IR 05000282/1997009
| ML20148H750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147J269 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-97-09, 50-282-97-9, 50-306-97-09, 50-306-97-9, 72-0010-97-09, 72-10-97-9, NUDOCS 9706110080 | |
| Download: ML20148H750 (18) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION lil l
Docket Nos: 50-282, 50-306,72-10
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License Ncs: DPR-42, DPR-60, SNM-2506 Report No:
50-282/97009(DRP); 50-306/97009(DRP);
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72-10/97009(DRP)
t Licensee:
Northern States Power Company
Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
April 5 - May 13,1997 Inspectors:
S. Ray, Senior Resident inspector R. Bywater, Resident inspector
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Approved by:
James W. McCormick-Barger, Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch 7 I
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9706110080 970602 PDR ADOCK 05000282 i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-282/97009(DRP); 50-306/97009(DRP): 72-10/97009(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support performed by the resident inspectors.
Ooerations
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Operations performance der;,,c this inspection period was mixed.' Although a number of
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good conservative open..or actions were identified during this period as described below, several performance issues were also identified. These issues reflect a continued decline in operations performance. A management meeting between the NRC and licensee senior management was conducted at the Region lli office on May 20,1997, to discuss this decline in performance. A subsequent meeting is planned in the near future to discuss further actions planned by the licenses to address this concern.
e Operators performed wellin a reactor shutdown and subsequent startup. (Section 01.1)
e An inadvertent reactivity addition occurred when a procedure was not properly followed. Another example of a reactivity addition event had occurred only four l
months previously. This was considered an example of a violation for failure to I
follow procedures. (Section 01.2)
The actions of the operators in questioning whether they might be operating above e
the licensed power 13: nit and actions to compensate for and resolve the issue were considered examples of conservative operation. (Section 01.3)
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The inspectors considered the licensee's decision to shut down Unit 1 to perform
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I the AFW modifications conservative. Additionally, performing the modifications made the configuration of the AFW systems for both Units consistent and that was a beneficial human factors consideration for the control room operators. (Section 01.4)
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e A second example of the violation for an inadequate procedure was identified during following up of an unresolved item for a previous inadvertent reactivity addition. (Section 08.1)
e When a main steam power operated relief valve (PORV) unexpectedly opened at below its setpoint, operators rapidly identified and responded to the event. (Section M1.1)
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l Maintenance i
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e The inspectors identified procedure adequacy and adherence prootams associated
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with the D1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) 18-month preventive maintenance
procedure during post-maintenance testing. Staff understanding of administrative
requirements for procedure changes was not clear. Two examples of a violation
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were identified. (Section M1.1)
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For a first time surveillance activity, bus sequencer load rejection and restoration for l
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the control room chillers, good pre-job briefs were observed in which thorough j
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l discussed. Before and during the tests, operators recommended several procedure
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i enhancements to the system engineer. (Section M1.1)
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e During followup troubleshooting on a reactor trip bypass breaker problem, the j
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original problem could not be duplicated and no problem could be found with the
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breaker. However, the engineer conservatively decided to replace the bypass
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breaker with a ready spare so that a complete preventive maintenance procedure could be performed on the questionable breaker. (Section M1.1)
i The inspectors considered the concurrent performanco of rod drop testing and a e
containment entry an example of a scheduling weakness. (Section M1.1)
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l The inspectors identified discrepancies in plant practices regarding use of lubricating e
oil. This issue was considered an inspection followup item. (Section M1.2)
Enaineerirn
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The inspectors' engineering findings and concerns identified during this inspection period were addressed in a separate System Operation Performance inspection
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Plant Suonort e
Preparations for and recovery from the flooding conditions on the Mississippi River were conservatively planned and well executed. (Section P1.1)
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l Report Details
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Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except for a power reduction to hot shutdown conditions from April 26 through April 27. The primary j
purpose of the shutdown was to install a modification to the turbine-driven auxiliary
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feedwater pump. Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire period. There were no spent fuel storage cask activities during the period. However, the NRC completed its
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l review of a dry cask storage issue.
l. Operatiores
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments a.
insoection Scone (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of plant operations. These reviews included observations of control room evolutions, shift turnovers, operability decisions, logkeeping, etc. Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13, " Plant Operations," was reviewed as part of the inspection, b.-
Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed proper control room manning, adequate attention to control panels, good use of communication protocols, good turnovers, and detailed shift briefs in which all members of the crew contributed.
The inspectors observed activities during the Unit 1 outage on April 26-27,1997.
