IR 05000282/1997010

Insp Repts 50-282/97-10 & 50-306/97-10 on 970519-29.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ep Program,Including Emergency Response Facilities,Equipment & Supplies

ML20148R902
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	07/01/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148R807	List: IR 05000282/1997010
References
50-282-97-10, 50-306-97-10, NUDOCS 9707080044
Download: ML20148R902 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil l

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Docket Nos:

50-282: 50-306 Licenses No:

DPR-22; DPR-60 i

Reports No:

50-282/97010(DRS); 50-306/97010(DRS)

Licensee:

Northern States Power Company Facility:

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:

1717 Wakonade Dr. East Welch, MN 55089 i

Dates:

May 19 - 29,1997 Inspector:

Robert D. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Approved by:

James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

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i 9707080044 970701

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PDR ADOCK 05000282 G

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant NRC Inspection Reports 50-282/97010; 50-303/97010

This inspection included a review of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program, an aspect i

of Plant Support. This was an announced inspection conducted by a regional emergency preparedness analyst.

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Emergency response facilities, equipment, and supplies were in an excellent state of

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operational readiness. Interviews with emergency response organization personnel i

l-demonstrated very good to excellent knowledge of emergency implementing procedures and responsibilities. Management support was strong.

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The overall effectiveness of the licensee's emergency preparedness facilities,

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equipment, training, and organization was very good. (Sections P2.1, P3, P5, and j

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P6)

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. Licensee personnel appropriately declared an Unusual Event during an actual

j activation of the EP Plan. Emergency classification was correct and offsite j

notifications were timely. (Section P1.1)

j The extensive planning and flood preparation by the EP Coordinator and plant

personnel were effective. The numerous flood planning meetings and interface

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I strengthened contacts already established with the offsite agencies for emergency j

preparedness and made it possible to rapidly accomplish all the activities conducted i

during the floods. (Section P1.2)

2 The emergency response facilities were in excellent material condition and in a state

l of operational readiness. Several pieces of equipment and instruments were

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j demonstrated to be fully functional by the EP staff. (Section P2.1)

Interviews with key emergency response organization personnel demonstrated very

good knowledge of the emergency implementing procedures and responsibilities.

(Section PS)

I Management support for the EP program was strong, as demonstrated through

l discussions with the EP Coordinator, and the recent program upgrades and enhancements. The EP staff was proactive in maintaining and improving the j

program and responsive to identified issues. (Section P6)

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The audits of EP activities satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t) and were

2-very good in scope and detail. (Section P7)

The inspector completed Temporary Instruction 2515/134 "Onshift Dose

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Assessment Capabilities" and verified that the licensee's capabilities met

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requirements. (Section P9)

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Report Details J

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IV. Plant Suncort

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P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Activities i

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i P1.1 Actual Emeroency Plan Activations

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a.

Insoection Scone (82701)

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The inspector reviewed records and documentation packages regarding plant

response for an actual emergency event which occurred during 1996.

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Observations and Findinas

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An Unusual Event was dec;ared at 3:05 p.m. on June 29,1996, when both units

tripped due to generator lockouts when severe storms caused the loss of three of j

five offsite power lines for the plant. The Shift Manager requested the callout of F

the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to assist the Control Room for the

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event. The Unusual Event was terminated at 10:35 a.m. on June 30,1996, when the licensee secured the diesel generators and restored the required minimum

number of offsite power sources.

The event was reviewed and a detailed evaluation package was compiled by the EP

Coordinator. The package contained an evaluation of the plant personnel's event

response, ERO callout time reports, Quality Services Observation Reports, offsite l

notification forms, control room logs, procedure checklists, and areas for j

improvement.

c.

Conclusions

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t The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately implemented the emergency j

plan in declaring the Unusual Event. The emergency classification was made correctly and offsite notifications were timely. The evaluation performed by the EP

j Coordinator was very thorough and provided an excellent assessment of the plant's response to the actual event, identified issues and corrective actions, and provided i

important feedback to management.

i P1.2 1997 Flood Prenarations a.

