IR 05000282/1997016

Insp Repts 50-282/97-16,50-306/97-16 & 72-0010/97-16 on 970806-0909.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20198L402
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	09/25/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198L399	List: IR 05000282/1997016 ML20198L397
References
50-282-97-16, 50-306-97-16, 72-0010-97-16, 72-10-97-16, NUDOCS 9710270029
Download: ML20198L402 (12)

Text

. - . - . - .. . . . - , - . . - . . . . . -- .- - - - . - - . - - . .

i I

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli  !

i

, Docket No: 50 282, 50 306, 72 10 License No: DPR-42, DPR-60, SNM 2506 i

Report No: 50 282/97016(DRP); 50 306/97016(DRP); l 7210/97016(DRP)

Licensee: Northern States Power Company l

.

Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant i Location: 1717 Wakonade Drive East i Welch, MN 55089 Dates: August 6 September 9,1997

!

Inspectors: S. Ray, Senior Resident inspector i R. Bywater, Resident inspector P Krohn, Resident inspector A Stone, Senior Resident inspector, Monticello  ;

'

S. Thomas, Resident inspector B. Wetzel, Project Manager

i Approved by: J. W, McCormick Barger, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7

2 ,

G PDR

. . _ . - - -

_ ___ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .-

i l

,

I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  !

!

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2 i NRC Inspection Report 50 282/97016(DRP): 50 306/97016(DRP); 7210/97016(DRP) '

'

This inspection was performed by the res dent inspectors, and others, and included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant suppor ,

Operations,

+ Improvements were noted in the quality and clarity of the shift briefings during this t inspection period,

< t

+ An improvement was noted in the operators' response to rod position indication

"

problems during this inspection period,

'

• Also during this inspection period, several improvements were noted in the

- performance of the Operations Committee, .,

Maintenance

+ All maintenance and surveillance activities observed were accomplished carefully and in accordance with procedures. Where procedures were in error, personnel performing the tasks stopped the work to obtain resolution before proceedin Enaineerina r

• A system engineer's action in recommending that an auxiliary feedwater pump be considered inoperable until a degraded condition was analyzed was conservativ Plant Supped

+ No discrepancies were identified in this are ,

r r

., - . . - - ._a:-,- - , - . . - . . - - -

. . - - - - - _ . - - . - _ - - . - - - . - . .- - -

l Stoort Details

Summary of Plant Status U,9 i operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period except for a power ,

reductiva to about 40 percent from August 9 to 11,1997, for condenser tube cleaning and l other wor !

Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.

'

L9Jttistion Conduct of Operations  !

,

01,1 General Comments

. Inspection Scoos f71707)

Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of plant operations. These reviews included observations of control room evolutions, shift turnovers, logkeeping, and evaluation of operability decisions. Update i Safety Analysis Report, Section 13. " Plant Operations," was reviewed as part of th s inspectio Observctions and Findinas All routine operations observed were conducted properly. Operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and the causes of annunciators. Logkeeping, communications, and turnovers were generally good. Shift briefings were detailed

~_

with Technical Specification equipment that was inoperable clearly differentiated from other equipment problems. Operating department management instituted a new management expectation for shift briefings in which each unit's reactor operator is to discuss expected reactivity changes for the shif On September 8,1997, the number 23 heater drain tank pump (HDTP) speed control failed on Unit 2 requiring the pump to be secured. Unit 2 has three HDTP's (numbers 21,22, and 23), two of which are normally required for 100 percent power operation. Since the number 22 HDTP was unavailable due to previous speed control problems, when the number 23 HDTP failed, only the number 21 HDTP was left running. When the number 23 HDTP failed, the Unit 2 operators first noticed a drop in feed water suction pressure. Before an annunciator had alarmed, the operators took the appropriate actions per alarm response procedure C4750 , Conclusions No problems were noted in routine plant operations. Improvements were noted in the quality and clarity of information discussed in shift briefing ,

f c,-wr- . e _% w ..~e--y., =-3-,, y .,yv-,,49,,. , . - w,,re-,.~,-,c#+,3-- ,es..w,,#,,- ,,,,,-m-,,,w-w- - , . .,- .wr,-,.:..-r.riorer --,,.e r-r-- ----,m... , mr -. *. - - ,

_ _ .

