IR 05000245/1987005

Insp Rept 50-245/87-05 on 870414-0518.Violations Noted: Potential Generic Deficiency in Processing License Action Requests & Inadequately Restrained Transient Equipment in safety-related Areas W/O Review of Potential Consequences

ML20214Q012
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/28/1987
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214P997	List: IR 05000245/1987005 ML20214P992 ML20214Q004
References
50-245-87-05, 50-245-87-5, NUDOCS 8706040205
Download: ML20214Q012 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report: 50-245/87-05 Docket No: 50-245 License No: DPR-21 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Facility: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Waterford, Connecticut

' Inspection at: Millstone Unit 1 Dates: April 14, 1987 through May 18, 1987 d

Inspectors: Geoffrey E. Grant, Resident Inspector

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Eben L. Conner, Project Engineer Approved: @ kC#As s-/2r/F7 j E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date

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l Summary: Report No. 50-245/87-05 (April 14 to May 18, 1987)

Areas Inspected: This inspection included routine NRC resident (147 hours0.0017 days <br />0.0408 hours <br />2.430556e-4 weeks <br />5.59335e-5 months <br />), and i

region-based (17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />) inspection of previously identified items, plant operations, surveillance, maintenance, radiation protection, physical security, fire protection,

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new fuel receipt, and the zinc injection trial progra Results: Two violations were identified during inspection of open items (Detail 4). These violations indicate a potential generic deficiency in processing license action requests. Also, inadequately restrained transient equipment in safety-related areas and erecting scaffolding and staging over Category I safety equipment without review of the potential consequences needs management attention (Detail 6). The new fuel receipt inspection program was well planned and executed (Detail

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8706040205 870529 gDR ADOCK 05000245 PDR l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Persons Contacted.................................................... 1 Summary of Facility Activities....................................... 1 Operational Safety Verification......... ............................ 1 Licensee's Action on Previously Identified Items. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Implementation of Trial Zinc Injection Passivation System............ 6 Transient Equipment Storage in Safety-Related Areas.................. 7 New Fuel Receipt Inspection and Storage.............................. 8 Observation of Surveillance.......................................... 9 On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee (P0RC)..................... 10 1 Review of Periodic and Special Reports............................... 12 11. Management Meetings.................................................. 12

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

[ Mr. S. Scace, Station Superintendent

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Mr. J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent Mr. J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintendent

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Mr. C. Clement, Unit 3 Superintendent

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The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of

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the Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, and Security Department . Summary of Facility Activities

i Unit 1 operated at full power during most of this report period. A power

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reduction to 45% on April 15 was made to repair a steam leak on a previously encapsulated moisture separator drain line. Other corrective maintenance

requiring a reduced power level also was performed at this time. Additionally, routine power reductions were made for backwashing of main condensers and testing of Main Steam Isolation Valves, and turbine stop, control, intercept and bypass valve . Operational Safety Verification  !

i The inspector observed plant operations during regular and back shift tours

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l Control Room Cable Vault j Reactor Building Fence Line (Protected Area)

l Diesel Generator Room Intake Structure

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Vital Switchgear Room Gas Turbine Building Turbine Building i

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Control Room instruments were observed for correlation between channels, proper functioning, and conformance with Technical Specifications. Alarm i

conditions in effect and alarms received in the control room were reviewed

, and discussed with the operators. Operator awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Operators were found cognizant of board and plant conditions. Control room and shift manning were compared with Technical Specification requirements. Posting and control of radiation, contaminated

{ and high radiation areas were inspected. Use of and compliance with Radiation

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Work Permits and use of required personnel monitoring devices were checke ! Plant housekeeping controls were observed including control of flammable and l

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other hazardous materials. During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed '

to ensure compliance with station procedures, to determine if entries were l correctly made, and to verify correct communication of equipment statu These records included various operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts and Plant Information Reports. The