Scone (82701)

in mid February 1997, the National Weather Service issued a moderate to severe Spring flood forecast for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) area, The EP Coordinator and other PINGP personnel began preparation for Spring floods with a number of offsite agancy meetings and then initiated the actions agreed upon at the meetings.

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Observations and Findinas l

l On February 27, the National Weather Service pr'edicted a Spring flood forecast

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crest of 685.8 feet. As a result of the forecast, the first Red Wing /Goodhue County Flood Meeting with State of Minnesota, Goodhue County, City of Red Wing, Prairie Island Indian Community, and Treasure Island Casino personnel was

held. A decision was made at the meeting to move up the start date of the

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Sturgeon Lake Road construction from early April to early March. The purpose of this construction was to elevate the primary Island access road approximately six

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feet above existing road levels.

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in March, plant staff held. vo flood meetings which included discussions of j

historical flood levels, current flood forecasts, and changes to the plant's flood l

procedure. By the end of March, the National Weather Service began issuing three day flood forecasts. Construction to elevate Sturgeon Lake Road six feet was e

started.

In early April, plant staff initiated daily flood meetings in which additional details were developed for the flood procedure. A second Red Wing /Goodhue County Flood Meeting was conducted and included the sharing of the flood preparation work that was underway by each of the participants' agencies. Road construction did not restrict PINGP employees, residents, or Casino patrons. The construction company ensured continued access to the island throughout the forecasted flood level crest. Housing alternatives were identified for commuting Wisconsin residents in case U.S. Highway 63 or U.S. Highway 10 were closed due to high water.

On April 9, alternative transportation was arranged in case the new road construction was to fail and consisted of two pontoon boats, boat docks, and onsite and offsite transportation. The Operations Committee approved an Emergency Planning Special Order which would institute partial augmentation of onshift personnel in the event of a declaration of an Unusual Event. River level was 683.8 feet, approximately 4.8 feet below the lowest current point on Sturgeon Lake Road. The PINGP Emergency Plan classification level for an Unusual Event was identified at a river elevation of 686 feet. The Alert classification level of 692 feet was also the Technical Specification level required for the reactor to be shutdown.

On April t0, the Plant Manager issued an information letter to residents near the plant and to tribal representatives concerning PINGP flood planning, and informing the residents that the road project should provide access to the island, and that alternate transportation had been arranged in case the new road was lost. The EP Coordinator also transmitted a description of emergency planning considerations to the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and the tribal representative.

On April 12 and 13, the river crested at an elevation of 685 feet and by April 14, the river had lowered to 684.8 feet.

Lessons learned from the planning and actions taken for the predicted floods was incorporated into the EP program and included:

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• a new EP implementing procedure for an emergency and flooding conditions

surveillance needs for various onsite monitoring locations

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• monitoring of offsite communications switch boxes

alternative transportation considerations

j public information for island residents

j flood protection for screenhouse equipment

i onsite housing arrangements if the highways are closed

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Conclusions

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The extensive planning and flood preparation by the EP Coordinator and plant l

personnel were effective. Significant additions and changes to plant procedures

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l resulted from lessons learned. The numerous flood planning meetings and interface

strengthened contacts already established with the offsite agencies for emergency preparedness and made it possible to rapidly accomplish the numerous activities conducted during the floods.

I P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P2.1 Material Condition of Emeroency Resoonse Facilities a.

Insnection Scone (82701)

The inspector evaluated the material condition of the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations

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Facility (EOF), and EOF Counting Room. The field survey team kits were also inspected. The licensee demonstrated the operability of several pieces of equipment, including radiological survey equipment, communications equipment, field survey team vehicles, and computer terminals.

b.

Observations and Findinas Copies of the Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were current and available in the Control Room. The TSC and field survey team kits were in a state of operational readiness. The facility, status boards, and equipment were in excellent material condition. The OSC was in excellent material condition and the newly added electronic dosimetry and radiation protection information computers were available and functional. The EOF was in excellent material condition and radiological instruments and equipment were calibrated, functional, and in very good order. The dose assessment computers and printers were verified operable.

Communications systems were functional in the TSC and EOF. A new 800 megahertz radio system had been installed in the ERFs which provided an improved on and offsite communications capability.

