Text

Insp Repts 50-282/97-07 & 50-306/97-07 on 970407-08 & 970416.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Vehicle Barrier System
	ML20138H101
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	04/30/1997
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20138H073	List: ML20138H070; ML20138H101;
References
	50-282-97-07, 50-282-97-7, 50-306-97-07, 50-306-97-7, NUDOCS 9705070071
	Download: ML20138H101 (9)
	v • d • e

- . - . . . . . . -. . . - - - _ . - _ - , . = _ . _ . ~ = _ - . .

'

'. i

"

l

!

1

<

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

< \

REGION lli )

Dockets Nos: 50-282: 50-306 l

Licenses No: DPR-42; DPR-60 !

Report Nos: 50-282/97007(DRS); 50-306/97007(DRS)

l

Licensee: Northern States Power Company )

,

-

' l

l

Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

Location: 1717 Wakonade Dr. East

l Welch, MN 55089

i

Dates: April 7 & 8,1997 onsite

April 16,1997 in NRC Region lli Office

i

inspector: G. Pirtle, Physical Security inspector

Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

' 1

l

1,

j

l

3

,

!

9705070071 970430

PDR ADOCK 05000282

G PDR 2

.- - - - . - . - . _ ._. - ..- - .-- - _- .- . -..-- - ._ . _ . - - ....

.

..

. .

.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

!

t

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

NRC Inspection Reports 50-282/97007; 50-306/97007

.

This announced inspection included a review of the Vehicle Barrier System. Temporary

,

instruction 2515/132 " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" was used for

inspection guidance.

No violations or deviations were noted. The features and structures that form the Vehicle

Barrier System (VBS) met the design characteristics established by the NRC. The vehicle

barrier components, or acceptable other barriers, and the location of the barriers were as

desedbed in the summary description of the VBS submitted by the licensee to the NRC, or

as described in the current security plan. Two unresolved items and three inspection

followup items were noted as described below:

An unresolved item was noted pertaining to a portion of the VBS not having

an engineering analysis completed to confirm that the barrier would be

effective against the design basis vehicle (Section S1.1.b(1)(a)).

An inspection followup item was noted pertaining to the need to revise the

security plan in response to NRC review comments for Revision 36 of the

plan which addressed the VBS (Section S1.1.b(1)(b)).

An inspection followup item was noted pertaining to some procedure

deficiencies noted during the inspection (Section S1.1.b(3)(b)).

An inspection followup item was noted pertaining to the need to prepare a

memorandum for record as part of the executive summary that was sent to

the NRC to describe the barrier designs finally installed and noting that the

correct barrier locations are described in the security plan (Section

S1.1.b(1)(c)).

l

f

_._ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _

. .

.

-

.

-

r

Report Details

81 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

, i

i !

'

S1.1 Tamoorarv instruction 2515/132. "Y^volant use of vebiel== at Noetaar Power ,

Plants" ,

s. Insoection Scone (Tl 2515/132) i

Areas examined included the licensee's provisions for land vehicle control measures l

to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle and to determine compliance !

with regulatory and licenses commitments. '

b. Observations and FiodjDE&

(1) yghicle Barrier System i

The inspector found that the features and structures that form the Vehicle !

Barrier System (VBS) met the design characteristics established by the NRC, i

except for a small portion of the VBS which did not have an engineering

analysis completed (See section a below). The vehicle barrier components

and the location of the barrier were as described in the summary description

of the VBS submitted by the licensee to the NRC or as described in the

security plan. Acceptable barriers that were not identified in the executive

summary were also used.

A visual walkdown performed by the inspector confirmed that the general

type of vehicle barrier described iri the VBS summary description or an

acceptable alternate type of barrier had been installed and that the barrier

was continuous. No significant signs of barrier damage was noted during

the walkdown of the VBS. The inspector also confirmed that the active

barriers (gates) at two locations had manufacturer's certifications that the

barriers would meet or exceed the maximum parameters of the design basis j

vehicle threat. One unresolved item and two inspection followup items were l

noted during the review of the VBS and are addressed below: i

i

(a) A portion of the VBS did not have an engineering analysis completed to

assure that the barrier could meet the maximum parameters of the design

basis vehicle threat (the exact location end construction characteristics of

that portion of the barrier system is considered safeguards information until

resolved). This issue will be monitored as an Unresolved item (50-

282/97007-01(DRS); 50-306/97007-01(DRS)). Resolution of this issue will

be addressed by separate correspondence.

(b) Revision 36 of the licensee's security plan addressed the VBS. NRC Region ,

! lil review of Revision 36 to the security plan was completed and the licensee l

<

was advised of the review results by letter dated April 2,1997. The

licensee had not received the April 2,1997 letter before the inspection

i ended. The letter contained several review comments that the licensee

needs to respond to. Resolution of this issue will be monitored as an

i

l

1 .

.. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ ..._ _ _ _ _._ _ ._.

'

..