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inspector observed selected actions concerning site security including per" sonnel monitoring, access control, placement of physical barriers, and com-pensatory measures. No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Licensee Actions on Previcusly Identified Items ,

(Closed) IFI 50-245/84-19-01, Modification to Allow Automatic Start of Condensate Booster Pump Auxiliary Oil Pump Following a Loss of Power Following a pump bearing failure on the "A" Condensate Booster Pump during an automatic start of the Feedwater Coolant Injection (FWCI) system, the lic-ensee added pressurized lubrication via two oil pumps per booster pump. How-ever, a June 22, 1984 test snowed that a loss of power (LOP) to the control logic required re-initialization of the logic in order to start an oil pum The open issues were design approval, installation, and testing of a modified start circui The inspector reviewed PDCR 1-123-84 including the modified logic drawing and the work orders used to perform the modification and testing. The new cir-cuitry allows one oil pump to be selected as a standby pump which starts on low oil pressure or operating pump breaker trip. On restoration of power following an LOP, the "A" oil pump (the only oil pump supplied by emergency power) automatically restarts independently of its selection as operating or standby pump. System testing confirmed the performance of this modificatio The inspector had no further question (Closed) IcI 50-245/84-21-01, Administrative Control of Railroad Cars, Switches, and Derailers In September 1984, a railroad car was inadequately controlled and rolled through a fence. The licensee's corrective actions included revision of associated General Site Procedures GSP 1915, 21915 and 31915. The inspector reviewed these procedures and concluded that the controls now in place ade-quately safeguard against such events. No recurence has been identifie The inspector had no further question (Closed) IFI 50-245/84-26-01, Include Containment Atmosphere Sample Line Isolation Valves in TS Table 3. The concern identified was failure to have the containment atmosphere sample line isolation valves listed in TS Table 3.7.1 to insure that they are ad-ministratively controlled during plant operation. Inspector review identified the following documentatio IR 84-26 documents the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) plan to resolve this issue to allow testing the PASS system by adding automatic closure logic to these valves or amending the TS to provide administra-tive control of their openin . _

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Site Proposed TS Change Request (PTSCR) # 1-4-85, was approved on March 11, 1985 and received by NNEC0 licensing on March 18, 1985. This pro-posed change includes three (3) additional pages of containment isolation valves to be added to TS Table 3. Questions from the licensee Nuclear Review Board (NRB) on the additional valves, dated December 16, 198 Response to NRB questions, dated March 24, 198 Draft Proposed TS Changes package of January 16, 1987 with Unit Superin-tendent concurrence of January 27, 1987. (NRC Region I received a copy of the final licensee package, signed April 28, 1987, on April 30, 1987.)

Both 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI and the Northeast Utilities Quality Assurance Program require that measures be established to assure that condi-tions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. The tables

, in Section 3 of the Technical Specifications identify conditions required to meet Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), which are defined in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(B)(2) as the lowest functional capability or performance levels required for safe operation. Failure to have appropriate LCOs is a condition adverse to quality in that the absence of LCOs increases the poten-tial for failing to maintain the associated safe conditions. While no im-proper plant configuration was identified as having existed in this case, a span of nearly two and one-half years from identification of an LC0 documen-tation requirement to its submission reflects inadaquate incorporation of LCO This violates the requirement for prompt correction of conditions adverse to quality (VIO 50-245/87-05-01).

(Closed) IFI 50-245/84-27-02, Locks on Containment Isolation Valves The reference inspection found that six (6) Low pressure Coolant injection (LPCI) and Core Spray valves, which should have been locked in position tc meet IPSAR Section 4.20.1 and 4.20.2 criteria, were not locked. The issue left open was verification of corrective action The inspector confirmed that the six valves, (torus test line valves 1-LP-77A and 78A, containment spray line drain valves 1-LP-69B and 708, and core spray line local leak rate test valves 1-CS-38A and 388) were included in the cur-rent (Revision 6) Locked Valve List (Departmental Instruction 1-0PS-10.11).

