IR 05000282/1989004
| ML20245G851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1989 |
| From: | Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245G835 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-89-04, 50-282-89-4, 50-306-89-04, 50-306-89-4, NUDOCS 8906290282 | |
| Download: ML20245G851 (33) | |
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.4 . 'B - . U. S. f:UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-282/89004(DRSS); 50-306/89004(DRSS) Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; 0FR-60-Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Mb.' hnii 6/u/81 Inspectors: Date w.c..SMh T. Ploski Ghi/sf Date w. G. SJ Approved By: W. G. Snell, Chief cA /s> Emergency Preparedness Date and Effluents Section Inspection Summary Inspection on June 4-8, 1989 (Reports No. 50-282/89004(DRSS);50-306/89004(DRSS)J Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant emergency preparedness exercise (IP82301) and followup on previously identified items (IP92701) involving observations by five NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The inspection was conducted by four NRC inspectors and one consultant.
Results: The licensee's overall exercise performance was good and demonstrated the licensee's ability to prevent serious consequences to public health and safety.
The exercise scenario was challenging and written to test OSC staffing and organization.
This testing included the dispatch of 16 in plant teams in response to simulated problems.
Personnel were well trained and demonstrated excellent awareness of plant responsibilities during a olant incident.
No violations of NRC requirements, deficiencies, &;iitics.
or open items were identified as a result of this inspection.
8906290282 890621 PDR ADOCK 05000282 , Q PDC I i a
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t J DETAILS-i il Persons Contacted . ' NRC Observers and' Areas Observed T. 0'Connor, Control Room Simulator.
J.' Hard, Technical Support. Center'(TSC) T. Ploski,: Operational Support Center (OSC)/In-Plant Teams F. McManus, OSC/In-Plant Teams ' M.! Smith, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) -Northern States Power Company L. Eliason, General' Manager.
! E. Watzl, Plant Manager D. Schuelke, Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection M.,Ladd,-Administrator, Emergency Preparedness T..Amundson,' Superintendent, Training-L. Wa1.dinger,-Superintendent, Production Training R. Lindsey, Assistant to Plant Manager M.- Agen, Engineer " All of the.above individuals attended the exit meeting on June 8, 1989. 2.
' Licensee Action On Previously Identified Items (IP 92701) (Closed) Open Item No. 282/88006-01: Radiological access control was.
> not adequately demonstrated in the TSC as the frisking station was not adequately established.to avoid contamination of the TSC.
Personnel did not frisk themselves properly even though the were under the supervision of a Health ~ Physics Technician.
Access control was established outside the TSC:and a step off pad was available.. Personnel were observed properly frisking themselves while under the direction of a Health Physics Technician.
Contamination control was considered adequate as observed.
This item is closed.
3.
General A daytime exercise of the license's Emergency Plan and Implementing . Procedures was ' conducted at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant on June 6,.1989.
The exercise tested the license's capabilities to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major radioactive release.
This exercise was a utility only exercise involving. licensee personnel.only.
- Attachment 1 de' scribes the scope and objective of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
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General Observations a.
Procedures l~ .This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part.50, Appendix E. requirements using the Northern States Power Corporate i ' Nuclear emergency plan and' implementing procedures, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant emergency plan and implementing j procedures, and offsite emergency organizations' emergency plans
and implementing procedures.
, b.
Coordination The licensee's respons was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely.
Had these events beer eal, the ' actions taken by the licensee would , ! have been sufficient to allow State and local' authorities to take-appropriate actions to vrotect public health and safety.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with five NRC observers.
d.
Exercise Critique The licensee conducted facility and controller critiques immediately following the exercise on June 6, 1989.
A formal critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on June 8, 1989, at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
Licensee personnel presented a comprehensive overview of their exercise observations followed by an NRC discussion of their observed strengths and weaknesses.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room i Control Room personnel responded properly to accident conditions as presented to them on the simulator.
They were familiar with their procedures and referred to them throughout the exercise.
Emergency conditions were properly classified in accordance with their emergency procedures.
The Control Room crew was adequately managed by the Shift Supervisor and demonstrated good Control Room practice and decorum.
However, briefings should have been conducted much earlier in the exercise and with greater frequency throughout the exercise in order to better track assignment completion and status of work requests.
Offsite notification procedures were followed and all offsite notifications were completed within time requirements.
However,
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notification of NRC was less than timely although completed prior to the one hour time requirement.
The delay in completion of this notification was due to the notification being conducted from the TSC; not the Control Room which is normal. This abnormal. method of NRC notification was considered necessary to compensate for the ' use of the Simulator Control Room during the exercise.
In spite of the confusion this caused, if briefings had been conducted earlier in the exercise this requirement could have been completed in a more timely manner.
Control Room personnel used proper procedures and adequately demonstrated their ability to perform plant equipment and system l analysis in order to prevent consequences to the public.
Adequate logs were maintained to allow reconstruction of significant actions taken during the emergency.
Public Address announcements were made following event classifications to alert plant personnel of the current emergency classification.
The plant Public Address system had been installed in the simulator for use during drills and exercises.
This addition added realism and depth to participants ability to adequately demonstrate their emergency actions.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
b.
Technical-Support Center (TSC) i The Technical Support Center was quickly activated and procedures, logs and checklists were properly utilized.
Although noise levels were-excessive, licensee discussion during their formal exit presentation indicated that they were aware of the noise problems and they indicated that attention will be given to this problem during the coming year.
Status boards were well maintained and used throughout t M exercise.
The TSC staff worked well together and functioned as a team.
Timely briefings were conducted by the Emergency Director.
Proper engineering procedures were followed and adequate logs were maintained.
