IR 05000282/1985021
| ML20136H184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1986 |
| From: | Hawkins F, Sutphin R, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136H174 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-85-21, 50-306-85-19, NUDOCS 8601090298 | |
| Download: ML20136H184 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/85021(DRS); 50-306/85019(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Copducted: October 28 - November 1 and November 12-15, 1985-1 Inspectors:
T. E. Vandel 1/3/GC Date '
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"I CM R. N. Sutphin u
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Approved By:
F.
. Hawkins, Chief
//:1/86 Quality Assurance Programs Date '
Section Inspection Summary Inspection on October 28 - November 1 and November 12-15, 1985
.(Reports No. 50-282/85021(DRS); 50-306/85019(DRS)_)
Areas Inspected:
Special announced inspection by two regional inspectors of the licensee's plant ir.odification program and related activities. The inspection involved a total of 125 inspector-hours onsite and 57 inspector-hours in the regional office by two region based inspectors.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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l DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel
- K. J. Albrecht, Director, Power Supply QA
- K. M. Beadell, Supervisor, Quality Engineering
~*J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services
- J. L. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
- A. A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer
- P. H. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA
- R. L. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenence D. J. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
- G. L. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
- R. P. Pearson, Senior Production Engineer
- R. W. Sitek, QA Specialist A. D. Smith, Consultant Scheduling Engineer
- P. F. Suleski, Superintendent, Nuclear Projects QA
- D. M. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction
- E. L. Watzel, Plant Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- R. A. Hasse, Acting Section Chief, Quality Assurance Programs Section
- J. E. Hard, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. M. Moser, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on November 15, 1985.
2.
Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives identified in Section 1 of this report at the conclusion of the inspection on November 15, 1985.
The purpose and scope of the inspection was outlined and recommendations for changes in the modification process were discussed. Licensee personnel indicated during a conference call on December 16, 1985, that the inspector had no access to proprietary information.
3.
Modification Assessment a.
Methodology The purpose of this inspection was to perform an indepth assessment of the licensee's modification program and its implementation relative to ongoing modification activities at the Prairie Island facility. The inspection was prompted by the NRC's concerns regarding apparent uncontrolled modification activities which had adversely impacted plant operating equipment. Because of the
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importance which the NRC places on maintaining plant integrity ~
through an effective modification program, this inspection was augmented in an attempt to identify the underlying causes of known deficiencies and provide recommendations to improve performance.
The assessment included interviews of 30 plant, corporate QA, and modification staff personnel; an overview of the modification program; review of training activities; and evaluation of several completed modification packages. Additionally, four recent incidents experienced at the facility were selected and evaluated to determine basic causal factors and to review the licensee's corrective action with regard to each.
b.
Observations
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For the major organizations involved in modification activities at Prairie Island, the inspector reviewed staffing levels, lines of authority, and assigned responsibilities for each. Current modification responsibilities are carried out by three independent organizations: Prairie Island plant staff, Nuclear Technical Services (NTS), and Nuclear Engineering and Construction (NE&C).
The Prairie Island plant staff includes over 50 I&C and maintenance personnel who are responsible for a limited number of minor modifications in addition to regular maintenance duties. Their modification activities are planned and directed by the plant operations and plant technical engineers. Both the plant technical engineers and operations engineers report through separate supervisors to the Plant Superintendent Engineering and Radiation Protection (PSERP), who in turn reports to the Plant Manager. The Plant Manager reports through a general manager to the Vice President of Nuclear Generation.
The NTS staff consists of 10 specialists having technical expertise in specific engineering disciplines. The majority of personnel are qualified as senior reactor operators. They are routinely charged with the handling of modifications associated with NRC changes, such as Bulletins, Circulars, and Generic Letters. They also provide technical assistance to the plant staff supervisors. NTS reports through a general manager to the Vice President of Nuclear Generation.
NE&C has an assigned staff at Prairie Island which includes a project manager, eight project engineers, five construction supervisory personnel, and three administrative specialists.
Generally, this staff controls all modifications which require the services of an outside Architect and Engineer (A&E). They are involved from the modification's inception, through engineering design, planning, and construction, to its completion.
NESC reports through a general manager to the Vice President of Engineering and Construction.
Essentially all modification assignments are made to one of these three organizations by the Operating Comittee (OC). Once the DC
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e has completed their review of a proposal and assigned the project, the assigned group proceeds with the necessary design, planning, coordination and construction.
Interviews with licensee personnel indicated that after an assignment is made, there is minimal interface between organizations.
Several modification packages were reviewed and interviews were conducted to assess the way in which each organization handled the modifications assigned to them. The modifications that had sub-stantial plant staff involvement, appeared to be handled most successfully. Specifically, two packages were reviewed where planning, work scheduling performance, and problem solving went smoothly and were completed satisfactorily. These two cases, the control room panel modification and the steam generator anti-vibration bar modifi-cation, were determined to have as e common element a dedicated plant staff system engineer who acted as the project lead providing better project control, and more effective problem solving.
