IR 05000245/1997012
| ML20247K572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1998 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247K540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-97-212, 50-336-97-212, 50-423-97-212, NUDOCS 9805220141 | |
| Download: ML20247K572 (39) | |
Text
- _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Docket No ,50-245 and 50-423 Report N License No DPR-21, DPR-65, and NPF-49 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Facility: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Dates: December 8-12,1997 and January 5-9,1998 Team Leader: Helen N. Pastis, Senior Project Manager Evaluators: Robert DeFayette, NRC Consultant Steve Dembek, Millstone Unit 1 Project Manager Carl Mohrwinkel, Assistant Agency Allegation Advisor Ray Mullikin, Region IV Allegations Coordinator Richard Pelton, Training and Assessment Specialist Richard Urban, Region l Millstone Project Engineer Approved by: William D. Travers, Director, Special Projects Office Phillip F. McKee, Deputy Director for Licensing, Special Projects Office Helen Pastis, ECP and ITPOP Oversight, Senior Project Manager
9805220141 900420 l PDR ADOCK 05000245 G PDR
- - _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . ._ ___ _
I TABLE OF CONTENTS Exe cutive S u m m a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I l Purpose of the ECP Evaluation Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Review Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. ... ... 1 Com position of the Te a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 B a ck g ro u nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Employee Concerns Program Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ECP Overview . . . . . . . . . ............. ........ ............. .2 ECP Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. ... . ..... .... ...... 2 Tracking / Closure of Comprehensive Plan Elements . . . . . . . . . .......... 4 Review of ECP Case Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .. ... 5 i ECP/SCWE Training and Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .7 ECP Position Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 11 i i ECP/SCWE Metrics and Trending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 E C P i n te rfa ce s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 14 EC P Exit lnterviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 16 5.10 Self-Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 17 Employee Concerns Oversight Panel . . . . . . . . . . ...... ................ . 19 Safety-Conscious Work Environment . . . ... ............. ...... ....... 22 Attachment: MIRG Root Cause Evaluation l
t i
I _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _._._.___.____d
__ - - - - -
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On October 24,1996, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued an Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), the licensee for Millstone, requiring establishment of (1) a comprehensive plan for resolving the Millstone station employees' safety concerns (ESC's), (2) an independent third-party oversight organization, and (3) a plan developed by the independent third-party organization for overseeing NNECO's implementation of the ESC program pla A team was formed to evaluate the effectiveness of Millstone's Employee Concems Program (ECP). The team's main objective in this evaluation was to assess the implementation of the ECP and the employee concems oversight program (ECOP) at Millstone. During its evaluation, the team also addressed some elements of the safety-conscious work environment (SCWE).
The team conducted its evaluation in two parts. During the week of December 8-12,1997, the team attended meetings, interviewed personnel, requested information, and observed various training sessions. At the end of that week, the team returned to the NRC Headquarters to evaluate the information gathered at the site. During the week of January 5-9,1998, the team returned to follow up on certain issues and questions, that arose during its evaluatio The following identifies certain program areas reviewed by the team and summarizes the team's findings in these area Employee Concerns Program The team found that the ECP was well established, that NNECO had significantly improved the ECP since the beginning of 1997, and that the ECP was functioning effectively. The team's evaluation included the following:
ECP Organization: The team found the ECP organization had sufficient independence, resources, and management support to perform thorough, unbiased investigations. The minor discrepancies found by the team did not significantly detract from the program or its accomplishment ECP Case.Edes: The team reviewed 18 ECP case files that were either closed or resolved after July 1997. For two of the case files, the team verified that the corrective actions had been completed as stated. The team found that the conclusions of the ECP evaluations were properly supported by NNECO's investigations, corrective actions were appropriate to resolve the issues, and communications with employees about their concerns were improving. The team also found that the ECP was adequately defining the issues of concerned individual's, with one exception. The exception was considered an isolated occurrence and did not reduce the overall effectiveness of the ECP. The team found that the ECP was properly protecting the identities of those individuals who brought concerns to the ECP. The team noted some minor discrepancies, including the licensee's failure to communicate on a timely basis with persons who raised concerns, inadequate classification of some cases, and, in cae case, premature closure of the cas i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ .
_ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _-_-____ _ __ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____
ECP Self Assessments: The team cancluded that ECP self-assessments were adequate. The latest self-assessment reports showed improvement in comparison with the first several reports. The licensee was adequately tracking its self-assessment corrective actions. The licensee's tracking of the actions being taken to address Little Harbor Consultant's recommendations was initially slow but had shown improvement at the time of the evaluation. Self-assessment and extemal assessment findings and recommendations were appropriately disseminated to plant management and staff.
l Employee Concerns Oversight Panel The team's review of documentation indicated that the ECOP was slow to develop and
! begin meaningful activities. However, at the time of the evaluation, the team found the l ECOP to be functioning effectively. The ECOP was found to be especially effective in l administering leadership surveys in specific parts of NNECO's organization to help l identify focus areas. The ECOP was made up of a diverse group of site employees who l were independent of the line organization and who reported the President and Chief I Executive Officer.
!
Focus (Problem) Areas The team reviewed the Problem Area Plan that d(scribes the standards, the
, expectations, and the course of action for addressing focus areas. The licensee defines l " focus areas" as areas of personnel interaction in which as SCWE is challenged or does not exist. This plan calls for specific action plans to be developed for each focus are I Generally, the team found that the licensee had made considerable progress to improve its identification and resolution of focus areas. The team found some weaknesses in the action plans used for resolution of focus areas. Specifically, the team found weaknesses in the program with respect to (1) prioritizing focus areas by significance; (2) high-level management review and attention, both in the development and the implementation of the action plans; (3) assurance that the scope of the action plan is adequate and addresses all possible organizational areas; (4) consistency and quality of the action plans; (5) setting and scheduling milestones; (6) developing the basis for closing the action plans as complete; (7) evaluating the effectiveness of meeting the
- goals and objectives of each action plan; and (8) identifying action plans as confidential l
and following procedures for confidentiality, as is done with other documents dealing with personnel action SCWE Long-Range Plan The team found that the licensee had not sufficiently developed plans to address long-range actions for enhancing and maintaining an SCWE. Specifically, processes for maintaining the ECP and the SCWE infrastructure; monitoring of performance, including recognition of program degradations; and phasing out of oversight organizations were l not addresseo b iicensee planning documentation.
f
{
ii i
_-_______-_ ___________- __ _ __ _ _ - ______ _ _ _ _ ___ _ - _ _
ECP and SCWE Training The team found that the licensee had significantly improved the training provided to its staff on the SCWE and the ECP to make it accurate and meaningful. The licensee is also maintaining its records to ensure that the training is given to those who require it and is also soliciting and using feedback to determine the effectiveness of the trainin However, the team found severalinstances of deviations from procedures and the training manual. For example, the team found instances in which the training for managers was not properly recorded, the training for the ECP did not follow the training manuals, and the licensee did not follow the ECP Administrative Control procedures to the independently confirm the background qualifications of investigative contractor Metrics and Trending The team reviewed and compared the Millstone Unit 3 performance indicators related to the ECP and the SCWE over a number of weeks. From its interviews, the team found that NNECO's management considers that the reports are useful tools for tracking and trending information on the ECP and the SCWE. The team noted that in most cases, the data show an improving trend. The team noted that although the data changed every week, the Analysis / Action section of the reports, that is, the text, did not always change, and at times had little bearing on the data presented. Also, sometimes the data for the same parameter were presented in different formats from week to week (bar versus line graphs, good trending up or down).
'
l iii
__ _ _ _ - _ ___ _ __ _-_________-_- __ _____-__ _
)
!
\
'
Evaluation Detailt, l Puroose of the ECP Evaluation The team's main objective in this evaluation was to assess the implementation of the Employee Concems Program (ECP) and the Employee Concerns Oversight Program (ECOP) at s Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's (NNECO or the licensee) Millstone Nuclear Power '
l Station. During its evaluation, the team also conducted an evaluation of some elements of the l safety-conscious work environment (SCWE).
