IR 05000336/1987013
| ML20235H444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1987 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235H419 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-87-13, NUDOCS 8710010053 | |
| Download: ML20235H444 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-336/87-13 Docket No.
50-336 l
l License No.
DPR-65 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company l
P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101-0270
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Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut i
Inspection Conducted: June 30, 1987-August 17, 1987
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Inspectors:
T. A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector Approved By:
NC 9/7t/s~7 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date
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Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Routine on-site resident inspection (93 hours0.00108 days <br />0.0258 hours <br />1.537698e-4 weeks <br />3.53865e-5 months <br />) covering:
Operational Safety Verification; Unit Trip; On Site Plant Operations Review Committee Review; Spent Fuel Pool Diving Procedure Review; Surveillance of Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Driven and Motor Driven Pumps; Security Diesel Sur-veillance; Emergency Facility Diesel surveillance, Pre-refueling outage plan-i
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ning; LPM Summary Report (50 CFR 50.59); New Work Schedule; Periodic Review of Licensee Reports; NRC Safety Issues Management Systems (SIMS); Maintenance on Safety Injection Motor Driven Outlet Valves; and Status of Licensee's Noncon-l l
formance Reports.
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Results: No unacceptable conditions were identified. This inspection noted a need for more tdmely resolution of actions in licensee Non-Conformance Reports (Detail 7).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS'
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1.
Pe r s on s C o n ta c ted.........................................
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2.
Summary of Facility Activities............................
1 3.
Daily Operational Safety Verification.....................
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4.
Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator Low Level.............
5.
On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee.................
1 6.
Review of Diving Procedure for Spent Fuel Pool East B u l kh e a d G a t e...........................................
7.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Surve111ances...................
8.
Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A to -Load...........
9.
Periodic Checks of Security Diese1........................
10.
Emergency Off-Site Facility Diesel Surveillance...........
7-11.
Planning for Next Refueling 0utage........................
12. NRC License Project Manager Audit of'10 CFR 50.59 Summaries...............................................
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13. New Work Schedule for Licensed Operators..................
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14.
Periodic Review of License Reports........................
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NRC Safety Issues Management System (SIMS)................
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Control Wire Replacement on Safety Injection Tank Outlet Valves..........................................
17.
Licensee Nonconformance Reports...........................
18. Management Meetings................
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted i
Mr. S. Scace, Station Superintendent l
Mr. J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintendent Mr. H. Haynes, Station Services Superintendent The inspector also contacted other licensee employees.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities
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l The plant remained at 100% power from the start of this report period (June 29) to July 23, 1987.
On that date, the plant tripped from 80%
power due to low water level in the No. 1 Steam Generator.
The low water level trip resulted from a transient induced by a malfunction of a press-urizer spray valve during boron equalization (See Paragraph 4 for Details).
Repairs were conducted and the plant was returned to power on July 24. The plant remained at 100% power through the end of this report period, Preparations for Fuel Consolidation in the spent fuel pit continued during
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this report period.
Initial testing of equipment and procedures is scheduled to commence on August 25, 1987.
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3.
Daily Operational Safety Verification I
The inspector routinely observed plant operation during daily regular and off-hour tours of the following areas:
Control Room Intake Structure Auxiliary Building Vital and 4160V Switchgear Room Spent Fuel Building Site Fence Line Turbine Building Off-Site Emergency Facility Railroad Access (SFB)
Training Building I
Yard Areas During this report period, the inspector observed operator response to the steam generator low water level trip, recovery and startup. No deficien-
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cies were observed.
The operators' responses to alarm conditions were observed.
Control room manning was found to meet regulatory requirements.
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It was noted that only a small number of annunciator windows displayed alarm conditions.
In addition, backshift inspections were performed on
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July 31 and August 2 and the operators were found alert and attentive to I
control room conditions.
Posting and control of high radiation areas were inspected and found acceptable.
The control room back panels and 480V and 4160V switchgear rooms were found to be clean and free of extraneous material.
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Site fenceline tours found no deficiencies. The inspector had no further questions on routine operations.
4.
Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level On July 23 at 5:46 a.m., an automatic trip occurred from 80% power due to low level in #1 Steam Generator.
The trip was preceded by a downpower evolution in response to decreasing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure.
The RCS pressure at the time of the trip was 2070 psia.