The Technical Support personnel did an excellent job identifying the top of pressurizer as the source of the leak early in the exercise.
They also developed an innovative way to supply water to the containment.
Radiological control was established in the TSC by setting up a Continuous Air Monitor and the issuance of TLDs to all personnel.
Adequate radiological access control was demonstrated in the TSC in response to NRC concerns from the 1988 exercise.
A step off pad was available and personnel frisked themselves properly under the supervision of an Health Physics Technician as observed by a NRC inspector.
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' ,. ' a .' Accountability'and' evacuation of plant non-essential personnel was
- satisfactorily. completed in'less than 30 minutes..The assembly
, point for evacuation was selected based on possible radiation hazards.
Based-on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program l' was' acceptable.
c.
l0perations Support Center (OSC)' 'The'0perational Support Center was staffed and operational in a . timely manner. Adequate supplies of emergency equipment were ~ available.
The OSC Coordinator provided informative briefings at.
, -regular' intervals.
Radiation Protection, I&C,. Mechanical-t- Maintenance and a licensed operator provided good administrative y team briefing' support to the OSC Coordinator. Work requests were L well'used to document' team assignments and results.
Key OSC-personnel displayed knowledge of plant maintenance and-troubleshooting activities.
OSC habitability was quickly determined and monitored frequently.
Dosimetry was' issued to all OSC personnel.
A frisker station was utilized.in the 0SC after the decision was made to evacuate nonessential personnel from the protected area. This was completed per procedures and not necessarily due to an increased contamination control problem.
OSC: status boards provided information regarding unit status, Jemergency actions, and in plant teams.
A plant layout board.
was used to describe rad levels in affected plant areas.
Health Physics personnel did an excellent job of tracking doses, checking dose records, generating emergency radiation work permits, .and issuing dosimetry.
Teams were adequately briefed on radiation hazards expected in their work areas.
Seven in plant teams were observed by evaluators and included: rack out and troubleshooting of an electrical breaker; seismic monitoring system acquisition; diesel generator oil lire repair teams; RHR and Containment Spray damage assessment team; Spent Fuel Pool team and the RHR pump motor team.
All teams were adequately briefed and , debriefed.
Radiation Protection Technicians accompanied all teams.
i Routes were developed prior to team dispatch.
All teams f demonstrated good ALARA techniques.
All observed teams adequately demonstrated their knowledge of relevant procedures and equipment.
The seismic monitoring team promptly obtained chart data from the Control Room seismic system panel and from a remote accelerometer '3 located on the Turbine Deck.
The team appeared slow in interpreting
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. the traces associated with the first earthquake.
The licensee identified _the need to re-evaluate the clarity of the procedural guidance for interpreting the chart traces.
Two repair teams were dispatched to the Number 1 Diesel Generator to repair the cracked oil line.
The teams adequately explained how they would replace the cracked segment of the oil line.
They acquired the needed tools and piping from the machine shop for added realism. A realistic estimate of repair time was made. OSC management was advised of their progress at frequent intervals.
Controllers d M not allow the Control Room personnel to start the diesel until this repair time had elapsed.
The team dispatched to inspect the Containment Spray pumps and RHR systems for earthquake damage adequately explained how they would inspect for leaks, and for damage to snubbers and pipe hangers.
Findings for Unit 2 were reported to the TSC prior to beginning a Unit 1 inspection.
The controller delayed this report to simulate I the time spent within the Unit 2 RHR pits.
The team complied with an order cancelling the Unit 1 RHR and Containment Spray pump inspection, sin,:e the dose rates were expected to rise because the Unit 1 RHR pumps would be started.
The Unit 1 RHR pumps were started without having been inspected for earthquake damage after a time lag.
No apparent attempt was made to reform the damage assessment team before Unit 1 f3R start up.
The failure to inspect Unit 1 RHR' equipment for earthquake damage prior to its startup later on appeared to be a communications mixup.
An inplant team was sent to the spent fuel pool to move some gates so tnat water could be transferred thru the pool from the Un 2 to the Unit 1 Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST).
The Radiation Protection Technician did a very good job of selecting a minimum exposure route from the OSC to the spent fuel pool.
He had a proper survey instrument and led the team.
He used a radio to report their progress on their mission.
He had the necessary key to unlock a door , to the pool area.
The team adequately explained how to do the work and estimated the length of time to complete the assignment.
The innovative use of a training breaker for demonstration of rack out and troubleshooting was a positive step to limit the over use of simulation normally seen during annual exercises.
During this < first time use, some implementation problems were encountered, however the use of the training breaker is the type of scenario development that will better test OSC and inplant personnel.
During the r6ckout procedure one electrical safety glove used was torn on the outer leather.
The electricians did not question the safety implication of the torn glove.
No preuse inspection of safety gloves was observed.
During replacement of damaged breaker parts the electricians were directed to back out of the breaker cubicle while power was restored.
Several loose wires (bare lugs)
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k ' ,7 v, , . - . . we're.in the' cubicle when power was restored. -An electrical engineer .at the scene directed that the lugs be taped before backing out of.- the cubicle' However this was'.not fully accomplished prior to . restoration of' power.
Failure to tape the. loose' wires c'ould hav'e resulted in additional ~ electrical damage..Following power restoration the electricians. reloaded the remaining auxiliary finger lugs.without. verifying the leads'were deenergized.
Failure to verify the leads were deenergized prior to work was a potential personnel safety. hazard.
' ' Based.on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The EOF was promptly staffed in an orderly fashion.
Personnel'were well. trained, professional and worked well together.
Proce dures, logs and. checklists were utilized properly.