i Review Methodoloav i
The team used as gu: dance inspection Procedure (IP) 40001, " Resolution of Employee Concerns." The team conducted its evaluation in two parts. During the week of December 8 to 12,1997, the team attended meetings, interviewed people, requested information, and observed various training sessions. At the end of that week, the team returned to the NRC headquarters to evaluate the information gathered at the sit During the week of January 5 to 9,1998, the team retumed to followup on certain issues and questions which arose during its evaluation. During this week, the team again gathered additional information, attended meetings, interviewed personnel, and observed training session Team members continued to review documents and observe training sessions. The team incorporated whatever information was available to it during this evaluation. However, as this is an area which involves personnel and their interactions, it is an area which is constantly changing. The team attempted to consider the most up-to-date information before issuing its report. Regarding evaluations of SCWE elements, information obtained from onsite monitoring of activities, both prior to and following the team's evaluation, were used to supplement the findir in this repor On January 22,1998, the team leader held an exit interview with NNEC .0 Composition of the Team The team was led by Helen N. Pastis, Senior Project Manager in the Office of Nuc! ear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Robert DeFayette is an NRC consultant and a former Director of Enforcement and Allegation Programs in Region 111, Stephen Dembek is the Millstone Unit 1 i Project Manager. Carl Mohrwinkelis the Assistant Agency Allegation Adviwr. Raymond l Mullikin is the Region IV Allegations Coordinator. Richard Pelton is a TraNng and Assessment i Specialist. Richard Urban is the Region i Millstone Project Enginee , Backaround On October 24,1996, the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued an I i
Order to NNECO, the licensee for Millstone, requiring (1) a comprehensive plan for handling the Millstone Station employees' safety concerns, (2) an independent third-party oversight
organization, and (3) a plan developed by the independent third-party organization for overseeing NNECO's implementation of the comprehensive pla The NRC staff has performed the following activities to ensute that NNECO's programs for handling eafety concems and the independent, third-party organization program (ITPOP) will be effectively implemented:
e Beviewed the Millstone employee safety concerns Comprehensive Plan for reviewing and dispositioning safety issues raised by employees of NNEC e Acoroved the selection of the ITPOP organization to ensure that the organization has qualified individuals to conduct the review adequately and independently of NNEC The ITPOP organization will oversee the implementation of the NNECO EC e Anoroved the ITPOP plan for auditing the implementation of the Millstone ECP. The ITPOP review must be comprehensive, incorporating appropriate audit and technical disciplines so the NRC can be confident that NNECO has been thorough in the identification and resolution of employee safety concems at Millstone. ECP Evaluation ECP Overview The team found that the ECP has made significant improvements and is functioning adequately. The ECP appears to be an established program at Millstone. ECP Organization Evaluation Scoce The tesm evaluated the licensee's ECP organization against the criteria in IP 40001 and the applicable portions of the licensee's Comprehensive Plan. The team reviewed the licensee's organization charts and interviewed ECP personnel to assess the licensee's ECP organization.
Observations and Findinas Attachment 1 of Supplement 1 to the Comprehensive Plan for Reviewing and Dispositioning Safety Concerns states, in part:
Objective X: Establish an effective ECP Success Criteria:
-
The ECP has sufficierd 3 sources, independence, and authority to fully resolve issues
.
There is obvious management support for the program
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _____ _ _ _ _ _ -__ _
The team reviewed the latest ECP organization chart. The Millstone ECP investigators are generally divided into a technical group and a Human Resources (HR) group. The team determined the number of investigators was appropriate to effectively handle the number of concems being seen. The ECP organization does not have any other significant duties and appears to be sufficiently independent of the rest of the NNECO organization to allow for thorough and unbiased investigation The team interviewed the Director of the ECP about the program's independence, personnel, i and management support. The Director stated he has been told by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) that he has authority to bypass management as necessary to ensure his independent view is properly considered. He said on one occasion he used this authority to talk the Nuclear '
Committee Advisory Team that what he considered to be an incorrect personnel decision. He further noted thM into reversing ECP's decisions have not been influenced by line management and he has adequate resources to conduct the investigations. Regarding the independence of
'
their reviews, he said that in the majority of cases his investigators obtain their information independently, in some cases, they will use line management or outside contractors in their investigations. The decision regarding the need for outside help is usually made by him during the triage phase of an ECP cas The Director noted that the long-term plan was to have the ECP consist of 10 NNECO employees (currently most of the investigators are contractors). The team interviewed both contractor and NNECO investigators and found they were aware of the long-term plans to phase out the contractor positions, and they did not consider it a conce The ECP Director stated they qualitatively measure their effectiveness by (1) comparing the number of allegations received by the NRC to the number of concerns ECP receives (he stated currently ECP receives about twice as many concerns as the NRC does), (2) determining the number of referrals they receive, and, (3) using a set of performance indicators obtained through survey The team also interviewed some of the investigators, and they also indicated the organization has adequate resources, management support, and independence from the rest of the NNECO organization to allow for thorough and unbiased investigations.
