IR 05000282/1989020

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Insp Repts 50-282/89-20 & 50-306/89-20 on 890702-0812.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of LERs & Generic Ltrs,Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance & Miscellaneous Licensing Matters
ML20247A703
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/28/1989
From: Burgess B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247A701 List:
References
50-282-89-20, 50-306-89-20, NUDOCS 8909120193
Download: ML20247A703 (7)


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U. S.; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h

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Reports.No. 50-282/89020(DRP); 50-306/89020(DRP)

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Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60

. Licensee:

Northern States Power Company.

.y 414'Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401'

Facility Name: -Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

Inspection At:

Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted:

July 2 through August 12, 1989 Inspectors:

.J. E. Hard T..J.-.O'Connor

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Brute L. B rg s, Chief-Ili(/ fi Approved By:

Reactor Projects Section 2A Date-

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-Inspection Summary c.

. Inspection on July' 2 through August 12,'1989-(Reports No. 50-282/89020(DRP);

No. 50-306/89020(DRP))

' Areas. Inspected:- Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors and the NRR: Licensing Proje'ct Manager of followup of LERs and Generic Letters,-

~ lant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, and miscellaneous '

p licensing matters.

Results: ~ Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip when operations personnel were investigating'sorre possible proolems with the number 11 bus.

The bus was 7 accidentally tripped which interrupted' power to a reactor coolant pump..

Reactor coolant systems performed as expected following the reactor trip but water': level remained within technical specification limits and

' subsequently returned to pre-trip levels.

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Unit 2 continued to operate at full power.

Licensee is investigating the j

possibility that the. unit ~may have been operated at slightly more (0.03%) than

' authorized power.over an 8-hour shift and this has been made an unresolved j-item.

No violations of NRC requirements were noted in the six areas inspected.

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DETAILS s

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Persons Contacted

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Licenseefmployees C. Larson,-Vice President, Nuclear Generation

.L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants

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  1. E. Watzl, Plant Manager
  1. R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection.
  1. M. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations G. Lenertz,' General Superintendent, Maintenance A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection-G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineering K. Beadell, Superintendent, Technical Engineering

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S. Schaefer, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering

  1. M. Klee, Superii tendent, Quality' Engineering -

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P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nucl_ ear Operations QA R. Conklin, Superintendent, Security and Services-

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D. Vincent,--Project Manager, Nuc_ lear Engineering and Construction D.-Musolf, General Manager, Nuclear Projects J. Goldsmith, Superintendent,~ Nuclear Technical Services T. Parker, Manager; Nuclear Support Services LJ. Hoffman, Project. Manager, Nuclear Projects

  1. A. Hunstad,-Staff Engineer T. Amundson, Superintendent Training

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A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse Electric Corp.

  1. E. Eckholt, Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer
  1. M. Wadley, Shift Manager G.-Rolfson... Lead Production Engineer J. Donatell, Engineer I J. Maki, Project Engineer, Nuclear Projects M. McKeown, Production Engineer D. Dilanni, Licensing Project Manager, NRR The inspectors interviewed ~other licenste employees, including members of

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the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary! operators, QA personnel, shift technical advisors, and shift

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managers.

  1. Denotes those present at the exit interview of August 14, 1989.

I 2.

Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)

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(Closed) 282/88006-LL:

Personnel Airlock Seal Test Surveillance Procedure Missed.

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~(Closed) 306/88001-LL:

Sao rubject.

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Containment' airlock seal testing is required within three days of use of an" airlock.

On two occasions in 1988, the tests were not performad because'of an administrative error. -To reduce the chance'of future errors; separate control room logs are maintained for each airlock, single pages in'each log are dedicated.to one day's entries, and

each individual-page requires a sign-off that the seal testing surveillance has been completed.

(Closed) 306/89001-LLi Failure.to Log Delta-I Upon Loss of Computer Logging Functione

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During switchover from the original plant computer to the new computer, alarm functions for Unit 2 axial ~ flux difference-deviation were lost for a short period of time..The operations crew noted the computer failure after about 1 1/2 hours and initiated manual logging of the parameter.

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Since the computer switchover has been completed, this type event will not recur.

(Cicsed) 282/89005-LL:

Auto Start of. the 12 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump.

This AFW pump started automatically on May 22, 1983, as a result.of an

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electronic failure in a DC undervoltage sensor.

A new replacement sensor was installed.

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(Closed)-306/89002-LL:

Unit 2, Reactor Trip.

The reactor tripped on May 26, 1989, from'a; failure of aging electronic components-in the turbine control power supplies.

The components were; replaced.

Corrective actions included discussions with the turbine vendor,_ Westinghouse, and developing a program to prevent similar'.