Noise levels were- . adequately controlled. 'Overall management of the EOF was excellent.
Briefings were conducted every half hour. Each manager discussed all designated responsibilities in'each briefing.
Recommendations were made, actions. assigned and followup on previous assigned items were.
tracked.
Status-boards were adequate and.kept current throughout the exercise.
Dosimetry was issued and properly _used.
Habitability.
checks were made at regular' intervals.
Access control was set up-at both entrances of the'.E0F and adequately maintained throughout the.~ exercise.
TheEOFebtablishedandmaintainedadequatecommunications with other plant emergency response facilities, and simulated communications with the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin and the radiological health departments of Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Field. teams were effectively used to monitor.for any possible-
. release activity offsite.
The taking of air, particulate and smear i samples was observed and personnel followed their procedures and practiced good Health Physics practices.
Field team data was compared to dose predictions to check'for accuracy and inconsistencies.
Technical-Support personnel effectively utilized. drawings, procedures I and ERCS information to trend plant conditions.
The administrative ] . support was efficient, and E0F personnel appeared well trained and
professional.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
e.
Exercise Scenario and Control The' exercise scenario strongly challenged Control Room, OSC, Inplant
Team and TSC personnel Control Room personnel adequately checked ' ! -i
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Sixteen'inplant teams were dispatched and tracked from the OSC.
The scenario and use of.the Simulator allowed l free play throughout the exercise.
A site evacuation was conducted and accountability was accomplished within 30 minutes.
This was'not an exercise objective, but controllers did not stop this activity.
Exercise control was considered adequate.
Controllers were adequately trained in their role as evaluators.
For this scenario, each.inplant team controller was provided with the task to be accomplished the week prior to the exercise and expected to develop answers to problems that they felt would occur.
The controllers ! during this exercise performed well during the freeplay involved ] during the exercise.
No instances of controllers prompting was J observed, f.
Licensee Critiques The lic'nsee held three levels of exercise critiques, one at each e individual facility immediately following the exercise, a critique for lead controllers following the' facility critiques., and a formal presentation at the NRC Exit Interview.
NRC personnel attended these critiques and determined that significant exercise deficiencies were addressed by licensee personnel and that the ' licensee had demonstrated a good self appraisal program.
6.
Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Program (IP 80721) Some aspects of the licensee's onsite meteorological monitoring program were evaluated to determine program scope and changes, and to determine whether the monitoring systems were being adequately maintained.
An evaluation was also made of the licensee's provisions for ensuring that onsite data which may be acquired and utilized during an Emergency Plan activation, are representative of current local meteorological conditions.
A sample of program records and procedures were discussed with the EP Coordinator and the cognizant systems engineer, MIDAS program manager, and I&C specialist.
The 60 meter meteorological tower site was also toured.
l The monitoring system consisted of two instrumented towers, associated i I signal transmission and processing equipment, and multiple pnwer supplies.
Sensors accuracies and sensitivities met Regulatory Guide 1.23 I limits, when applicable.
The 60 meter and 22 meter towers were i inaccurately described in Revision 9 of the Emergency Plan as the primary I and backup towers, respectively.
The 60 meter tower was adequately j equipped with redundant sensors, signal processors, and redundant power l supplies so that cognizant personnel, relevant procedures, and data ! displays accurately categorized data from this tower as being both the j primary and backup onsite meteorological data.
The 22 meter tower, l located near the Training Center (and also housing the EOF), was equipped i with only one set of wind speed and direction sensors and was correctly referred to as the tertiary onsite data sources.
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The'60' meter tower was equipped with a lightening rod and was grounded.
The licensee; indicated that there had been no inctances of prolonged L - instrument outages due to lightning damage in recent years.
Wind speed
l-. .. and. direction transmitters were.provided with heat jackets to reduce the l potential.of the sensors'.becoming it.uperable due_to.the combination of j ' ' low temperatures and moisture deposition.
Temperature' sensors were 'J housed in aspirated shields which included airflow sensors... Insufficient .i airflow indication; lights were available and were functionally checked in '{ , , the adjacent, climatically controlled instrument shelter.
Signal j ' transmission lines to the signal processors were provided with power J surge. protection.
Primary and backup sets of sensors and related J - equipment normally' received power form one of two AC_ power supplies.
The licensee planned to' install an automatic power: transfer switch in ) case of an outage' involving the primary AC power supply.
The present i AC power' supply transfer switch required manual. operation.
Batteries I provided. short-term backup power in' the event that AC power was lost ] and transfer to the backup AC power supply did not occur.
- - Several Significant changes had been made to the types of onsite l meteorological measurements. -The licensee discontinued measuring i dewpoint temperature in about 1984.
Reasonable reasons given in a 1984 I internal memo regarding the deletion included the lack of requirement i for measuring ambient dewpoint foi emergency response or routine plant .. operations purposes, and repeated equipment maintenance problems.
Contacted were uncertain whether the NRC 'had even been formally notified of this monitoring program deletion.
Some years ago, the licensee had installed an onsite acoustic monitoring system, referred to as 50DAR, in order.to determine vertical wind profile data.
This system was - discontinued earlier in 1989 following receipt of a study of local meteorological conditions, performed under the direction of a Certified Consulting Meteorologist (CCM). The licensee had apparently not yet formally informed NRC staff of the decision to terminate use of the 50DAR . by emergency response personnel.
The Emergency Plan did not include any references to proceduralized monitoring system surveillance, calibration, and data quality control provisions.
The Plan did not address provisions for system preventive and' emergency maintenance.
Discussions and records indicated that tasks - would typically be performed by licensee personnel.
Many system
components could be replaced by.onsite spares while defective components l . would be returned to their manufacturers.
