IR 05000282/1987014

Insp Repts 50-282/87-14 & 50-306/87-13 on 870823-1003.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillances,Esf Sys,Cooling Water Sys Difficulties,Spent Fuel Pool Activities & LER Followup

ML20236K076
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	10/20/1987
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236K033	List: IR 05000282/1987014 ML20236K029
References
50-282-87-14, 50-306-87-13, NUDOCS 8711090083
Download: ML20236K076 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/87014(ORP); 50-306/87013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. OPR-42; No. DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted: August 23 through betober 3, 1987 Inspectors: J. E. Hard M. M. Moser

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Approved By: R. DeFayFtte, Chief 6?c[ed w 2 0, / 98 7 l Reactor Projects Section 28 Date l Inspection Summary Inspection on August 23 through October 3,1987 (Reports No. 50-282/87014(DRP); l No. 50-306/87013(0RP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, ESF systems, cooling water system difficulties, spent fuel pool activities, training, followup of Licensee Event Reports, and meetings with corporate managemen Results: No violations were identified in the ten areas inspecte PDR ADOCK 0500

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DETAILS l

' Persons Contacted

• • D. Gilberts, Senior Vice President Power Supply

• • C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation ,

• • L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants

• • F. Tierney, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction l

• • D. Youngdahl,-Manager, Production Plant Maintenance ,

• • S. Northard, Senior Nuclear Program Consultant i

• • G. Ortler,. Senior Management Consultant

• • D. Musolf, Manager Nuclear Support Services i P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance E. Eckholt, Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer

• E. Watzl, Plant Manager  !

D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager

• M. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection  ;

G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance  ;

J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering

• K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering M.' Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering l R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction '

J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

• A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer  ;

A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services '

A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse D. Robbins, Refueling Coordinator, Westinghouse The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, Shift Technical Advisors, and Shift Manager * Denotes those present at the exit interview of October 5, 198 ** Denotes corporate personnel who were visited on September 22, 198 . Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) 282/86007-01 Violatio Failure to Follow Written 306/86007-01 Procedures in Substatio Correction action included reviewing with all relay technicians the importance of adherence to written procedures. This subject is being revisited as a result of a more recent event originating in the .

substatio See Notice of Violation 282/87012-03(DRP). )

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. L(Closed)L282/86007-03a Violation. . Failure'to Replacs Limit Switch Cover on Valve 3202 A Stop Work Order was issued and modification control procedure significantly.' revised as ~a result of this and other-occurrence (Closed)- 282/86007-03b Violation. Failure to Promptly Log Pe'rtinent Informatio Instructions ~to the operating staff have been expanded and clarifis '

(Closed) '282/86007-04 Violatio Failure to Control Activities Which had Some Adverse Effect on Plant-Operation. (Inadvertent step counter operation).

A Stop Work Order.was issued and the modification: control procedure- ]

.significantly revised, i (Closed) 306/86007-02- Unresolved Item. Component Cooling M0V 32129 Did Not Operate During RHR Surveillance Tes Analysis of the occurrence showed that the failure of the valve to open was due to a bent' stem or buildup of foreign matter on the stem or an improperly sized spring pack on the Limitorque operator. Despite these

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faults,'the valve demonstrated that it would have opened under the conditions of.an automatic start of the associated RHR pum , Operational Safety Verification'(71707)  !

UnitEl and Unit 2 were base loaded at 100% power except for reductions-for surveillance testin The inspector observbd control' room operations, reviewed applicable logs, l conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift '

turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency l systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper '

. return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted j to' observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, '

and to~ verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of. maintenanc See Section 7 for a summary of the recent problems associated with the (Cooling Water Syste No' violations or deviations were identified.

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. Maintenance Observation (62703)

. Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities (on safety-related systems and components) listed below were observed /

reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation ~were' met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning !

components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, ;

activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemente Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

• Prevertive Maintenance of Guardhouse Emergency Diesel Generator

• - Flush sling Water Inlet Piping to No. 21 Auxiliary Feedwater l i

Pump

• Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Valve Installation i

• Repair Steam Admission Valve to No.11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirement Portions of the following surveillance were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

• SP 1093 D1 Diesel Generator Manual and 4KV Voltage l Rejection-Restoration Scheme Test, Bus 16

• SP 1661 Monthly Guardhouse Emergency Diesel Generator Operation j

• SP 2102 No. 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillance l

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• SP 1172 Ventilation System Monthly Operation Test