Operators performed well during the shutdown and subsequent startup and responded adequately to a few balance-of-plant challenges during the evolution including problems with the turbine turning gear, condenser air ejectors, and feedwater regulating valve leakage.
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Conclusions i
Plant operations were generally well performed. However, some examples of procedure adequacy and compliance concerns are discussed in Sections 01.4 and M1.2. As discussed in the preceding Executive Summary, these concerns reflect a continued decline in operation's performance.
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01.2 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition a.
Insnaction Scone (93702. 92901)
On April 5,1997, an inadvertent reactivity addition occurred on Unit 2. The
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inspectors reviewed the circumstances of the event. Another reactivity addition I
event recently occurred and was discussed in inspection Report
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282(306)/96016(DRP).
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Observations and Findinas l
On April 5,1997, Unit 2 was operating at approximately 37 percent power and j
control room operators were increasing powes at a rate of less than 3 percent per
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hour. The plant chemist requested that the No. 21 mixed bed ion exchanger (MBlX) be placed in service for reactor coolant system (RCS) chemistry control. An auxiliary building operator placed the MBlX in servics cM within a few minutes, control room operators noted an unexpected increase in RCS average temperature and power. The auxiliary building operator was orderad to remove the MBlX from service while control room operators inserted control rods and started a boration to stop the power increase. The MBlX was in service 14 minutes and reactor power increased about 2 percent.
The boron concentration in the MBlX prior to it being placed in service was less than 920 ppm. The boron concentration of the RCS at the time of the event was 1581 ppm. Therefore, when the MBlX was placed in service, it was not in equilibrium with the RCS and an RCS boron dilution occurred. Procedure 2C12.2,
" Purification and Chemical Addition - Unit 2," Revision 2, identified the steps required to place the MBlX in service, in Section 5.5, the procedure stated that the operator was to contact the duty chemist to determine whether the MBlX was borated or unborated, if unborated, the operator was instructed to borate it prior to placing it in service. For this event, the operator did not ask nor was instructed to borate the MBlX. The inspectors noted that the procedure did not address the condition of placing a MBlX in service that had been used previously, but was at a different boron concentration than the RCS (higher or lower). Rather, the procedure only addressed the situation of placing an MBlX in service that had its depleted j
resin replaced. For that case, the procedure required the.t the MBlX be borated to within 20 ppm of the RCS boron concentration.
The nuclear engineering department performed a review of the event and determined that reactor core puaking factor limits were not challenged and that the
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Conclusions This was the second occurrence of an unintentional core reactivity addition within four months. Operators were attentive and responded promptly to terminate the reactivity excursion. However, the event should not have occurred if procedures
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' had been properly followed. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, required that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be performed in accordance with these procedures. Procedure 2C12.2, Section 5.5 required that an MBlX be borated to within 20 ppm of RCS boron concentration prior to it being placed in service. Its boron concentration was greater than 20 ppm less than the RCS boron concentration and caused an unexpected addition of reactivity and increase in reactor power.- Therefore, this was considered an example of a failure to follow procedures (282(306)/97009-01a(DRP)).
01.3 Conservative Control Room Oneratina Decision a.
Insnaction Scone (71707)
On April 21,1997, the inspectors were informed that power had been reduced by about 2 percent on Unit 2 because of operator questions regarding the accuracy of indicated thermal and nuclear power. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances of the event.
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Observations and Findinas At about 1:10 am on the moming of April 21,1997, during routine log taking, the Unit 2 reactor operator and lead reactor operator noted that the temperature difference between the reactor coolant system (RCS) loop hot and cold legs (AT)
were reading about 102 percent. Since loop AT was directly related to reactor power, the operators were concerned that actual reactor power might be higher than 100 percent even though both the thermal power monitor and power range nuclear instrumentation read 100 percent and the electrical output of the Unit was the same as Unit 1. The operators noted that feedwater temperature instruments had been adjusted the day before, which affected the thermal power monitor reading, and nuclear instruments had also been adjusted based on a calorimetric calculation using feedwater temperature as one input.
After discussing the situation with the shift supervisor, operators conservatively reduced reactor power by about 2 percent until the loop AT readings were below 100 percent.
Later on April 21, instrument technicians checked the calibration of the feedwater temperature instruments and found them to be acceptable. Reactor power was then raised back up to an indicated value of 100 percent. On April 24, instrument technicians completed a calibration of the loop AT instruments which verified that their gain was on the high end of the acceptable band. They reduced the gain slightly causing loop ATs to read about 100 percent.