Review of the last system valve lineup showed that the locked closed position of these valves had been verified and documented. Additionally,1-0PS-10.11 was executed in December 1986, and all locked valves were verified in their correct position. As a sample, the inspector visually verified that 1-LP-69B and 708, and 1-CS-38A were locked shut. The inspector had no further ques-tions.

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(Closed) IFI 50-245/84-27-03, Update Commitment on Installation of Second Manual Containment Isolation Valves By letter of December 27, 1982, the licensee committed to install an addi-tional isolation valve in each of three (3) lines of the containment boundary in accordance with SEP Topic VI-4. These valves would be downstream of torus test line vent valves 1-AC-220 and 1-AC-222 and containment spray line drain valve 1-LP-67A. NRC concern was for the licensee's failure to update this commitment if the intent was to substitute pipe caps or blank flanges for the additional valve NNECO letters of April 2, 1985 to Region I and April 25, 1985 to NRR docu-mented the change in commitment and the installation of two pipe caps and one blank flange prior to startup from the 1984 refueling outage. The inspector confirmed that the pipe caps and blank flange had been installed in ]984 and remained installed on the two torus test line vents and the containe .n. spr e line drain. The cap downstream of containment spray line drain valse, -LP-s 67A, was verified to be in place. The inspector had no further question (Closed) IFI 50-245/85-06-01, Implement Program for Testing Snubbers This item concerns the lack of provisions for mechanical snubber testin Equipment for testing both mechanical and hydraulic snubbers has been in use since the 1985 refueling outage. Theinspectordiscussedtestingequipment, procedures, and test results with the lead engineer. Unit 1 LER s 84-009-01 and 85-026-01, each reporting failures of both hydraulic and mechanical snub-bers, were reviewed. These failures occurred during functional testing during the last two refueling outage The inspector reviewed maintenance procedures for hydraulic and mechanical snubber visual inspections (MP 739.5 and MP 739.6). Additionly, a number of completed MP 739 forms for snubber attachment dimensional checks, hydraulic snubber functional test data sheets, and snubber visual checklists were re-viewe No inadequacies were identified. The inspector had no further ques-tion (Closed) IFI 50-245/85-06-02, Add 2 Hydraulic Snubbers and 6 Mechanical Snubbers to the TS Snubber Lists NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/84-21 (October 1984) documented the licen-see's verification of snubber installation data. This process resulted in finding that two (2) additional hydraulic snubbers and six (6) additional mechanical snubbers in safety-related applications were not listed in Techni-cal Specification (TS) Tables 3.6.1.a and b. This issue was made an open item in IR 50-245/85-06 (March 1985).

The inspector compared the lists of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers in MP 739.5 and 739.6 with that in current TS Tables 3.6.1.a and 3.6.1.b, respec-tivel The snubbers found in 1984 were still not listed in the TS table .

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In addition, about 12 mechanical snubbers were added and 10 mechanical snub-bers were deleted from safety systems during the last two refueling outage TS 3.6.1.6 states:

" Snubbers may be added to or deleted from safety related systems without prior License Amendment to Tables 3.6.1.a and 3.6.1.b provided that safety evaluations, documentation and reporting are provided in accord-ance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that a proposed revision to Tables 3.6. and 3.6.1.b is included with the next license amendment request."