,

'

inspection Followup item (50-282/97007-02(DRS): 50-306/97007- :

02(DRS)). l

(c) Barriers installed in some aspects are different than the barriors described or i

discussed in the executive summary provided to the NRC. All barriers

observed were considered acceptable based upon the engineering analysis

obtained or performed by the licensee. The licensee agreed to prepare a !

memorandum for the record which clarifies that (1) part of the VBS has been '

located differently than indicated in the executive summary sent to the NRC

and (2) identifies the design of the current barriers in use (Enhanced and !

l

Super Barriers). The memorandum for file would be maintained with the

executive summary that was sent to the NRC. This issue will be monitored i

as an inspection Followup item (50-282/97007-03(DRS); 50-306/97007- I'

03(DRS)).

i

(2) Bomb Blast Analysis

)

inspector field observations of standoff distances were consistent with those l

documented in the summary description. The licensee confirmed that

calculetion of minimum standoff distance was based on NUREG/CR-6190 or l

l an independent engineering analysis. Five actual measurements were l

completed to confirm that the minimum standoff distances, as documented

l

in the summary description, were the actual or greater distances provided by '

the as-built VBS.

(3) Procedural Controls

The licensee appropriately defined criteria for maintenance, surveillance, and

,

compensating for the VBS in appropriate procedures. The procedures were

! generally well written and detailed except as noted in (b) below. Discussions

with the Superintendent, Security (who is a licensed reactor operator)

confirmed that procedures necessary to safely shutdown the units after a

bomb blast were reviewed and found to be adequate. A specific procedure ,

i for damaged equipment by a bomb blast was not prepared, but the existing i

! abnormal operation and emergency operating procedures were corsidered

l adequate to cope with loss of equipment because of a bomb blast. !

l l

! (a) Dunng review of procedures, it was noted that the licensee's procedure for 1

l reporting and logging security incidents / events (SIP 5.1, " Guidelines For

j Reporting Events *) did not identify what degradations or vulnerabilities )

would be reported to the NRC or logged as security events / incidents in i

accordance with 10 CFR 73.71. Existing NRC guidance for reporting sad

logging security events / incidents does not describe examples of VBS

degradations or vulnerabilities that warrant reporting or logging. This issue

will be monitored as an Unresolved item (50-282/97007-04(DRS); 50-

306/97007-04(DRS)).

i

k

! 2

i .

-

- - - -_ -- .. -- - . - - .-. - - _.-. -

.

- ;

,

-

l

(b) During review of security procedures, the following weaknesses were noted )

and correction of the weaknesses will be monitored as an inspection ;

Followup item (50-282/97007-05(DRS); 50-306/97007-05(DRS)). (

The procedure for logging and reporting security events (SIP 5.1,

" Guidelines For Reporting Events") incorrectly' stated that secudty

event logs must be sent to the NRC on a quarterly basis. This

requirement has been terminated for several years.

)

The procedure for Vehicle Barrier System compensatory measures i

(SIP 5.0, " Compensatory Measures") does not require the NRC i

Region Office to be contacted if compensatory measures for the VBS !

exceed 30 days as identified in section 4.2 of Nuclear Energy

institute (NEl) Document 96-01, which the licensee has committed to i

for compensatory measures.

{

!

The tamper test acceptance criteria for the cable gate pole needs to !

be changed to conform with the existing adequate testing practices.

The tamper switch has the capability to detect movement well before '

the gate would be ineffective as a barrier. The acceptance criteria in

the procedure needs to be more descriptive of that capability.

l c. Conclusions

t l

The iicensee's provisions for land vehicle control measures met regulatory

l requirements and licensee commitments. The VBS program was consistent with

the summary description submitted to the NRC (except as noted in this report) or

the security plan; installed components were identified in NUREG/CR 6190 or the

licensee's engineering analyses; and appropriate proceduras had been developed

and implemented. Unresolved items were noted pertaining to the lack of an

analysis for a portion of the VBS, and lack of licenses procedural guidance for

reporting or logging VBS degradations and vulnerabilities. Inspection followup items

were noted for administrative matters that required action.

S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguard issues

S8.1 A discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the Updated

Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a special

focused review that compared plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the

UFSAR descriptions. The inspector verified that the wording of the UFSAR was

consistent with observed plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters within the

areas inspected.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

l

l The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at

the conclusion of the onsite inspection on April 8,1997. The licensee acknowledged the

I findings presented. The inspector requested the Superintendent, Security to mail identified i

i

I

! 3

,-

.

l

'

l

.- _. .. . _ _ _ - .- __ - . - _ . - - . . -. . - . .-

'.

I

!

l'

!

security procedures to the NRC Region 111 Office for review. The documents were received

April 16,1997.

The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined or inspection findings

discussed during the exit meeting should be considered as proprietary or safeguards

information. It was agreed that the specific location and specific construction criteria for

j the portion of the VBS that had not had an engineering analysis completed should be

treated as safeguards information until the issue is resolved. No other proprietary or

'

safeguards information was identified.

l

,

4

!