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Conclusions The actions of the operators in questioning whether they might be operating above the licensed power limit and actions to compensate for and resolve the issue were considered examples of conservative operation.
01.4 Conservative Plant Ooeratina Decision a.
-Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors were informed that Unit 1 would be shut down to perform modifications to the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and reviewed the circumstances of the decision.
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Observations and Findinas The licensee had determined that modifications to the AFW system were required to address concerns with runout protection for the AFW pumps and the ability of the AFW system to perform during an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)
event. The issues were reported in licensee event report (LER) 282/97003. The modifications had been completed for Unit 2 during the refueling outage and Unit 1 was shutdown to perform the modifications on April 26-27, 1997.
Although an operability determination was completed which supported safe, continued operation of Unit 1, modifications were developed to address the actual performance capabilities of the AFW system and those described in the USAR. Due to the risk of causing an unintended plant transient during the modification activities, a decision was made to shut down the Unit. Also, performing the modifications made the configuration of Unit 1 consistent with Unit 2.
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Conclusions The inspectors considered the licensee's decision to shut down Unit 1, to perform the AFW modifications, to be conservative. Additionally, performing the modifications made the configuration of the AFW systems for both Units consistent which was a beneficial human factors consideration for the control room operators.
Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 IC.lp'.ed) Unresolved item 282/96016-01: Inadvertent Boron Dilution of the RCS.
This event occurred on December 31,1996, and was discussed in inspection Report 282(306)/96016(DRP). The event was caused by an error in the system lineup associated with a work order (WO 9614859) and resulted in a brief power excursion above licensed thermal power level. The error in the work order was considered an example of an inadequate procedure. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, required that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be performed in accordance with these procedures. WO
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9614859 contained an error that resulted in an unexpected addition of reactivity and increase in reactor power. Therefore, this was considered a procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances and an example of a violation (282(306)/97009-01 b(DRP)).
08.2 Clarification of Dry Cask Storace Terms (81001)
In Inspection Report 282(306)/96014(DRP), Section 02.2, the inspectors discussed concerns with whether certain fuel loaded into the fifth spent fuel cask met the
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Technical Specification requirements for structural integrity and the 10 CFR 72.122(1) requirements for the capability of ready retrieval. The report stated that j
an interpretation was being requested from the NRC Spent Fuel Project Office.
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On April 16,1997, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation responded to Task Interface Agreement 96-0440 in a memorandum to the Region 111 Division of Nuclear Materials Safety. Regarding the requirements for the capability of ready i
retrieval, the memorandum stated "The NRC staff has stated that the potential need to unload a cask in response to an event or condition in the technical specifications j
or certificates of compliance does not require licensees to maintain a continuou.=
ability to unload a cask within a specified time." Regarding the structural integrity question, the memorandum stated "The structural requirements... are satisfied i
even if it is necessary to use a special handling tool to overcome problems in lifting selected fuel assemblies, provided that these assemblies do not have gross cladding failures and will otherwise maintain fuel assembly geometries assumed in the design-basis analyses performed for the cask."
A complete copy of the memorandum is included as an enclosure to this report.
II< Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
insoection Scone (61726. 62703,92902)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures (SP) or work orders (WO) listed as well as the appropriate USAR sections regarding the activities. The inspectors verified that the surveillance procedures observed met the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
- SP 1035B Reactor Protection Logic Test at Power - Train B, revision 21 l
SP 1046 Unit 1 Multiple Rod Drop Test, revision 14 l
SP 1106A 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Test, revision 53 l
SP 1106B 22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Test, revision 50
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e SP 1111 '
Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve Test - Unit 1, l
revision 23 j
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SP 1218 Monthly 4kv Bus 15 Undervoltage Relay Test, i
revision 21 I
e SP 2258A Bus'25 Sequencer Load Rejection and Restoration of l
121 Control Room Chiller, revision O e
SP 2258B Bus 26 Sequencer Load Rejection and Restoration of i
122 Control Room Chiller, revision O e
Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM 3OO1-2 D1, revision 12, D1 Diesel Generator 18 Month inspection j
e WO 9700120 Test Unit 1 CV-2 in imp-in Control i
e WO 9702720 Troubleshoot 11 Steam Generator Power Operated i
Relief Valve Cycling with no Demand j
e WO 9702748 investigate Unit 1 Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker
e WO 9702767 Test Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker While Installed in the
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Cubicle e
WO 9704041 Perform Rod Drops @ Shutdown l
e WO 9704087 Repair CV-31457,22 Diesel-Driven Cooling Pump i
Jacket Cooler Outlet Valve j
e WO 9701286 D1 Fuel Cut Out Control Microswitch Replacement
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Observations and Findinas
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e For WO 9612599, which implemented the D1 emergency diesel generator j
(EDG) 18-month preventive maintenance (PM) procedure PM 3001-2-D1, the inspectors had concems with procedure adequacy and procedure adherence
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during post-maintenance testing. Through interviews, the inspectors _
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determined that plant staff understanding of administrative requirements for procedure changes was not clear.