Since the TS page with this requirement was dated January 29, 1987, the in-spector obtained a copy of the version in effect in 1984/1985. There was no change in the wording of this requirement. Review of related licensee paper-work identified an October 17, 1984 Proposed TS Change Request (PTSCR)

1. 1-21-84. The engi M ar in charge of the Unit 1 snubber program stated that a number of correctic , to the TS tables, as snubbers were added/ deleted, had been telephoned to thL NNEC0 licensing group over the last several year No problems with the related safety evaluations, documentation, and reporting were identified. Since the licensee ht made over 40 requests for amendments since October 1984, the failure to submit proposed revised listings violates Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 (VIO 50-245/87-05-02). Subsequent to this inspection, by letter dated May 15, 1987, the licensee made application to delete Tables 3.6.1.a and 3.6.1.b from the T (Update) IFI 50-245/85-10-01, Inoperable Emergency Gas Turbine (EGT) Starting Air Pressure Regulating Valve (PRV)

In April 1985, the EGT failed to start during surveillance due to an inoper-able starting air PRV. The valve was subsequently replaced. The remaining issue was completion of a failure analysis by the valve manufacturer. The inspector found that, although repeated attempts have been made by Unit 1 Engineering to obtain the report from the manufacturer (AiResearch Corp.),

no report is availabl The licensee now believes the failure is related to moisture induced contamination in the air supply system. This item remains

'open pending failure analysis completion and final licensee corrective action (Closed) IFI 50-245/86-23-01, Status Boards in the Technical Support Center (TSC) Inadequate ana Disorganized The status boards in the TSC were inadequate, disorganized and caused con-fusion during the exercise. The licensee has revised the status boards in the TSC. The new boards display status of plant problems, and identify key members of the TSC and corporate contacts. Inspection of the TSC verified i placement and adequacy of the new boards. This iten is close t

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(Closed) IFI 50-245/86-23-03, The EOF Protective Action Implementation Status Board is Confusing The status board in the EOF for implemented protective actions contained both implemented and recommended protective actions. The licensee has modified the board to say " Place only implemented actions on status board." This item is close (Closed) IFI 50-245/86-14-02, Yard Evacuation Alarm Tests not Included In Surveillance Procedure Yard area evacuation alarms have been included in EPIP 4601-1. Satisfactory tests of the alarms were performed using IST-3-86-032, " Yard Areas Evacuation Alarm Test." Yard areas have been added to EPIP Form 4601-1. This item is close . Implementation of Trial Zinc Injection Passivation System In an effort to reduce drywell radiation levels and thereby lower total per-sonnel exposure, the licensee is contemplating establishment of a zinc (71)

injection process for the feedwater system. It is postulated that the pre-sence of Zn/Zn oxide in concentrations of 5 to 20 parts per billion (ppb) in the coolant of boiling water reactors (BWRs) passivates the stainless steel pipe surfaces. Passivation results in a thinner oxide layer containing less imperfections than the oxide formed in Zn-free water. This oxide would then incorporate less of the soluble Cobalt (Co) present in the coolant, resulting in lower recirculation system piping radiation field This effect has been substantiated to some extent by industry experienc BWR radiation build-up studies have shown that plants with brass condenser tubing (high Zn content) and powdex condensate treatment (low Zn removal) have lower radiation levels than plants with copper-nickel (Cu-Ni) or stainless steel tubing and deep bed demineralizers (high Zn removal). Millstone Unit 1 has Cu-Ni tubing and deep bed demineralizers and, therefore, a low coolant Zn concentration. The ionir Zn injection process is designed to establish and maintain reactor water Zn concentration in the beneficial 5 to 15 ppb range. Laboratory testing at General Electric (GE) has substantiated the correlation between reactor water Zn concentration and piping radiation level Implementation at Unit 1 is expected to reduce pipt radiation build-uo by a factor of up to 3. The process should have the most effect on piping that has been chemically decontaminated prior to Zn injectio Permanent implementation of the process is scheduled for the upcoming refuel-ing outage (June to August 1987). A trial program was established in mid-April 1987. The Zn injection process is new and has not been used at mid-life plants that already have established oxide layers on piping and fuel. Testing and analysis by GE has addressed possible interactions and concerns associated with introducing Zn into existing systems and shown them to be of little or no consequence. One question remaining is the possible release of Cu-60 from oxide films and deposits present on the fuel. Such a release could poten-