The pressure decrease was caused by pressurizer spray valve 2-RC-100F being stuck open.
The operations staff was forcing spray to obtain boron equilibrium when a low RCS pressure annunciator alarmed at 5:15 am. The spray was secured but RCS pressure continued to decrease.
Turbine load was decreased to maintain RCS pressure. The licensee believed that the spray valve was not fully closed and made preparations for a containment entry.
During tur-bine load reduction, the operator observed that the feed regulating valve differential pressure controller was erratic. The cause of the low level trip was the operator's inability to maintain level #1 in steam generator due to poor response of the feedwater controller following the decrease in turbine load.
The licensee entered containment at 0617 and closed the spray valve, stabilizing RCS pressure at'1730 psia.
The spray valve was repaired and the faulty differential ' controller was replaced.
The inspector examined the trip sequence report and panel instrumentation and recorders.
Licensee reporting of the event was i
factual.
Unit 2 returned to 100% power on July 24, 1987.
i The inspector had no further questions on this trip.
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5.
On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)
l The resident inspector attended Unit 2 PORC meetings on July 24, 29, 30, and 31.
Technical Specification (TS 6.5.1) requirements for committee makeup were met.
The PORC topics discussed included the following:
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Procedure T87-1-9, Review of Special Load Test of Switchgear 14H Using Gas Turbine Generator.
This procedure tests the ability of switchgear 14H to safely transfer power between the Unit I and 2 4KV electrical distribution systems.
Licensee review concluded that the procedure was not an unreviewed safety question and did not result in any adverse environmental impact.
The inspector will review the results of the test during a subsequent inspectio.,
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Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) 2-15-87, ' adding two switches in
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the 4KV breaker cubicle.
The addition of the switches will defeat interlocks that would prevent backfeed during an emergency.
This allows Millstone 2 to supply power to Millstone 1, or vice versa, l-using the Normal Station Service Transformers (NSST), Reserve Station l
Service Transformer- (RSST) or a Diesel Generator.
Discussions in-cluded a review that concluded that the switches would not affect the protective trip functions or loss of normal power logic. ' PORC con-curred with this PDCR.
As part of each PDC 2 review, the Safety Evaluation is presented to all.
board and alternate members.
Additional Items presented at PORC 2-87-80 included the following:
Change to Inservice Test T87-10 Cathodic Protection, so that a volt-
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age of 0.80 volts is not exceeded during normal operation of the condenser cathodic protection system.
Revision 3 to CE vendor procedure ESE-652, Reoperation Checkout of
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Fuel Consolidation.
PDCR 2-87-013, Installation of Heavy Duty Back Draf t Dampers on the
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Suction Side of Ventilation Ducts.
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Main Exhaust Fan Isolation for maintenance.
PDCR 2-87-26, which added a Bypass / Jumper to the Control' Room
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Annunciator Panel to provide a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) vibration i
alarm indication.
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In addition, changes to procedures and forms were presented on the l
following:
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Dewpoint Continuous Monitor on Instrument Air systems, adding pre-ventive maintenance PM schedules on recorders.
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Fire Suppression System Tests.
Various containment pressure and sump level instrumentation calibra-
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tion.
l In addition, a PDCR 2-13-87 added a eighteen month surveillance to ensure control room air leakage is less than 100 cfm at a differential pressure of 1/15 inch water gauge. This will be effective after the 1988 refueling
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outage.
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During the PORC meetings, questions by members to PDCR presenters indi-cated a thorough review of submitted matters was conducted.
Procedures presented for review were,- in some cases, rejected due to lack of
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validity.
The inspector had no further questions on the conduct of PORC
meetings, l
6.
Review of Diving Procedure for Spent Fuel Pool East Bulkhead In preparation for fuel consolidation, a preliminary examination of the east spent fuel pool (SFP) bulkhead gate noted a dislodged gate gasket.
l The licensee's review determined that the installed gate shims and holding l
screws could be removed to allow full length seatint if the gate gasket.
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The licensee prepared procedure CC-SC-50, " Diving Procedure for East Bulkhead Gate Shim Removal." A review of this procedure indicated that Health Physics (HP) concerns were referenced to HP procedures HP-945,
-2945, and -3945.
The prerequisites and precautions addressed included the following:
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Continuous Health Physics (HP) coverage is required for all diving operations.
