IR 05000282/1985007

Insp Repts 50-282/85-07 & 50-306/85-06 on 850513-15.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise,Including Observations,Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20127E456
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	05/29/1985
From:	Patterson J, Phillips M, Ploski T, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127E440	List: IR 05000282/1985007 ML20127E439
References
50-282-85-07, 50-282-85-7, 50-306-85-06, 50-306-85-6, NUDOCS 8506240555
Download: ML20127E456 (12)

Text

_- . _ _

.

' *

s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/85007(DRSS);50-306/85006(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 424 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Co ucted Ma 13-15, 1985 WW

'

Inspectors: P. Patterson al-Team Leader Date h' b 5 T. J. Ploski h(lg Date Af$ S7w N. R. Williamsen 27 F Date -

Approved By Chief Emergency Preparedness Section 5/zr/f/

Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 13-15, 1985 (Reports No. 50-282/85007(DRSS); 50-306/85006(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Prairie Island Nuclear

, Generating Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by seven NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercis The inspection involved 116 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors and four consultant Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie DR ADOCK 0 g2

- . -

. -

.- _-. .- - ._ .

-

,

• *

.

DETAILS Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)

W. Hansen, Control Room F._Carlson, TSC T. Ploski, TSC .

_

_

W.' Thomas, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)'

N. Williamsen, EOF L. Rathbun, Offsite' Monitoring Teams J. Hard, Senior _ Resident Inspector - Control Room, TSC and EOF Northern States Power Company E. Watzl,-Plant Manager D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Plant. Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance Klee, Power M. Agen, Superintendent Productionof Nuclear Training Engineering (Corporate)

Department C. Crever, Power. Production Training Department (Corporate)

M. Ladd, Administrator, Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)

T. Amundson, Superintendent of Training, Prairie Island J. Nelson, Superintendent of Maintenance M. Reddemann, Technical Training Supervisor F. Fey, General Superintendent, Radiation. Protection and Chemistry (Corporate)

W. Irvin, Lead Plant Equipment and Reactor Operator G. Hamberg, Lead . Plant Equipment and Reactor Operator -

D. Nelson, Plant Equipment and Reactor Operator J. Goldsmith, Superintendent of Technical Services R. Stenroos, Principal Production Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent of Operations D. Schuelke, Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection D. Stember, Lead Production Engineer C. Baltos, Engineer Associate S. Chezick, Reactor. Operator D. Walker,_ Shift Supervisor

'R. Flack, Shift Supervisor G. Edon, Shift Supervisor L. Anderson, Lead Production Engineer J. Sorenson, Production Engineer G. Kolle,. Radiation Protection Instructor K.'DeLong, Radiation Protection Specialist

.J.- Lundquist, Radiation Protection Specialist-J. Early, Radiation Protection Specialist-J. Maurer, Scheduling Coordinator

,. .

Northern States Power Company G. Martin, Instrument and Controls Instructor J. Oelkers, Quality Control Specialist H. Aadahl, Operations Instructor D. Palmer, Instructor, Engineer II T. Asmus, Engineer II G. Malinowski, Radiation Protection Coordinator All personnel listed above attended the exit interview on May 15, 198 . General An exercise of the licensee's Northern States Power Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plan and the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant on May 14, 1985, testing the licensee's capabilities to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario without a significant release of radio-active material. This was a utility only, off-hours exercise. The attachment describes the scenari . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using both the Prairie Island and Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plans, the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and the Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. - Licensee Response The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely. If the event had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public health and safet Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with seven NRC observer Critique The licensee held critiques imediately following the exercise and also on May 15, 1985. The NRC critique was held after the licensee's May 15th critique. The NRC and the licensee identified inprovement items in their respective critiques as discussed in this repor . .