EP staff demonstrated the operability of offsite field survey team vehicles, new 800 megahertz radios, radiological survey equipment, various communications lines, the new TSC cordless microphone and speaker system, and computer terminals for display of plant data and dose assessment programs for onshift, TSC, and EOF meteorological and dose assessment information.

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The inspector reviewed records for the Public Alert Notification System (PANS)

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sirens for 1996 and 1997. Reported annual operability for 1996 was 96.6 percent.

The reported twelve month rolling operability average for 1997 was currently 96.5 percent. Siren operability exceeded the minimum acceptability limit of greater than

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or equal to 90 percent.

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Conclusions

. The emergency response facilities were in excellent material condition and in a state

of operational readiness. Numerous pieces of equipment and instruments were l

operated by the EP staff and verified to be functional. The PANS sirens had been appropriately maintained in 1996 and 1997, as indicated by the reported operability

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averages.

P3 EP Procedures and Documentation a.

Insoection Scooe (82701)

The inspector reviewed and evaluated a selection of ;fnergency Plan sections and

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EPIPs. They included Emergency Flen Section 4, RLvbion 18, " Emergency Conditions," EP Plan Section 6, Revision 18, " Emergency Measures," EPIP F3-3, i

Revision 14. " Responsibilities During a Notification of Unusual Event," EPIP F3-5, Revision 19, " Emergency Notifications," and EPIP F3-5.3, Revision 4, " Response To Railroad Grade Crossing Blockage."

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Qhrgvations and Nndinos Emergency Plan Section 4, Revision 18, added a statement that Annex A contained a summary of the Emergency Classifications and Emergency Action Level (EAL)

scheme with examples of initiating conditions. Section 6 identified tae State of Wisconsin Department of Emergency Management will be notified tiat the Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) and that the Mdewankaton Indian Community Representatives would be notified via the Treasure Island Casino Security Dispatch

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Center. Section 6.3, " Summary of Site Response Actions," identified that the State and local offsite authorities were to be promptly informed of emergency conditions as soon as discovered. EPIP F3-4, Revision 24, " Responsibilities During

An Alert, Site Area, Or General Emergency," appropriately identified that State, local, and Northern States Power (NSP) personnel are to be notified immadiately. A note indicated that the NRC notification is required as soon as practical but no later

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than one hour after the declaration of the emergency.

i EPIP F3-3, Revision 14, clearly identified that the Shift Manager could augment the onsite staff or activate the ERO as he deemed necessary. EPIP F3-5.3 effectively identified the normal and emergency procedules fcr contacting the railroad company in the event of blockage of the plant's access.

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Conclusions

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The EPIPs were clear and easy to use. Current copies of the EPIPs and Emergency Plan were available in all the emergency response facilities. No problems were j

identified in the procedures or documents reviewed.

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P5 Staff Training and Qualification in EP a.

Insoection Scot,e (82701)

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The inspector interviewed five key ERO personnel, reviewed training attendance records, ERO Training Records and the Emergency Notification Duty Roster, dated

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l April 30,1997. Also, selected training instructor's guides were reviewed by the i

inspector, including CP-10-17-00-01, "TSC Walkthrough" and " EOF Walkthrough."

Additionally, a portion of the Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG)

training provided to plant management and personnel was observed by the

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inspector.

b.

Observations and Findinas p

interviews with key ERO personnel included an EOF Emergency Manager, Control Room Emergency Director, TSC Emergency Director, and two Security Lieutenants

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identified as SECS. Interviewed personnel generally demonstrated very good knowledge of emergency procedures and their responsibilities. They indicated that

'the EP and training programs were very good and that staff were always looking for

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ways to improve the program.

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The TSC Emergency Director demonstrated knowledge of the NRC's and i

Department of Energy's incident response. Federal incident response information

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had been incorporated in the licensee's training lesson plans for TSC Coordinators, Emergency Managers, Emergency Directors, Radiological Protection Support

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Supervisors, Radiological Emergency Coordinators, OSC Coordinators, and Technical Support Supervisors.

The May 1,1997, ERO Training List printouts were reviewed and compared to the

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Emergency Notification Duty Roster. Records and documents indicated all ERO personnel reviewed were currently qualified for their positions.