• SP 1110 . Cooling Water System Isolation Valves Test

• SP 1728 Siren Test-Emergency diesel generator D2 failed to start during surveillance testing on September 21, 1987. Investigation revealed that the engine governor oil booster had failed. The oil booster was replaced, and the diesel was successfully tested the same da On September 30, 1987 during surveillance testing of No. 11 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the auxiliary oil pump failed to stop after the feedwater pump came up to speed. This was indication that the shaft driven oil gear pump was not operating. Investigation revealed that air binding of the gear pump seemed to be the problem. Possible design changes for the oil system are being evaluated. Since the introduction of air may be from the periodic operation of the auxiliary oil pump, less frequent auxiliary oil pump operation is being considered. This is an open item (50-282/87014-01). '

No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdcwn (71710)

The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators. Observations inc?uded confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, '

checklists, plant druings, verification of correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and instrumentation are properly aligned, and local System indication to insure proper operation within prescribed limit No violations or deviations were identifie . Recent Cooling Water System Difficulties A series of recent difficulties with the cooling water system is summarized her During Unit 1 outage, April-May 1987 - Testing of the valves which connect the cooling water system (river water) with the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps resulted in the flushing of large quantities of sediments and clams into the two AFW pump One of the two pumps, No. 11, was disabled to the extent that in later testing, the pump was unable to deliver the required flow rate. Though it appears that had this pump been running at the time of introduction of dirty water it probably would have continued te pump under these conditions, the potential existed for disabling this important safety equipment. See also Inspection Reports No. 50-282/87009(DRP); No. 50-306/87009(DRP). This matter was also discussed by the licensee in a meeting with RIII management on July 15, 198 _

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.On' August 1, 1987 - During a period of high' river water temperature, the emergency cooling water safeguards bay gates were closed, thus causing cooler water at river bottom to be drawn into the cooling water syste ,,

However, the emergency cooling water line to the river bottom was not backflushed beforehand. .As a result, muddy river waten was pumpedgint <

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the cooling water system. The immediate effect of this was a hign t temperaturealarmon124aircompressorwhichcleared'afterflushine["ths- l cooling water piping. No other problems were reported at the tim '

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On August 13, 1987 - Du % g , testing of the cooling water system feature which is intended to isoYatu turbine building loads from the'A cooling .. ,

water loop ~ in the; event of a line break, the flow switch failed to D j actuate. The reason for the failure was determined to be mud in the flow j dvitch sensing lines. Sin S this test is'a monthly one and since the July test wa's successful, introduction of muddy water on August 1 may

'have been instrumental in the. failur l Also'on August 13, 1987 - During routine testing of the comparable l isolition feature on the B cooling water loop, Operations personnel had to tap the microswitch manifold to cause the microswitch to activate and the' desired isolation to occur. No corrective action seems to have been

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initiated at this' tim > 1 On August 24, 1987 - During 'lhe monthly operational surveiliarce test of No. 22 AFW, there was no cooling water flow to the turbine governor nor  !

to the turbine bearings. A strainer in that ecoling watmline was found

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p?ugged. This required disassembly-add cleaning of the strainer te resume flow. Since previous tests by t s, pumps can operate satisfactorily wi,thou% plant dter t this cooling staff supply showedforthat these

about 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, No. 22 pump seems riot to have been inoperable as a result of this pluggiry. .thnetheless, the pump possibly had been in this  ;

condition for a' considerable time without detection of;tte plugged straine .

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On September IL,'1997 - Tne senion resident inspector noted in conversatioils sith plant sttff.that followup actions as a result of the discovery of clams and sediinent in April-May 1987.had not been complete These discussions and walkdowns of the cooling water header by plant personnel and the insp9ct3r revealed a number of safety-related piping attachments to the fire p%te:: tion system and to the diesel generator cooling systems which had not been flushed. These piping attachments whidh are'backuS3 cares to the two systems probably had not been flushed j since the plant y $aded operation in 1973-74. Plant personnel made plans j

,to flush this pipsr j

.On September 18,'1987 - During routine testing of the B cMiing water j l 7aop isolation valve feature, the flow microswitch again fiMled to l

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operate without tapping on the manifold. Subsequent testirQ o6.the i microswitch, witnessed by the resident inspector, could not repdat the

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On. September 21, 1987 - The backup cooling water piping to diesel generator No. 2 (D2) was flushed through the generator heat exchanger ;

Cooling water flow to the heat exchangers after the flush was estimated :

to be about 900 gpm. This is the flow recommended in the generator !

manual and exceeds the 700 gpm shown in the FSA The.02 heat exchangers were disassembled and a small quantity, about 1/2 pint, of clams were removed.' j

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On September 22, 1987 - The backup cooMag water piping to 01 was flushed through the generator heat exchangers. Cooling water flow through the l

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i heat exchangers following this flush was estimated to be about 300 gp ;

The amount of clams found in the heat exchangers was about one quart. It u{y r is not clear that this cooling flow is adequate to consider D1 to have g) q

'been operable had it been necessary to use the backup cooling water

. sourc The licensee is investigating this questio JN -),

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Status as of October 3,1987 - Procedures which specify the conditions i rk(

, under which the emergency cooling water line can be put inte operation i

'o a have been clarified to require prior backflushing. The flow sensing microswitches discussed above are scheduled to be replace Backup cooling water supplies to the diesel generators have been flushe A ,

detera,ination is being made whether D1 would have been operable when l using'the backup cooling water supply. Backup cooling water supply lines '

to the fire protection system remain to be flushe !

