IR 05000282/1989003

Insp Repts 50-282/89-03 & 50-306/89-03 on 890129-0309.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillances,Esf Sys,Security,Qa Programs & Followup of LERs

ML20248F909
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	03/28/1989
From:	Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20248F906	List: IR 05000282/1989003 ML20248F903
References
50-282-89-03, 50-282-89-3, 50-306-89-03, 50-306-89-3, NUDOCS 8904130254
Download: ML20248F909 (12)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'  !

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, REGION III Repo'rts No. 50-282/89003(DRP);'.50-306/89003(DRP)

i Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; OPR-60 Licensee: Northern States. Power Company  :

414 Nicollet Mall

' Minneapolis, MN 55401 Fac_ility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear ~ Generating' Plant

' Inspection At: . Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted: January 29, 1989 through March 9, 1989 Inspectors: J. E. Hard T. J. O'Connor R. p p hin Approved By: Me 3/2T[87 Reactor Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Summary

' Inspection on January 29, 1989 through March 9, 1989 (Reports No. 50-282/89003(DRP); No. 50-306/89003(DRP))

Areas-Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspector of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, ESF systems, security, quality assurance (QA) programs and followup of LERs and Generic Letter Results: During this inspection period, Unit 1 operated continuously at 100%

power. Unit 2 operated at 100% until 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on February 24, 1989, at which time end of fuel cycle coastdown commenced in preparation for the upcoming refueling outage scheduled to start on March 29, 1989. In general, the plant continues to be well operated, as noted by no reactor trips since  !

July 1987, and few personnel: errors. Improvements in control room layout have been completed in conjunction with the installation of the emergency response  !

computer system-(ERCS). Improvements were also noted in the area of shift turnovers and access to the "at the controls" portion of the control room, .

as noted in Section 3. Of the nine areas inspected, no violations of NRC  !

requirements were identified. One unresolved item was identified in the area of seismic qualification !

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I 8904130254 890328 l PDR ADOCK 05000282 j-Q '

PDC

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineering P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA

• E. Watzl, Plant Manager

• D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering'and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager M. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance K. Beadell, Superintendent, Technical Engineering  !

• M. Klee, Superintendent, Quality Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction D. Musolf, Manager Nuclear _ Support Services J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

• A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer l T. Amundson, Superintendent Training  !

• A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services i E. Eckholt, Senior Nuclear Safety / Technical Services Engineer !

A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse Electric Cor G. Ortler, Manager Corporate Security The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members !

of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, shift technical advisors, and shift manager * Denotes those present at the exit interview of March 6, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92700, 92701, 92702)

Open Items listed in the attachment to this report have been closed during this inspection period based on a directive by the Division Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III. Our decision to close these items is based on the length of time the item has been in existence and the recognition of limited safety significanc (Closed) Open Item (282/89002-01(DRP)): Failure of Emergency Notification Siren Investigation inco the failure of 17% of the emergency notification sirens on January 4, 1989, has been complete The cause was found to be an ice build up in the siren rotor / stator gap which prevented the siren motors from turning, thereby drawing excessive current and causing the motor protection circuit to activate and take the motor off line before any damage could result. Failures were concentrated in Federal Signal Corporation models 2T22 and 3T22. The overload protection circuit of the

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siren uses a " heater" to protect the motor if the amount of motor current is excessive. A check with the manufacturer showed that larger amperage '

heaters, which would permit the motor to draw 20 more amps of current before engaging the protection circuit, are currently being installed by the manufacturer. Accordingly, the 30 sirens of this type in the Prairie Island system have been so modified. This should reduce or eliminate future problems from this caus Shield Building Fan Failure (See Inspection Reports No. 50-282/89002(DRP);

No. 50-306/89002(DRP))

The No. 11 shield building recirculation fan motor failed during surveillance testing on January 27, 1989. Since a spare motor could not be located, the failed one was returned to the vendor for rewinding while the licensee pursued with the NRC temporary relief from the technical specifications 7-day Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO). A seven day extension to this LCO was granted by the NRC on February 2, 1989. The rewound motor was installed, tested, and declared operable on February 7, 1989, approximately 11 1/2 days after the initiating failure. Information requested by the NRC on February 2, 1989, regarding vendor-recommended surveillance of safety-related equipment has been prepared and was sent -

to Region III on March 6, for regional revie !

