IR 05000302/1979007

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IE Insp Rept 50-302/79-07 on 790122-26.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Have Adequate Auxiliary Bldg Evacuation Sys & Failure to Have Working Portal Monitor at Guardhouse
ML19246B449
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1979
From: Gibson G, Hufham J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19246B412 List:
References
50-302-79-07, 50-302-79-7, NUDOCS 7907130511
Download: ML19246B449 (7)


Text

I e* R'00 UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

ATLANTA. GEORGIA 3o303 ogs...../

Repo.t No.:

50-302/79-7 Licensee:

Florida Power Corporation P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stcp C-4 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Docket No.:

50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Inspection at Crystal River Site, Cr's 1 River, Florida f // 6 /~79 Inspector:

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Approved by:

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  1. i J. W. Hufha.,

ection Chief, FF&MS Branch IL te' Bigned i

SUMMARY Inspection on January 22-26, 1979 Areas Inspected The inspection involved 32 manhours onsite and 2 manhours offsite by one NRC inspector. A special unannounced emergency plan followup, announced confirmatory measurements sample collection, and unannounced health physics inspection including:

review of auxiliary building evacuation system; review of evacuation accountability system, collected intercomparison radiochemistry sample collection; examined personnel monitoring equipment; monitored personnel protective clothing; review of plant decontamination facilities; and examination of RCA material control program.

Results Of the seven areas reviewed, two items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction - failure to have adequate auxiliary building evacuation system - Section 5; Deficiency - failure to have working portal monitor at guard house (Emergency Assembly Center) - Sectic,n 7) in two areas.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • G.

Beatty, Nuclear Plant Manager P. McKee, Technical Services Superintendent

  • J. Cooper, Compliance Engineer
  • J. Wright, Chem-Rad Protection Engineer
  • J.

Harrison, Assistant Chem-Rad Protection Engineer

  • G.

Perkins, Pealth haysics Supervisot G. Beal, Technician R. Fuller, Chem-Rad Plant Engineer S. Lashbrook, Technician C. Ruszala, Radwaste Supervisor

  • G. Williams, Nuclear Compliance Plant Engineer In addition, the inspector interviewed 14 FPC plant personnel and licensee subcontractor personnel.
  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 26, 1979, with those persons noted in Paragraph 1.

The licensee acknowledged the two items of noncompliance and one unresolved item.

As discussed in Section 5.g., the licensee provided a complete response to one itea of noncompliance and the inspector stated no additional response would be required.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings No previous enforcement items were within the scope of this inspection.

4.

'Jnresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. One new unresolved item identified furing this inspec-tion is discussed in Section 6.b.

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-2-5.

A:idibility of Auxiliary Building Evacuation Announcement System The inspector reviewed the licensee emergency announcement system a.

for evacuation of the auxiliary building.

As discussed in IE inspection report 302-79-01, unresolved item 302-79-01-01 dis-closed potential areas in the auxiliary building where high noise levels may preclude audibility of the PA system which is used to announce evacuation of the auxiliary building.

b.

The inspector toured the auxiliary building area.

The inspector interviewed 21 individuals, selected at random, from plant records of individuals in the RCA during recent auxiliary building evacu-ations. Of the 21 individuals interviewed, 19 individuals stated that " dead areas" existed in the auxiliary building and related areas.

In addition, on January 4 and January 22, 1979, six and eight individuals, respectively, working in the auxiliary build-ing, were unable to hear actual evacuation announcements.

The inspector compiled a partial listing of the following areas where the PA system is apparently inadequate: Diesel Room (during diesel operation), air handling fan area (145 foot elevation),

auxiliary building pumps and waste tanks (143 foot elevation),

and the makeup purp decay heat pit (75 foot elevation) area.

c.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.e requires the licensee to imple-ment the emergency plan procedures.

Emergency Plan procedure EM-100, " Emergency Plan", Section 2.5.1.2, states, "As the Plant Public Address (PA) System, the phone is used for announcements or sg :ial instructions.

A number of speakers are located stra-tegically throughout the plant to assure maximum voice coverage".

Section 4.1.1 states. "A class

'A'

radiation emergency is one which involves excessive and/or uncontrolled radioactive spills and unexpected high radiation ar2as which may require partial evacuation icem or within the Nuclear Plant area only.

The plant evacuation alarm 3,

te:.fil not be used for a Class 'A'

radia-tion emergency although the RB evacuation alarm may be used as required".

Section 2.6.1.A states, "The Emergency Coordinator will use the plant PA system to notify plant personnel of the emergency".

Contrary to the above, the plant PA system on January 4 and 22, 1979 did not adequately function to alert plant personnel in the auxiliary building. This constitutes an item of noncon-pliance with the referenced Technical Specification (302-79-07-01).

d.

The inspector examined licensee work requests and discussed with licensee personnel engineering evaluations of the PA system.

Licensee personnel stated the PA system was properly functional, but did not have the ability to be audible in certain high noise areas.

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-3-The inspector examined all licensee reports of plant Safety e.

Meetings for 1978 to identify instances where the PA audibility question was discussed. The inspector observed the first ap-parent discussion of system adequacy was on November 28, 1978.

f.

The inspector conducted an independent assessment of the audi-bility of the PA system, including a demonstration of the " Call Code Mode", in the auxiliary building.

