IR 05000282/1988014
| ML20195E319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1988 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195E317 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-88-14, 50-306-88-14, NUDOCS 8811070338 | |
| Download: ML20195E319 (7) | |
Text
,
_ _ _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ - _ _
- _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - - - - _ _.
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
-
s
.
...
-
"
-
..
O
.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. S0-282/88014(DRP); 50-306/88014(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60
[
,
.
,
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant i
Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota I
[
Inspection Conducted: August 7 through September 24, 1988
!
Inspectors:
J. E. Hard
/d//7/tr
[
Dat'e
I M. M. Moser
/o/n/pp
'
Date
Approved By:
. L.
urg f
t4M7dP Reactor Projects Section 2A Date r
Inspection Summary l
Inspection on August 7 through September 24, 1988 (Reports No. 50-282/88014(DRP);
,
50-306/88014(DRP))
,
l Areas _ Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillances, ESF systems, LER followup, refueling activities, and
!
closecut of Temporary Instructions.
j Results:
During this inspection period, Unit 1 completed coastdown and began
-
a scheduled refueling outage.
Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power.
.
l In general, the plant continues to be operated well as noted by no reactor
!
'
trips since July 1987, few personnel errors, good equipment conditions being l
maintained, and very good progress being made in the Unit 1 outage.
There does need to be a continued emphasis on attention to detail and procedure i
compliance as evidenced by several occurrences identified in Sections 4 and
!
.
!
7 of this report.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during
!
the course of this inspection.
i
i i
i j
!
8811070330 881017
PDR ADOCK 05000292, f
,
G PNV l
!
!
_.._~~.-,.._i
-. _,. _. _., _ - -, _ _ _ _ _.
_. _
. _ _..., _ _ _.., _ _ _ _. _ _
.
..
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Watzl, Plant Manager D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager
- H. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance K. Beadell, Superintendent, Technical Engineering it. Klee, Superintendent, Quality Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer T. Amundson, Superintendent, Training A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services
- E. Eckholt, Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse Electric Corp.
W. Cramer, C&L Engineers D. Dilanni, License Project Manager, NRR The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisor, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, Shift Technical Advisors, and Shift Managers.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview of September 26, 1988.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) 282/87012-01(DRP) Violation:
Autostart of No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Diesel Generator No.1 (DG1) inadvertently started on receiving an undervoltage signal.
Investigation determined that the cause of DG1 autostart was due to exceeding work instructions while performing maintenance on a malfunctioning undervoltage relay.
Corrective action included discussing the event with involved personnel and distributing the LER report to work supervisors.
(Closed) 282/87016-01(DRP) Violation:
One of Two Paths from the Grid to the Plant 4 KV Safety Buses was not Fully Operational On October 28, 1987, with Unit 1 at full power and Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 out of service for scheduled maintenance, Bus 15 relay testing resulted in a fuse being accidentally blown.
This resulted in the Bus 15 voltage restoration scheme being inoperable for 13 minutes until the fuse was replaced.
The immediate corrective action was completed and long term corrective actions of installing test switches is being implemented.
._-,._- - -. _ _ - - _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ _,.. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _,, _ _ _ _ - _ _ _, _ _ _ - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -,_________
- _ - _., _ _ - - _ _,. _ - _ - _ - _ _ -
-
<
-
.
-
,
.
(Closed) 282/88005-02(DRP) Violation: Auto Voltage Restoration Scheme for Bus 16 Inoperable On April 26, 1988, a similar event occurred as described above except that a technician accidentally shorted two terminals with his screwdriver and the voltage restoration scheme for Bus 16 was disabled for 20 minutes.
The corrective action previously described was not fully implemented when this second instance occurred.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 93702)
Unit 1 completed coastdown and was taken off line on August 24, 1988, to commence a scheduled refueling and maintenance outage.
Unit 2 was base loaded at 100% power except for reductions for surveillance testing.
,
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs,
!
'
conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers.
The inspector verified operability of selected emergency i
systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building, and external areas of the plant were I
,
conducted to observed plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
Increasing river water temperatures during July and August 1988 dictated
.
!
that the licensee review the temperature limits for the safety-related cooling water system loads.
The containment fan coil units and the component cooling heat exchangers have the lowest design inlet cooling
"
water temperatures (85 degrees F) and are therefore most limiting.
