IR 05000302/1979012

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IE Insp Rept 50-302/79-12 on 790307-09.Noncompliance Noted:Inadequate Fuel Handling Procedure
ML19270G195
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/1979
From: Burnett P, Graham M, Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19270G158 List:
References
50-302-79-12, NUDOCS 7906050121
Download: ML19270G195 (6)


Text

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ATLAl_(A. GEORGIA 30303 ' o ..v / ... Report No. 50-302/79-12 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-72 Inspection at Crystal Riveg, Florida w.A[ //-/N[[ Inspectors: T. T. Bti'rnett " ' , Diate Signed ~ ! ')/ m m / W, O '18 - f/ Date Signsd 'h.'J.

Graham / ~' Approved by: [ 6-M M//C / 7jf R. D. Martin, Section Chief, RONSB Oyte s'igned SUMMARY Inspection on March 7-9, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 40 inspector-hours on site.

The subject areas inspected were receipt inspection of new fuel, maintenance and inspection of cranes and fuel-handling equipment and surveillance of core performance.

Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas; two apparent items of noncompliance were found in one area (deficiency - f ailure to follow procedure - Paragraph 7 and deficiency - inadequate procedure - Paragraph 7).

790605012I

. . . DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee 2mployees G. P. Beatty, Nuclear Plant Manager

  • P. F. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent
  • G. R. Westafer, Maintenance Superintendent
  • G. L. Boldt, Performance Engineering Supervisor
  • W. E. Kemper, Technical Specification Coordinator
  • J. Cooper, Jr., Nuclear Compliance Engineer
  • G. M. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer
  • B.

E. Crane, Planning Engineer

  • G. L. Claar, Planning Coordinator
  • C. G. Goering, Outage Planning and Scheduling F. Pleubel, Electrical Supervisor S. Schroeder, Maintenance Engineer W. R. Klein, Computer and Controls Engineer J. Parrish, Maintenance Engineer
  • Attended exit intervieu 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 9, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.

One unresolved item (paragraph 5 of DETAILS) was identified to the licensee. This item, which was related to the power level at which the moderator temperature coefficient was determined for operation with less than 300 ppm boron was subsequently resolved by information provided by the plant staff by telephone on March 12, 1979.

The two items of apparent noncompliance (inadequate procedu're and failure to follow procedure), which are discussed in paragraph 7 of the DETAILS were presented by the inspectors. The licensee did not rebut the findings, but did describe the actual visual and hands-on inspection of the new fuel as being both more intensive.nd extensivc than required by the procedure. The inspectors stated that the additional information did not resolve the issues of following the inspection procedure and providing acceptance criteria within it.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte, . -2- . 4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Core Surveillance By review of surveillance procedures SP-421 performed on January 3,1979 and February 7, 1979 the inspector confirmed that comparisons between expected and measured core reactivities were performed with the f requency and within the limits specified by Technical Specification 4.1.1.1.2.

The licensee performed surveillance procedure SP-101 on January 9,1979 to determine the f ull power moderator-temperature coef ficient for boron concentrations less than 300 ppm.

The recorded boron concentration was 307 ppm, and licensee personnel stated that the uncertainty in their method of determining boron was 30 ppm.

Two chart recorders were used to measure changes in reactor power so that appropriate doppler-coef ficient corrections could be made to the observed power coefficient. The moderator coefficient so determined, the average of two observations, the moderator coefficient be less negative than -3x10-4ak/k/guires that was -1.11x10-4ak/k/ F.

Technical Specification 3.1.1.3.c re F at RATED THERMAL POWER.

The chart recorder data that were a part of the test package indicated that the measurements were performed at nominal power levels of 91% and 95% of rated thermal power.

(Power observations were recorder dependent). There was no evidence in the test package that these measurements had been extrapolated to 100% power for comparison with Technical Specification requirements.

Further, the test procedure, SP-101, required that the transients be initiated from a power level of 10010.5% power.

The issue of adequate determination of the moderator coef ficient at rated thermal power was defined as an unresolved item during the interview on March 9, 1979.

By telephone on March 12, 1979 the licensee reported a record search, which confirmed that the power range nuclear instruments met the re-quirements of the procedure when the transient s were initiated and that the instruments had been calibrated against a heat balance within the proceeding seven hours. The licensee went on to explain that they had been unable to span the recorders to indicate 100% power. The recorders were then used only to provide a resolvable record of power changes during the transients.

This matter is closed.

6.

Crancs and Fuel Handling Equipment The licensee expanded a commitment made in the course of inspection 78-19 to clean and re-inspect the wire rope on the spent-fuel-cask handling crane to include the rope on the polar crane.

Cleaning ar..d inspection of the latter was in progress during this inspection. The work was being done by a contractor under the direct supervision of an FPC enginee s - -3- . Maintenance was in progress on the polar crane under Work Request No.

00937, which was initiated on July 24, 1978, but not received by the maintenance supervisor for implementation until March 6,1979. On the work request the polar crane is described as a quality item not related to nuclear safety.