Although the " Call Code Mode" system improved am1ibility, areas were still identified ty the inspector which were " dead areas".

g.

The inspector discussed with licensee personnel the item of noncompliance and proposed corrective actions.

As discussed and as committed to by the licensec in the exit interview (Section 4),

the licensee is to conduct the following program:

(1) The licensee shall evaltate alternative annunciator systems, including, but not limited to:

(a) An additional " siren" type sound to the existing reac-tor building and site evacuation siren sound system.

(b) Augment the current announcement PA and " Call Code Mode" system with bells and speakers.

(c) Flash existing lights.

(d)

Install visual alarm devico.

Completion of the evaluation and selection of corrective action shall be completed by February 15, 1979=

(2) On February 15, 1979, the licensee shall inform the Com-missioi as to the date by which completion and operation of the corrective action selected in (1) above.

(3)

In the interim period, ur.til operation of a final system, the licensee shall:

(a) Posi notices and inform all employees that as of Janua ry 29, 1979, auxiliary building evacuation an-nouncements will be supplemented with a dual-single ring on the " Call Code Mode".

(b) A guard shall be posted from January 29 until February 5, and thereafter if required, at the entrance to the RCA to assure that personnel properly adhere to sign-in/ sign-out procedure:- for RCA accountability.

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(c) During all shifts, during an auxiliary building evacua-tion, Chem-Rad technicians will immediately review the RCA entrance records and RWP orders to perform person-nel accountability and to re-enter the auxiliary build-ing if necessary to assure all personnel receive the evacuation announcement.

This item will be examined during subsequent inspections.

6.

Accountability During RCA Evacuations a.

The inspector reviewed plant RCA dosimetry records to identify personnel in the auxiliary building as discussed in Section 5.b.

The inspector noted that licensee personnel were not checking in/out each entry into the RCA.

The inspector confirmed this observation during discussions with licensee personnel.

Cur-rently, the licensee is unable to quickly account for personnel in the P.CA based upon dosimetry records at the Chem-Rad office control point.

As discussed in Section 5.g(3)(b), current ac-countability shall be improved.

b.

As discussed with licenses personnel, a nea security-accountability computer system is currently being installed.

The new system will allow the licensee to identify and locate per-sonnel during emergencies, thus allowing reentry if assistance is required. This item shall be considered an unresolved item (302-79-7-02) pending irstallation and successful operation of this system, including a remote terminal output at the Chem-Rad RCA control point.

7.

Preventative Measures "ersonnel Contamination The inspector nuied, on January 22 and 24, 1979, that on three a.

occasions, the inspector passed through the radioactive personnel portal monitor at the guard house without initiating the counting mechanism. Additionally, on January 24, the inspector observed two licensee indiv; duals pass through the portal monitor without activating the counting mechanism.

Procedure EM-100, Section 4.3.1.1.f states, "All personnel leaving the plant will be monitored at the guardhouse for radioactive contamination" Contrary to Technical Specification 6.8.1.e, requiring imple-mentation of EM procedures, failtre of the portal monitor to operate properly for preventative contamination monitoring con-stitutes an item of noncompliance with the referenced Techrical Specification (302-79-7-03).

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-5-8.

Protective Clothin s The inspector performed an independent survey of the contamination levels on protective coveralls.

The inspector surveyed selected clothing used as PC's for reactor building entry. The coveralls surveyed were within the contamination limits set forth in the Radia-tion Control Manual, Procedure RP-101.

The inspector has no further questions regarding this item at this time.

9.

Decontamination Facilities a.

The inspector examined the Decontamination Room in the RCA.

The inspector discussed with licensee personnel the methods of decon-tamination when the liquid waste tank is being discharged and the sinks are labelled " closed".

Licensee personnel stated that employees will be reinstructed in HP procedures, such that the contaminated individual notifies HP personnel and then use the decontamination facilities.

This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection (302-79-7-04).

b.

The inspector also discussed with licensee personnel the avail-ability of cleaning agents in the decontamination kit kept in the decontamination facility.

In addition, general housekeeping in the deconta,ination area was discussed.

Licensee personnel stated recent administrative changes had been made tc improve the condition of the decontamination facility.

This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection (302-79-7-05).

10.

Removal of Materials from the Reactor Building The inspector examined the HP survey records of selected items removed from the reactor building during the August through October 1978 outage.

The inspector discussed with licensee personnel the tethods and procedures whereby material is surveyed and tagged prior to re-moval from the facility.

The inspector examined work logbooks of HP for the periods August I through October 1, 1979. The inspector noted the records reviewed indicated all material was properly contained within the RCA and/or the special RCA laydown area on the plant berm.

This item will be examined further during a subsequent inspection.

(302-79-7-06)

11.

Confirmatory Measurements Samples a.

The inspector discussed with licensee personnel problems as-sociated with samples previously collected (302-77-24-13) where the samples were discarded inadvertently.

Therefore, item 302-77-24-13 is considered closed.

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-6-b.

The inspector obtained a liquid waste, waste gas, particulate filter, and charcoal adsorber sample.

The licensee performed analyses an these samples during the inspection and will submit these results to the inspector. This item will be examined during a subsequent inspection (302-79-7-07).

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