IR 05000302/1979021
| ML19208B135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1979 |
| From: | Martin R, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B127 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-79-21, NUDOCS 7909190097 | |
| Download: ML19208B135 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES E
'n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 o,,
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Report No. 50-302/79-21 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Docket No. 50-302 License No. DPR-7 Inspection a t
ite near Crystal River, Florida Inspector:
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Ifate Signed
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Approved I
7f D. Martin,SeffionChief,RONSBranch Nat( Signed
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SUMMARY Inspection on June 11-15, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 39 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of piping system supports and restraints, independent inspection and follow up on open items.
Results Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Liegnsee Employees G. P. Beatty, Jr., Nuclear Plant Manager J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer s
G. Boldt, Performance Engineering Supervisor
- W. Stephenson, Plant Engineer R. Kennedy, Plant Engineer
- G. Williams, Compliance Plant Engineer
- L. Hill, Compliance Auditor L. Tittle, Results Engineer K. Lancaster, Compliance Auditor S. Johnson, Maintenance Engineer
- G. Westafer Other licensee employees contacted included shif t supervisers and reactor operators.
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection sce;e and findings were summarized on June 15, 1979 with those persons in.iicated in Paragraph I above, and discussed in a subsequent telephone conversation on June 20.
These findings are T
delineated in this report.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item (302/78-20-02): Evaluation of non ethylene propylene snubber seals. The licensee has not completed the deter-mination of expected life time for non EP Seals (RCP Seals excluded).
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/78-20-04): Temperature correction to functional test data. This item was incomplete. On June 20, the licensee informed the inspector by telephone that temperature corrections had been made to test data in accordance with NUREG 0467 and snubber operating ranges were acceptable.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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Piping Support and Restraints The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program for safety-related support and restraint systems. This included a review of procedures for technical adequacy; examination of a sample of installed dynamic and fixed pipe supports and restraints; review of recent surveillance records; and, follow up on previous inspector identified items. Pertinent aspects of this review are discussed below.
a.
Procedure Review Review of revised procedures SP-201, Hydraulic Snubber Inspec-tion, dated 6-4-79 and MP 130, Pipe Snubber Maintenance, dated 4-19-79 show that certain NRC concerns identified in an inspec-tion of August 10-11, 1978 (IE Report No. 50-302/78-20) were not adequately addressed.
Items which need to be included in these procedures were discussed with licensee personnel as follows:
1)
Limit of operable piston rod travel which will assure that the snubber will activate before it it tully extended or retracted.
2)
Lower limit of lock up and bleed velocity ranges which will assure that the snubber will not sctiv'.te from system movement during normal heat up and cool down.
3)
Correction factors to correct functional test data from test temperature to operating temperature.
At the exit interview, the licensee agreed that the above items would be determined and included in the procedures.
Timely revision of procedures SP-201 and MP-130 to include appropriate limits and temperature corrections was identified for future inspector follow up review as IFI (302/79-21-01).
b.
NRC Position The inspector discussed the conditions which must be met when a functional test is used to exempt a snubber which has failed a visual inspection from being counted as inoperable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval as follows:
1)
Hydraulic shock supperssors which are found to have empty hydraulic fluid reservoirs are inoperable even if functional testing of the lock-up a.;d bleed rate characteristics preve satisfactory. Snubbers with empty reservoirs provide inadequate assurance that they will remain operable 1, ' !
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2)
Hydraulic shock suppressors found to have missing or failed linkage connection to anchors or failed anchors are considered inoperable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval and may not be exempted
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by performing a functional test.
3)
For hydraulic shock suppressors which exhibit a deteriorated condition (for instance, low fluid levels, corroded piston, dirty piston rod, etc.) and which do not pass the visual inspection, satisfactory functional test results may be used to exempt the suppressor from being counted as inoperable for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval,provided that the cause of the visual inspection failure is clearly established and corrected (hydraulic problems are normally to be corrected by means of a snubber overhaul) for the particular snubber and for all other snubbers that may be generically susceptible. Note:
A snubber is considered to be generically susceptible if:
a)
It is the same make or model and has the same design features directly related to the failure of the visual inspection performed on the inoperable snubber.
b)
It is similarly located or enosed to the same environmental conditions (e.g., same temperature and radiation fields) as the inoperable snubber.
4)
If the cause for failure of the visual inspection is not identified, the snubber shall be considered inoperable for the purposes of establishing the subsequent visual inspection interval.
c.
Test Results Review The inspector reviewed the data of the visual inspection of ac:essible snubbers performed on March 21, 1979 anu unaccessible snubbers performed on May 10, 1979 and the data of functional terts performed in the period February 15 to April 4, 1979.
Findings from this review were discussed with licensee engineers and management as follows:
1)
Documentation does not adequately describe visually identified problems, technical evaluation and corrective action.
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Technical evaluation of an identified problem to determine whether a snubber is operable or inoperable should be performed by qualified personnel before the condition of the snubber is altered and the basis for the technical decision clearly documented.
3)
The source of leakage was not identified in some cases for snubbers with low reservoir levels.
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4)
Temperature corrections to extrapolate functional test dats from test temperature to operating temperature had not been performed.
Licensee management agreed that prior to taking the plant to a hot condition, temperature corrections would be made to func-tional test data and operability of these units verified.
Also, snubbers with low fluid levels would be reinspected to determine and evaluate the source of leakage.
The licensee subsequently informed the inspector by telephone that the functional test data had been adjusted to operating temperatures in accordance with the values of NUREG-0467 and all units tested were acceptable. Of 6 snubbers reinspected for leaka;e 4 had slight leakage around the sight glass and were considered operable. Two others with leaks in the pressure boundry were functionally tested and found inoperable. Repairs were made.
d.
Support / Restraint Inspection Accompanied by licensee personnel the inspector toured the reactor building to inspect installed supports and restraints.
One discrepancy was identified in that a spring hanger near RCH30 appeared to be bottomed. The licensee agreed to evaluate the problem and take corrective action.
e.
Containment Purge Exhaust Valves During this outage (May 11, 1979) the licensee identified significant leakage through the containment purge exhaust valves AHV 1A and IB.
It appeared that although a high leakage rate existed (192000 SCCM) from these valves the combined type B and C leak rate did not exceed 0.6La (248656 SCCM).
During a review of the leak rate calculations for AHV 1A and IB in the Region II office, the inspector noted that an incorrect conversion factor had resulted in a nonconservative determination of valve leakage.
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-5-Discussion with the licensee by telephone on July 2 reJealed that the licensee had identified the error and was implementing corrective action.
A 30 day event report will be submitted.
The licensee stated that the valves were repaired and leakage reduced to 3 SCCH. The unit is still in mode 5 and no technical specification action statement was exceeded after identification of the problem.
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f.
Follow Up Inspection Items (Closed) Follow Up Inspection Item (78-20-01): Revise visual inspection and functional test procedures SP-201 and HP-130.
The licensee had revised his procedures but certain NRC concerns had not been adequately addressed. This item was closed and item 79-21-01 was opened to address the current procedure discrepancies (see paragraph 5.a).
(Closed) Follow Up Inspection Item (78-20-03): Establish guide lines for selection of a representative sample of snubbers for functional testing. Guide lines are now specified in SP-201.
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