Although Regulatory Guide 1.23 , indicated a' semi-annual nonitoring system' calibration frequency, annual I calibrations have been performed in.accordance with Surveillance Procedure !(SP) 1676.- Monthly surveillance tests have also been performed per SP 1677; Blank and completed copies of both procedures were spot checked for only the 60 meter-tower's equipment.
SP 1676 and 1677 were clearly - worded, specific and sufficiently thorough for their intended purposes.
SP 1677 ; included provisions for performing a component calibration in the event that the component was found to be out of specified tolerance limits during a monthly surveillance.
The monthly surveillance, l
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " ,, , - . . thorough' annual system calibration, and routine data review provisions were the licensee's adequate justifications for an annual versus a . semi-annual calibration frequently.
The MIDAS Program Manager indicated that meteorological data quality control checks were performed on both towers' data sets in accordance with Radiation Protection Implementing Protection Implementing Procedures 6819 and 6820 on a daily and at least a weekly frequency, respectively.. Example documentation of such data checks were not ' reviewed by the inspector.
Since neither the 60 meter tower's instrument shelter, the CR, nor any onsite ERF were equipped with analog meteorological data readouts, these daily and weekly data reviews involved only digital data which may or may not have been plotted and trended by computer.
Proprietary documentation also indicated that MIDAS ! software utilized by emergency response personnel included a number of
tests to identify suspect or obviously invalid current meteorological data, which would be identified as " bad" on data displays.
Cognizant personnel described the process by which a monitoring system inspection would be initiated upon discovery of obviuusly bad or suspect
data during the various quality control checks.
A Work Request would be initiated and~ routed to the responsible systems engineer,.normally within a day of the discovery of a data abnormality.
One or more I&C specialists would begin their inspection within two days of receiving the work request.
The licensee indicated that informal notifications would typically expedite this process.
Documentation of actual work requests and associated equipment inspections were not reviewed.
A brief review of records indicated that a CCM has performed annual comparative reviews of joint frequency distributions of onsite meteorological data for several years.
These data summaries were apparently generated by licensee staff from sets of onsite data which had been considered valid by the licensee.
Data recovery rates were maximized by the acceptable practice of incorporating data from backup , sensors into the data base if a primary sensor's data were unavailable or ) deemed invalid.
Summary reports indicated that the data recovery rates for individual or grouped parameters had exceeded 90 percent for several years through 1988.
The contractor's reports to the licensee typically included recommendations on such issues as increasing data recovery rates, improving the monitoring program's cost effectiveness, and the 22 meter , tower.
There had been legitimate concern that nearby trees were i affecting the airflow around that tower's sensors due to the trees' l proximity and height.
The Training Center housing the E0F is also near enough to probably affect the downwind airflow to these sensors to some extend even if the trees were trimmed or cut down.
Based on the building's proximity and the redundant monitoring eqtipment on the 60 meter tower, which has no nearby structures or trees to affect local
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. . . . airflow patterns, the licensee did not cut down the trees near the 22 meter tower and has treated it as only the tertiary onsite data source.
The licensee acted on the CCM's recommendation 'und a study of local meteorological conditions.
The April 1989 s amary report titled " Meteorological Monitoring Requirements for the' Characterization of Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station" was briefly reviewed.
The study involved data from the 60 meter tower, the onsite 50DAR system, and temporary 10 meter towers located on land along the broad river valley and the bluffs within
about five miles of the site.
About 53 days of hourly data from the 60 meters tower, the 50DAR, and both temporary 10 meter towers, collected during the period October 1987 through May 1988, were utilized in the study.
Among the study's conclusions was the determination that the acoustic sounder ($0DAR) system provided insufficient additional information from that available from redundant 60 meter wind sensors and low level wind data available from the National Weather Service (NWS) to justify the 50DAR's continued use for characterizing airflow at the approximate heights of the bluffs.
The licensee discontinued operation of the 50DAR in 1989 and modified procedure F-3-13-6 regarding acquisition of low level wind data from the NWS. The study also concluded that the 10 and 60 meter wind speed and direction sensors on the 60 meter tower normally provided representative airflow data for the local area, presumed to be the (10 mile EPZ) so that supplemental monitoring locations were not necessary.
The exception was during light and' variable wind conditions, which occurred relatively infrequently.
The licensee revised procedure F-3-8 in April 1989 to further emphasize the need for offsite PARS within several miles' radius of the site for light (under five miles per hour) winds during General Emergency conditions, while emphasizing that data from the 60 meter tower were adequate to categorize local (10 mile EPZ) conditions if 10 meter wind speeds exceeded five miles per hour.
Based on the review of this study, the inspector concluded that adequate justification had been provided for the use of only the 60 meter tower's data, supplemented by lower level wind data from the NWS, to adequately characterize the airflow in the 10 mile EPZ for offsite protective action decisionmaking purposes.
Digital displays of 15 and 1 mi'.ste running average data from both towers were available on computer terminals in the CR, TSC, and EOF.
Data were color-coded and labeled to distinguish 15 minutes from one minute averaged data for the various primary, secondary, and tertiary meteorological sensors.
Parameters displayed consisted of: 10, 22, and 60 meter wind speed, wind direction, and temperature; numerical and alphabetic stability class information for the 10 meter temperature difference interview; and ground-level precipitation.
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- , Basedfon the abov'e f.ndings,.this portion of the l'icen'see's program was acceptable; however,.the'following items.should be consisted for ' improvement Th'e licensee:should formally notify the:NRR Project' Manager and
_ . appropriate. Region III staff of 1989 and any future changes-toi the onsite meteorological monitoring. program that involve addition or deletion of' parameters of re-designation of primary.or backup.
measurement locations.