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failures in the turbine control'and other non-safety grade systems.

(0 pen) 282/89009-LL:

Auto Start of No. 122 Control Room Cleanup Fan-Due to Spike on Chlorine Monitor.

As a result of the monitor failure on July 18, 1989, and others listed below, an investigation was started in cooperation with the monitor vendor, MDA.

Lessons learned from'the investigation will be applied.to all four control room chlorine monitors.

Circuitry changes are being considered which would result in a system which would not auto-start on failure of only one monitor.

(0 pen and Closed) 282/89010-LL:

Unit 1 Reactor Trip.

On July 21, 1989, investigation was performed to determine the source of a ' smoky odor near non-safeguards Bus:11 in the Unit 1 turbine building. When the access cover to the " Pot Fuses" area of' Bus 11 was removed.for internal visual inspection, ~ power was automatically

interrupted to Bus 11 loads, 11 Reactor Coolant Pump, and 11 Main i

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Feedwater Pump.

The reactor tripped at 11:43 p.m. on low reactor coolant flow in the loop.

This bus in both units are labeled with warning signs to prevent futere errors of this type.

(0 pen) 282/89011-LL:

Company Emp1oyee May Have Been Improperly Granted a.

i Security Clearance.

On July 27, 1989, the resident inspection staff was notified that a 5 year NSP employee may have been improperly granted a' temporary clearance on July 24.

The individual's badge was.immediately de-activated.

This.

matter is being evaluated by the NRC Region III Safeguards Section.

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Jpen) 282/89012-LL:

Auto Starts of No. 121 Control Room Cleanup Fen Due i

to Spurious Operation of the Chlorine Monitor.

Two additional starts of a chlorine monitor from the same reason as 282/89009-LL above, occurred on August 4 and 6, 1989.

Corrective actions are the same as discussed above.

3.

pperationalSafetyVerification(71707,71710,93702)

The' inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted interviews with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers.

The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper-

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return to service of affected components.

Inspections were made of the auxiliary building, turbine building, and the external areas of the plant to observe plant equipment conditions for potential fire hazards

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and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for~the i

equipment in need of maintenance.

'Except for the trip discussed in LER 282/89010-LL above and the reductions in power for surveillance tecting, Unit 1 ran at full power during the peri od.'

The trip occurred at 11:43 p.m. on July 21 and the unit was restarted and placed on line at 10:01 p.m. on July 22.

Dose-equivalent iodine activity of the reac. tor coolant increased from its pre-trip value of about 0.004 pCi/ml to'.a peak of 0.56 pCi/ml immediately following the

trip.

This activity has. subsequently dropped to near the pre-trip value.

(The technical specification LC0 value is 1.0 pCi/ml).

Unit 2 operation was continuous at ful'1 power during the inspection period, except for brief power reductions.during' surveillance testing.

During a routine audit of the plant computer records for August 5,1989, the Operations Shift Manager noted that the average core thermal power exceeded 100% of the authorized power level.

Calculations made by the resident inspectors showed the average:to'be 100.03%.

Although this

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power difference has negligible safety significance, operation in this manner is not acceptable from a regulatory viewpoint (see Discussion of " Licensed Power Level", E. L. Jordan, August 22, 1980) and such operation is not permitted by plant procedures (Procedure C1.4, Power Operatiun, Section 4.5 states that the' average power for an

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eight hour-shift shall be 100.0% or less).

Th'ed $cens'ee is reviewing X

the individual factors in the thermal. power calculation equation to

' determine if the built-in conservatism is more than the amount of apparent overpower.' This~ analysis will:be-reviewed by the resident

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inspectors.

Until.the' reviews are complete this matter will be considered an Unresolved Item (50 306/89020-01).

Administrative actions taken to prevent a recurrence of this type included; interviewing operators involved by the Chairman of the Error Reduction TaskcForce, and a written

. reminder to all operators of the requirements of.. Procedure.C1.4.

  • The inspector performed a walkdown of portions of the Unit 2 auxiliary feadwater system and diesel-driven cooling water pumps.

Observations J

were'made of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists,

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Qrification of correct valye and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant.equipnent and instrumentation are properly aligned, a g

and of local system indications.to insure proper operation within

prescribed limits.

I On July 5, 1989, during the routine testing of the public 'lert a

r. notification system, 19 of'78 sirens failed to actuate.

The failures.

were the result of a faulty power supply for the primary encoder at the Pierce County, Wisconsin Sheriff's office in Ellsworth.

The power supply was repaired and the system retested satisfactorily.

Several options were discussed which could prevent future failures 'of this type.

The liceasee gade a 1-hour notification to the NRC using the ENS.