Hence an approved procedure was not required for the maintenance. The inspector questioned management on this characteriza-tion of the crane. Management stated that steps had been taken prior to this ir,spection to define the craue as having a safety-related function.

This action, if approved by corporate management, would require that maintenance on the polar crane, and others handling radioactive material, be performed by procedure.

Work needs to be done on the fuel handling and fuel transfer systems prior to the forthcoming refueling outage.

One of the licensee's engineers discussed the various maintenance, refurbishment and modi-fication options that are being considered.

Since no decision on the options had been made, there were no work or acceptance testing pro-cedures available for review.

7.

Receipt and Inspection of New Fuel The inspector examined two procedures used during receipt and inspection of fresh fuel, evaluating them for adequacy and reviewing documentation.

The procedures evaluated were: FP-302 " Fresh Fuel Receipt, Inspection, Inventory, Documentation and Storage" (Rev. 7) and SP-601 " Procedure for Load Testing Slings and Lifting Fixtures" (Rev.

6) The inspector reviewed documentation of the performance of these two procedures for versions in effect at the time new fuel was received.

There were five shipnents of new fuel received during September, October and November of 1978. Each consisted of 4 to 6 new fuel containers holding two fuel assemblies apiece.

All or part of the documentation was examined for every shipment, container and fuel assembly.

For the shipment of November 3, initialled and dated checklists for sections 6, 7, 8 and 11 of FP 302 were not available for review.

They will be examined at a later date (open Item 302/79-12-03).

In examining documentation of FP 302, the inspector found that on about 20% of the container / fuel assembly inspection reports, the sections to be completed for "QC Maps Compared to FA. " and " Inspection . . Summary" were left blank or marked "NA", contrary to FP 302 Step 9.10, requiring execution of the form.

In addition, Step 10 13, which is

-4- . applicable to each container, is omitted for about 90% of the con-tainers, and the Fresh Fuel Receipt Unloading form is unsigned for the October 27 shipment, contrary to the requirement of step 7.7 that the form be executed.

The finding of a series of examples of failure to follow procedure FP 302 represents noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 (302/79-12-1).

Extra and duplicate signoffs of FP 302 checklists were also found by the inspector. For the September 29 shipment, the entire procedure was signed off separately by two different individuals, and for the October 13 shipment, steps 9.1 to 9.14 were signed for each fuel assembly although the steps applied to the shipping containers only, each of which held two fuel assemblies.

In both cases, the nature of the duplicated steps is such that they would be expected to have been performed only once, giving the inspector the impression that dupli-cation arose because FP 302 was not used as a working procedure, to be followed while fuel receipt and inspection was in progress, but was instead filled in later, af ter work was complete. This impression is reinforced by the common practice of initia11ing and dating the first step of a checklist and drawing arrows through the rest to indicate completion.

The inspector also noted that the NRC-741 forms for the shipments of October 27 and November 3 both list receipt of fuel assembly NJ019E. The correction of one of these two forms will be reviewed at a later date (0 pen Item 302/79-12-4).

In evaluating FP 302 for adequacy, the inspector found several instances where information is recorded and no acceptance criteria are applied before continuing with the procedure. Moisture indicator color and container pressure are recorded without judgement of acceptability on the Fresh Fuel Receipt Unloading Inspection Reports, and moisture indication is again simply recorded on the Container / Fuel Assembly Inspection Reports.

Additionally, FP 302 Step 9.21 requires any deviation with the QC maps to be listed, with no criteria given for the depth of cladding scratch, width and length of a grid plate crack, etc.

acceptable for fuel use in the core. The inspector also noted that these deviations are listed on a form that has previously been signed per step 9.10 as " inspected and acceptable".

The licensee and inspector discussed the philosophy behind inspection of new fuel. FP 302 and P0QAM Volume 12 describe a simple visual inspec-tion for shipping damage. The inspector noted that as long as six months had passed between the Babcock and Wilcox QC inspection and the licensee's re:cipt of the fuel, during which time damage unrelated to shipping could have occurred.

Conversation with operators who performed . . -

S.

- .

-5-the fuel inspections indicated a much more complete inspection than that called for by FP 302 had actually been done, but again, without using acceptance criteria.

This finding of a lack of acceptance criteria for FP 302 represents noncompliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion 5 (302/79-12-2).

The inspector also found that the organization of FP 302 is such that provision is not made for the applicability of portions of the procedure to the shipment, the container, or the fuel assembly. Following the procedure as written documents the step-by-step progression only of the first fuel assembly and container selected. Those executing the procedure attached supplemental sheets for the additional containers and assemblin, but the steps selected for this documentation were incomplete, and inconsistant from shipment to shipment.

In additioa, the inspector found that the FP 302 equipment list for container and new fuel assembly handling and the SP 601 definitions of handling equipment did not clearly correlate with what was actually tested under SP 601 and used. The licensee and inspector discussed including in the FP 302 list more specific guidance on recommended equipment and acceptable alternates.

The licensee is currently revising his surveillance program for cranes, hooks, slings, etc., and the inspector will review changes made in FP 302 and SP 601 as a part of that program at a later date (Open Item 302/79-12-5). }}