4. Specific Observations Control Room The Control Room staff demonstrated good knowledge of the plant and plant Emergency Operating Procedures (E0Ps), as well as the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). No serious mistakes were observed by the NRC observer, while several noteworthy actions were observed. These actions included rapid detection of the small LOCA and determination to manually initiate the Safety Injection System as a corrective measure. This action was taken by the Control Room staff within three minutes of the distribution of the data sheet by the Controlle The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the Shift Emergency Comunicator (SEC) were notified within 4 minutes after the initial emergency conditions were given. They both arrived in the Control Room within the 10 minute response time comitment for these emergency position Comunications were well maintained throughout the event. The event was properly classified as an Alert by the Emergency Director within 14 minutes, followed by a plant public address system announcement at 052 The interim Emergency Director (ED) understood and demonstrated use of the following EPIPs: F3-1 (0nsite Emergency Organization), F3-2 (Classification of Emergencies), F3-4 (Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency) and F3-5 (Energency Notifications). He utilized good judgment in restricting access to the plant to only those personnel with emergency assignment As the exercise was initiated on the back shift, this effectively redtced the potential for unnecessary personnel exposure While the simulated leak was in a location which precluded its identification from the data presented in the scenario, the Control Room staff demonstrated excellent teamwork and knowledge in their attempts to identify and isolate it. The Control Room staff also exhibited foresight in their advanced preparations for placing the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system on line. They also determined, with the support of the TSC, that the RHR system could be placed in service earlier at 400 F rather than at 350 F, as called for in Plant Operating Procedure It was necessary for the Controllers to move the Operators ahead several steps in an operating procedure to keep up with the scenari The Operators were using the correct procedures properly, but were

, proceeding more slowly than anticipated. This was probably because of their unfamiliarity with the data sheets early in the exercise.

-

The interin ED turned over his responsibilities to the Plant Superintendent for Operations and Maintenance. The turnover was performed well, except that information on the two stuck control rods was not passed on. Less than 5 minutes later, the primary

, .. - - . .

.

... .

designated ED arrived and his briefing did include the information about the two stuck control rods. This information would not have been omitted on the first ED transfer if the turnover had been more formalized and organized to include a review of all logs and check-off sheets. At times the STA seemed somewhat reluctant to get involved. He could have been more assertive, but he did a good job on certain tasks, including watching the thermal shock problem during 4 cooldow Technical Support Center (TSC)

2 .

Following declaration of the Alert, the SEC notified. State and County agencies in a timely manner. He also promptly activated the tone alert radios to initiate staff augmentation of onsite personne Also according to procedures, the SEC notified the NRC Resident Inspector and INP0 of the Alert declaration and verified that the Control Room had contacted the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer on the ENS phone. The TSC was declared operational at about 0610, which is within one hour of the Alert. declaration (0524). However, no announcement was made within the TSC that it had been declared operational . The NRC observer had to detemine this from a notation in the ED's lo Message forms and status boards were updated and information posted as required on a continuous basis. These actions help keep the TSC operating smoothly. Good preparation and training was eviden Thorough briefings were conducted by the ED about every 15 minute These briefings included changes in plant parameters, inplant radiation survey information and sampling activities, and field monitoring team actions. Appropriate key plant parameters were

,

plotted and trended by TSC engineering staff beginning with 0600 data. Although there were no indications of a release, TSC dose

. assessment staff correctly monitored containment radiation level data and performed offsite dose projections to estimate offsite consequences should a release occu These dose assessment projections were made using the Meteorological Infonnation and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS). A backup program and a hand calculator method were also available.- The tracking of offsite monitoring teams was very well done, even after the E0F took control of the field teams. Dosimetry was provided for all TSC personnel. An air sampler (CAM) was set up and used in the TSC to monitor habitability. The TSC st~f a correctly initiated a Work Request to investigate and fix the cause of a " trouble alarm" on the TSC's emergency ventilation syste The ED and his staff closely monitored the Eats and changes-to plant conditions to determine if any emergency reclassification was warranted. They determined that no reclassifications were necessary during the exercise. The ED did a good job in involving his staff

,

in discussions regarding the potential to reclassify the emergency, the potential consequences and causes of changes in plant parameters,

'

- qs "* -+r w n++-r----- ae.a --m wg -mo

_ . _ _

., - __ _ _ __ _ _ . - - _ _ __ __

_

m

'

ft .7

;. -

y

' ,

L thhneedforonsiteprotectiveactions,andwhattodowiththe '

' unaffected' Unit 1. The.ED and Radiological Emergency Coordinator

! ' (REC) were; properly concerned about the habitability of the

auxiliary building. Security provided

information on the numbers

and duties of personnel .in the auxiliary building long before-f ts  ;

evacuation was ordered. An evacuation route was chosen well before it would be needed., The PA announcement ordering this evacuation .