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On May 8,1997, during EDG restoration in preparation for the post-maintenance testing, an operator checked engine sump oil level and then aligned an oil flow path to provide oil to the filter, heat exchanger, strainer, and associated piping that had been drained during maintenance. Both of these activities were conducted according to the procedural instructions.
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The procedure did not identify that checking engine sump oil level was
required after the drained components were filled. When the engine was started, a low engine oil level alarm was received, oil level was checked and verified low, and operators promptly shut down the engine as a precautionary measure to protect it from damage. Approximately 60 gallons of oil were added to the engine sump (50 gallons are required to raise sump
level from " ADD" to " FULL" as indicated on the sump dipstick).
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Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, required that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented
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procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be performed in accordance with these procedures. Procedure PM 3001-2-D1 j
was not of a type appropriate to the circumstances because it caused an
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unrecognized insufficient oil level condition in the EDG; this was considered l
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an example of a violation (50 282(306)/97009-01c(DRP)).
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After the engine oil condition was corrected, operations, engineering, and
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i maintenance personnel attended a pre-job briefing and reperformed steps of i
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procedure PM 3001-2-D1 to start the engine and continued with post-
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maintenance testing. Later, the inspectors noted that there was no
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documentation recorded in the procedure that a problem was encountered l
during the first engine run and no documentation of review and approval for
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i changing the procedure to establish engine prerequisite conditions and
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j restart the test. Steps in the procedure that were repeated were in'.iicated by a second set of initials by the individual performing the task. The j
q inspectors discussed this with the shift supervisor who agreed that there
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should have been documentation of what had occurred. The system
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engineer and shift supervisor later amended the procedure to indicate the
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changes that were made and their review and approval.
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j The inspectors reviewed the licensee's administrative procedures for conduct l
of work and the work package change process. Procedure 5AWI 3.2.4,
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" Conduct of Work," revision 13, identified that work shall be conducted in
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j the sequence presented in the work control package and that changes to
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i Change Process," revision 2, identified that changes to work packages shall
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be prepared, reviewed, approved, and documented prior to implementation.
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Procedure PM 3OO1-2-D.1 was changed without documentation of its
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preparation, review, or approval prior to implementation. This was i
considered an example of a violation (50-282(306)/97009-01d(DRP)).
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o SP 1111 and WO 9702720 were performed in response to a problem in
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which a main steam power operated relief valve (PORV) unexpectedly i
opened at below its setpoint. Operators rapidly identified the opening and
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i closed the valve with the controller in manual. For troubleshooting the l
operators and instrument technicians developed an innovative method of
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maintaining operability of the PORV while at the same time allowing adjustment of the controller output signal in place. They placed the valve in
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local control at the hot shutdown panel, which removed the control room
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circuit from the system while still allowing automatic operation. Instrument technicians determined that the problem was in the electrical controller and
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replaced it with a bench tested spare.
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o For SP 2258A and B, the surveillances were new procedures being run for the first time. Good pre-job br:efs were observed in which thorough discussions were conducted associated with the expected system response and contingency actions. Before and during the tests, operators recommended sev3ral procedure enhancements to the system engineer.
o WOs 9702748 and 9702767 were written to investigate and repair a problem with the B train reactor trip bypass breaker. During a routine
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reactor protection logic surveillance the breaker had failed to operate properly. During an in place inspection of the breaker, the system engineer noted a loose nut and washer under the breaker. The inspectors noted that the loose parts had apparently come from a pushbutton located on the door of the breaker. The associated bolt could not be found in the area and the system engineer feared that it might be in the breaker mechanism.
The system engineer had the breaker removed from the cubicle and i
thoroughly inspected and tested. Although the original problem could not be duplicated and no problem could be found with the breaker, the engineer l
conservatively decided to replace the bypass breaker with a ready spare so that a complete preventive maintenance procedure could be performed on the questionable breaker.
e For WO 9704041, a multiple control rod drop timing test was planned for Unit 1, at the start of its maintenance outage on April 26,1997. Rod i
insertion problems had been identified at other plants and was the subject of NRC Bulletin 96-01. Prairie Island had met its NRC commitments for rod drop testing in response to the bulletin in 1996, but wanted to obtain j
additional data. The jnspectors considered this a positive initiative.