.

01.2 Unit 1 Power Reduction and Ascenign Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed major portions of the control room activities surrounding a Unit 1 power reduction to about 40 percent power on August 9,1997, and subsequent power ascension back to full power on August 11,199 Observations and Findinas The primary purpose of the power reduction was to isolate portions of the main condenser to allow tube cleaning per work order (WO) 9708077. The inspectors observed the prejob brief for the power reduction and the evolution itself. The power change was conducted in accordance with Operating Procedure 1C1.4, * Unit i Power Operation,' Revision 14. During the load reduction, three individual rod position indications for 'D" bank rods indicated more than 12 steps different from the bank demand position. The operators completed Surveillance Procedure SP 1319,

' Rod Position Verification,' Revision 4, to verify that the control rods were not actually mispositioned. In this case the operators properly declared the rod deviation monitor inoperable for the affected control rods at the conclusion of the surveillance, inspection Report 50 282/97015(DRP); 50 306/97015(DRP), Section M (Violation 50 306/97015 02), described a case where the procedule was not properly followed and the deviation monitor was not declared inoperabl Shortly before operators planned to begin raising power back to full power, the control room received annunciators indicating that Al(the axial neutron flux dhrence between the upper and lower power range detectors) was out of the target band. Operators believed the condition was due to underberation and inserting control rods too far during the power reduction. This caused power to shift to the upper part of the core, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.1? B.7.b, power could only be raised above 50 percent if Al was not outside of the target band for more than one hour (cumulative) in the preceding 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The nuclear engineers were consulted for advice on returning the flux profile to the desired condition. Since more than one hour outside the band had accumulated, the operators had to wait for 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> after correcting the al condition to increase power above 50 percent. Power was retumed to near 100 percent on August 11,1997, without further problems. The inspectors observed major portions of the power ascensio Conclusions The evolutions were conducted safely and properly. The only problem was that Al shifted out of the target band which delayed the retum to full power. The licensee's Error Reduuon Task Force was evaluating the Al problem and developing

~

recommendations to prevent recurrence. The Task Force haa not reached any conclusions at the end of the inspection period. The al prf,blem was considered an ;

operational and economic concem by the licensee but, since the proper actiont were taken in accordance witt Technical Specifications, it was r ot e regulatory con,:er An improvement was noted in the operators' response to rod position indication problems compared to a previous similar occurrenc ,

L 07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Eq1formance of Operations CommittteJOC) [D.ipElion Scope (92901)

The inspectors observed several OC meetings during the course of the inspectio One purpose of the observations was to evaluate corrective actions taken in response to a violation discussed in inspection Report 50 282/97011(DRP); 50-306/97011(DRP), Section 07.1 regarding performance of the OC (Violation 50-282/97011-03; 50 306/97011 03). Qttigtvations and Findinag The inspectors observed improvements in the performance of the OC. At meetings in which more than two alternate members were in attendance, the voting members were clearly designated. Procedure revisions received reviews in detall on a level commensurate with the significance of the change. On several occasions, the OC members asked that all members be given copies of the revisions. Procedures due for biannual reviews were listed about a month in advance of the due date so that appropriate management attention could be focused on completing them. Several OC Responsibilities Meetings were held in which the committee researched the exact regulatory requirements of the committee and developed clear expectation Those expectations were in the process of being incorporated into Revision 5 of Administrative Work Instruction (AWI) SAWI 3.3.0, * Operations Committee."

