IR 05000282/1987005

Insp Repts 50-282/87-05 & 50-306/87-05 on 870419-0530.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillances,Esf Sys,Refueling,Facility Mods,Training & Followup on LERs

ML20216F615
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	06/16/1987
From:	Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216F588	List: IR 05000282/1987005 ML20216F586
References
50-282-87-05, 50-282-87-5, 50-306-87-05, 50-306-87-5, NUDOCS 8706300897
Download: ML20216F615 (10)

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4-IV.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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3 REGION III--

.'Reports.No.'50-282/87005(DRP); 50-306/87005(DRP)

Docket Nos.'501282;.50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 l Licensee: Northern States Powe~r Company

' 414.Nico11et Mal Minneapolis, MN 55401 I

' Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating' Plant

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, ;Inspectfon At: Prairie Island S.ito, Red Wing, Minnesota-

Inspection Conducted: April:19 through May 30,.1987

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Inspectors: J. E..Har M. M. Moser

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Approved'By: . DeFayette, hief Reactor Projects-Section 2B d /M [2 Date /

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Inspection' Summary Inspection on Aaril 19 through May 30, 1987 (Reports No. 50-282/87005(DRP);

50-306/87005(DR)))

. Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance,  !

surveillances,.ESF systems, refueling, facility modifications, training, followup of Licensee Event Reports, and Headquarters request ,

Results: -No violations were identified in the ten areas inspecte ]

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

'*E. Watz1, Plant Manager

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• D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection

'R. Lindsey, Assistant to the Plant Manager  ;

• M. Sellman, General Superintendent, Operations .

D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection l G. Lenertz, General Superintendent, Maintenance

,~ J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering

• K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering

M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering  !

R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

• A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer

• A. Smith, General Superintendent, Planning and Services A. Vukmir,- Site Services Representative, Westinghouse

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The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of'the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisor '* Denotes those present at the exit interview of June 1, 198 . Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92703)

(Closed) Open Items (282/86011-01) Report Concerning Axial Xenon Oscillation Divergent axial xenon oscillations occurred in the Unit 1 core from November 2-12, 198 Since existing core physics codes did not predict such instability, the licensee analyzed the situation and prepared a written report which has been examined by the resident inspectors. The report was also presented by its author to the Safety Audit Committee. The oscillations are believed to be the result of a combination of iower fuel temperature in the Westinghouse 0FA' fuel as compared to the Exxon TOPROD fuel giving a different Doppler feedback, plus a reinforcement of oscillations from moderator temperature feedback when T is held constant through boration and dilutio Operatingstrat@eswiththeseunstablecoreshavebeenadjustedto permit some float of T ave in addition to selective insertions of control rod bank (Closed) Unresolved Item (282/86003-01; 306/86003-01) Impact of Unqualified Limitorque Valve Motor Operator Wires On The Safe Shutdown Of The Plan The NRC has determined that no enforcement action will be taken for j

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Environmental Qualification violations involving unqualif'ed valve motor l internal wiring. This decisian is based on the generic r,ture of the !

deficiencies, extenuating circumstances, and limited pot? .tial safety significance of the violation .

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (282/86003-02; 306/86003-02) Impact-of Unqualified ;

Wires On Licensee Compliance To 10 CFR 50.49 Progra The NRC has- .

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determined that no enforcement action will be taken for Environmental Qualification violations involving unqualified valve motor internal wiring. This decision is based on the generic nature of the deficiencies, extenuating circumstances, and limited potential safety significance of the violation (Closed) Show Cause Order (282/86-R1-01-R; 306/86-R1-01-R) On October 20, 1986, the NRC issued to Northern States Power Company an Order to Show Cause why radios or other electrical / electronic equipment used to provide background music in the control rooms at Prairie Island and Monticello should not be remove On May 1, 1987, the order was rescinde . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

Unit I completed a 49 day refueling and maintenance outage on May 27, i 1987 which included an unscheduled main generator repair. At the end of this inspection period, Unit I was at 78% power. Unit 2 was base loaded at 100% power except for reductions for surveillance testin The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed' applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc On May 16, 1987, the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW)

pump was test run following modifications to the pump thrust bearing i lubrication system. During the test, pump performance did not meet discharge pressure and flow requirements. Disassembly of the pump found ,

foreign matter / sludge in the pump intake and several pump stages. The i pump was thoroughly cleaned, several parts replaced, reassembled, and ,

tested satisfactorily. The licensee is investigating the source of the !