'

t 3

was not heard tin the TSC. The TSC staff made a number of leak rate

,

.

estimates ba' sed on changing pressurizer level and SI flow rate dat .

y When the res'ults of an analysis of the- containment air and primary 7~

coolant samples wire obtained, they were used to generate an estimate 1 of core damage. _However the Nuclear Engineer in the TSC had difficulty

using a computer _ terminal for_these calculations. He had to leave the ,

F .TSC to perform the calculation' on another terminal. After-the exercise, '

{. the Ifcensee investigated this problem and determined that the proper

, computer code for core damage assessment had not been programmed into ,

l the TSC terminal. This oversight will-be correcte .

4, The ED had.a good discussion with_his sta'ff on Reentry / Recovery, i emergency reclassification,: reentry hazards, and cleanup concerns.

j" .The operating status of the undamaged Unit 1 was not included in the Reentry / Recovery discussion. The status:of the undamaged reactor

'should always.be part of this discussion.

l It was never announced to the entire TSC-when the EOF was operational i

and taking control of the emergency. . The area of the TSC dealing with radiation protection was independently informed that the EOF -

was taking _over the dose assessment responsibilit '

!- Operational Support Center (OSC)

I-The OSC Manager briefed his' supporting staff at 0600 and the OSC was  !

declared operational at 0612, less than one hour after the Alert wa ,

, . declared (0526). The noise level in the OSC was excessive at tioes

, due to the background noise generated by the air conditioner. . The -

air conditioner was turned off during OSC briefings, but'while-it

was running the P.A. announcements were difficult to hear as well

[ 2as normal-level voice communications. Habitability of the OSC was

confirmed initially with a Victoreen Area Monitor and periodically .,

E assessed with air samples and smear' surveys. Health Physics 7 Technicians, Electrical Maintenance and Instrument _ Control ,

- -Technicians, and Radiochemistry'and Chemistry Technicians * arrived

-promptly at the OSC and were: prepared to_ implement their appropriate

~

,

functions when'neede '

All primary communications systems functioned well in the OSC.

LPersonnel assignments were performed in a timely manner.upon requeste  ;

. by.the:TSC. ' Good briefings and1 instructions were provided to the '

. 1 teams prior to dispatchIfrom the OSC. The Radiation.. Protection -

y .

-SpecialistLissued self-reading' dosimeters,' extremity dosimeters, and -

'

"he assigned exposure limits'for'each team ' dispatched from~the OSC.

.

-

!.

'

-

,

. h 4

,

'

,

, 6 ,,

y

,' - -

i' ,

. . _.,wa, ma .. . _._ :~ . a _ _ a .;- .- .- . .au. ._ _ , . ,, ; . .. ._ _ .- . - m ._ _ __u . _ a. , ~ .-

. .

,

High range dosimeters were issued when it was determined that they night be required. Cumulative radiation exposure of personnel was considered in all team assignments and planning action The PASS teams were qualified and capable of procurins and analyzing coolant and containment samples under emergency conditions. The wearing of protective clothing or equipment during sampling activities was not required by the scenario. As demonstrated, the appropriate radiation protection procedures were followed as well as procedures for obtaining the samples. The proper tools were obtained and used in obtaining and transporting the samples. Initially the incorrect procedure was used to obtain the containment atmosphere and liquid sample, and the lead pig was not used as a shield when the sample was taken. The controller later pointed out these errors to the PASS team and the procedure was rerun correctly. This repeat did not adversely affect the time required to collect the sample. The NRC observer suggested that the sampling procedure PINGP 610, Revision 3, should be separated into three sections, highlighting each sampling procedure and end result. This would make each part of the sampling operation easier to follow under emergency conditions. Samples were analyzed for noble gases, radioiodines, and hydrogen. Techniques used by the teams prevented laboratory contamination. Tb results of the analyses would have been available to the TSC within about three hours of the request to take the sampl Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