One example of improved performance was in a meeting on September 3,199 One of the items reviewed was proposed design change 97ZN01 which was for changing the air diffusers and runout ducts in the control room air treatment system in an attempt to reduce ambient noise. The work would create the possibility that the control room air cleanup filter might experience more than its design flow rate if activated when a diffuser was removed for replacement. The draft design change directed that one diffuser be removed and the cleanup filter flow measured while in a one hour allowed outage time for both trains of the system in order to prove that the system would remain operable for the remainder of the work. The OC questioned the one hour allowed outage time, reviewed Technical Specification 3.13, and determined that the one hour time limit was not an allowed outage time but rather to allow an orderly shutdown if both trains of control room air treatment systems were inoperable. Thus, performing the design change as written would have resulted in placing the plant in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. In addition,

-

__

. . .

-

r*i -

Jr. criem 1ned that the flow test with a diffuser removed should have been It mMwd 4 pecial test or experiment and should have been screened as such for f a sttentiC ,veviewed safety question in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.5 ,

dtCM12D1 The inspectors noted several improvements in performance of the OC since the locntification of the violation discussed above. The violation will remain open penohg the inspector's review of the completed revisions to SAWI 3. Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (ClqstMonktmatgiylgli0nittitLLCAU No NRR 97-0Q1 This CAL was issu3d on March 0, *D97, after the determination that an unreviewed safety question (USQ)

existed with the licensee taking credit for the nonseismic intake canal as a source of water following an earthquake and the use of operator actions to reduce nonessential cooling water loads following the earthquake. The CAL specified that the licensee would not take Unit 2 beyond hot shutdown (Mode 3) until the NRC staff determined that the USO had been satisfactorily resolve The licensee remained in Mode 3 while NRR (NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation) reviewed several submittals by the licensee regarding the USQ. On March 25,1997. NRR amended the license to allow full power operation on an interim basis utilizing a dedicated operator to take specific actions to assure the availability of an adequate water supply for safety related loads following a seismic event until a seismically qualified emergency cooling water source was available that would provide the basis to extend the time for normal operator post-carthquake coolin0 water load management. This could be done either through a seismic evaluation of the intake canal, physical rnodifications to the intake canal or plant, or some combination of the two. On March 27,1907, the Unit 2 reactor was modo cntical again and resumed full power operations shortly thereafter (documented in inspection Report No. 50 282/07005(DRP); 50 306/07005(DRP)).

IkMal019nMla M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 G entf G o m m tDi [nsnqqtigfdggnpl01720. 01LQLQ21021 The inspectors observed all or portions of the following mair,tenance and surveillance activities. Included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures (SPs) and work orders (WOs) listed as well as the appropriate Updated Safety Analysis Report sections regarding the activities. The inspectors verified that the surveillance procedures observed met the requirements of the Technical Specifications where require O

___. .. _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ - _

-. - .. _

. - _ . - - _ . _ _ - . - .

• SP 1233 11 Condent"e Storage Tank Level Functional Test, Revision 8

• SP 1319 Rod Position Verification, Revision 4

• SP 2007 SI [ Safety injection) Pump Monthly Lubrication, Revision 5

• SP 2090 Containment Spray Pump and Spray Additive Valve Test,

'

Revision 44

• SP 2233 21 & 22 Condensate Storage Tank Level Functional Test, Revision 4

• WO 9704540 Pre operational Testing for the number 22 Sl Pump Control Switch Circuitry After Control is Rerouted per Appendix 'R'

• WO 9708421 Turbine Building Crane Heavy Load Handling (Remove Spare Low Pressure Turbines)

• WO 9708077 Power Reduction for Condenser Tube Cleaning

• WO 9708831 Transfer Water Between the numbers 11 and 21 Refueling Water Storage Tanks

• WO 9708962 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Flow Transmitter Replacement per SPCE [ Substitute Part/ Component Equivalency Evaluation) 109