Since the river water temperature was exceeding 80 degrees F and was approaching 8E degrees F in mid-August, the licensee performed a safety analysis of the ability of the plant systems to perform their intended function at inlet temperatures greater than 85 degrees F.
Their conclusions were:
a.
The margin in fancoil units' heat removal capability between that j
assumed in the FSAR and that of the installed equipment would permit plant operation with a cooling water inlet temperature of about 90 degrees F.
j b.
The effect on design basis accidents of a 5 degree F increase l
in temperature of cooling water to the component cooling heat l
exchangers is insignificant.
c.
A plant administrative limit of 88 degrees F on cooling water inlet temperature should be instituted.
(This was done on August 17,1988.)
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
!
i 4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities were observed /
reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved proceduros, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in
<
'
l l
-~ ---,-
,r-,---r,----
r-
-
,. - _-,--- n -,, -,
e---c,,--*er,._n,e,--
.
._,,~---,--ym-,-
.,.,.--nr-.-,
,- - -.
e-
--
-
-
.
?
.-
.
e conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation J
were met while components or systems were '.emot>1 from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work acti ties were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
a.
Unit 2 Condenser Inner Pass Water Box Cleaning b.
Pump House Inlet Trash Rack Cleaning c.
No. 22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Angle Drive Lube Oil Leak Repair d.
No. 12 Battery Charger Troubleshooting e.
Repair of No. 11 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger f.
Repair of R-21; Circulating Water Discharge Canal Liquid Monitor g.
No. 12 Circulating Water Pump Impeller Replacement During Unit I refueling outage, inservice inspection of both steam generators was performed.
Eddy current inspection of all tubes resulted in nine tubes in No. 11 Steam Generator being plugged (total of 69 now plugged [2%]), and eight tubes in No. 12 Steam Generator being plugged (total of 71 no.< plugged [2%)).
An additional 73 tubes in No. 12 Steam Generator were sleeved (total of 100 now sleeved [3%]).
See also Inspection Report No. 50-282/88015(DRP) for additional details.
On August 8, 1988, the power supply to the Prairie Island Training Center was momentarily interrupted when personnel from NSP's Electric Utility Operations dug up an energized 12.5 kV underground cable.
Though the Training Center loads were automatically transferred to an alternate source, training simulator operations were disrupted when the computer dumped.
Acenrding to plant Nuclear Engineering and Construction (NE&C)
forces, Electric Utility Operations personnel had been informed of the location of the underground cable.
Since this same group will be installing the power cabling and transformer for the new administration building being constructed near the nuclear plant, the resident inspectors questioned the controls to be placed on these activities.
NE&C management at Prairie Island stated that Electric Utility Operations personnel will be required to follow NE&C rules while doing work onsite.
The General Manager of NE&C has agreed with this commitment.
On August 31, during preparation for repair work on 11 component cooling heat exchanger (11 CCHX), maintenance personnel removed a plug on the heat exchanger (HX) in order to finish draining the cooling water out of the tube sheet area.
The plug removed, however, was the wrong one and by the time it was replaced about 800 gallons of component cooling water had spilled to the floor and into readily available barrels.
An inadequate maintenance precedure, poor design arrangement for draining the HX, and failure to follow the existing procedure were all cited by the licensee as contributing factors to this spill.
_ _ _ _
__
_
_
.__.
._
_ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
'
.
..
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance (61726)
i The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components.
The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements by observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:
,
SP 1027 Radiation Monitoring System Calibration
SP 1007a Unit 1 NIS Testing
.
SP 1083 Unit 1 Integrated SI Test
'
SP 1099 Unit 1 MSIV Stroke Test
SP 1186 No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
>
SP 1098 No. 12 Battery Capacity Load Test
'
SP 2054 Unit 2 Turbine Valve Test
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
ESFSystemWalkdown(71710j i
i The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions
,:
of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Injection Systems.
Observations included
{
confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists, plant drawings, verification of correct valve and power
,
supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and i
instrumentation are properly aligned, and local system indication to insure proper operation within prescribed ifmits.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
l
.
7.
Refueling Activities (60710)
l
The following are brief summaries of special areas inspected and
l noteworthy occurrences associated with this inspection period:
r During Unit I refueling activities on September 1, 1988, a new fuel
!
i assembly intended for Unit 1 was slightly damaged.