The licensee has developed a series of administrative work instructions to provide better control and consistency for modification activities at their two nuclear facilities. These instructions, commonly referred to as the " Uniform Modification Process" (UMP), are intended to (1) provide better management control, (2) improve coordination of interfaces, (3) bring independent organizations closer to an integrated team, and (4) minimize the occurrence of events which impact plant safety.
Although the new instruction series has been approved and available for use for more than a year (approved July 6,1984), the program has not been fully adopted and implemented.
Plant management personnel stated that complete adoption of these instructions is included in their five year operations plan.
The UMP is recognized by the inspectors as a major planned improvement in the present modification process.
Even so, the inspectors are concerned that it does not clearly provide plant staff lead responsibility and authority. Clarification of this responsibility would provide a focal point for effective management of all modification projects.
Also, as part of the assessment of the three organization interfaces, several NE&C personnel stated that they did not feel an integral part of the plant organization. The NRC recognizes that the management of a support organization, such as NE&C, can experience unique difficulties with regard to employee motivation and effective connunication. This has resulted in the plant staff expressing apparent dissatisfaction in the manner in which some of the support functions have been carried out.
In certain instances, this lack of appreciation for each others responsibilities has led to a disregard for the needs of the plant as a whole and resulted in less than the optimum desired results.
Further indoctrination of all Prairie Island personnel involved in the modification process would provide better connunications, improved understanding of each organization's
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role, and would help ensure completed modifications which meet both the technical and practical needs of the facility.
Four separate incidents, all impacting plant operating equipment and caused by personnel engaged in modification work, were selected and evaluated. The 4 incidents involved the fault of a 480 Volt temporary cable splice, a reactor trip caused by a broken 2 inch instrument air line, and inadvertent trips of 2 different #80 volt breakers (Nos. 228 and 12M). Each incident had been investi-gated by the licensee and reported to the plant OC. Only one of the four, the faulted splice, was not subsequently reported to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER). The faulted splice incident was reported as a Significant Operating Event (SOE).
Information regarding SOEs is not routinely provided to the NRC.
The SOE report associated with the faulted splice was reviewed.
S0E Report No. P-SOE-1-85-9, issued August 16, 1985, established the event date as July 26, 1985.
It clearly outlined the operational aspects of the event and detailed the apparent cause of the fault along with the immediate action to effect repair. The report established that the faulted splice, part of design change No. 81Y174 WR G6784-EB-Q initiated in December 1983, was to provide temporary feeder service to a diesel generator motor control center until permanent service could be established. The permanent service was completed approxi-mately 18 months later. This was approximately one week after the splice had faulted to ground.
The resolution of the SOE report did not address corrective action beyond immediate operating requirements. Specifically, the report did not establish those actions necessary to preclude similar occurrences in the future, nor did it require the identification of other temporary splices which existed in the plant at the time of the incident. As a result of the inspector's expressed concerns, the licensee conducted a surveillance which is documented in Report No.
SR-RI-2107 (November 13,1985).
The report indicated that during the preceding four year period there were two temporary splices used in modification work.
Although there were only two such temporary splices identified at Prairie Island, the NRC considers their control to be of significant importance. At the present, there is no method to control temporary splices when their use is extended beyond the originally intended time period.
With regard to the broken two inch instrument air line associated with the feedwater regulating valves for the steam generators, interviews with personnel and a cursory review of the system's past performance indicated that it had historically been unreliable.
It appeared that a more effective trending program would have led to improved management involvement and better plant reliability.
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The review of the accidental trips of the two 480 Volt breakers indicated that both occurred under similar circumstances and within three months of each other.
Each was caused by non-company contractor personnel engaged in modification work.
It was apparent that their unfamiliarity with the facility and their lack of appreciation for the consequences that their actions would have on plant operations contributed significantly to these occurrences.
Plant indoctrination of non-company personnel, such as craftsmen and visitors, presently consists of an informal briefing and orientation and is cjo ducted in a very non-uniform manner with varying results.
BetLer_. indoctrination and field surveillance of non-company personnel would help minimize the occurrence of such incidents.
Recommendations Although modification work projects have been performed reasonably well when good leadership was provided by dedicated individuals throughout the course of the projects, further improvements can be made in the modifica-tion process. The following reconrendations are presented for consideration.
a.
The plant staff should be clearly designated as the focal point for all modification projects. Their authority should include lead responsibility from the project's inception to its completion.
b.
Clear instruction should be given that the Uniform Modification Process is to be implemented and utilized for all modification projects.
c.
Further management involvement to foster improved associations and attitudes between the three major organizations involved in plant modification appears to be warranted, d.
Problem analysis and proposed corrective actions to prevent recurrence of incidents, reportable events, and other nonconformances need a higher degree of management overview to ensure proper resolution, c.
A routine system is needed to ensure that results of QA audits, surveillances, problem investigations, and other source specific information is made available to management on a routine basis.
A trending program should be developed and results included in the source information flow to management.
f.
Indoctrination, training, and field surveillance for non-company personnel who play a role in modification activities, but are unfamiliar with the plant, should be upgraded and be more prescriptive with the Lead System Engineer providing a more active role.
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