Sufficient lighting and clear visibility.in the SFP is necessary for
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HP monitoring of the dive, c
SFP temperature is to remain betseeen 70-95 degrees F while the diving
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is in progress.
Tool and material logs are to be kept and verified by the Quality
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Control group.
Additional areas address contractor requirements, diver access to
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water, dressing stations to be established, and washdown capabilities to be available.
In addition, the procedure defines the minimum distance that divers can be from any spent fuel bundles and requires the use of restraining barriers.
The inspector observed the replacement of the gate after shim removal.
Proper dimensional height of the top of the gate was visually verified.
The preliminary inflation of the gate gasket with air indicated an air loss, caused by a leaking air inlet valve.
The valve was repaired, the gate gasket was inflated, and the system was found acceptable.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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7.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillance The licensee's auxiliary feed pumps cons'ist o'f one Terry Turbine Auxiliary Feed pump and two motor-driven auxiliary feed pumps. The following tests were conducted and witnessed by the resident inspector at the auxiliary feedwater cubicle:
Terry Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operations Readiness Test
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Procedure SP21107.
Auxiliary Feed Pump Turbine Periodic Test Procedure 2660.
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Auxiliary Feedwater System Operability Test Procedure SP2610A, B and
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
"A" and
"B" Operational Readiness Test SP 21105.
Quarterly In-Service Inspection (ISI) Testing of the " A" 'and
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Auxiliary Feedwater Minimum Flow Procedure SP21135.
In addition, the Quarterly ISI Testing of the Spent Fuel Pool inlet check valve from the auxiliary feedwater system was witnessed.
All the tests performed met established test criteria.
Physical discrepancies observed in motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump areas were:
Instrumentation tubing protective caging was not secured and the Unit'
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A instrument line appeared to have been stepped on.
One of four nuts was not fully engaged against the base plate for the
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wall mounted pressure tratrumentation panel.
Unit "A" instrument support stand had one missing nut.
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The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room needed cleanup.
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The inspector informed site management of these discrepancies. Cleanup of the steam-driven pump room was completed. The other items were addressed to the Maintenance Department for repair of these minor discrepancies.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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8.
Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" to Load On August 4, 1987, following normal preventive maintenance EDG
"A"
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failed to build up to normal voltage following a remote (from the Control Room) start signal.
A few minut'es later, a second start was attempted I
with the same results.
The diesel came up to speed, but the generator voltage would build up to only about 1/2 of normal.
The licensee called in a Production Test (PT) engineer for assistance prior to~ another-test.
This time the EDG loaded normally to 4 kV.
It was operated at normal load for over two hours; no abnormal problems were observed.
The inspector witnessed the third successful start.
The PT engineer inspected contacts inside the relay cabinets and installed some monitoring i
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Nothing out of the ordinary was observed.
The inspector. at-
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tended a PORC meeting the. next day where this event, along with other
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issues, was discussed. The licensee agreed to increase the frequency of
EDG "A" surveillance testing to ensure operability. The first supplemen-tal start test was performed satisfactorily on August 5.
Subsequent sat-isfactory starts were made on August 11,13 and 18, and on September 1.
Special instrumentation for monitoring EDG performance on these surveil-lances has not provided any information on the cause of the failure to load on August 4.
Close monitoring of EDG "A" surveillance testing will continue. The inspector had no further questions, but increased monitor-ing of EDG operability is planned.
9.
Weekly Checks of the Security Diesel A surveillance test of the Security Diesel was witnessed by the resident inspector.
Test No. 2654, Periodic Checks, was performed successfully.
The following discrepancies were noted.
The control panel has no means of verification of alarm lights.
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Since no test circuit is available, a burned out indicator light could result in failure to indicate an alarm for an essential para-meter.
The diesel room was not adequately illuminated.
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Minor cleanup was needed.
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Upon identification of the above items to licensee management, the follow-ing corrective actions were initiated.
A PDCR is to be prepared to provide for panel light testing.
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The diesel room was relamped (M2-87-9213) and cleaned.
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The inspector had no further questions on this surveillance.
Security.
diesel surveillance and PDCR progress will be reviewed further incident to routine inspection.
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10.
Emergency Off-Site Facility Diesel Surveillance The Emergency Off-Site Facility (E0F) has an installed diesel generator for electrical backup power.
The emergency diesel generator, located outside the hardened structure, will automatically start on loss of power to the EOF.
