IR 05000282/1985016

Insp Repts 50-282/85-16 & 50-306/85-13 on 850811-1012.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operational Safety,Maint,Surveillance,Facility Mod,Meeting W/Corporate Mgt & Safety Audit Committee & Followup on LERs

ML20198B444
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	10/24/1985
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198B435	List: IR 05000282/1985016 ML20198B432
References
50-282-85-16, 50-306-85-13, NUDOCS 8511060495
Download: ML20198B444 (7)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/85016(DRP); 50-306/85013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: August 11 through October 12, 1985 Inspectors: J. E. Hard M. M. Moser Approved By:

W.% W f I. N. Jackiw, Chief j

IO ld YI l8 h, Reactor Projects Section 2B Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 11 through October 12, 1985 (Reports No. 50-282/85016(DRP);

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50-306/85013(0.9P))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of previous inspection findings, plant operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, facility modifications, meeting with corporate management, followup of Licensee Event Reports, refueling activities, and meeting with Safety Audit Committee. The inspection involved a total of 512 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors including 56 inspector-hours onsite during off-shift Results: No violations were identified in the nine areas inspected. An event directly related to facility modification is an example of an item of continuing safety concern to the resident inspectors. The inspectors will continue to monitor this area carefully.

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8511060495 851024 PDR ADOCK 05000282 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants F. Tierney, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction

• E. Watzl, Plant Manager

• D. Mendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection

• R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance

• A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering K. Beadell, Superintendent, Quality Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Services D. Vincent, Project Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Construction J. Goldsmith, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services M. Ferraite, Director, Technical Review, ANI M. Brocker, Sr. Regional Field Engineer, ANI P. Giaccaglia, Sr. Staff Engineer, ANI R. Anderson, Sr. Fire Protection Specialist, M&M Protection Consultants J. Stevens, Secondary Side Services Engineer, Westinghouse E. Renaud, Operations QA Engineer, Westinghouse A. Vukmir, Site Services Representative, Westinghouse The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, QA personnel, and Shift Technical Advisor Corporate personnel visited on September 24, 1985 are listed in Sect. ion 7 belo * Denotes those present at the exit interview on October n , 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings -

(Closed) Deviation (282/84004-02): Reactor coolant system vent Failure to meet requirements of Amendments 63 and 69 of Technical Specifications. The requirements of the amendments have been me The vent system is in operatio _

(Closed) Open Items (282/84018-01; 306/84019-01(DRP)): Toxic gas detection system inoperable. NRR review was completed and requirement for system operation delete (Closed) Violation (282/84018-02(DRP)): Failure to maintain BAST above 2000 gallons with RCS greater than 200 F. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and found the corrective action to be adequat _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - -

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(Closed) Violation (50-282/85014-01(DRP); 50-306/85011-01(DRP)): Valid alarm response procedure not available in control room. The inspector reviewed the response and found the corrective action to be adequat . Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71710)

Unit 1 was base loaded at 100% power except for reductions for surveillance testing, special maintenance, weekend load following, and one trip on September 15, 1985. Unit 2 completed the coastdown mode and commenced a scheduled 45 day refueling and ten year inspection outage on September 6, 198 The inspector observed control .'oom operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observed shift turnovers. The inspector verified operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected component Tours of the auxiliary building, turbine building and external areas of the plant were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc On August 14, 1985, breaker 124 tripped thereby de energizing pressurizer heater Group B for Unit 1. The heaters were switched to an alternate power supply. Investigation revealed failed insulation on one cable in the power supply. This failure appeared to be the result of extended cable operation in a high temperature environmen At 4:51 a.m. on September 15, 1985 Unit 1 tripped on generator under-excitation while attempting to manually adjust output voltage. A component in the voltage regulator was replaced and the unit went back on-line at 1904 on the same day. Associated with the trip, the 12 steam generator main feedwater isolation valve motor and its breaker failed while attempting to reopen the valve. The motor operator and breaker i were replaced. The unit reached 100% power at 3:22 a.m. on September 16, 198 At 4:08 p.m. on October 1, 1985 the 480 volt breaker 12 M which supplies half the plant normal safeguards (ESF) 480 volt loads was accidentally tripped open (bumped) by a workman performing facility modification work near the breaker. A control room operator who was nearby reclosed the breaker within two minutes and Unit 1 operation was unaffecte . Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved proceoures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

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work, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, quality control records were maintained, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, radiological controls were implemented, and fire prevention controls were implemente Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed during the inspection period:

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Repair of D-1 diesel generator

l 125 V DC battery cell replacement (one cell)

i i Steam Generator Snubber testing and rebuild

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Boric Acid pipe replacement Main Feedwater pump motor refurbishment Fuel Transfer system repair

! Reactor Coolant pump PM 21 RCP rotor removal and replacement

f Refueling manipulator crane PM Removal of containment equipment hatch MS Containment isolation valve PM Sludge Lancing Steam Generators No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance (61726)