sludge in the cooling water piping and its potential safety significanc J Also, on May 16, 1987, the Unit 1 operating crew noted control room d annunciator windows illuminated which would indicate that the isolation valves for both 11 and 12 accumulators were closed. However, other evidence including a visual che'ck of the valves showed the valves to be J open. Investigation revealed that the wrong type of annunciator card had d been installed on May 7, during startup preparations. The old card had been removed earlier in the outage. The incorrect cards were replaced ,

with proper ones within one hour of discovery. At the time of these !

actions, Unit 1 was at hot standby in preparation for physics testin g

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Since at the time ~ of ' discovery,'the Unit I reactor coolant temperature exceeded 200 degrees F, the alarms for the isolation valves were. required-to.be operable. However,-this was not a violation of Technical

. Specifications 3.3. A.1.h.3 since operability was restored well-within the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />' time limi ,

'On May 19, 1987.during' review of steam generator eddy current data from 'l the Unit 1 inspections, the licensee discovered that one tube had not been plugged that should have been. Cooldown of the' reactor coolant'

system;(RCS) began and at 2:41 a.m. on May 20, the 12 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAF) pump started. automatically as the steam generators were being drained. The pump control had been. inadvertently L left in.the " auto" position. The licensee reported this automatic '

actuation as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). ,, d Unit l'was placed on line at 10:38 p.m. on May 27, 1987 ending a 49 da ' '

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outage for maintenance, refueling, and unscheduled main l generator repai In accordance with the Region. III requirements set forth ~for licensees on the' reduced inspection program, a team.insp9ction conducted a mid: sal.P ' ,

review of plant activities free May 11-May 15, 1987. The-results of this '

inspection are contained in Ir.spection' Reports No. 50-282/87006 and-No.:50-306/87006(DRP).

.No violations or deviations were identifie i Maintenance Observation (G2703)

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Routine, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities (on safety related systems and components) listed below were observed /

reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance w'ith- W ,

approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or stasidards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for s"

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operation:were met while components or systems were removed from ,7

.servied, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, activities /

wers accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to raturning. components or. systems to service, quality control records ..

v6rts naihtainad, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological-controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls vere-implemente .

Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection poried: '

• - 12 motor driven au2iliary feedwater pump lube ' oil system '

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• ' Unit 1 containment' air' temperature sen',or replacement test

!* Unit 1containmentequipme6thatQdnstallation

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. i l As noted in the previous. inspection r6p'ott, the D-2 diesel generator visual lnspection of the bearings during the annual preventive maintenance (PM) l resulted in the replacement of the upper and lower crankshaft thrust  !

bearin's due to' excessive wear. During this, inspection period,'a region based nspector conducted a' review of.the diesel generator operating J history, current maintenance practices, and uiscussed proposed diesel generator reliability improvements. This inspection is the subject of Inspection'.ReportsJo. 50-282/87008'and No. 50-306/87008(DRS).

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As. partif the Unit 1 refteling detage, an inspection of the main

! generator had uncovered some localized damage to an inner stator windin .l s

,Cause of the dasage~is attMbuted to'a loose part from the vibration I induced failure of mountidg hardware from a hydrogen gas' discharge  !

resistance temperature detector (RTD) in the generator. In-place repairs l tc, the main generator stator ' winding were successfully completed and ,

added,an additional 13' days to the length of the cutage. , . 1 i

During'the Unit ("efueling outage, all tubes in steam , generators 11 and^ \

, 12 were ins)ected e,ing eddy-current techniques. In 1b steam generator,  ;

five tubes lad.through-wall indications ranging from 40154% and were A j plugge These indications were at either the first, second, or; thirdh '

coldLleg support plates. In 12 steam generator six tuber with --

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through-wall indications ranging from 40-86% wer,e plugged. Two of these- s !

indications were at the first cold leg support plate. Thetremaining f@ r- ]

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were in'the tubesheet region on the cold leg side that could not be< s -

sleeved. In additio:t, atotalof27tubeswiththrough-wall.indicationsl,e,M ranging.from 26-96% were sleeved using the leak tight welded sleeve' -

i technique developed by Combustion Engineerin The tubes that were '

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sleeved all had indications in the tubesheet region on the hotleg sidc'. .

