplished under MAR-79-6-86-G.
Work on modifying seismic restraint SWR-517 was begun on October 23, 1979 and was completed by 0630 on October 24, 1979. The inspector verified the installation of the new restraint and its associated documentation on October 24th. The licensee submitted documentation on October 25th in support of not modifying seismic restraints SWR-490 and SWR-521 The licensee was informed that seismic restraint SWR-521 would have to be modified to bring its safety factor above 4.0 and additional documentation was needed with respect to restraint SWR-490.
The restraint SWR-521 was modified by 0700 on October 26, 1979 and the associated documentation was signed by 1400 on October 26, 1979. The inspector examined the modified seismic restraint and its documentation on October 26th and found no discrepancies.
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The licensee also identified twelve seismic hangers and supports in the Decay Heat Removal (DH) and the Nuclear Service Water (SW) systems which had safety factors between 2.0 and 4.0 and which were to be worked on a nonpriority basis. The inspector accompanied a licensee maintenance engineer and a contractor engineer as they examined these hangers and restraints for feasibility of the proposed modifications.
The inspector had no comments on the modifications.
1933 061
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Review of Plant Documentation On October 23, 1979, the inspector reviewed licensee Non-Conformance Operations Reports (NCOR's) submitted to the site Quality Compliance group for preliminary review.
NCOR-389 was written at 2230 on October 22, 1979 stating that " Containment Building RM-A1(G) alarms were 10X settings for RBVRP-79-55". The inspector verified using the control room operator logs and the nuclear shift supervisor log that the gaseous radiation level had exceeded the alert value for the RM-A1(G)
monitor at 2200 on October 22, 1979, and that it was at that time that the operation's staff discovered that the radiation monitor had been incorrectly set.
The inspector reviewed " Radioactive Airborne Release Permit", RBVRP-79-55, issued on October 19, 1979. Part I of the release permit was completed by the site's health physics personnel and in step I.F the
.RM-A1(G) set point was specified as 1300 CPM and the alert value as 950 CPM and signed by a health physics supervisor. Part II of the permit is completed by the operations staff in preparation for per-forming the reactor building ventilation purge.
Part II.A, "RM-Al operational and alarms verified", war initialed by an assistant nuclear operator in accordance with step 3.3.1 of release permit procedure RP-105. The remaining portions of section II were initialed and the
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ventilation purge was initiated at 0000 on October 20, 1979, as indicated by the nuclear shift supervisor's initials and date on the release permit and his log entry. A review of the logs indicates that the purge continued until the radiation monitor alert occurred on October 22, 1979.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that no cross verification is made of the radiation monitor setpoint and alert values and that if the radiation level had not risen to the alert value, they would not have known about the incorrect settings. The licensee agreed that the monitor's setpoint and alert valves should have been set in accordance with the release permit and station procedure RP-105 (rev 6), " Radio-active Airborr.e Release Permit Procedure", step 3.3.1.
The failure of the licensee to set the radiation monitor setpoint and alert values in accordance with RP-105 step 3.3.1 appears to be in noncompliance with technical specification 6.8.1.a.
The licensee took immediate actions and long term corrective actions to prevent reoccurrance. At 2230 on October 22, 1979 when the radiation level reached the alert valve, the nuclear shift supervisor had the reactor containment ventilation purge secured, the radiation level verified, and upon discovering the incorrect monitor settings he had them reset to the correct valves.
Once the gaseous activity had
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decayed to a level below the permit's alert level the purge was resumed.
At 2305 on October 22, 1979 the gaseous activity increased, reaching the new setpoint of 1300 CPM, and causing the containment purge to be automatically secured. The purge was restarted at 0500 on October 23, 1979 when activity had decreased to approimately 500 CPM. The inspector verified by log entries and operator interviews the above sequence of events.
1933 062
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-6-The licensee, as a permanent corrective action to prevent reoccurrance, issued on 10/26/79 revisions to the following plant procedures:
OP-412, " Waste Gas Disposal System Operating Procedure", Rev 17; OP-407, " Liquid Waste Disposal System Operating Procedure", Rev 17; and OP-417, " Containment Operating Procedure", Rev 15 The revised procedures require the operator to enter the final radiation monitor setpoint(s) and the assistant nuclear shift supervisor verify independently that these setpoints are in accordance with the radioactive release permit.
Based on the immediate actions taken on October 22, and 23, 1979, with respect to the reactor building ventilation purge 79-55 and the long term corrective actions consisting of the procedure changes and operator briefings the inspector considers that the licensee has taken appropriate action and no further response is required.