The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety-related

, systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirement Portions of the following surveillances were observed / reviewed during the

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inspection period:

I SP-2083 Integrated SI Test

SP-1219 Bus 16 Undervoltage Rela / Test i

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l SP-2036 Turbine Overspeed Trip Test and Setpoint

. Verification SP-2154 Main Steam Safety Valve Test (Hot)

SP-2174 (8D) Hydro Test, Cooling Water to 21 AFWP SP-2646 Steam Flush of Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves In addition, on August 15, 1985, the inspector witnessed the loading for shipment offsite of the third set of Unit 1 reactor vessel surveillance specimen I No violations or deviations were identifie . Facility Modifications (37700, 37701)

In the previous inspection report for the Prairie Island facility, the subject of facility modifications was an area in which tne inspectors had identified items of safety concern. See Reports Nos. 50-282/85014(DRP);

50-306/85011(DRP). In the current report period for this facility, another event occurred on October 1, 1985 related to facility modifications. This event was the accidental tripping of 480 v. breaker 12 M which supplies half the plant normal safeguards (ESF) 480 v. load (See also Section 3 above). The trip was caused by personnel involved in the RVLIS (Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System) installation who accidentally leaned on or bumped the trip pushbutton. The licensee has assigned an out-of plant investigator, the Operations Committee met to i discuss preliminary recommendations, and the resident inspectors have discussed the matter with licensee corporate management. This unresolved

item will remain open pending completion of licensee action and review by

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l Additional facility modifications which are being made during this refueling outage are as follows:

! Control Room Panel Modifications Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS)

Boric Acid Line Replacement Steam Generator Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) ,

No. 21 and 22 Bus Panel Modifications i Reactor Trip Preaker Modifications ,

l Meeting with Corporate Management (30702)

On September 24,.1985, the senior resident inspector met with the following NSP people in corporate headquarters:

C. Larson, Vice President, Nuclear Generation i

L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants f; G. Neils, General Manager, Headquarters Nuclear Group D. Musolf, Manager, Nuclear Support Services l

K. Albrecht, Director, Power Supply QA P. Kamman, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations QA

R. Zerban, Manager, Corporate Security Department

G. Hudson, Administrator, Nuclear Security Services i

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Discussions were held on the subjects of the operation of the Prairie Island plant and the NRC inspection progra . LicenseeEventReportsFollowup(92700J Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications:

(Closed) 282/85016-01 Unit 1 trip on generator under excitation (PRE-1-85-12)

(0 pen) 282/85016-02 Feedwater MOV operator failure (PRE-1-85-13)

(0 pen) 282/85016-03 Accidental opening of breaker 12 M (PRE-1-85-14) Refueling Activities (60710, 86700)

Prior to the handling of fuel in the core the inspector verified that all testing required by the technical specifications and licensee procedures have been complete During fuel movement, the inspector verified that core monitoring, boron concentration, refueling canal water level, and containment integrity were maintained as required by technical specifications and licensee procedure The inspector witnessed refueling operations during several shifts observing: proper use of approved refueling and fuel shuffle procedures, adequate shift manning in the control room and at the refueling platfor The inspector observed proper radiation controls, good housekeeping and protection against foreign objects falling into the reactor in the refueling are Associated with the ten year outage inspection and refueling were the following activities which were observed in part by the inspector:

Reactor Vessel Weld Inspection Steam Generator Eddy Current Inspection Steam Generator Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Installation Reactor Vessel Head Removal

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On September 25, 1985, a small basket being used for visual inspection of two suspected failed fuel rods dropped about 6 feet to the floor of the spent fuel storage pool when its supporting cable broke. The cable broke while the basket was being raised; the basket apparently caught on the spacer of one of the spent fuel assemblies stored in this location, thus overstressing the cable. There was no damage done to the fuel rods nor the basket. Retrieval was accomplished the following day.

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l On October 1,1985, the fuel transfer car broke down thereby suspending core reload operations. Repairs to the chain drive were made and core reload Operations resumed until the system again broke down. Further l repairs to the fuel transfer system were completed and core reload proceeded until it was discovered on October 6 that a number of fuel assemblies were not correctly positioned in the core. This situation became evident when one fuel assembly became stuck when it was lowered

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into the core. The stuck fuel assembly was subsequently removed and inspected as were the other mispositioned fuel assemblies. Several of the mispositioned fuel assemblies and the previously stuck fuel assembly were replaced and the core loading was successfully complete . Meeting with Safety Audit Committee (40701)

On September 13, 1985, the inspectors met with the offsite safety committee (SAC) and discussed the following items: Introduction of new resident inspector Some conclusions from Davis-Besse event Control of facility modification work Content of Investigative Reports 11. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11, 1985. The inspectors discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any documents / processes as proprietar