l In addition to the assigned ECP staff, the ECP organization her volunteer Peer Representatives in the different Millstone organizations. The Peer Representatives received a limited amount of training and are available to receive issues from those NNECO employees who may prefer to j give tneir concems to someone they know. The licensee noted that only a small percentage of l the concems received in 1997 were brought in by the Peer Representative Conclusions The team found the licensee's ECP organization had the independence, resources and management support to perform thorough, unbiased investigations. The minor discrepancies found by the team did not significantly detract from the program or its accomplishment l
>
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _- - - _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
T Trackina/ Closure of Comprehensive Plan Elements Evaluation Scope The team reviewed and evaluated the actions taken and proposed by NNECO to track and close Comprehensive Plan element Observations and Findinas
'
The January 31,1997 version of the Comprehensive Plan identified 132 items that were determined to be necessary to ensure employees who raise safety concems are not discriminated against. In the July 22,1997, version of the Comprehensive Plan, the number of action items increased to 155, with no clear explanation of the increas In November 1997, the remaining open Comprehensive Plan actions were incorporated into the l "Roadmap for Establishing a Safety Conscious Work Environment at Millstone Station." The SCWE plan identifies actions to be taken to establish an SCWE.
,
As of December 10,1997,138 of the 155 Comprehensive Plan action items have been
completed. The 17 Comprehensive Plan open items are being tracked through the SCWE l Comprehensive Plan. The Non-Union Peer Review Process scheduled completion date was l February 28,1998. The team was informed that the completion date for this item will be modified to sometime later in 1998.
l During the followup period, the team evaluated the actions taken on 15 open Comprehensive Plan Action items and 18 closed items. The closed items were evaluated to determine if the actions taken to close the item were as planned or different. The team determined that those items that were closed based on actions different from those planned were identified with a deviation that described the actual action taken. Many of the open items evaluated by the team were late in closure of the item according to the Comprehensive Plan. The team determined that actions are being taken to close the items; however, the completion dates had not been revised. In most cases, the team was assured that modifying the completion date was an oversight and would be correcte Conclusioria Completed Comprehensive Plan items are well documented and the actions taken to close the item are usually in accord with the planned actions. If the actions taken to complete an item ere diffe,ent from those originally planned, a deviation statement la added that documents the actual actions taken. While severalitems are late in being closed, appropr' ate and necessary actions are being taken to complete the items. The delays for several of the items can be attributed to the training shut down during 1997. Overall, the items identified in the Comprehensive Plan dated January 31,1997 and supplements are being completed in accordance with the plen in a timely and well-thought-out manne . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - ____ Review of ECP Case Files Evaluation Scone The team reviewed 11 ECP case files that were either closed or resolved after July 199 These were files that the ECP had classified as involving potential nuclear safety issues or harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination (HIRD) for engaging in protected ;
i activities, as defined in 10 CFR 50.7. The 11 files were not included in the sample reviewed by '
l Little Harbor Consultants (LHC), and documented as having case file deficiencies in the LHO l August 1,1997, letter to the licensee. The licensee's Employee Concems Processing Manual, Revision 2, defined a closed concem as one where the investigation and corrective actions
,
were complete. A resolved concem was one where the investigation was complete and the i
corrective actions were approved and scheduled, but not complete. Additionally, the team j interviewed five of the concemee The team also reviewed seven ECP case files that were either closed or resolved after l July 1997, and had been classified as not involving potential nuclear safety issues or HIRD for engaging in protected activities.