Such notifications should include assurance-that the change (s) do not affect Technical Specification requi'ements.of other commitments.
r i The Emergency Plan.should be revised to accurately identify the
primary and backup'onsite.freteorological monitoring equipment.
The Plant should briefly address.the surveillance, calibration, maintenance and data quality control programs that have been developed to better ensure that emergency responders will.have access to' representative onsite meteorological data.
Appropriate'EPIPs should indicate that wind data from the 22 meter .
, tower may not adequately characterize airflow due to the proximity I 'of' low level trees and the Training Center building.
' i 7.
' Exit Interview I The'NRC exit interview was conducted on: June 8,.1989, with the licensee.
. representatives. listed in Section 1.
Th'e-NRC-Team Leader discussed the scope and' findings of the inspection..The licensee was responsive to NRC ~ concerns regarding the development of more challenging scenarios which will task TSC and EOF. personnel..The licensee was commended for the realistic'and' challenging scenario developed to task the OSC and in plant teams.
The development of scenario dev'elopment procedures through the-Corporate Training Center has contributed greatly to the~ improvement of the scenarios.at Prairie Island.. The licensee indicated that none of .the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
- Attachments:
1.
NSP Exercise Objectives and Guidelines 2.
Narrative Summary )
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. - _ , - ,.;. . PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 , ' , 1989 . . , ..n . .
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i l . .-) NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY l i SECTION V: EXERCISE SCENARIO PART 1: NARRATIVE SUMMARY J '! O i & l ? i l I j l l i
) l ! PITC/EPLAN Page 1 of 4 SECTION V Part 1 < l
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. PRAIRIE ISLAND' NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT i EMERGENCY TLAN EXERCISE Rev.C , 1989 . ' TIME EVENT .Q , 0730 INITIAL CONDITIONS 1.
Unit I at 100%, Unit 2 at cold shutdown.
2.
Equipment 0.0.S.
Breaker 26-F, bustie between bus 26 and bus 15, - due to bad trip coil j PORV block valve MV-32196 closed due to leakage - 13 charging pump due to-leaking discharge - flange D1 Diesel Generator due to faulty voltage - regulator Turbine oil purifier - 11 HDTP packing 3ask, n:aintenance vill adjust - tomorrow ! '3.
Power reduction to 25% for condenser tube cleaning.
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Fuel leakage v 5.
Wind is from the east (95 degrees) at 0.7 mph.
Temperature is 64 degrees.
0730 Power decrease started at 1/2%/ minute.
0745 Seismic event occurs resulting in: i , 1.
Trip of breaker 15-3, 1R to bus 15 causing loss of voltage on bus 15. D1 diesel generator auto starts and repowers bus 15 through breaker 15-2.
2.
D1 fuel oil day tank develops a leak on the supply line ta the diesel causing the tank to drain to the ficor.
3.
Approximately 250 ml of reactor coolant is spilled in the hot chem lab on the chemist and 12oor while sampling.
0747 D1 trips out due to loss of fuel oil causing loss of voltage on bus 15.
i 0800 Maintenance investigates problem with breaker 15-3.
O ! PITC/EPLAN Page 2 of 4 SECTION V Part 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ - _ _ _ _ - _. .__ . ... . PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rsv. D ', . 1989 i - f7 TIME CONDITION Q.
0800-0815 NUE declared due to seismic event (not Operation Basis Earthquake [0BE]) - initiating condition #18 (any earth-quake).
0820 Maintenance reports breaker 15-3 cubicle appears to be , damaged;.need to remove the breaker to inspect cubicle l and buswork.
0830 Spill cleaned up. HP deconned.
z 0830 Second seismic event (OBE)-occurs resulting in:
11 RCP failure (locked rotor) causing reactor trip signal 2.
RCS fuel Jaakage increase l 0830 Reactor fails to automaticah y trip and cannot be tripped manually (ATWS [ Anticipated Transient Without Setam]). 0831 Pressurizer rafety valve opens to relieve high pr>sssure and fails to close after pressure reduced below setpoint , resulting in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) into
l containment.
(V,) i 0832 Reactor trip breakers are opened locally by the Turbine l Building operator.
0832 Safety injection actuates due to LOCA.
0845-0900 Alert declared due to initiating condition #1 (ECCS j initiated and discharge to vessel), #2 (primary coolant
leak rate greater than 50 gpm), #12 (Failure of RPS to j initiate and complete a trip which brings the reactor j suberitical), or #18 (OBE earthquake).
l ' l 0945 TSC and OSC staffed and operational.
! 1030 (-) 12 RHR pump motor bearing fails, causing overload and subsequent trip of pump. No RHR pumps are available for long-term recirculation or low head injection.
i 1045 EOF staffed and operational.
1050 D1 fuel oil c'ay tank repaired and fuel oil supply reestablished.
1100 D1 restarted and bus 15 repowered from the diesel generator.
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h , PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY. PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 H . '1989 ,l % - ._). TIE CONDITION 1110 11 RHR pump restarted.
1200 Exercise stops for 72-hour time step.
New conditions: a.
12 RHR pump has been repaired.
. b.
Unit I at cold shutdown on RHR cool u g.
c.
Breaker 15-3 has been repaired, bus 15 is being supplied from IR transformer.
d.
P2R safety valve has been closed and gagged shut.
e.
All safety systems have been inspected, f.
No radioactive release occurring.
1230 Restart exercise.
Control room and OSC personnel terminate involvement.
.TSC and EOF discuss new conditions and recovery effort.