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.0ther acti~ities v observed that are associated with the tinit'l refueling

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outage and unscheduled main. generator repair' included: q

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• M0 VATS testing of limitorque valves for IEB 85-03 -

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s Raychem splice inspection / repairs N

• Reactor trip breaker preventive maintenance and testing ,

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l i s ,condary Se pipVng wall thinning inspection (See Section 11p q

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• 11 M bihe driven auxiliary feed pump inspection <

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• . Steam generator snubber control block test

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No violations or deviations were identifie !

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' Surveillance'(61726)-

The. inspector witnessed portions.of~ surveillance testing of safety-related!

W , . systems and components.. The inspection included verifying that'the tests

were scheduled and performed wit 11n Technical Specification requirements, observing.that procedures were being followed.by qualified operator::,

that Limiting conditions for Operation. (LCOs). were not violated,. that'

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._ system and equipment restoration was' completed, and.that test results-

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were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirement Portions 1of the following.surveillances were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

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'SP.2186- D2 Diesel Generator Operability Test SP 16158 ' Unit 1 Safeguards Bus Voltage Restoration Function Test

'SP 1661 Monthly Guardhouse Emergency Diesel Generator Operation SP 1278- Incore Thermocouple Test SP-1046 Full Length Control Rod Drop Timing SP 1072 Unit 1 Containment Penetration 25A, 25B, 44 Local Leak ]i Rate Test 1 SP 1102' Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFW) Monthly 1

• Test

SP'1728' ' Siren Cancel Test J

,. No violations.or deviations were identified.' l

,6.1 . ESF System Walk'down' (71710)

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The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions

.of.: Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety injection. systems. -0bservations included confirmation of selected portions.of the licensee's procedures, checklists,

. plant. drawings, verification of correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment'and instrumentation are properly aligned, and local system-~ indication to insur'e proper operation within

. prescribed limit ~No' violations or deviations were identifie ,

Refuelind Activities (60710, 86700, 71711)

Prior to the. handling'of: fuel in the core, the inspectors verified !

that all testing. required by the technical. specifications and licensee procedures had been complete During fuel movenent, the inspectors verified that core monitoring, boron concentration, refueling canal water i level, and containment' integrity were maintained as required by Technical i Specifications and licensee procedure , 'The inspectors witnessed refueling operations during several shifts,

. observing: proper use of approved refueling and fuel shuffle procedures; and adequate shift manning in the control room and at the refueling :

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platform. The inspectors observed proper radiation controls, good housekeeping, and protection against foreign objects falling.into .I the reactor-in the refueling are 'l

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Associated with the Unit 1 refueling were the following activities j which were observed in part by the inspectors:

Reactor Vessel' Head Removal Reactor Fuel Shuffle using new SFP transfer equipment Reactor Criticality Zero-Power Physics Testing Reactor On-Line-As noted in Inspection Reports No. 50-282/87002 and No. 50-306/87002(DRP),

demonstration consolidation of the fuel rods from up to 50 fuel assemblies

'is planned to be accomplished in September-October 1987. This-demonstration is to be done under the provisions'of 10 CFR 50.5 Safety analyses are to be performed under contract to Westinghouse- ;

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and Nutech. These analyses will be done for both the demonstration program and for consolidation of the contents of the~ entire spent fuel storage poo Following the demonstration consolidation, the subject will be reviewed

'to determine what course to follow with the rest of the spent fuel. This j

. subsequent work will be done under the provisions of an NRC approved '

amendment to the technical specification No violations or deviations.were identifie . Facility Modifications (37700) I A number of modifications associated.with the Unit I refueling outage 1 were completed and are listed as follows: 1

• -11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Thrust Bearing 4

.-Lubrication System Modification

• , Redundant Fusing for Appendix R; Modification 86L927 l'

• Reactor Cooling Pump Motor Rotor Modification

• ~ Control Room Panel B and D Modifications

• ' Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System'(RVLIS) Modifications ;

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• Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Vent Modification No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine 4 that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:

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(Closed) 282/860072 LL.' -Deficiencies seen in Raychem Splice Inspection by the licensee during the Unit 2 outage in the Fall 1986 was performed in response.to I.E. Information Notice 86-53. Because of this inspection, a repair program was established with the result that all Unit 2' splices were brought into a condition where full qualification per 10 CFR 50.49.could be show Similar inspections were conducted on Unit'l~ during the Spring 1987 outage. A repair program was conducted on these splices, als Currently, all' splices on Units 1 and 2 are qualified.in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.

