IR 05000282/1985024

Insp Repts 50-282/85-24 & 50-306/85-22 on 851208-860208. Violation Noted:Failure to Amend Tech Specs to Reflect Plant Changes to Inverters Supplying Instrument Buses

ML20214E116
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	03/03/1986
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214E100	List: IR 05000282/1985024 ML20214E098 ML20214E106
References
50-282-85-24, 50-306-85-22, IEB-85-001, IEB-85-1, NUDOCS 8603070124
Download: ML20214E116 (7)

Text

. .

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/85024(DRP); 50-306/85022(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensce: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: December 8, 1985 through February 8, 1986 Inspectors: J. E. Hard M. M. Moser Approved By: ek $f" S 'N l

ReactorP)jectsSection28 Date'

'

Inspection Summary Inspection on December 8, 1985 throu No. 50-282/85024(ORP); 50-306/85022(gh DRF)) February 8,1986 (Reports Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, ESF systems, facility modifications, periodic and special reports, corporate management concerns, followup of Licensee Event Reports, and IE Bulletins followup. The inspection involved a total of 356 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors including 58 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: One violation was identified in the ten areas inspected. The violation involved failure to amend technical specifications to reflect plant changes that had been mad PDR ADOCK 05000202 G PDR

.

.

. . _ . _ _ . . _ .. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . . _ _

e l . .

i1 i

DETAILS l i Persons Contacted

{ L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants i F. Tierney, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction i

'

• E. Watzl, Plant Manager

!

'

• D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance

*A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer

A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer

M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations I D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

'

l J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance G. Lenertz, Superintendent, Maintenance  ;

! J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering j *K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering

! M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services

'

, D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction

! J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

,

A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse i

j The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of l the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and

auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift fechnical Advisor '

l Corporate personnel who visited the site on December 11, 1985, are listed

{ in Section 9 below.

I * Denotes those present at the exit interview on February 19, 1986.

I

! Licensee Action on Drgyjous Inspection Findings i

l (Closed) Open item (50-282/85010-01(DRP)): 0-1 crankcase oil contaminated

'

with water. This event occurred on May 21, 1985. On August 2, 1985, the ,

onsite safety committee (OC) approved the investigative report with its

recommendations. These recommendations have been implemented.

i Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710)

i

'

Unit I commenced coastdown on January 3, 1986 for a refueling outage with power at about 67% at the end of the report period. Unit 2 was base loaded

{ at 100% power except for reductions for surveillance testing, special i maintenance, and weekend load followin i i

!

!

l  !

i

'

!

i

.__

. .

The inspector obse'rycj control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc During initial switch-in of the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Level Indicator System (RVLIS) on December 11, inverters 22 and 23 tripped to standby electrical supply. Several automatic trips to standby source occurred during the day. For an 11-minute period in the af ternoon, both 22 and 23 inverters were simultaneously powered from their standby source, a condi-tion not believed to be permissible by the intent of the technical specifications. See Section 7 below for further discussion of this potential violatio On January 28, 1986 during control board walkdown on shift turnover, it was noted that neither control panel light was illuminated for 21 shield building recirculation fan. The problem was traced to a blown fuse in the control circuitry. The redundant train, 22, was immediately tested and found to be operable although the amount of vacuum drawn in the shield building did not seem to meet the values discussed in the technical specification bases (see below for further discussion). Train 21 was run after replacing the blown fuse and operated satisfactorily. On January 29, further testing of 22 train was conducted with the inspector present. This time the test was run at the design temperature of 70 degrees F. and the system met its equilibrium pressure requirement (-1.83 in, water v .82 in, water required).

4. Maintenance Observation (62703) i Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components c listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted "

in accordance with approved proc 2dures, regulatory guides and industry ;

codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were corsidered during this review: the limiting ,

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radio-logical controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were

.

implemente .

3 '

.

e

.

.

.

- ... _- - -

,

. .

'

>

i

'

Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed

,

during the inspection period: ,

121 Traveling screen repair Upper internals cask construction Boric acid storage tank level sensor installation (

Underwater repair of fuel transfer car ,

!

No violations or deviations were identifie ,

5. Surveillance (61726)

The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safet>-related

! systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests

'

were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, !

observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operaters, that i Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system i

!

'

and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirement Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

I SP 1093 Diesel generator functional test SP 2093 Diesel generator functional test Special test of new control air valve on

II TDAFW pump steam supply

No viciations or deviations were identified.

'

i ,

'

6. ESF System Walkdown (71710) '

! The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of

the Units 1 and 2 containment spray systems and also both emergency diesel ,

! ranerator systems. Observations included confirmation of selected portions

! of the Licensee's procedures, checklists, plant drawings, verification of ;

i correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant ,

! equipment and instrumentation are properly aligned, and review of control ,

i room and local system indication to insure proper operation within l prescribed limit [

! No violations or deviations were identifie I i ,

}

l l

!

i 4 i .

.