(Closed)UnresolvedItem(282/88022-02;306/88022-01(DRP)}: Questions Resulting From Audit of Fire Protection Progra The plant manager's responses to the fire protection audit findings were reviewed with the following results: Fire door positions and door inspections - Practices and procedures are being revised to reflect comments of the auditor Carbon dioxide system - Testing is being conducted as specified in ,

the NFPA requirements. Recalculation of the volume of Fire Areas 18 !

and 19 shows this volume to be very close to the " double shot"  ;

Volume, i Cardox system bypassing - Plant practice over the past 15 years has I been to bypass the system during the normal working hours, 7:00 to 5:00 p.m. The plant feels that this has met the Technical Specification requirement for bypassing during those periods when the area is "normally occupied." Following completion of the removal of the old plant computer in the summer of 1989, the cardox j system is to remain in the automatic mode unless work assignments require personnel to work up in the electrical racks or on top of the computer room roo Combustibles in Fire Area 29 - This fire area contained excessive combustible loading in the form of drums of morpholine and hydrazine, plastic containers of floor stripper and sealer, and file cabinets containing cleaning supplies. The morpholine and hydrazine have been removed. Safety storage cabinets have been obtained and are in use for storing floor cleaning material l

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. . Diesel l fire pump surveillance - The manufacturer's recommendations for annual and biennial' inspections are met with-the plant PM

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system. This frequency disagrees with Technical Specification y: 'Section 5~.16.B.1.f which refers to an 18-month inspection in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. The Technical Specifications are'to be revise (Closed) Deviation (282/88022-01(DRP)): Brazing was performed without approved procedures or certified brazer During maintenance on 0-1 diesel ge'nerator, the maintenance crew shortened and re-brazed a fitting on a section of fuel line. . Company process controls for work on safety related systems were not followed; viz., the brazer did not have proper certification documentation at the

. plant nor were a written procedure or certified filler material-use Since that time, the following corrective actions have been taken: Brazer certification lists are now available at the plant, Administrative arrangements have been made to provide detailed brazing procedures ~to the plant on an as-needed basis. Standard

' brazing procedures are to be incorporated in the NSP Welding Manual by May 1, 198 Appropriate qualified brazing materials are being accumulated by the plant maintenance grou (Interim Report) Open Item (50-282/88001-01; 50-306/88001-01(DRP)):

Accuracy of Electrical Drawings Many recent examples of incorrect or incomplete electrical drawings including one which resulted in the loss of flow control to an RHR pump during mid-loop operation, have stimulated the licensee to examine the matter closely. In February 1989, an electrical engineer consultant was retained by the licensee for four months to scope the problem and make-recommendations for resolving it. Areas to be' examined during the four months include: Vendor-architect engineer drawing interfaces How to eliminate unnecessary electrical drawings Determine feasible ways of indexing electrical equipment to all electrical drawings on which the equipment appear A program for long-term resolution of electrical drawing questions is to be developed by July 1, 198 Operations Committee Meeting Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.B states in part that Operations ,

Committee (OC) members shall be drawn from the key supervisors of the onsite staff and that a quorum shall be a majority of the permanent