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(Closed) 282/87003-LL~ Shield Building Doors Open. The senior resident inspector found both shield building maintenance airlock doors open with the reactor coolant system temperature above 200 degrees F. The doors were promptly closed and investigative and corrective actions take Revision of heatup checklists to assure that the control room alarm is 1 j

unbypassed has been completed and should prevent any future occurrences of this typ In addition, the investigative report contained 27 recommendations for possible other corrective actions, some of which could have very long lead times for implementation. These recommendations have been distributed'amongst the plant staff for review. The plant Operations Committee has scheduled a meeting for June 19, 1987 to decide which recommendations will be accepted. This review and final disposition of action items will be followed by the resident inspectors as an Open

i Item (282/87005-01; 306/87005-01).

L (Closed) 282/87004-L Reactor Trip During Safeguards Logic Testing, j This trip was the result of not following the test procedure exactl !

Because of this event and other recent ones involving this test procedure,

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~the procedure has been simplified and revised to reduce the risk of trip This; revised procedure currently is in use for both Units 1 and 2. Further information on this subject can be found in Inspection Reports  !

No. 282-87006 and No. 306-87006(DRP).

(Closed) 282/87005-L Both Trains of Steam Exclusion System Isolate During electrical modification work during the Unit 1 outage, the steam- ,

exclusion systems' for Units 1 and 2 were accidentally deenergized. This !

situation was corrected within a few hours so no violation of technical i specifications was~ involve Special control room logging requirements of the status of shared systems have been instituted for situations 1 involving outages in one of the two units. Additionally, modifications !

are to be made to better separate the power supplies to control circuitry !

such as this for the steam exclusion syste !

1 Non-Licensed Staff Training (41400)

The inspector reviewed the plant operating history and selected two !

events and two maintenance activities and verified that the lessons learned from the events and activities were effectively factored into the training program. The inspector reviewed the training records of personnel involved with events / activities and also interviewed those

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personnel to ascertain whether training was received for special tasks

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that;had been assigned. _ During the course of those interviews, the inspector found-that the actual practices'of how QC hold points /

' . inspections points were inserted into the. work procedures varied generally from the administrative control directive (ACD) requirements. .Specifically, S'ACD 3.2_(Work Control) and 5 ACD'3.8 (General Repair and Maintenance Activities) state'that'the re'sponsible' individual (e.g. System Engineer, etc.) establishes the hold points and that Quality Engineering reviews the hold points for adequacy and appropriateness. In actual practice, Quality Engineering was taking care of adding most hold points. The Superintendent of Quality Engineering has agreed to resolve this inconsistency by either revising the ACDs or following the existing ACD procedure. This item is considered open pending review of the licensee's final resolution (282/87005-02; 306/87005-02(DRP)).  ;

In addition, the inspector reviewed the licensee's progress with respect-to accreditation by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

The following training programs are currently accredited:

• Non-Licensed Operator

• Control Room Operator

• Senior Control Room Operator / Shift Supervisor i

• Electrical Maintenance Personnel <

• Mechanical Maintenance Personnel l The following training programs sre scheduled for review by INP0 in !

August of 1987: 1

• Instrument and Control Tec1nician

• - Radiological Protection Te:hnician

• Chemistry Technicians r

• On-Site Technical Staff and Managers

• Shift Technical Advisor No' violations or deviations were identifie i 11. Headquarters Request (92704) k l

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As noted in Inspection Reports No. 50-282/87002; and No. 50-306/87002(DRP),

an NRC Request dated January 30, 1987, concerning thinning of secondary piping was accomplished. The following additional information is provided as a result of inspections performed during the Unit 1 refueling outag More than 20 areas of condensate and feedwater piping were examined using ultrasonic testing (UT) techniques and in some locations visuall Three areas upstream of the feedwater (FW) pumps are candidates for close monitoring in the future. 'Two of these areas are at the manufacturing tolerance minimum pipe thickness for that location (0.325") but show no signs of active corrosion mechanisms. These areas will be measured again in six months during plant operation. The third area has a measured i

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minimum wall thickness of 0.340". Metal sampling has been done in this area to determine the chemical composition of the piping. This area will be monitored closely also. In addition to the upstream areas discussed above, two areas downstream of each feedwater pump have evidence of I possible thinning. These two areas will be monitored during operation als . Exit Interview (30703)

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The inspectors-met the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 l at the conclusion of the inspection on June 1, 1987. The inspectors {

discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the i inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by 1 the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietar l

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