By 0611 six people had arrived at the E0F, including the EOF Coordinator who was the Acting Emergency Manager (EM) until the designated EM arrived. Security control was established and access was limited to one door. Personal dosimeters were issued to all present. The EM arrived about 0738, at which time the Acting EM announced that the new EM would take over after the Acting EM had briefed him on the emergency conditions. This change of command could have been more effective and better presented if the new EM made the initial announcement when he was in charge. Comunications with the TSC and offsite agencies were established promptly and continued well throughout the exercise. Status boards, messages and a flip chart were used effectively and updated every 15-20 minutes while data was changing. Briefings by the EM or the E0F Coordinator were held frequently with each support group making a contributio The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) and the. Corporate HQEC were briefed periodically from the E0F, although the JPIC did not make any news releases to the news medi The newly arrived Radiation Protection Support Supervisor (RPSS)

was well briefed by the interim RPSS. However, the responsibility was really shared from then on. The end result was satisfactor ' Radiation monitoring readings, stack meters, high range dome meters, and containment pressures were trended by the RPSS group in the EO In addition, trending of key plant parameters was done by the

. .

,

Technical Support Group. This trending included the RWST level, steam generator level (No. I and 2), degrees of subcooling, pressurizer level, core exit temperature, and RCS pressur A shift change roster was completed as announced at 0825. Two 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts were planned, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Habitability of the E0F was periodically checked. Projected dose assessments were provided as needed by the RPSS using the MIDA The analysis of samples from the offsite monitoring teams were-performed in approximately 10-12 minutes after the sample was received. The analyst appeared competent in performing the analysis as well as in handling the sample From the E0F vantage point it did not appear that the exercise was properly terminated. There should have been telephone communications between the EM and his counterpart in the TSC to make the joint decision to terminate with the final announcement coming from the EM at the EOF. Instead, the Chief Controller in the TSC unilaterally gave a contingency message to terminate the exercise. The EOF was informed promptly of this decision; however, a Reentry / Recovery briefing was then being held by the EM. He nonetheless asked for input on the recovery mode from his two support leaders. Discussion included long tenn recovery for RHR, getting water out of containment, radiation protection status, and other recovery-related issue Offsite Monitoring Teams The two Prairie Island teams reported to the Northern States Power Red Wing Service Center in Red Wing, Minnesota. By 0543, or 15 minutes after they were notified, the teams were assembled and briefings began. Plant status along with meteorological information wat provided by the TSC prior to dispatching the teams. Prior to deployment, team members performed preoperational checks on their radiation monitoring and sampling equipment. Preoperational activities were well don Radio communications between the survey teams and the TSC/E0F were generally good. During their sampling and radiation monitoring activities the teams were frequently infonned as to changing plant conditions along with the accident classification. Team members were also requested to. read their personal dosimeters frequentl At 0727 the TSC transferred control of the offsite teams to the EO Monticello offsite teams, No. 3 and No. 4, arrived at the EOF for assignment at 0755. Meanwhile, Prairie Island Team No. 2 was requested to obtain particulate and gaseous samples for demon-stration purposes since there was no-radiation release from the plant. These samples were properly taken.and sampling techniques were good. The samples were then transferred to the E0F counting

' laboratory for analysis (reference Section 4.d).

.

o

,

.. . _ _ . _ - -- - . . -

... . .

-

i l

Monticello Team No. 3 did not obtain the requested gaseous sample with the suction bulb in the position specified in EPIP 1.1.1 The bulb preceded the sample chamber instead of following it. Overall,

,

teams. from Prairie Island and from Monticello performed activities !

.*

including comunications, radiation monitoring, and sample-taking -!

very wel '

' Exercise Scenario and Control The' scenario used was well. organized and realistically presented

'

through messages and technical data including plant radiological

. data. The scenario was somewhat unique in that a simulated radioactive release never occurred outside the plant and the emergency remained at the Alert level throughout the exercis Minor errors in scenario data and messages as identified _by the

~

~

.

NRC prior to the exercise were corrected in the final scenario package.

l The quality of scenario data was much improved from that of the 1984

scenario. It was obviously well constructed, reviewed, and examined for accuracy by qualified personnel before final. editing. Both the l players and the controllers contributed to the good utilization of

this scenario.