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members including the Chairman or Vice Chairma There are 11 key supervisors who are identified on Figure TS 6.1-2. However, there are no provisions for alternate members in the event that adequate permanent members (key supervisors) are not available to comprise a quoru In practice, plant management has designated alternates for the Superintendent Quality Engineering, the Superintendent Nuclear Engineering, plus the Superintendent Technical Engineering, and has designated two alternates for the Superintendent Operations Engineering. Thus, when these superintendents are absent from the plant, their organizations can be represented in OC meetings. The plant further restricts the use of alternates by allowing only one to make up a quorum, although other alternates may be present. This practice with its limitations seems to be a reasonable way to conduct OC business especially when one looks at the Standard Technical Specifications and the provisions there for the use of alternates for the equivalent organization, the Unit Review Group (URG). However., the Prairie Island Technical Specifications do not address the use of alternate members so some interpretation is require Plant management has also included the Shift Managers as members of the Operations Committe This practice is clearly not acceptable because these people are not identified on Figure TS 6.1-2 as Key Supervisors, though they probably should be. As of December 14, 1988, the plant terminated this practic NRR is reviewing these quest' ions with the ' goal of including appropriate technical specification changes in the technical specification upgrade amendment which was requested on March 17, 1986 and currently in the final stages of regulatory revie , Operational Safety Verification (71707, 93702)

Both units remained base loaded at full power with Unit 2 commencing an l end of cycle coast down in preparation for the upcoming refueling outage l scheduled to start on March 29, 1989. The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed shift turnovers. The inspector i verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected l

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components, tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that .

maintenance work requests had been initiated for the equipment in need of maintenance.

l As noted in Inspection Reports No.50-25U 89002, No. 306/89002(DRP),

I the No. 11 shield building recirculation fan motor failed while the

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fan was being operated during a monthly surveillance test. The licensee ;

conducted surveillance procedure SP 1073, Shield Building Ventilation

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System Functional Test, Rev. 18, on a daily basis to confirm the operability of the redundant train in compliance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.E.3. No discrepancies were identified. See also Section No. 2 for additional information.

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a Significant improvements were made in the control room layout in conjunction with the. installation of ERCS. Improvements included the addition of.several parameter monitors and the redesign of the.R0 and SR0 <

work stations. 'The redesigned work stations provide the operators with a less obstructed view of the control board from their work statio Additionally, in attempts to further control the number of individuals in the "at the controls" area of the control room, the licensee has posted signs directing individuals to obtain permission from the operators before entering the "at the controls" area. The inspectors consider this action a prudent step toward the minimization of control room distractions. The inspectors will continue to monitor the implementation of the licensee's efforts in this are Overall, the licensed operators were cognizant of ongoing plant evolutions and equipment conditions. However, a need for improvement was noted in the turnovers conducted between on-coming and off going operators, and brought to the attention of the General Superintendent of Operation Immediate action was taken in the form of a memo to all shift supervisors to be cognizant of shift turnover practices and to correct poor turnover practices. The inspectors observed immediate response by the operations staff with improved turnovers. The inspectors will continue to monitor the shift turnover proces On. February 20, 1989, Unit one experienced a failure'of an amplifier associated with the reactor coolant flow and received a low flow alar The subject channel was placed into.a trip condition, repaired and returned to servic As a result of routine inspection, the-licensee has identified minor cracking and bowing in the covers of the 12 and 22 station batterie The licensee intends to have the battery vendor visit the site on March 10, 1989, to assist in the evaluation. At this time, the licensee considers the subject batteries to be fully operable. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's activities in this are During the course of touring Units 1 and 2 vital areas the inspector observed lifting hoists and trolleys located on rails which were attached to the top of the 480 v safeguards Buses 120, 210 and 220. At the time of the inspection, the licensee was not able to provide analyses showing that the lifting equipment was seismically qualified. This is identified as Unresolved Items No. 282/89003-01; No. 306/89003-01(DRP). The licensee has removed the subject equipmen Unit 2 commenced an end of fuel cycle coastdown in preparation for the upcoming refueling outage scheduled to start on March 29, 198 Coastdown was verified to be in accordance with Operations Procedure Cl-29, Tave restrictions during EOL coastdown, Revision No violations or deviations were identifie '

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e 4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities were observed

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to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved <

procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and in I conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were-considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service,' approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable,. functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or. systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire preventionLcontrols were implemente Portions of-the following maintenance activities were observed during the inspection period:

• Repair Of The Unit 1.No. 11 Shield Building Fan

• PM 3505-1-121 121 Station Air Compressor

• Preventative Maintenance on the Control Rod Unlatching Tool Light-and. Cord Replacement on the Spent Fuel Pool Lights During the observation of the preventive maintenance on the 121 station air compressor, the inspector noted that a maintenance manual was not present in the work area, nor did the procedure specify torque requirements for outer head or valve covers. The system engineer was unable to locate.the respective torque valves in the applicable maintenance manual. Upon contacting the manufacturer,.the system engineer was able to obtain the applicable torque requirements. The system engineer intends to incorporate these values into a new revision of the preventive maintenance procedure. Although the station air compressors are non-safety related, QA Type II/ Design Class II, the inspectors consider the use of vendor recommended torque values or accepted industry torque values- to be a part of good maintenance practice No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related systems and components. The inspection included ver'fying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Spec 1fication requirements, by observing that procedures were being follcwed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirement _-__ - -

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Portions of the following surveillance were observed / reviewed durin the inspection period:

R SP 1093-1 D1 Diesel Generator Manual and 4 KV Voltag Rejection-Restoration Scheme Test',-Bus 15, Revision 3 SP 1074 Auxiliary Building Special Vent System Functional Test, Revision 14 SP 1073- ShieldBuildingVentilationSystemFunctionallTest,

.Re' vision 18 No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The inspector performed a walkdown of emergency diesel generators D1 and'D Observations. included confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists, verification of correct valve and'

power supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and

' instrumentation are properly aligned, and' local system indication to insure proper operation within prescribed limits. One minor discrepancy was identified in that Operations Procedure C1.1.20.7-1, D-1 Diesel Generator Valve Status, Revision 6, did not identify valves CW-62-1 and-2 as.having a " Block and Tag" tag attached to the valves. The-licensee has. initiated action to correct this discrepancy.

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Facility Modifications (37701)

During the upcoming Unit 2 outage, the existing steam generator feedwater control system is to be replaced with one of digital design. Simultaneous with this modification will be changes and new circuitry needed to meet the requirements for ATWS mitigation and control. Questions were raised by NRR reviewers in mid-February 1989, on whether the new system meets the requirements of IEEE-279. The licensee pointed out precedents for-using this type of circuitry at the Beaver Valley and H. B. Robinson

. plants, both installations having been reviewed by the NRC. Approval of the Prairie Island modification was made contingent on NRR review of the precedents and of a failure mode and effects analysis plus an inspection by representatives of the NRR Instrument and Control Systems Branch of the Westinghouse facilities where certain of the components are being fabricate . Preparation for Refueling (60705)

In preparation for the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage, the inspectors reviewed activities associated with the recent inspection and storage of new fuel. Additionally, the inspector attended a licensed operator requalification training class which concentrated on various aspects of fuel movement and handling equipmen _ _-_- -

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Requalification training covered the description and use of fuel handling equipment, equipment interlocks and a review of past problem Additionally, an engineer from the Nuclear Engineering group lectured on the logistics behind core shuffles with emphasis on precautions to take when modifying the shuffles to minimize delays as a result of equipment problem The receipt, inspection and storage of new fuel was conducted in compliance with approved plant procedures with appropriate attention being given to cleanliness requirements. Individuals were cognizant of their specific responsibilitie Additionally, a spent fuel pool evacuation drill was conducte No violations or deviations were identifie . QA Programs (35502, 40500)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities associated with Quality '

Assurance Program (QAP) implementation and Self-Assessmen Organizations and activities reviewed included: Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Operations Committee, Safety Audit Committee, Plant Staff and Site Engineering Organization Quality Assurance (QA) verification of implementation of QAP changes was not previously accomplished as a specific objective of the licensee's QA Audit function. As a result of this determination, during the inspection, the licensee revised their self-assessment policies and procedures to include verification of implementation of changes as a clear objective for future audit Audit performance to schedules, during the last three quarters of 1988, was'somewhat weak. Of 65 audits scheduled only 33 were completed as scheduled. Those not completed were for the most part reschedule A few were combined with other audits and two were cancelled. During the 4th Quarter of 1988, NSP management directed that a major special non-scheduled audit be performed at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Station to cover modification activities. This involved the full time effort of 6-8 auditors. At the same time the QA organization was short two auditor The inspector reviewed the list off rescheduled audits and the basis for the action taken at the time and determined that appropriate management attention was applied, however, the overall level of performance during this period does represent a potential weakness in their ability to meet some self-assessment objective The overall results of the audits actually performed were very good and the.QA audit organization performed well during this period of special circumstance Other QA activities, in the areas of verification and self-assessment, were reviewed and determined to be proceeding in a successful and objective manner. They included:

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• The.QA' Trending Program,.as represented by the 4th Quarter 1988-Trend Report, dated January 12, 198 * The "PSQAQSP," Power Supply Quality Assurance Quantifiable SALP Predictor Pla L * QA Surveillance, as represented by QA Procedure 3QAP2.8, Revision 3, and the log charts of the QA Surveillance goal *- The 1989 schedule for an independent review of the Operations QAP to assure its adequacy, per Section 1.6 of the 0QAP.-

The Quality Control (QC) organization has initiated a new trending program, for management assessment, and is considering some expansion of this activity to include plant systems orientation of reported dat Operations Committee (OC) meetings, agendas, minutes, etc. per the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.28, were generally good, however, one meeting w..'ch was scheduled for February 16, 1989, during this inspection, had to be postponed for lack of a proper quoru The Safety Audit Committee (SAC) meetings, agendas, minutes, etc. per the requirements of TS 6.2A, were generally good however, several items were somewhat weak, as follows:

• The resumes, of the SAC members, need to be updated and established in a.more uniform format. Most of the resumes on file were five to seven years.old and not of uniform quality or format. The licensee took appropriate action during the inspection to update the resume * The SAC committee had no level 3 member in the expertise areas of Metallurgy and NDT. The committee had indicated that the Northern States Power (NSP) Superintendent of Materials and Special Processes would be consulted in this area if questions arose, however, they did not have his resume on file or have other experience or qualification information readily available for review, to support this positio * Minutes of the SAC meetings were missing details of questions raised by the SAC members during their review of QC meeting minutes and Safety Evaluations, that were required by TS to be submitted to SAC for revie * One of the members of the SAC, who satisfied the independence requirement, because he was not an employee of the NSP Company, had retired. Before his retirement the SAC had nine members, five of which were non-NSP employees. The membership at the present time is split evenly, four NSP and four non-NSP. Until he is replaced the

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independence aspect of the SAC membership is potentially unbalanced in an unfavorable manne _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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reinforced by a special Error Reduction Task Force which was concentrating on human errors and was doing very wel In the areas of technical review the licensee had good investigative reports of reportable events, LERs, etc., had continued to make plant systems assignments to Technical Section Engineering personnel and to  :

Operations Engineering personnel in lieu of an ISEG. The NSP Manager of '

Nuclear Support Services had prepared a position statement paper on the NSP Prairie Island response to the general ISEG (Independent Safety

, Engineering Group) concepts established by NUREG-0737, which took credit l for this system assignment approach, in the absence of a formal ISE The overall performance in this general area of QA Program implementation

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and Self-Assessment Capability was good.

No violations, open items, or unresolved items were identifie . Exit (30703)

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on March 6, 1989. The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any document /

processes as proprietar '

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Attachment to Prairie Island Inspection Reports 50-282/89003; 50-306/89003(DRP)

Prairie Island 1- Docket No: 50-282 Operational Programs Section Report Category Identity Status 85011-04 3 0 Close Materials and Processes Section Report Category Identity Status 85018-02 3 U Close 85018-03 3 U Close Plant Systems Section Repo,' Category Identity Status 86012-03 3 0 Close 87004-14 3 0 Close Prairie Island 2 Docket No: 50-306 Materials and Processes Section Report Category Identity Status 85015-02 1 U Close-85015-03 1 U Close Plant Systems Section Report Categor Identity Status 86014-03 3 0 Close 87004-14 3 0 Close l

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