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Representatives of the Stone and Webster Corporation started a Quality

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Assurance Program audit which was requested by the Senior Vice President of Pcwer Supply. The audit will include Prairie Island, Monticello, and corporate activities.

4; Maintenance Observatio,n (62703)

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g Routine preventive and corrective maintenance activities were observed

.to ascertain that they were cor. ducted in accordance with approved

procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and.in

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conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during this review:

the limitin( conditions for operation were. met while components or systems were re'mwcal from service, approvals

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'were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures, functional testing and/or calibrations'were performed prior to returning components or systems to. service, quality control records were' maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention

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Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed during the inspection period:

111 Chlorine Hooitor Troubleshooting..

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p 11 CC Pump Seal and Bearing Change Out.

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Installation.of-Limitorque Operator on 21/22 RCP CC Inlet Isolation,.

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including MOVATS Testing-Trouble Shooting on;the Number 11 4160 V Non-Safety Rslated Bus

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(After the Unit Trip).

. Replacement of the Number 12 Charging Pump DesurM r.

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-L Trouble Shooting on the 14-5 Breaker Substation reeder.

Sluicing of Resins From' Ion Exchangers.

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..toading of Low Specific Activity Wastes for Shipment Offsite.

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' Changing of Boric Acid Transfer Filters.

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Repairs of Victoreen Area Monitors.

Approximately 80% are complete

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with the remaining six waiting for spare parts.

Completion of the

repirs has greatly enhanced the plant's. ability to' detect radiation j

problems.

Repair to the Fire Barrier over the RHR Pits.

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Molded Case Circuit Breaker Testing on Breakers removed from both

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Units.

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No~ violations or deviations were identified.

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Surveillance (61726)

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The inspector witnessed portions af surveillance testing for safety-related systems and components.

The inspection included verifying that the tests

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were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, by observing that procedures'were being'follosed by qualified operators,.

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that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that

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system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results

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were acceptable to, test'and Technical Specification requirements.

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Portions of the following surveillance were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

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SP-1588,. Charging Pump Desurger' Test, Rev. 11.

w SP1093-1, D1 Diesel Generator Manual-and 4 KV Voltage Rejection

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P-Restoration Scheme Test, Eus 15.

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Response Time Testing of Unit 1 RCS. Pressure and Temperature y

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Instrumentation.

Eddy-Current lesting of the 122 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger.

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6.

Generic tetter Followup (92703)

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(Closed)' 282/88011-GL; 306/88011-GL:

NRC Position on Radiation Embr'ittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant

0perations.

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The licensee responded to this GL in a letter to the Director of NRR on

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October 28, 1988.

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(Closed) 282/88014-GL;306/88014-G(.

Instrum.ent Air Supply Problen;s affecting Safety-Related Equipment.

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The licensee, responded to this GL in a letter to'the Director of NRR on February 20, 1989.

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Licensinc Project Manager Input

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'On July 18-20, 1989, D. Dilanni, Licensing Project' Manager for Prairie

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Islend,-visited the site, inspected the plant, and conducted technical discussions with the plait staff.

The following are his' summaries of the

' discussions:

Also discussed were the provisions for including-torsional moments in future piping analyses with E. Eckholt, G. Rolfson, J. Donatell, and M. McKeown on July 18.

A statement describing the licensee's plan

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for such analyses will be provided to the NRC on the Prairie Island

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Docket.

Reviewed the status of the procurement of two additional safety grade

diesel generators with J. Hoffman and J. Maki on July 18.

The

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licensee plans to submit a finalized design package for NRC approval by

. August 1989, with an estimated preliminary concurrence by January 31,

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1990, and a targeted project completion by January 1992.

One issue.of

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concern is the IEEE 387 requirement for 300 starts to 50% rated load.

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The' LPM requested that tht licensing package contain adequate justification

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if this requirement is'to be waived and an. alternative test as part of

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the justification.

Discussed the information requested in preparation.for the pilot-team inspection on the subject of intersystem LOCA vulnerability with G. Miller, S. Hiedeman, and D. Carlson on July 18.

The LPM will provide additional written guidance to the' licensee.

The LPM provided' clarification for the applicability of Generic Letter 89-01 to the Prairie Island.IST: program.

The LPM reviewed and commented on the licensee's proposed changes to the.

March 17, 1986 technical specification amendment request which was made

in response to NRC/NRR/TSB's review of the request.

The LPM reviewed the design and the installation of the new feedwater control system for Unit 2.

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Exit (30703)

l The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1

on August 14, 1989.

The inspector discussed the purpose and scope of the-l inspection, and the inspection findings.

The inspector also discussed

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the likely information contert of _the inspection' report with regard to

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documents or processes reviewed by the inspector duing the inspection The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietary.

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