] The NRC observers, after examining the nine objectives and_ guidelines of this exercise, felt they were all met including., shift augmentatio The one objective which was not included in the nine was assembly and accountability. 1.icensee management had agreed to include this objective in the 1986 exercis Exit Interview

' The inspection team held an exit interview on May 15, 1985 the day i -after the exercise. Those who attended are listed in Section The NRC team leader discussed the preliminary findings of the exercis No_ items of noncompliance or major weaknesses were identified. The

- team leader stated that~for future exercise's the NRC would like to see key positions including Emergency Director and some supporting positions in the E0F filled by qualified alternates rather' than-the

,

primary designees. This would give more individuals an opportunity D to participate in exercises, plus broaden the base to11nclude more experienced personnel.- The licensee did not comit to this at the meetin The inspectors discussed the content'of the reportL to determine.if the licensee thought that any of the information was proprietar The_ licensee responded that none.of the information should be

proprietar ,

Attachment: Exercise Scenario

1.

s

'

,

. ,

. _ . ._ -. -

{

<

-

'

,' '

PRk IE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERI NG PLANT l EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rov. O i May 14,1985

-,

,

i

.

-

.

,

%

PART 1: NARRATIVE SUMMARY j

.

l l

l

! i l

s l

• l

!

IBM /EP85 V-1 Page I of 3 EXERCISE /85/3 l

-- . .. _

. - . ,. -- . - ,

. .-. . . _ . - _ - - _ . _. _

' .- * "

f f

-

PRL.RIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERA. .NG PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.0

, May 14,1985 TIME CLOCK '

EVENT SUMMARY

>

EEXPSED 0000 0500 Initial Conditions to Control Roo . Both units are operating at 100%. ' Wind is out of NE (450) at 4 mp (Stablity Class E). Unit II has been operating with some fuel leakag Primary Xe-133 eq 3.9 pCl/ml Primary DEI 1.17 E-2 pCi/ml Total non-iodine activity < 100/E

' S/G Primary to Secondary leakage .25 gp Secondary DEI 1.09 E-4 pCl/ml Unit II RCS Boron is less than 1.0 pp . Refueling shutdown will start 6000 May 18, 198 . #22 Shld Bldg Vent System out of servic Small b /eak LOCA (500 gpm) at 2235 psid occurs on Unit II. The leak is due to a cracked weld at the RHR Loop B suction connection. The leak is not isolabl Manual SI is initiated due to Low Pressurizer Level

'

0012 0512 initiating a Rx trip. Two control rods failed to

,

t ri .

0025 0525 An ALERT should be declared based on F3-2 Condition #2, " Primary Coolant Leak Rate > 50 gpm" (also due to "SI with Flow to Vessel"). Unit I SS has assumed the role of ED and summoned the 1 SEC and STA.

~

'

0040 0540 Notification to the States and Counties have been ,

complete The TSC is adequately staffed and operationa RCS has been releasing its radioactive gases into containment. Offsite dose projections based on containment monitors and possible containment release are being made. Rad Survey teams are dispatched to confirm that no radioactive release is occurring.

I 0200 0700 #21 Shield Bldg Vent System fail l

IBM /EP85 V-1 Page 2 of 3 'g EXERCISE /85/3

,

, , - , , , . . , , , - , . , - , . . . - _ - - , , , , . . , ~ , , , ,

_ _ _ _ _

. . __

.

..

,..

- * ' ' '

'.' *

Pl. .RIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENER4 ING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. O ;

May 14,1985 TIME CLOCK EVENT SUMMARY EIAPSED 0225 0725 EOF is fully staffed and operationa .

0330 0830 RHR is placed in servic Primary system average temperature at 350* Primary System is at Cold Shutdown 0500 1000 Exercise is stopped: 1-DAY TIME ADVANCE BRIEFIN Update of Plant Parameters / Conditions and Environmental Parameter * Unit II is at Cold Shutdown Conditio * Reactor is on RHR cooling and stabl * The emergency remains at the ALER *

No significant radioactive release is occurrin * Environmental surveys indicate no detectable iodine in the environment and all readings are normal backgroun Exercise Resumes - Simulated Time 1010, Wednesday, May 15, 1985 After the ED and EM discuss present plant conditions, they decide to close out the emergency but continue to perform offsite environmental monitoring and inplant cleanu Final news release is prepared for emergency ,

closeout. All Emergency Centers Close Ou EXERCISE IS TERMINATE t

.

IBM!EP85 V-1 Page 3 of 3 EXERCISE /85/3 6