Surveillance of the EOF diesel was witnessed to the resident inspector. Test No. 4606, Operability. Test of EOF Diesel, was performed successfully with the following discrepancies noted.
When a test of control board lights was performed, three lights did
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not illuminate.
The bulbs were-replaced and functioned correctly.
Licensee management directed operational surveillance personnel to j
document this type of problem for immediate resolution.
Prior to the test, the operators added 1.5 quarts of oil to bring the
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diesel oil sump level from the low mark to the full mark. The on-going need to maintain normal oil level was discussed with site management.
The E0F diesel power cable conduit can be flooded by rain or snow due
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to lack of grouting.
Licensee management responded immediately and grouted the cabling conduit.
The diesel muffler is provided with pipe plugs to drain and period-l
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ically examine the muffler. The licensee plans to review their sur-
veillance program as to the requirements for muffler inspection, The inspector found the operators knowledgeable of the test and its
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acceptance crite'ria.
The inspector had no further questions on EOF diesel surveillance.
11.
Planning for the Next Refueling Outage The licensee is continuing to review the jobs for the Unit 2 Refueling Outage.
Planners on the various departments meet weekly to finalize departmental projects.
An integrated refueling outage meeting is con-ducted monthly to discuss projects that affect all departments. Two meet-ings were held during this report period.
The unit superintendent was present at both meetings.
He commented on keeping the containment clean by requiring repair areas to be immediately cleared of all debris.
Reduction of the steam generator (SG) work scope in order to meet the overall outage schedule was discussed. Updates by the various departments were presented and commented on.
Examples are:
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a.
Project Assignments (pas)
Project Assignments were reviewed.
All assignments are.to be com-pleted by September 1.
Procurement of material for the projects are to be completed by December 1, with drawing changes scheduled for completion by October 15.
The Plant Design. Change Request reviews are to be completed by October 13. In addition, leak. rate tests are
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to be performed on 15 of 23 valves prior to the outage. The project-l assignments reviewed included:
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PA 83-062 Extraction Steam Piping PA 86-005 MOV Mount Testing PA 86-007 Service Water Repairs PA 87-043 DC Switchgear Room-Halon Protection System PA 87-210 CRDR Human Factors Changes An additional ten projects were also discussed. Major-PDCRs will be reviewed by the NRC incident to routine inspection.
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Generator Construction and Planning Progress on the Project Assignments was reported. Of note was the commitment to maintain the spent fuel pool area in a condition to support the new fuel receipt, presently scheduled between September 17 and 30. The removal of fuel consolidation equipment may impact this item. In addition, major items on the critical path, such as halon protection of DC Switchgear and replacement of an RCP motor, l
were discussed.
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Additional Items
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The departments that presented the status of preparations for the outage were:
Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, I&C, ALARA, Health Physics, Production Test, and Site Planning.
The subjects
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discussed included; turbine outage support, identification of repairs
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to thirty-two containment isolation valves, the expediting of pur-chase specifications and the need for identification of high radia-tion controls on radiation work permits (RWPs) in a clear, concise and understandable manner.
Conclusion
The licensee is attempting to identify and take corrective actions on problems that may arise during the 1988 refueling outage.
This preplann-ing has been in-depth.
The licensee stated that the present fuel burnup rate will dictate a power coastdown beginning on December 28, 1987.
The inspector has no further
questions about the outage planning meetings.
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NRC Licensing Project Manager Audit of 10 CFR 50.59 The NRC Project Manager was on site from July 13-17 to conduct an audit of 12 of the 56 plant design changes reported by a February 27, 1987 letter to the NRC.
The audit included procedures ACP-QA-3.08 (NE0 3.12), Revision 3, on pre-paring safety evaluations per 10 CFR 50.59.
For the 12 PDCRs reviewed, the safety evaluations were found to be detailed and well prepared.
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area that was not specifically addressed by the licensee was that, if j
significant test changes occur, a new safety evaluation may be needed.
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Overall, it was concluded that the licensee had complied with 10 CFR 50.59
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(b)(1) for performance and maintenance of written safety evaluations for j
plant design changes and tests.
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New Work Schedule for Licensed Operators l
Plant management and representatives of the Center for the Design of Industrial Schedules developed 'a tentative new work schedule that was implemented on April 13, 1987.
The schedule was formulated to provide features such as the following.
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Six consecutive scheduled days off once every 12 weeks.