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' PRAIRIE > ISLAND NUCLEAR. GENERATING PLANT ' , ., . EMERGENCY PLAN. EXERCISE.
'Rev. - 0 " ' - - 198S:-- , , ,.- , , ftih g ' .o .. ' NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY-SECTION II: EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES , 'F 1: , _
._ PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT ' ' .. . EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.0 1989 . . II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES <3 k,_,)' Northern States Power Company (NSP) will exercise its Emergency Response Plan on June 6, 1989. The exercise will include the mobilization of the NSP Emergency Response Organization, such that the capability to adequately respond to a simulated accident at the , ) Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be verified.
Exercise participants will include the following NSP organizations: 1.
Onsite Emergency Response Organization.
a.
Control Room b.
Technical S'tpport Center c.
Operations Support Center 2.
' Corporate Emergency Response Organization.
a.
Emergency Operations Facility b.
Headquarters Emergency Center Active participation in the exercise will only be required of the , above listed organizations.
State and county officials will only man their emergency phones for the purpose of receiving information ,__ from NSP.
If the exercise scenario requires that any other organi-(
zations and/or officials be contacted, they shall be contacted only x-for the purpose of checking communications.
Guidelines have been developed for the conduct of the exercise which reflects capabilities of the various participating organiza-tions to meet the objectives set forth below.
Each objective is followed by a guideline which defines the " extent of play" by the participants. Plant and Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP's) are also listed which may be used to support the objective.
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_- - __ -- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _. _. _ <.. - " . PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT . ' " .. . EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 , , 1989 j . EXERCISE OBJECTIVES FOR THE NSP (LICENSEE) EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION: yfy I objective 1.0 Identification and Classification of the Emergency l ' Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate.
l personnel shall correctly' identify and classify the emergency as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or I GENERAL EMERGENCY as specified in PI EPIP F3.2.
Guidelines: 1.1 - When given initiating condit1ons'of an emergency action level, the Shift Supervisor / Emergency Director will classify the emergency consistent with the PINGP's emergency classification scheme. The postulated plant conditions will necessitate classifications beginning at an NUE and escalating uplto an . Alert.
1.2 The following EPIP will be used to support the objective stated above: PINGP F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies 0u- - l PITC/EPLAN Page 3 of l'. SECTION II > _ .U____m.___.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.___ _. _ _ '
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- EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1989 , , z Objective 2.0 Accident Notifications and Communications Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall promptly complete accident notifications to the appropriate State and County / City agencies (15 minutes), the NRC (1 ' hour), PINGP personnel and Emergency Response Organization. (30 minutes), and NSP' Corporate ' Emergency Response Organization (I hour).
^l Guidelines: ' 2.1 Notifications of emergency classifications to States of Minnesota and Wisconsin, Pierce County, Dakota County, and Goodhue County / City of Red Wing vill.be completed within 15 minutes.. Initially these notifications will.be made by the Shift Energency Communicator (SEC) at the plant. Offsite communicators.at the Emergency. Operations Facility (EOF) will assume these responsibilities after it becomes fully operational.
2.2 The NRC will be initially notified within one hour by knowledgeable plant staff via the ENS hotline. The extended use of this communication line will be determined by the NRC participant.
This communication link may eventually be transferred to a technical support person in the EOF.
2.3 The SEC will notify.the PINGP personnel per EPIP procedures ..
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within 30 minutes.
' -( 2.4 The control room staff will notify PINGP personnel of an . emergency classification via the plant page.
2.5 NSP Corporate Emergency Response Organization will be notified within I hour by the NSP' System Control Center (SCC) Operator per the " Nuclear Emergency Notification List for System Control Center".
2.6 All major NSP emergency communication links will be demon-strated utilizing designated emergency response communication equipment, e.g.
telephones, ENS phone, HPN phone, field team radios, and facsimile transceivers.
2.7 Offsite emergency centers and government agencies will be updated with accurate and timaly information.
2.8 NSP will dispatch corporate personnel to the MN State EOC.
Their extent of play will depend on state participation.
L O PITC/EPLAN Page 4 of 17 SECTION II _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
. i:n ~. . ' PRAIRIE ISLAND' NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE :
Rev. 0 1989 , . ~ . . .. ., 2.9. The-following EPIP's may'be used to' support the objective .., .. -f%.. stated above:
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. Emergency Notifications: '. PINCP ; F3-5 ~. . .. PINGP F1-24 Record Keeping.
PINGP~F3-29 . Emergency Security Procedures.- -MNGP A.2-702 Response to an Emergency 'at Prair!.e Island (Monticello'EPIP) CORP EPIP-1.1.2 Notifications CORP EPIP 1.1.3 Public'Information CORP EPIP 1.1.8 Communications Equipment and Information CORP EPIP.1.1.14 ' Vendor.and Consultant Services - ! k < i ! l ! i
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- PRAIRIE'ISL' ND NUCLEAR ' GENERATING: PLANT A p ' ' P . EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE. Rev. 0; . ,u c1989 .J " ,
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- Objective 3.0 ; ' Emergency Response Organization'and Facility Activation l
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ip - , lj Given's'imulated accident conditions, PINGP and'NSP Corporate ' '
- personnel sha11' activate at least'the TSC and OSC.within I hour and
, a_ the EOF within 2 hours, j . Guidelines: , 3.1 Upon notification, the. participants will demonstrate actual. . startup times and activities for'each emergency center.; " -3.2 The TSC and OSC will be fully functional within 1 hour.. $ 3.3 The EOF will be fully. functional withini2: hours. An EOF , Coordinator,(acting Emergency Manager) will be present in the , H EOF within I' hour.
[ .! L 3.4 The HQEC will be fully functional within 2 hours.