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I The inspector observed a portion of SAMG training pertaining to severe accident progression and phenomena which was conducted on May 22,1997. The instructor was very knowledgeable and effectively presented the material. Handout

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materials and projected graphics were of high quality. Questions from the audience were answered effectively.

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Conclusions Overall, EP training was considered effective. Training and drill crit;que documentation was available. Critique forms were adequately detailed. Training records we'c :omplete. Interviewed ERO personnel demonstrated very good to excellent knowledge of their ERO responsibilities, emergency procedures, and an

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adequate knowledge of NRC and Federalincident response. SAMG training was effective and detailed.

P6 EP Organization and Administration (82701)

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Insoection Scone (82701)

The inspector discussed the current station organization and changes to the EP

program with the EP Coordinator.

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Observations and Findinas The EP Coordinator reported to the General Superintendent of Radiation Protection and Chemistry, who reported to the Plant Manager. Discussion with the EP Coordinator indicated that management support for the EP program was very good

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under the current plant organization.

Strong management support to the EP program was indicated by several equipment upgrades as well as other enhancements to the program. Upgrades and

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enhancements included the new 800 megahertz plant radios (also installed in the

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field survey team vehicles), additional emergency facility walkthroughs and drills, SAMG procedures and training, additional long range pagers for selected ERO management personnel, dosimetry monitoring computers added to the OSC, new radiological survey meters and information forms for the field survey teams, and the revised EAL format and classification procedure.

The EP staff displayed a proactive attitude, which was demonstrated by ths extensive flood preparations, program enhancements, and upgrades. Aly.,,

interviewed key ERO personnelindicated that the EP Coordinator and staff has been responsive to issues identified in training, drills, and exercises.

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ConclusioD1 Management support to the EP program has been strong as indicated by discussions with the EP Coordinator and the program upgrades. The EP staff was proactive in maintaining and improving the program and responsive to identified issues.

P7 Quality Assurance in EP Activities P7.1 Audits (82701)

a.

Insoection Scooe (82701)

The inspector reviewed Quality Services audits for 1990 and 1997. Numerous observation reports had been performed during the years covering different areas of

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the EP program and were compiled by the EP Coordinator.

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Observations and Findinas

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- month review of the EP program met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (t). The method used to assess the adequacy of the States and local government interfaces with the licensee was accomplished by attending quarterly Radiological Emergency Planning (REP) meetings with the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota, Counties of Dakota,Goodhue/ City of Red Wing, and Pierce, Indian Community, and casino representatives. The auditors observed the interfaces between the licensee and offsite agencies at these REP meetings. Additionally, the Quality Services Department provided telephone surveys of some of the offsite agencies to verify their observations from the meetings.

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Conclusi.901 The licensee's 1996 and 1997 Observation Reports of EP activities were effective and satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).

The observation reports appropriately documented program activities and numerous elements of the EF Program and were of very good scope and detail. Strengths and weaknesses were identified. Corrective actions from previous year's findings were tracked.

.P8 Miscellaneous EP lasues P8.1 (Onen) Insnection Followun item 50-282/96006-09: 50-306/96006-09: During the 1996 emergency exercise, the OSC Coordinator was unable to ascertain the status of emergency response teams from the team status board. Appropriate corrective actions were in progress anii discussed with the'EP Coordinator. This item will remain open pending observat'on of the July 21,1998, Evaluated Emergency Exercise.

P8.2 (Open) Insoection Followun item 50-282/96006-10: 50-306/96006-10: During the 1996 emergency exercise, the EOF communicators did not initially transmit a protective action recommendation change notification form to the State Emergency Operations Center. Thorough corrective actions were in progress and discussed with the EP Coordinator. This item will remain open pending observation of the July 21,1998, Evaluated Emergency Exercise.

P8.3 (Onen) Insoection Followuo item 50-282/96006-11: 50-306/96006-11: During the 1996 emergency exercise, the EOF staff was slow to recognize that the General Emergency classification had been met without needing a safety injection to occur.

Corrective actions including procedure changes and training were in progress and discussed with the EP Coordinator.- This item will remain open pending observation of the July 21,1998, Evaluated Emergency Exercise.