. ,

,

7. Facility Modifications (37700, 37701)

Problems with 22 and 23 Inverters As noted in Section 3 above, during the initial switch-in of the Unit 2 RVLIS on December 11, 22 and 23 inverters transferred to their standby sources and were simultaneously in this condition for an 11-minute period during the day. (These two inverters provide power to instrument buses 212 and 213 respectively). Technical Specifit.ation 3.7.A.7 states that:

"No more than one of the inverter supply buses 111,112,113, and 114, or i 211, 212, 213, and 214, 10 powered from each of Panels 117 and 21 Panels 117 and 217 are the backup power supplies for the instrument buses l in the original plant design, and the technical specification requirement cbove seems to be based on the original design. However, in 1980 and 1983, Units 1 and 2 inverter instrument supply systems respectively were upgraded to provide a standby power source integral to each of the inverters. This new design improved considerably the reliability of power to the instrument buses. However, the Technical Specifications were not amended to reflect the plant changes (a significant tech spec ;

i revision currently being prepared by the licensee and soon to be I submitted should correct this difficulty.) This appears to be in violation with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1). See Notic (282/85024-01; 306/85022-01)

On January 29, 1986 a special test was performed on the No. 11 turbine driven auxiliary feed pump (TDAFW) with simulated loss of electrical power. The pump was started using a special control air valve which is used to bleed air off the control valve in the turbine steam supply lin The pump came up to speed and normal discharge pressure but lack of pump bearing oil pressure required that the pump be manually shut dow Immediately after the pump shut down, operability of the motor driven oil pump was confirmed, thus demonstrating that #11 TDAFW purp has not been inoperable. This potential problem is applicable to both TDAFW pumps and to electrical oil pump failure of the motor driven auxiliary feed water pumps (MDAFW). The licensee is evaluating the significance of the even This is considered to be an Open Item (282/85024-02; 306/85022-02).

'

8. Review of Periodic and Special Reports (90713) Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)

Revision 3 dated June 1985 to the updated safety analysis report (USAR) describes the residual heat removal cubicle air monitor (R-26 and R-27) in Paragraph 7.5.2.9. The description states in part that

"two identical systems monitor the exhaust air from the RHR cubicles for any indication of system leaks. Each cubicle is monitored."

And also "a high level alarm is annunciated in the control room to alert operators of an abnormal condition." As presently installed

,

- ..

and operated, the monitoring of the RHR cubicles and high level alarm annunciation in the control room only occurs when the emergency auxiliary building special ventilation system is activated during an emergency. This discrepancy between the USAR and actual practice will be listed as an Open Item until the USAR description is revised. (282/85024-03; 306/85022-03).

The post accident cooling water flow requirement per the USAR is 14,620 gp See USAR Page 10.4- However, in a loss-of-offsite power situation, cooling water available from one operating diesel powered cooling water pump is only 13,000 gpm. See USAR Page 10.4-6. This apparent difference between required and available cooling water is being discussed with the licensee. This is an Open Item (282/85024-04; 306/85022-04). Technical Specifications During review of the emergency cooling water system, the inspector noted a lack of technical specifications regarding the safeguards traveling screens, 121 and 122. In particular, operability requirements for these screens are not included though the screens are part of the plant ultimate heat sink. This matter is being discussed with the licensee and NRR and is considered an Open Item (50-282/85024-05; 50-306/85022-05).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Meeting with Corporate Management (30702)

On December 11, 1985, ',he inspectors met with the following NSP people in the NRC Site Office:

D. McCarthy - Chairman of the Board and CEO B. Richard - President and C00 D. Gilberts - Sr. Vice President, Power Supply Discussions were held on the subjects of the NRC inspection program and operation of the plan . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:

(Closed) 282/85024-06 Reactor trip caused by broken air line (Closed) 306/85022-06 Turbine overspeed surveillance test done two days late .

a

(

. ..

(Closed) 282/85024-07 Inoperability of diesel generator support systems (Closed) 282/85024-08 Auto start of one diesel powered cooling water pump on low header pressur (Closed) 282/85024-09 Slight cooling water leak in containment No violations or deviations were identifie . IE Bulletin Fo110wup (92703)

(Interim Report) IEB 85-01 (282/85024-BB; 306/85022-BB(DRP)): Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps The inspector verified that the following 90-day responses were completed within the time allotted: " Develop procedures for monitoring fluid conditions within the AFW system on a regular basis during times when the system is required to be operable. This monitoring should ensure that fluid temperature at the AFW pump discharge is maintained at about ambient temperature. Monitoring of fluid conditions, if used as the primary basis for precluding steam binding, is recommended each shift."

Turbine building operators are required to touch the pipes during their rounds twice a shift. This requirement is included in their log sheet . " Develop procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur."

These special procedures are now included in Procedure ES, Loss of Feedwater Suppl No violations or deviaticns were identifie . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on February 19, 1986. The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with rega-d to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietar _ - - _____-__ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _-___ -