Though none)of the items discussed above have as yet been specifically f identified as a violation, collectively they are of safety concern since !

they are an indication of inadequate attention to the details of plant

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cperation,. and of insufficient followup actions which should have been taken as a result of plant occurrences or surveillance test Questions raised by these experiences with the cooling water system will be tracked within the scope of the previously identified'unresclved item

.. 287/8'7009-01(DRP)pendingreviewbytheresidentinspectorsofthe i

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d ' completed cWrective action '

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. SpentFue[PoolActivities(86700) ,

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As noted inxthe last inspection report, the fuel rod consolidation !

demonstrahidaprogramwasmovingforwardwithatentativestartdateof  !

October b,' 198 The contractor for this demonstration (Westinghouse)

has installed and tested all of the specihl tooling / fixtures in the spent '

fuel pool and a specially trained crew is on sit One final issue that i needs to be addressed is whether this demonstration program falls under ;

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10 CFR 50.59 changes, tests and experiments, or whethe, a technical j

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specification amendment is required. (This issue was resolved by NRR on October 8, 1987.)

During the report period, a special tool for the handling of fuel l-

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assemblies suffering from bulge joint corrosion was received onsit This tool, called the"thiinble grip tool, was tested with a fuel assembly !

but failed its tesUwhen the gripping mandrels slipped. New mandrels are I

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being provided by-the designer, Westinghous No corroded fuel is to be handled during the rod consolidation program until the thimble grip tool has been modified and teste ' General Employee Training (41990)

The inspector attended a session of the General Employee Training that is required to be given to both NSP and contractor personnel who work at the plant. Included in the six-hour session were a general plant orientation

, and discussions in the work control system, QA program, industrial safety l l _ rules, NRC rules and regulations, plant security, fire protection, emergency plan signals and actions, radiation protection, respiratory 1 l protection, and other topics. Instruction was given in donning and removal of anti-contamination clothing and the attendees were required to demonstrate that they could properly do this. This training is currently in the program certified by INP y 1 Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700) h

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:

(Closed) 282/87007-LL Failure of No. 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Voluntary) i Extensive analysis of this event results in the conclusions that total -

loss of pump capability would not have been expected to occur had the cooling water vaW e opened under loss of condensate conditions, and that it is unknown whether the pump would have operated satisfactorily

, (i.e. , would have had a satisfactory flow rate) under those conditions.

l Followup items such as flushing of the balance of the cooling water system will be tracked under Unresolved Item 282/87009-01(ORP). Lee Section 7 abov (Closed) 282/87009-LL Failure of No. 11 Safety Injection SI Pump To Start While doing a routine surveillance test on the Unit 1 SI pumps, pump 11 failed to start because the breaker was improperly racked in. This condition had existed for many days with the reactor at power. Corrective action taken as a result of this event: This breaker racking was immediately correcte .. All other-similar breakers were checked to assure they were operational.

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' All operators have been retrained in the proper racking of this type breaker,

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l Independent verification procedures were revised to reflect the lessons learned from.this even . Plant procedures have.been revised to assure proper testing of safety equipment following any work which involves racking out of the !

. associated breaker .(See' Inspection Report No. 50-282/87011(DRP) for further details on this event.)

(0 pen) 282/87013-LL Unit 1-Trip on Restart from Main Generator Inspection (0 pen) 282/87014-LL Unit 1-Power Range Hi Flux Lo Setpoint Exceeded Technical Specifications (0 pen) 282/87015-LL Storm-related Equipment Actuations and Power Outages (0 pen) 282/87016-LL No. 10 Transformer Locked Out by Relay I Technician 1 M_eeting with-Corporate Management (30702).

On September 22, 1987 the Senior Resident Inspector met with NSP officials 'l identified in Paragraph 1 above at the corporate offices in Minneapoli The following subjects were discussed: Recent plant events Y NRC requalification on testing and NSP training progra I Results of annual INP0 audi . Plant organizational matters.

, Corporate organizational matter . Plant expansions being planne . Fitness for duty implementatio . Exit (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 5, 198 )

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The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and !

the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely information ]

content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes l reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not !

identify any document / processes as proprietary,

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