P9 Temporary instruction (TI) 2515/134 Onshift Dose Assessment The inspector discussed onshift dose assessment capability and provisions with licensee personnel, reviewed the Emergency Plan and EPIPs, and inspected the equipment utilized for dose assessment. The Emergency Plan arid EPIPS contained provisions for onshift dose assessment. Necessary equipment and personnel

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training were available and provided. Personnel were know!adgeable of their responsibilities and how to perform dose assessment. The acceptance criteria for the Tl were met and this Tl is closed. Documentation as to these findings is attached as Attachment A.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 23,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspector reviewed documentation regarding the 1997 island flooding and telephoned the licensee with his findings on May 29,1997.

The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i

J. Sorensen, Plant Manager

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D. Schuelke, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry M. Ladd, Training issues Manager J. Hill, Quality Manager M. Agen, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. Payton, Sr. Technical Instructor J. Leveille, Licensing Engineer L. Hoskins, Sr. Quality Specialist D. Schlintz, Quality Specialist INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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IP 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program Tl 2515/134 Temporary Instruction, Onshift Dose Assessment ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED OPEN None CLOSED None DISCUSSED 50-282/306-96006-09 IFl OSC Coordinator was unable to ascertain the status of emergency response teams from the team status board.

50-282/306-96006-10 IFl EOF Communicators did not initially transmit a protective action recommendation notification form to the State EOC.

50-282/306-96006-11 IFl EOF staff was slow to recognize that the General Emergency classification had been met without needing a safety injection.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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CFR Code of Federal Regulations EAL Emergency Action Level ENS Emergency Notification System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP Emergency Preparedness EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ERO Emergency Response Organization HPN Health Physics Network IP inspection Procedure IR

Inspection Report

IFl

inspection Followup Item

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSP

Northern States Power

OSC

Operational Support Center

PINGP

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

REP

Radiological Emergency Planning

SAMG

Severe Accident Management Guidance

SEC

Shift Emergency Communicators

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Temporary Instruction

TS

Technical Specification

TSC

Technical Support Center

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UFSAR

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

USAR

Updated Safety Analysis Report

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FORM FOR DOCUMENTATION OF ON-SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

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Pr-iri* Island / Units 1&2/ 50-282: 50-306

North *rn St-trs Power Comp =nv

10/03/96

SITE / UNIT / DOCKET #s

LICENSEE

DATE

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4.01

DOSE ASSESSMENT COMMITMENTIN EMERGENCY PLAN

Acceptance Criteria

Person (s) Contacted

Position Title (s)

Plan Section

Revision No.

Meets acceptance

(Refer to page 1 of this Appendix for

containing

and Date

criteria?

further detail on the acceptance criteria)

commitment

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.3;

Rev.17 4/96

Yes

Section 4.01 Item 1

6.4.1

Emergency Plan contains commitment for on-

shift dose assessment capability.

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

Section 6.4.1

Rev.17

Yes

Section 4.01 Item 2

4/96

Emergency o! n centaine cc - tmer.4 fes

backup deze 2 cere ent capabW!y.

04.02 ON-SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

Person (s) contacted

Position Title (s)

Procedure / indication

Revision No.

Meets acceptance

and Date

criteria?

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

F3-1, section 4.3.6

Rev.13

Yes

Section 4.02 Item 1

3/95

Procedure initiates dose assessment

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

F3-13

Rev.14

Yes

Section 4.02 Item 2

12/95

Indications initiate dose assessment

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

F3-13.0 through

Rev. 4; 7/92

Yes

Section 4.02 Item 3

F3-13.3

Rev. 5; 7/92

Procedure for performing dose assessment

Rev.1; 5/87

available.

Rev. 8; 9/95

04.03 ON-SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT TRAINING

Person (s) contacted

Position Title (s)

Personnel Trained

Meets acceptance

(Title /#)

criteria?

Mel Agen

EP Coordinator

Shift Rad Protection

n/a

Yes

Section 4.03 Item 1

Specialist; 8

On-shift Personnel trained for dose assessment

inspector: Thomas Ploski Recion 111. DRS. Plant Support Br.1

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