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tially cause further contamination of the reactor system. The licensee de-termined that a prudent approach to this potential problem was to institute a closely monitored trial program. The program achieves the final reactor water Zn concentration of 10 to 15 ppb in several defined steps with " soak" periods between step change Reactor water and feedwater chemistry is being continuously monitored by special analyzers. Any unexplained excessive in-crease in soluble or insoluble Co-60 will be cause for test terminatio The resident inspector reviewed the licensee's trial Zn injection program including examination of the following:

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Plant Design Change Request Engineering safety evaluatio Integrated safety evaluatio Seismic revie Materials and chemistry, techni al and safety evaluatio Vendor and industry report Fuel warranty extensio The inspector found the licensee's approach to implementation of the trial program to be thorough, well engineered, and capably executed. Program moni-toring is extensive, documented, and reviewed by management. The trial pro-gram and follow-on permanent installation illustrates the licensee's commit-ment to occupational exposure reduction under ALARA principle . Transient Equipment Storage in Safety-Related Areas Background A portion of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) conducted in the late 1970's included seismic design evaluations. Results indicated potential safety concerns about the anchorage and support of safety related electrical equipment. During various SEP plant site visits, NRC review teams confirmed the overall basis of the safety concern and also observed non-seismic Category I auxiliary items (dollies, gas bottles, etc.) located such that they might dislodge, impact, and damage safety-related equipment during an earthquak These issues were addressed in individual correspondence with each SEP plant and to the industry as a whole in IE Information Notice 80-2 SEP plants were requested to perform inspections, reviews, and analysis to address the electrical equipment anchorage and support issue as well as the non-seismic auxiliary item issue. The licensee developed and satisfactorily executed a program to address the first issu For the second issue, the licensee noted that adequate housekeeping measures governing the use and storage of such equipment existed and that as a routine practice miscellaneous equipment is not permanently stored in areas adjacent to seismic Category I equipmen The resident inspector revisited the issue of non seismic Category I auxiliary item storage to determine the licensee's current statu _ _ . _ - - - - . - . - -- -

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Findings In a review of documentation relating to housekeeping, the inspector found that until September 1986 the licensee did not have adequate procedural con-trol of non-seimsic Category I auxiliary item storage. As a result of seismic interaction concerns raised by the NRC at Millstone Unit 3 and Haddam Neck, in September 1986 the licensee modified Administrative Control Procedure (ACP)

QA-4.01, Plant Housekeeping, to incorporate requirements necessary to prevent or minimize seismic interactions. The change covered temporary ladders, staging, scaffolding, wheeled equipment, and swinging equipment. The inspec-tor found plant staff and supervision to be generally unaware of ACP-QA-4.01 seismic related requirements. During plant inspections, the inspector noted numerous heavy wheeled loads unrestrained in various plant safety-related areas. Additionally, some staging and scaffolding erected to support outage work required enhanced restrain In a related examination (See Detail 9), the inspector reviewed licensee con-trols of potential seismic interactions when erecting or installing temporary equipment. Generally, if a proposed installation is identified as having a potential negative seismic impact, an engineering seismic review of the Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) is conducted and becomes part of the PDCR. Sur-veys of a sample of seismic reviews showed them to be comprehensive and com-plete. The inspector noted, however, that identification and review of seis-mic concerns for temporary staging or scaffolding erected to perform various plant modifications was lacking. Such concerns should be systematically ad-dressed and appropriately included in modification documentation package The practice of erecting non-seismic structures over Category I safety equip-ment required to be operational (Emergency Diesel Generators, Low Pressure Coolant Injection pumps and valves, etc.) warrants further licensee revie Although deficiencies noted by the inspector did not render safety-related equipment inoperable, a coordinated licensee approach to this issue is neede The licensee is currently taking action to ensure compliance with ACP-QA-4.0 Pending completion of licensee corrective actions, this remains an unresolved issue (UNR 50-245/87-05-01).