+ WO 9708995 Move Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pit b. Observations and Findinas For all of the work observed procedures were properly used und followed. Good prejob briefs were conducted and proper safety precautions were followed. Work was properly planned and scheduled, and proper permission was received prior to its executio * For SP 2000 the inspectors noted that there were no special precautions in the procedure directing the operators to wear protective clothing when operating valves in the caustic addition system nor did the operators wear protective clothing. However, a large sign in the immediate area of the valve operations stated: * CAUTION Use Protective Clothing When Pumping or Operating Valves." The inspectors discussed the situation with the Site Safety and Fire Protection Administrator who researched the requirements and determined that protective clothing was not required unless working with an open system or actually handing the liquid caustic. The Safety Administrator stated that he intended to remove or modify the sign to contain the actual requirement During the surveillance the operators noted that it could not be performed exactly as written. Steps 7.5.8, and 7.5.9 directed the operator to throttle a domineralized water supply to maintain s;35 pounds per square inch (psi)

before a flow path for the demineralized water was established. The pressure could not be successfull) throttled without flow and the steps should have been reversed, in addition, the operators noted that step 7.5.8 neglected to direct the opening of an extra supply isolation valve in the system. The operators halted the test, placed the equipment in a safe condition, and informed the shift supervisor that the procedure needed to be revise l i

l

._

a The inspectors reviewed WO 9704540 and observed the post maintenance testing of the number 22 SI pump following rerouting of the local control switch cable. The inspectors observed a good questioning attitude by operations and electrical maintenance personnel during performance of Electrical Maintenance Procedure PE 002610T, *4.16KV Bus 26 Cubicle 10, number 22 Sl Pump Electrical Maintenance Test Tripping," Revision 0, which was required to be performed as part of the WO. Operations personnel depressed the local A phase overcurrent time relay test button expecting the breaker to trip open within approximately five seconds. When the expected response was not ot,tained, the workers contacted the cognizant system engineer who verified that the overcurrent time relay should actually trip in approximately 26 seconds. The workers proceeded to test the local A phase overcurrent time relay test satisfactorily. However, they did not take action to toquest a procedure change to reflect the 26 second time require The inspectors noted a procedural weakness in that the overcurrent time relay trip set point was not provided in PE 002610T stept d.25,8.32, or 8.56. As a result the work was delayed slightly during step 8.25 when, as discussed above, the workers did not obtain what they thought to be a correct respons * The inspectors reviewed WO 9708831 for correct configuration control. The activity transferred water between Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling water storage tanks via the reverse osmosis system to reduce the silica concentration in the Unit i refueling water storage tank in preparation for an upcom'ng outage. The inspectors noted correct configuration control and no casos where the safety-related functions of the tanks would have been compromise * Comments on WO 9708677 and SP 1319 were discussed in Section 01.2 of this repor Conclusions All maintenance and surveillance activities observed were accomplished carefully and in accordance with procedures. Where procedures were in error, personnel performing the tasks stopped the work to obtain resolution before proceedin Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Eypluation of Operability of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumos Insvection Scope (92903)

On August 14,1997, the number 21 AFW pump was declared inoperable due to

i

. _ - - - - - _ _ - - - - . _ - - _ _ _ - - - . - _ - . - . - - . - - . _ _

questions regarding its flow capabilities. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances of the event and the licensee's respons l t

b. Observations and Findinas While reviewing the results of American Society of Mechanical Engineers,Section XI, testing of the number 21 AFW pump, the system engineer determined that pump recirculation flow had increased by almost 2 gpm since the last measurement in 1995. The licensee had previously calculated that under design accident conditions the pump might only deliver 200.8 gpm to the steam generators compared to a design minimum of 200 gpm. That calculation was previously considered Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50 306/97008 01 and was discussed in inspection Report 50 282/97008(DRS);

50 300/97008(DRS).