j Observations and Findinos The team found that 10 ECP case files, which involved nuclear safety or 10 CFR 50.7 HIRD issues, had concern statements that properly defined the concemee's issues. The exception l was File 291, which did not address one of the concernee's issues regarding potential discrimination for engaging in a protected activity. This finding was provided to the licensee during the team's evaluation. The licensee subsequently informed the team that the ECP had evaluated the case based on the team's finding, and concluded that the subject alleged discrimination was not substantiated. The ECP was in the process of documenting this evaluation for the file at the end of the team's evaluation period. Based upon the verbal information provided by the ECP and information in the case file, the team determined that the ECP's conclusion was appropriat The team found that the licensee performed thorough investigations for the 10 case files which had proper concem statements. and that the corrective actions appropriately resolved the issues. The team verified that the corrective actions for two case files had been completed as state <
i
'
The team found that the ECP organization provided closure letters to the concemees, when applicable, describing the resolution of their issues. The team noted that the ECP provided feedback forms, with the closure letters, to the concemees requesting comments regarding the concemees' satisfaction with the ECP process. However, concemees were not retuming the l
'
l forms to the ECP, which could provide the ECP with information to potentially improve the
! progra The team found that the ECP's goal notifying the concemee every 30 days until the concem was resolved or closed had not been met in 5 of the 10 applicable ECP case files reviewe ,
,
- __ _-___-________-__------ - ---- - - - - - - -
The remaining case was filed by an anonymous source, so no notification was possibl However, the team noted marked improvement in the area of communications with concernees during the months of November and December, in that all the case files reviewed had documentation of contacts with the concemees. Additionally, the team noted during an ECP stand-up meeting, that the notification to concernees was stressed by ECP supervision, as well as the prioritizing of case The team determined that 9 of the 11 case files had the proper concern classifiestion as defined in the Employee Concerns Processing Manual. The two exceptions were Files 291 and 340, which were classified as Class 2. Because the concerns involved potential discrimination for previously reporting nuclear safety concerns, they should have been Class 1 according to the manual. The failure to address the concemee's issues in File 291, regarding potential discrimination, was previously discussed. The licensee defined Class 1 concems as nuclear safety or quality concerns that relate to the protection of health and safety of the public, employees or contractors at the facility, or which could affect the public trust of Northeast Utilities to reliably operate the Millstone facility. A wrongdoing or HlRD concern involving nuclear safety or quality issues would also be a Class 1 concern. Class 2 concerns generally involved personnelissues. The team discussed this finding with the ECP Director and was informed that the licensee was in the process of revising the Employee Concerns Processing Manual to clarify the concern classification definition. The ECP Director stated that the present classification definition was too broad and the ECP did not use it for prioritizr.aon. The team determined that the effect of a different classification for File 340 could not be evaluated since the concernee withdrew the concem during the initial phase of the investigation. The team determined from the review of selected Class 1 and Class 2 files that the quality of the investigations and the timeliness of communications with concernees were similar in two case The team found that the ECP had properly classified the seven cases not involving nuclear safety or 10 CFR 50.7 HIRD issues. The team also determined that the corrective actions, either completed or proposed, were adequate to resolve the concemees' issue The team found from the interviews of concemees that 60 percent did not agree with the resolution of their concern. However, the team determined from the information in the case files that the resolutions were proper, except for File 291 mentioned above. The team also found that 60 percent of the concernees interviewed would use the ECP again. Based upon the interviews, the team determined that the ECP took appropriate measures to protect the concernees' identitie The team noted that all the case files, unless anonymously received, contained a confidentiality statement. A concemee could either request confidentiality or grant a waiver of confidentialit Confidentiality assures the concernee that the ECP would take all reasonable steps to ensure that the concernee's identity would be protected. The team found that correspondence to external licensee organizations did not identify the concernee's identit Conclusions The conclusions of the ECP evaludions were properly supported by the licensee's investigations, corrective actions were proper to resolve the issues, and communications with
_--_ _ _ _ .
the concernees were improving. The ECP was adequately defining the concernee's issues, with one exception. The one exception was considered an isolated occurrence and did not I reduce the overall effectiveness of the ECP. There was a lack of satisfaction by some concernees with the investigation results. However, concernees were not providing the requested feedback to the ECP, which could provide the ECP with information to potentially improve the program. The ECP was properly protecting the identities of those individuals bringing concerns to the EC .5 ECP/SCWE Trainino and Qualifications Evaluation Scooe The team evaluated the licensee's ECP and SCWE training programs against the criteria in IP 40001 and the applicable portions of the licensee's Comprehensive Plan. Specifically, the team reviewed the qualifications of the ECP, ECOP, and certain HR Resources staff members and also attended training sessions and reviewed the training plans for SCWE and ECP trainin Observations and Findinos Qualifications of ECP Staff The licensee developed an Administration Control titled, " Qualification of ECP Intake &
Investigative Personnel" to describe the training program and define the training criteria for ECP representatives. The team evaluated this document against the applicable statements made in the licensee's January 31,1997, " Comprehensive Plan for Reviewing and Dispos ltioning Safety Concerns." The Comprehensive Plan states,in part:
ECP Investigators and Intake Staff The ECP staff requires skill sets that take into account the varied nature and responsibilities of their work. They need to be able to properly obtain information that may ultimately lead to formal investigations, and also need to be objective listeners and skilled report writers. The following areas are intended to be included in ECP staff development for increased awareness:
. Interviewing Skills
. Legalissues in Employment
= Investigative Report Writing
. Investigative Planning
. Time Management
. Effective Writing
. Plant Systems
. Interpretive Skills (HPES/ Root Cause Analysis)
- Communicating with Regulators and Auditors
. Team Building The licensee's Administrative Control requires training (or a memo explaining the reason for a !
waiver)in all of the above areas. The team reviewed several of the qualification folders of the l l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.. _ _ _ - _ _ .