Seven scheduled weekends (Saturday / Sunday) off each year in place of
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the previous six per year.
Additional weekends off in each 12 week cycle, with one 6-day weekend
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and three 4-day weekends.
Fewer consecutive working weekends.
Vacation weeks are enhanced by
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increased days off and four, 4-day workweeks are scheduled.
The new schedule cut in half the number of shift changes over a 12-week l
period. A licensee review of the new schedule will be concluded prict to the scheduled January 1988 outage. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
14.
Periodic Review of Licensee Reports During this report period, the following two ALARA reports were issued.
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Millstone Unit 2 Exposure Goal Status Report for June 1987.
Millstone Unit 2 Stear. Generator Tube Leak Forced Outage ALARA Report
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for July 198.
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The inspector's review of the Millstone 2 exposure goal. report noted that -
the larger exposure of man-rem can be attributed to charging pump repairs, modification of high radiation. area gates, decontamination of steam gen-erator nozzle dams, and radwaste handling. The 1987 exposure is presently at 130 men-rem, 72.2% of the goal (180 man-rem).
The major contributor during the month of June was steam generator nozzle dam decontamination.
The~ inspector had no further questions.on the exposure goal report.
The forced outage report is for the steam generator tube leak inspection and repairs between January 29 and February 17, 1987.
It summarizes the I
major work performed, and documents exposures and methods used to provide
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dose reductions.
A table describes the exposures for 15 tasks which accounted for 77.8 man rem of the outage total of 81.7 man-rem. The steam generator tube repair was the major contributor, with 60.1 man-rem.
A breakdown of SG tasks indicated that the estimated 40.4 man-rem was ex-ceeded due to a circumferential tube crack which required additional eddy current testing, staking of tubes, and an examination of steam generator No. 2.
The report addresses ALARA controls used, comments on tasks, and provides recommendations for reducing exposures.
Included in the tables are sur-veys for initial entry into steam generators and loose surface.contamina-tion in the generators.
In addition, additional tasks are reviewed and recommendations addressing ALARA concerns are documented.
During this forced outage, the inspector verified licensee attention to ALARA during eddy current testing (ECT) work in both steam generators.
Work tents were placed and the remote controls for ECT were in low exposure areas.
The report provides information useful for decreasing exposures for future similar tasks.
The inspector has no further ques-tions on this report.
15. NRC Safety Issues Management System The NRC has combined information from the Generic Issues Management Track-ing System and information on Plant Specific Safety Issues into the Safety Issues Management System (SIMS).
SIMS will be used by the NRC to track the review, implementation, and verification of safety issues.
The licensee was asked by NRR to review safety issues and identify needed additions, deletions and/or dates for completion and/or implementation.
The licensee requested an extension to October to reply to this request.
Upon receipt of the updated licensee listing, the NRC will review that information for inclusion in review and verification planning.
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16.
Control Wire Replacement on Safety Injection Tank Outlet Valves On July 17, an NRC inspection identified the potential use of unqualified wire in thirteen Unit 2 valves. The unqualified wire was identified as
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Vulkene SIS, Model 51-57275, manufactured by General Electric Co.
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addition, the inspectors identified Vulkene Supreme SIS, model 57279 as a qualified substitute. The licensee performed a review and evaluation and determined that only two Safety' Injection Tank valves, 2-51-614 and 2-SI-615, could have improper wiring-The valves could not be examined
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l during operation due to their location inside containment. An opportunity to examine these valves occurred, due to a reactor trip, on July 23, 1987.
Containment was entered and the wiring for four control jumpers were replaced with qualified wiring. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
17.
Licensee Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs)
The inspector's review of NRC status indicated that six (6) NCR's were open beyond one year from original issuance.
Nineteen (19) NCR's that were written in 1986 remain open.
Twelve (12) NCRs issued in 1987 have been open for greater than 90 days.
Nine of the 12 NCRs issued in 1987 addressed snubbet s that were lacking identification numbers. These snubbers are to remain in storage until NCR closecut. Management discussions indicated that a new NCR tracking system will identify status, department responsibilities for close out, and addi-tional descriptions of problems.
Licensee management plans to place greater priority on the expeditious closing of the NCRs by more frequent updates of the reports.
This item will be reviewed during a subsequent routine inspection.
18. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings. No proprietary informa-tion was identified during the inspection period. No written material was provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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