The damage was
the result of moving the bridge crane prior to removing the rod cluster control assembly handling tool from the fuel assambly.
The fuel assembly
.
was returried to the vendor, Westinghouse, on September 4,1988, for
[
'
expeditious repair.
l t
On September 2,1986, while shuffling fuel in the Unit 1 core, a 3/4" cap
.
i l
screw was discovered on top of the lower core support plate.
The screw l
was found while investigating a fuel assembly which did not properly seat
'
,
{
i
'
i
_ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _,. _. _.,., _ _... _. _ _
_ ______..__.,____. _ _. _ _ _ _
_, _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _. -, _ _ _ _. _ _ _
_
. -.
.
. _ _
.
.
,
.
on the support plate.
From the appearance of the cap screw and its radioactivity level, the licensee concluded that it had been on the support plant for at least one operating cycle.
About 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> were required to retrieve the screw from the core.
The licensee was unable to identify where the fastener came from except to establish that it was not from the refueling manipulator crane, fuel assemblies, or reactor vessel
.
internals.
'
,
Secondary System Pipe Thinning Measurements - During this refueling l
outage, the licensee continued its program of systematic inspections for indications of secondary pipe thinning.
Results of UT thinning measurements did not identify any areas at or below minimum wall
,
thickness nor was significant thinning trends noted since the last
!
inspection.
,
During this refueling outage, an integrated leak test of the containment
'
was successfully performed.
Specific details can be found in Inspection i
Reports No. 50-282/88016; 50-306/88016(DRS).
t Other activities observed by the resident inspectors included:
i Eddy current testing of Unit 1 control rod assemblies Fuel shuffle
Replacement of Control Room E Panel Snubber testing
"
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
8.
Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700, 86/00)
,
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:
i (Closed) 282/87018-LL:
Auto Voltage Restoration Scheme for Bus 15 Disabled
,
On October 28, 1987, while performing Bus 15 relay testing in conjunction
,
with the outage of Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1, the voltage
'
restoration scheme for Bus 15 was temporarily disabled.
This was caused r
by the technician accidentally contacting an incorrect relay stud while attempting to reland a lifted wire.
The voltage restoration scheme was
,
restored within 13 minutes, involved pt.rsonnel have reviewed this LER,
!
and long term corrective action of installing test switches is being
!
implemented.
0 en and Closed) 282/88003-LL:
Auto VoM.r.g P%';udN. 2dwe f or us 6 Disabled r
!
On April 26, 1988, a similar event occurred as described above except that the technician accidentally shorted two terminals with his screwdriver and the voltage restoration scheme for Bus 16 was disabled for 20 minutes.
.
l
,
!
- - _ ~-.. _,
. - _ -, _ _.. -
. - - -
-
-- --. 0
_.
,.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The corrective action previously described had not been fully implemented when this second instance occurred.
(0 pen) 282/88001-LL:
Inadequate Net Positive Suction Head in Low Pressure Safety Injection System
$ pen) 306/88002-LL:
Autostart of Diesel-Driven Cooling Water Pump (0 pen) 282/88004-LL:
Unit 2 Shutdown Required Due to Degraded Delta-T Reactor Trip Channels No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Collocated TLD Verification (IP 25022, 80721)
Regional based inspectors (A. Januska and R. Bocanegra) examined nine locations where licensee and NRC dosimeters were thought to be collocated.
All of the locations were close enough in distance and azimuth to be considered as collocated.
10.
Closeout of Temporary Instruction (TI 2515/86)
TI 2515/86 Licensee's Action Taken to Implement Generic Letter No. 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown (SIMS No. MPA-B-66)
Inspections required by this TI were completed with the following results:
04.01 Plant-specific commitments for emergency procedure changes and for lectures on the 1980 St. Lucie incident were satisfied.
04.02 Classroom and simulator training on natural circulation cooldown is part of the licensed operator training program.
04.03 Emergency procedures regarding natural circulation are in accordance with the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines.
See also Iaspection Reports No. 50-282/88010; 50-306/88010(DRS).
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Meeting (30703)
The inspectors w t with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 26, 1988.
The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspection during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any documents / processes as proprietary.
7