, 3.5 'NSF representatives will be present at the MN State EOC within-2 hours.
3.6 The transfer of appropriate offsite responsibilities (e.g., . offsite communications,. dose assessment, and offsite protec-tive action recommendations) from the Onsite Emergency.
Organization to the Corporate' Emergency Response Organization (EOF) will be demonstrated within 2 hours.
3.7 'The NSP Emergency Organization will demonstrate through discussion and staff-planning the ability to perform a shift change _in the TSC and EOF.
' 3.8 Activation of the Recovery Phase transition will be con-sidered_by involving the Recovery Manager in staff planning and discussion with the Emergency Manager and' Emergency.
Director.
" 3.9 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objective stated above: PINGP F3-1.
Onsite Emergency Organization PINGP F3-3 Responsibilities During an NUE PINGP F3-4 Responsib111 ties During an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL EMERGENCY PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC PINGP F3-7 Activation and Operat1on of OSC PINGP F3-29 Emergency Security Procedures MNGP A.2-702 Response to an Emergency at Prairie Island (Monticello EPIP) iA l PITC/EPLAN Page 6 of 17 SECTION II
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- ^l ' EMERGENCY PLAN. EXERCISE - p e,/ y
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j ., i: ..,, [i ? /[\\ ~ CORP EPIP 1.1.1' Corporate Emergency' h.
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- Response Organization-
. [.-l dd CORP'EPIP 1.1.5l Startup.and Operation
of EOF CORP EPIP.1.1.8 Communication Equipment l and Information'- CORP EPIP 1.1.6 Emergency Organization - < - Shift Turnover -
CORP EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation' '
of HQEC-CORP EPIP 1.1.15 Transition into the-Recovery Phase is <! > r (.w .;. i l . ' t l
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-__- __-__-_ _ - _ _. _ ._ -___. _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ - _ _. -__ _ - -. _ -. -_- -- cia N 4 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT'- P 1' EMERGENCY TLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 ' 1999 , .. , ' Accident' Assessment Objective'4.0 .. ~[[( Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate-personnel shall demonstrate assessment of plant operational para-meters ~and radiological' data.
i Guidelines: . 4.1 Plant conditions and events will be monitored and assessed in the Control Room, TSC, EOF and HQEC.
, 4.2 Radiological assessment will include onsite and offsite radiological sampling and sample analysis onsite and at the.
EOF.
4.3 offsite dose l projections will be performed by use of'the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS).
'4.4 Core damage' assessment will be performed per1EPIP's by TSC support staff if PASS is' implemented.
4.5 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objective stated above: < PINGP F3-2 Classifier.tions of Emergencies . PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation , " (\\ / -of TSC PINGP F3-7 Activation and Operation , of OSC PINGP F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions ' PINGP F3-13 ' Offsite Dose Calculations PINGP F3-17 Core Damage. Assessment PINGP F3-20 Manual Determination of Radioactive Release Con-centrations PINGP F3-24 Record Keeping During an Emergency , PINGP F3-26 Operation of TSC ERCS l Display CORP EPIP 1.1.4 Emergency Organization' Records and Forms CORP EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF CORP EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC CORP EPIP _.1.11 Accident Assessment ( PITC/EPLAN Page 8 of 17 SECTION II
_ _ _ _ i*'- PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1989 . Objective 5.0 Accident Mitigation _p $ () Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate mitigation of the accident.
Guidelines: i 5.1 Decision making and problem solving will be demonstrated at the various emergency centers by the appropriate participants, e.g., Control Room Operators, Shift Technical Advisor (STA), and Shif t Supervisor in the Control Room; Emergency Director and TSC staff in the TSC; Emergency Manager and EOF staff in the EOF; and Power Production Management in the HQEC.
5.2 Corrective actions will be formulated in an attempt to mitigate the accident; however, some unforeseen corrective actions that may defeat the scenario may not be permitted by the exercise controllers.
5.3 Simulated equipment failures will require repair planning and briefings J eading to emergency repairs.
5.4 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objective stated above: PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an ALERT, SITE AREA, or i n/ T GENERAL EMERGENCY U PINGP F3-24 Record Keeping During an Emergency CORP EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation l of EOF CORP EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC l O
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- EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.: 0 '
1989 , L' - Objective-6.0 Protective Action Decision-Making . [M ' '(j Given' simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate' personnel shall develop and promptly communicate protective actions for onsite and EOF personnel and offsite protective action' recom-mendations for:the' protection of the health and safety'of the public.. !' Guidelines: 6.1 Simulated plant conditions may warrant a plant evacuation.for nonessential personnel to an onsite assembly point.
Personne1' accountability will be performed if a plant evacuation l occurs.. 6.2 No protective actions will be warranted for personnel'func-- tioning in the EOF.
6.3 Recommended protective actions for the general public offsite will be formulated and communicated to the appropriate state agencies with regard to the plume exposure pathway. The general direction of the wind will be from the West-Northwest.
6.4 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objectives stated.above: , PINGP F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions
- PINGP F3-18 Thyroid Iodine Blocking Agent CORP EPIP 1.1.11 Accident Assessment t
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1989 .. ? ,.4 l Objective 7.0I.' Post-Accident Sampling and ' Analysis e v d.
'Given simulated accident.. conditions, PINGP personnel shall obtain ' ' i and-analyze various inplant liquid and air type samples.
Guidelines: 7.1 Various'inplant liquid and air type samples are' expected to-be- ' collected and analyzed. However, the sampling should not require the use of-the Post Accident Sampling procedures'and , equipment due to the' nature of the scenario. Some normal operational sampling. procedures may be used.