. _ . . _ ___ .- _ - _ _ _ . __ _

s

l .

.

. i

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

l

Licensee: 1

l

D. Axt, Nuclear Security Program Coordinator

l

D. Dugstad, Engineering Associate I

! T. Escher, Generation Quality Services Auditor l

D. Hutchson, Nuclear Security Specialist l

R. Oelschlager, Project Manager

S. Samson, Project Engineer

l D. Schlintz, Generation Quality Services

l M. Sleigh, Superintendent, Security

l J. Sorensen, Plant Manager

,

E. Timmer, Nuclear Security Specialist '

i

NB.C l

Steven Ray, Senior Resident inspector '

!

l

5

. _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ - - - . _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . ___._.__m._. __

l,<

l'

l

. ,

'

l

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

Tl 2515/132 " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" issued l

January 18,1996 !

!

l

ITEMS OPENED )

Onened ;

l 50-282/97007-01 URI A Portion of the Vehicle Barrier System Did Not Have an

j Engineering Analysis Completed.

! 50-306/97007-01 URI A Port on of the Vehicle Barrier System Did Not Have an

Engineering Analysis Completed.

50-282/97007-02 IFl The Security Plan Requires Revision To Address NRC Review

Comments for Revision 36 of the Plan

,

50-306/97007-02 IFl The Security Plan Requires Revision To Address NRC Review

Comments for Revision 36 of the Plan l

50-282/97007-03 IFl Memorandum To File is Required to Clarify Information )

l Contained in the Executive Summary Sent to the NRC '

'

50-306/97007-03 IFl Memorandum To File is Required to Clarify information

Cr ruined in the Executive Summary Sent to the NRC

50-282/97007-04 URI 6. c.ria For Logging and Reporting Vehicle Barrier System

Degradations as Security Events

50-306/97007-04 URI Criteria For Logging and Reporting Vehicle Barrier System

Degradations as Security Events

50-282/97007-05 IFl Some Procedural Weaknesses Were Noted

l

50-306/97007-05 IFl Some Procedural Weaknesses Were Noted

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CAS Central Alarm Station

IFl inspection Followup item

PA Protected Area

SAS Secondary Alarm Station

UFSAR Updated Facility Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved item

VA Vital Area

'

l VBS Vehicle Barrier System

I

l

1

'

6

f

, - .. - -.

. _ _ _ _._ . _ __ .. __. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ .__ _ ... _ _ _ _ .

l

. . ;

'. i

..

.

PARTIAL LISTING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Preliminary Engineering Study of the implementation of the NRC Final Rule Amending 10

CFR Part 73 Protection Against Malevolent Use of Land Vehicles, Undated

Submittal of Vehicle Barrier System Summary Description: dated February 24,1995

(Executive Summary)

Certificate of Conformance for the Model TT212 Series Cable Beam Barrier System,

undated, from Delta Scientific Corporation

Certificate of Conformance for the Model SC3000S Series Cable Reinforced Cantilever

Gate System, undated, from Delta Scientific Corporation

Surveillance Procedure humber 1648, " Vehicle Barrier System inspection Procedure"

Revision 0, Approved May 14,1996

Preventative Maintenance Procedure Number PM 3800-1," Security Fence Gates and

Guardhouse Turnstiles," Revision 14

,

Surveillance Procedure Number 1604, " Annual PA/ISFSI Barrier inspection," Revision 15,

Approved June 20,1996 (Safeguards information) '

Surveillance Procedure Number 1651, " Weekly Perimeter intrusion Detection (PIDS)

System Test," Revision 17, Approved May 22,1996 (Safoguards information) i

Security implementing Procedure Number 1.3, " Vehicle Admittance / Control," Revision 8,

Approved February 27,1997 (Safeguards information)

Security implementing Procedure Number 1.6, " Site Area Description," Revision 3,

Approved February 29,1996 (Safeguards Information)

Security implementing Procedure Number 3.2, "CAS/SAS Operations," Revision 7,

Approved December 5,1996 (Safeguards Information)

Security implementing Procedure Number 3.4, " Security Patrols," Revision 4, Approved

[ February 29,1996 (Safeguards Information)

!

! Security implementing Procedure Number 5.0, " Compensatory Measures," Revision 3,

Approved August 2,1996 (Safeguards Inf mation)

Security implementing Procedure Number 5.2, " Security Response to Site Emergencies,"

Revision 3, Approved November 1,1996

Security implementing Procedure Number 5.1, " Reporting of Security Events," Revision 4,

Approved ' January 23,1997 l

l Contingency Plan Implementing Procedure Number 3, " Bomb Threat / Discovery / Response," )

1 Revision 6, Approved February 29,1996 l

'

l

7 ,

i

I

ML20138H101

Text

Navigation menu

Search