When the reactor was tripped to start the test, the data acquisition equipment failed to actuate. Although all rods drove to the bottom of the j
core as indicated by the rod bottom lights, no timing data was collected.
The licensee decided to attempt the test again using SP 1046, which required withdrawing all of the control rods from the core. The nuclear engineering department had provided minimum RCS boron concentration requirements to provide adequate shutdown margin for performing the test.
The inspectors had a concern that although control room operators had borated the HCS, other personnel were entering the containment building to perform work at the same time that the control rods were to be withdrawn from the core, adding a large amount of positive reactivity. This was inconsistent with the inspector's understanding of licensee practices of ensuring that no one was in containment prior to pulling all control rods.
The inspector discussed this with the system engineer and shift supervisor and the test was delayed. The inspectors considered the concurrent performance of the test and a containment entry an example of a scheduling weakness. The licensee informed the inspectors that it would evaluate its practices of restricting or allowing containment access during control rod manipulations.
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Conclusions inspector-observed maintenance and surveillance activities were generally well
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coordination between departments. However, problems with procedure quality and l
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procedure adherence were identified as examples of a violation. Plant staff were not clear in their understanding of administrative requirements for procedure
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M1.2 Lubricatina Oil Samolina and Usaae Practices a.
Insoection Scone (62703. 92902_)
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During review of post-maintenance testing of the D1 diesel generator, the inspectors identified questions regarding the sampling and usage of lubricating oil onsite.
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Observations and Findinos i
The inspectors learned that the plant maintenance department had procured oil filtration equipment within the last year that it uses to filter oil obtained from the plant oil storage room when oil is changed in equipment. The general
superintendent of plant maintenance informed the inspectors that although the oil in the oil storage room had been sampled and accepted, there may still be particulate j
matter in the barrels that needed to be removed from the oil.
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Operations department personnel obtained oil from the same sources as maintenance personnel when they add oil to equipment, but do not filter the oil prior to use. The inspectors learned that operations personnel were unaware of the
oil contaminant concern.
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Conclusions
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The inspectors will review the licensee's lubricating oil procurement, sampling, storage, and usage practices in a future inspection (IFl 50-282(306)/97009-
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02(DRP)).
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92700,92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 306/96003: Auto-Start of 21 Component Cooling Water Pump due to Personnel Error. This LER was previously discussed in inspection Report 282(306)/96016, Sections M1.2 and M8.1. The inspectors
- verified by review of surveillance procedures SP 1089, and 2089, " Residual Heat Removal Pumps and Suction Valves From the Refueling Water Storage Tank,"
revisions 44 and 49 respectively, that the corrective action to revise the procedures had been completed.
M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 282(306)/96018: Missed Surveillance of Low
Pressure Start of Component Cooling Pumps Due to inadequate Procedure. This
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LER was previously discussed in Inspection Report 282(306)/96014, Section M3.1 and was considered a Non-Cited Violation. The licensee's corrective action was to write surveillance procedures to test the component cooling (CC) pumps low pressure auto-start feature. Tne inspectors reviewed new procedures SP 1121,
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1122,2121, and 2122, "11,12,21, and 22 Component Cooling Pump Low Pressure / Auto Start Pressure Switch Calibration," revision O. The inspectors also l
verified that the tests had been successfully accomplished on the 21 and 22 CC I
pumps during the most recent Unit 2 refueling outage; 11 and 12 cc pumps were scheduled to be performed during the next Unit 1 refueling outage.
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i lil. Engineerino E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment (37551,92903)
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The inspectors reviewed licensee actions in response to previously identified design
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discrepancies in the auxiliary feedwater system. In addition, the inspectors brought
f up several new concerns in the design of the control room ventilation system.
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These issues were addressed during a separate System Operation Performance inspection (SOPl) that was documented in Inspection Report
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282(306)/g7008(DRS).
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E2.1 Review of USAR Commitments (37551. 92903)
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While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed l
the applicable portions of the USAR that related to the areas inspected and used
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the USAR as an engineering / technical support basis document. The inspectors compared plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the USAR descriptions
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as discussed in each section. The inspectors verified that the USAR wording was i
consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and parameters except as
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noted in the SOPl report.
IV. Plant Suonort
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R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the areas of radiological protection and chemistry controls using inspection Procedure 71750.