7. New Fuel Receipt Inspection and Storage The resident inspector v cerved licensee ac.tivities supporting the receipt and inspection of Cycle P new fuel. Observation commenced with a review of the training program for Reactor Engineering personnel. Training was based on a video cassette supplied by the fuel vendor, General Electric, and in-cluded inspector certification by a GE field representative. Topics included:

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Overall new fuel inspection progra Detailed discussion of procedure i

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Demonstration of inspection technique and competency by each inspector under direct observation by a certified GE field representativ The high quality of training material and program scope, depth uid presenta-tion demonstrates the licensee's commitment to training excellenc Applicable plant and vendor procedures were reviewed to determine technical adequacy and completeness. These included:

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RE 1012, New Fuel Receipt & Inspectio RE 1072, Channeling Unirradiated Fuel in the Fuel Inspection Stan RE 1074, Unitradiated Fuel Channel and Channel Fastener Inspectio MP 790.3, Operation of 15 Ton Grove Cran MP 790.4, Control of Heavy Load Fuel receipt and inspection documentation reviewed included:

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Basic Work Orde Inspection plan for slings, grapples, hooks and crane Inspection Kit Inventory Checklis Prerequisite and initial condition checklis New fuel container receipt inspectio Radioactive Materials Packaging and Shipping Recor Domestic Memo of Shipmen Material transfer accountability form Quality assurance record The inspector observed various aspects of new fuel receipt and inspection activities including stora.w , and reviewed records documenting completed in-spections. No deficiencies were noted. The general conduct of receipt and inspection activities was thorough and professiona . Observation of Surveillance The inspector observed selected surveillances to determine general compliance with requirements for procedure approval, test instrumentation calibration,

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personnel qualification, test results acceptance criteria, and Technical l

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Specification conformance. Tests were observed from both the control room '

and equipment locations (Reactor and Turbine Buildings). Testing observed l on April 20 and 23 included:

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SP 410C, Rod Block Monitor Calibratio SP 410B, Rod Block Monitor Functiona Audio Tone Test Procedures - tests the Reserve Station Services Trans-

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former (RSST) primary and backup audio tone relaying circuits between the Unit 1 control room and switchyard contrM hous ' The inspector noted during the conduct of SP 410C that several handwritten I

annotations appeared in the margins of the test procedure. These notes pro- t vided clarifications and corrected procedural errors, one of which had been

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previously noted by the inspector during testing on March 25 (see IR 50-245/

87-04 Section 10). The inspector questioned the licensee as to why SP 410C had not been promptly and formally changed to include required correction The licensee determined that the changes had been incorporated and PORC re-viewed in a timely manner (early April) but that distribution of the revised procedure had lagged. The technician had anticipated the distribution of the revised procedure by making annotations in the current procedur The inspector further questioned why SP 410C (a quarterly calibration test)

was being performed less than a month since last completion. Investigation determined that SP 4108 (a monthly functional test) was actually the required surveillance. The revised SP 410C incorporates the old SP 410C and SP 410B into one procedure. Although the revised SP 410C had not been distributed, it had been entered into the licensee's preventive maintenance program (PMMS)

and had automatically replaced the old SP 4100 and SP 410B in the schedul Thus, although PMMS indicated that SP 410C was to be accomplished (the monthly functional test portion), the technician, having only the old SP 410C proce-dure to work from, performed the quarterly calibration. The licensee took prompt corrective action which included performing SP 4108 and placing the revised SP 410C in service. The inspector observed performance of SP 410B and found no inadequacie The licensee has adequate administrative procedures in place to control docu-ment corrections and change Since the corrective action taken on the in-spector's comments resulted in no surveillance being missed and presently appears to be an isolated occurrence, no enforcement action has been initiate Surveillance performance will be reexamined regularly during routine inspec-tio . On-site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)

The resident inspector attended Unit 1 PORC meetings on April 15, 16, 22, 24, 29, and May 4, 6, 7 and 13. Technical Specification 6.5.1 requirements for committee composition were met. PORC topics included the following:

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Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) for ventilation system modifications in Feedwater Coolant Injection (FWCI) areas. The modification connects area cooling fans to reliable emergency power supplies and adds a post-LNP restart capability. Active PORC discussion covered FWCI area heat loading and the additional electrical load this PDCR will place on the Gas Turbin PDCR to replace the Gas Turbine Generator grounding transforme A dry-type transformer will replace the present PCB filled mode Review of several Plant Incident Reports (PIRs) including: minor oil spills, minor fire outside of the protected area, an open normally locked high radiation area gate, and a technician's inadvertent initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. PORC review of long term corrective actions was detailed and well focuse .- . - - . _ . .

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PDCR for permanent installation of overhead monorails and padeyes in the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room. The modification will facilitate future major EDG maintenance. PORC review focused on safety and EDG operability concerns during the installatio The resident inspector noted that neither the PORC nor the PDCR safety evaluation addressed the seismic stability of temporary scaffolding to be erected over the EDG for the modification. (See Detail 6 for further discussion.)

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PDCR for replacement of the recirculation system jet pump instrument line nozzles. Current nozzle welds are degraded by intergranular stress cor-rosion cracking (IGSCC). Extensive discussions were held covering the technical approach to nozzle replacement, old versus new design differ-ences, and retest requirement PDCR to install new emergency lighting in the control room per 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. There was limited PORC discussion on this topi Changes to new fuel receipt inspection procedures RE 1074, 1012 and 107 No PORC questioning occurre New fuel receipt inspections had commenced two days prior to these changas being submitted to PORC and were per-formed well (see Detail 7). Although they were minor and the late pro-cessing did not adversely affect fuel receipt, the changes should have been reviewed and incorporated into the procedures in a more timely fashio Review of several minor operation, maintenance and surveillance procedure change Review of the Plant Incident Report (PIR) and associated LER concerning

degradation of insulation on 4160 volt buswork. PORC comments addressed the schedule for long-term corrective actio Review of revision to the LER concerning Main Steam Line low pressure switch setpoint drift. The revision described a follow-up study and recommended a permanent corrective action of adjusting switch setpoint PORC questioned the wording of the setpoint change safety evaluatio Approva, was tabled pending clarificatio Nuclear Review Board (NRB) meeting minutes were reviewed and discurse The unit superintendent provided PORC members with an overview of generic NRB concerns and issue Review of a Proposed Technical Specification Change concerning safety-related snubber listings in Tables 3.6.1.a and b. The change corrects the deficiency noted in Detail 3 of this inspection report regarding table updating as well as minor Section 3.6.I alterations. This topic elicited active PORC discussion. Pertinent questions were raised con-cerning the technical basis of the change and future administrative con-trols of the snubber list. All items were resolved to the PORC's satis-faction.

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FDCR for chemical decontamination of the recirculation system and Reactor Water Cleanup Syste Extensive PORC questioning and discussions covered the technical basis of the process, procedures, precautions, safety and radiological hazards, interference and seismic reviews, safety evalu-ations, and lessons learned from previous decon operations.

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Review of a Proposed Technical Specification Change concerning boron concentration limits of the Standby Liquid Control syste This change is intended to meet 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS requirement PORC discussed the issue in detail to ensure their full understanding of the change and its technical basi The inspector found that, through probing and insightful questioning and

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analysis, PORC satisfactorily fulfilled its required duties. The inspector

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had no 'urther questions in this area.

10. Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted purauant to Technical Specifications were reviewed. This review verifi?d that the reported infor-

! mation was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolu-tion of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following report was reviewed:

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Monthly Operating Report for plant operations from Ap-il 1-30, 198 The inspector noted no oeficiencies.

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11. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the finding No proprietary information was identified as being in the inspection coverag No written material was pro-vided to the licensee by the inspector, i