With the increased flow in the recirculation line, the engineer questioned whether the 200 gpm requirement could still be met. On the advice of the engineer, the operators declared the pump inoperable and started a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowed outage tim Nonconformance Report 2010829 was written to document the condition and corrective action Licensee engineers subsequently performed a calculation which showed that there would still be about 200.4 gpm available to the steam generators even with the increased recirculation flow and the pump was declared operable again on August 15,1997. An NRC regional engineering specialist was reviewing the calculation; this review will be tracked as part of the effort to address IFl 50 306/97008-01, in addition, the licensee performed the Section XI testing a second time to confirm the recirculation flow. The results were essentially the same. Recirculation flow testing of the other three AFW pumps showed no increase over previously measured values. The engineer intended to write a work order to replace the flow orifice in the recirculation line for the number 21 AFW pump to restore the original flow margin,

c. Conclusions The engineer's action in recommending it it tha AFW pump be considered inoperable until the degraded condition was analyzed was conservative but also appropriate considering the small available margi E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Review of Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Commitments (37551. 92903) ,

Whlie performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the USAR that related to the areas inspected and used the

, USAR as an engineering / technical support basis document. The inspectors compared plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the USAR descriptions '

as discussed in each section. The inspectors verified that the USAR wording was t 9

!

!

_ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ ,

.. . . _ . . .-. - - _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ - .-

consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures, and parameter IV. Plant SJaggf1 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)  ;

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the areas of radiological protection and chemistry controls using inspertion Procedure 7175 The inspectors reviewed the control, labeling, posting, and stowage of radioactively contaminated tools in the Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary building. No discrepancies were note P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities (71750) ,

The licensee conducted an annual emergency plan drill on August 6,1997. The emergency drill simulated a fire in an emergency diesel generator room, a reactor coolant pump thermal barrier heat exchanger rupture (an intusystem loss of coolant accident), and the loss of instrument air to containment. The licensee also manned the backup Emergency Operaticns Facility (designated the Headquarters Emergency Center) in downtown -

Minneapolis to simulate corporate response to the drill. The inspectors observed portions of the drill. Good command and control were demonstrated by the licensee in the technical support center and the simulated control room. The licensee correctly declared the emergency classification levels that occurred during the dril S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)

During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the areas of security and safeguards activities using Inspection Procedure 71750. No

'

discrepancies were note V. Management Meetina X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at :

the conclusion of the inspection on September 9,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary, No proprietary information was identifie i

10 -l t

.--_ .. _ -. _

.-

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Sorensen, Plant Manager K. Albrecht, General Superintendent Engineering, Electrical /l&C T. Amundson, General Superintendent Engineering, Mechanical J. Goldsmith, General Superintendent Engineering, Generation Services J. Hill, Manager Quality Services G. Lonertz, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance D. Schuelke, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry T. Silverberg, General Superintendent Plant Operations M. Sleigh, Superintendent Security INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 02707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Oopport Activities IP 92901: Followup Operations IP 92902: Followup Maintenance IP 92903: Followup Engineering ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed NRR 97 001 CAL Confirmatory Action Letter - Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Discussed 50 306/07008-01 IFl Review of Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Model 50-282/97011 03; VIO Failure of Operating Committee to Meet Technical Specifications 50-306/97011-03 50 306/97015-02 VIO Failure to Follow Surveillance Procedure and Declare Rod Deviation Monitor inoperable

_ . - . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ .

,

i l-I

. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AWI . Administrative Work Instruction-  !

CAL _ Confirmatory Action Letter l

,

CFR Code of Federal Regulations l DRP Division of Reactor Projects

,

DRS Division of Reactor Safety l

'

ERTF Error Reduction Task Force

"

ppm Gallons per Minute l HDTP Hester Drain Tank Pump ,

"

-IFl Inspection Followup item NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  !

.NSP Northern _ States Power Company OC Operating Commlttee psi Pounds per Square Inch SI Safety injection .

SP Surveillance Procedure SPCE Substitute Part/ Component Equivalency Evaluullon-USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report .

'

USQ Unreviewed Safety Question '

'

VIO Violation WO Work Order -i

'

=

1I l

.

ll I.__.,-.,,,_..,._ ._ ;_ . . . . _ , . _ _ . , _ . . _ . - . _ _ _ _ - . . , - _ . _ _ _ . . . - . . . . _ _ , ..._..-. _ _ ._. ,-.,2,