Sampling will ir.clude sample analysis.of the Reactor Coolant. System and' containment atmosphere, as appropriate.
7.2 The following EPIP's may. be used to support tha objective stated above: PINGP F3-20 Determination of Radioactive Release Concentration PINGP F3-23 Emergency Sampling f, ' V .
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., _ _.. _ __ _ __ _ . _. .- - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -- -. - _.. _ _ _ ,. N "t. ' * > PRAIRIELISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT ' EMERGENCY ' PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 0 1989x , ._ . ,( Objective 8.0' Onsite Radiological Monitorfng . . Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall-perform radiological. surveys onsite (inplant and out of plant)..: ,, Guidelines:- 8.1' Onsite radiological monitoring will include radiation and-contamination (Beta and Gamma) surveys, sampling for. parti-culate'.. iodine, and gas,.as appropriate.-- 8.2 The'following EPIP may be'used to support the objective stated.above: . PINGP F3-14.1 Onsite Radiological-Monitoring I i l, .i ' ,.
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Objective 9.0 Emergency Radiation Exposure Control _) I ' Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate
personnel shall maintain a program of emergenef. radiation exposure
l control.
Guidelines: I 9.1 Emergency exposure management and control vill be demonstrated ] by the issuance of TLDs'and dosimeters in the plant and EOF.
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9.2. Continuous air monitors will operate in the Control Room, TSC, i and EOF.
9.3 Radiological controls may be demonstrated at the OSC, TSC, and EOF, depending on scenario events.
9.4 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objective stated above: PINGP F3-12 Emergency Exposure Control PINGP F3-14.1-Onsite Radiological Monitoring PINGP F3-19 Personnel and Equipment Monitoring and Decontamination [ CORP EPIP 1.1.16 Offsite Personnel and Vehicle N Monitoring and Decontamination CORP EPIP 1.1.17 Persornel Monitoring at the EOF CORP EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF -. > r'^T U . PITC/EPLAN Page 13 of 17 SECTION II _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ -
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE . Rev. 0 1989 ,
,+ r Objective 10.0 Offsite Monitoring l < \\ bl Given simulated accident conditio s, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall monitor offsite ra tological releases through a program of surveying, sampling and analyzing.
Guidelines: 10.1 PINGP may dispatch at least two field monitoring teams for offsite radiological monitoring.
10.2 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant will assist in offsite monitoring upon notification and arrival to the EOF.
i 10.3 Offsite radiological monitoring will include plume search, Beta / Gamma surveys, contamination surveys, and air sampling, as required.
10.4 Offsite samples may be transported to and analyzed in the EOF Countroom.
10.5 The following EPIP's may be used to support the objective , ' stated above: PINGP F3-15 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release g s CORP EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF CORP EPIP 1.1.10 Offsite Surveys CORP EPIP 1.1.12 Implementation of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program CORP EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE.
. Rev. O' m 1989 = . o: Objective 11.0 Assembly and Accountability g-f g-
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'Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall- -demonstrate a plant avacuation and perform personnel accountability within 30 minutes following'a plant evacuation.
L: Guidelinas: 11.1'.A plant evacuation will not be demonstrated for this. exercise.
.The scenario may warrant a local evacuation.
. '11.2 Accountability will not result in any missing personnel.
p 11.3 The following EPIP's may be used to support'the objective ' stated above: , PINGP F3-9 ' Emergency Evacuation-PINGP F3-11 Search and Rescue PINGP F3-12 Emergency Exposure Control , i , - 'O
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Rev. 0 ' .1989
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. Objectivei12.0 Access Control ' .% p. Given, simulated ~ accident conditions, PINGP and NSP. Corporate ' personnel shall maintain access control into the plant and EOF-respectively throughout the emergency.
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Guidelines:- 12.1-Access control will be demonstrated'by both NSP and Security; personnel at.the' plant, EOF, and.HQEC throughout the simulated.
emergency.
, 12.2 The following;EPIP's may be used to support the objective stated above: PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities D!tring an ALERT, SITE AREA, or GENERAL EMERGENCY I PINGP F3-29 Emergency Security Procedures CORP EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF ' CORP EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC CORP EPIP 1.1.17 Personnel Monitoring at EOF CORP EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF
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. _. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J*"#D PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev 0 1989 . ,, ,- s . 0bjective 13.0 Interfaces with Support Ori.:anizations, Representatives of the News Media, and Government Agencies l [v} Given simulated a 'ent conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate petsonnel shall de. nstrate interface with outside support organizations, news media representatives, and government agencies in a timely manner using appropriate communication channels.
Guidelines: 13.1 The appropriate communication systems will be used e.g., telephones ENS phone HPN phone, and facsimile transceivers.
13.2 Appropriate plant conditions will be communicated to the state's emergency governments.
13.3 Field survey data and offsite dose projections will be shared with the State Health Departments, depending on the extent of state participation.
13.4 Plant architectural and design engineering organizations will be notified and kept informed of plant events, depending on the vxtent of their participation. Advice from these organi-zations will be considered if so offered.
13.5 Simulated pre =s releases will be prepared by the NSP Communication Department.
\\~ / 13.6 Spokespersons from NSP will be present at the State E0C.
13.7 The following EPIP's may be used ..o suppot t the objective stated above: PINGP F3-5 Energency Notifications CORP EPIP 1.1.2 Notifications CORP EPIP 1.1.3 Public Information CORP EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC CORP EPIP 1.1.8 Communication Equipment and Information CORP EPIP 1.1.14 Vendor and Consultant Se rvf.ces , ( 9tTC/EPLAN Page 17 of 17 SECTION II }}