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No discrepancies were noted.
- P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities (71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the area of emergency preparedness using Inspection Procedure 71750. No discrepancies were noted.
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P1.1 Coning With Flooding i
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Inanection Scone (71750)
I As discussed in Inspection Report 282(306)/97005, Section P1.1, the licensee i
experienced significant flooding at the plant. The inspectors observes the Ucensee t
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preparations for and recovery from the flooding conditions.
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Observations and Findings
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As the flood levels rose, a licensee task force met daily to review preparations.
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Arrangements'were made to allow employees living on the east side of the l
Mississippi river to set up campers or recreational vehicles on site when it appeared l
that river crossing might be closed. The circulating water cooling towers were i
shutdown as access to them was lost. Equipment near the intake screenhouse
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floor was de-terminsted and removed to higher elevations. Nets were set up to j
intercept floating debris that might bypass the screenhouse when water levels went
above the intake bay levee. Watercraft were obtained and temporary docks built to -
allow ferrying of employees across Larson lake if the access road needed to be closed. Fortunately, a road construction project started earlier on Sturgeon Lake road was completed to the point of significantly raising the elevation of alternate lanes before the original road became submerged. Thus road access to the plant
was never lost.
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Licensee officials maintained a close liaison with city, county, state, tribal, and federal officials to coordinate flood preparation and response efforts. Road
conditions were monitored to insure adequate evacuation and emergency response
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capabilities were maintained.
Due to less rainfall than average during the flood period, the crest was somewhat
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lower and earlier than first predicted. The crest, which at one time had been _
predicted to be as high as 687.7 feet at the plant, actually occurred at a level of 685 feet on April 12,1997. That level was one foot below the level which would
have required a Notification of Unusual Event. No significant damage to any plant o
equipment occurred. The most difficult problem was controlling the external circulating water system with the cooling towers shutdown and intake and discharge levees overflowing.
As the flood receded, the licensee carefully controlled reestablishing normal i
operation of the intake screenhouse, cooling towers, and external circulating water system.
c.
Conclusions Preparations for and recovery from the flooding conditions were conservatively planned and well executed. Area flooding was the worst since before initial operation of the plant.
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S1 Conduct of Security end Safeguards Activities (71750)
During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the areas of security and safeguards activities using Inspection Procedure 71750. No discrepancies wore noted.
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V. Management Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 13,1897. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
l The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, i
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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l Licensee l
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J.' Sorensen, Plant Manager l
K. Albrecht, General Superintendent Engineering, Electrical /l&C l
T. Amundson, General Superintendent Engineering, Mechanical l
l J. Goldsmith, General Superintendent Design Engineering
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J. Hill, Manager Quality Services
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G. Lenertz, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance l
l J. Maki, Outage Manager D. Schuelke, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry T. Silverberg, General Superintendent Plant Operations M. Sleigh, Superintendent Security l
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 81001:
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
IP 92700:
Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901:
Followup - Operations
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IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance
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IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Followup of Events ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Onened
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282(306)/97009-01a(DRP)
VIO Failure to Follow Procedures for Placing an MBlX in Service Resulting in Reactivity Addition 282(306)/97009-01 b(DRP)
VIO Inadequate Procedure for Restoring System to Service Resulting in Reactivity Addition 282(306)/97009-01c(DRP)
VIO Inadequate Procedure for Diesel Generator Post-Maintenance Testing 282(306)/97009-01d(DRP)
VIO Failure to Follow Procedure for Change to Work Package During Post-Maintenance Testing 282(306)/97009-02(DRP)
IFl Lubricating Oil Sampling and Usage Practices i
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Closed 282/96016-01 URI Inadvertent Boron Dilution of the RCS
- 306/96003 LER Auto-Start of 21 Component Cooling Water Pump due to Personnel Error 282(306)/96018 LER Missed Surveillance of Low Pressure Start of Component Cooling Pumps Due to inadequate Procedure
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram AWI Administrative Work Instruction CC Component Cooling CFR Code of Federal Regulations CV Control Valve DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator IFl inspection Followup Item IP inspection Procedure ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MBlX Mixed Bed lon Exchanger NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSP Northern States Power Company PDR Public Document Room PM Preventive Maintenance PPM Parts per Million-PORV Power Operated Relief Valve RCS Reactor Coolant System SOPI Systern Operation Performance Inspection SP Surveillance Procedure USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report TS Technical Specifications URI Unresolved item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VIO Violation WO Work Order 18