ECP contractors and determined there were no assessments performed by the ECP Director to ensure the contractors' previous education and experience were sufficient for the Millstone assignment (i.e., the licensee did not perform an evaluation to verify the contractors' previous training and experience was equivalent to the required training elements listed in the
! Comprehensive Plan). The ECP staff agreed and said that this finding was also identified in a l December 5,1997, self-assessment. The ECP Director completed the evaluation of the l
l contractors' qualifications shortly after the team discovered this deficiency. The team found the i l ECP Director's response to be acceptable.
,
i l The team also noted that the Administrative Control allowed individuals to perform selected j activities which suited their existing knowledge and skills before they were fully qualified.
l However, the licensee's Administrative Control did not require any documentation to ensure the person would be limited to a certain type of evaluation. The ECP Director documented the basis for the limited qualification and the selected activities that the investigator is qualified to investigate shortly after the team found this administrative deficienc The team performed interviews and reviewed qualification records to assess the qualifications of the ECP investigators. Although, as noted above, the licensee had administrative weaknesses regarding documentation of qualifications, the team found the investigators to be well qualified and properly trained for their dutie Qualifications of ECOP Staff The licensee's Comprehensive Plan does not make any statements regarding the qualifications or training of the ECOP staff. The team reviewed the ECOP staff's training records and l determined that ECOP staff members who may perform investigations are trained in (1) legal ,
'
issues, (2) interviewing skills, and (3) the ECP process. The team found this level of training appropriate for the ECOP staf i
!
Quahfications of HR Staff The licensee's January 31,1997, " Comprehensive Plan for Reviewing and Dispositioning Safety Concems," states, in part:
[T]he HR (HR) staff requires some of the same training as the ECP staff including:
. Interviewing Skills
. Investigative Report Writing
= Investigative Planning
- Effective Writing
- Listening Skills
. Team Building
. Legalissues in Employment Training
- The team reviewed the licensee's documentation and verified that HR personnel involved with assisting in ECP investigations either received the above training or had previous experience and training regarding investigation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
_ ___
SCWE Trainina for Supervisors and Manaaers Because of the licensee's conclusion that there was a lack of knowledge of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, " Employee Protection," training was developed for all supervisors and managers on the SCWE. The licensee also revised existing training programs, as applicable, to include ECP indoctrination. The team attended several sessions of the SCWE training (the team attended at least one of all three sessions of the SCWE training) and found the training to be well attended, with good participation. Overall, the team concluded the training to be a worthwhile effort to address the licensee's shortcomings in this are The licensee stated that its success criterion or good in this area was to have greater than 95 percent of the supervisors trained regarding processing and handling employee concems before restart of Millstone Unit 3. The licensee considers " Forum for Leadership Excellence,"
" Managing for Nuclear Safety," " Civil Treatment," and "50.7 Familiarization," to be the training courses that must be completed by the supervisors of Unit 3 to satisfy the training objectiv The licensee's training department maintains a database to track those individuals that have taken the required training. The licensee made significant progress in this area and expects to meet its goal with its current schedul NNECO had surveys performed to determine ' rom employees how they believed tneir supervisors and managers were performing with respect to SCWE. Based on leadership survey feedback, low scoring managers work with the HR staff to develop individual i improvement plans. The team found that the criticisms of the low-scoring performers were I
directly addressed in the three improvement plans reviewed. The team found the licensee's program of training, employee surveys, and feedback to supervisors and managers to be an effective method for introducing and enforcing an SCWE at Millston ECP Trainina for Non-Supervisors and Manaaers The licensee's January 31,1997, " Comprehensive Plan for Reviewing and Dispositioning Safety Concems," states:
Employees will receive training about the new ECP program and the expectations set forth which detail the responsibilities of management and non-management employees as part of plan introduction and on a continuing basis as part of initial and annual Plant Access Training (PAT).
As part of its SCWE training for non-supervisors, the licensee held an SCWE standdown while the team was onsite. The standdown was intended to allow one hour for the supervisors to provide further discussion on the information presented in an SCWE videotape that was previously shown to the site personnel. The standdowns were held at the work group leve The team attended several of the standdown sessions. The team observed that the standdown sessions were well attended, promoted a good exchange of information, and led to the development of worthwhile action items. The team also viewed the SCWE videotape that was l previously shown to the staff and viewed the lesson plan material that accompanied the videotape and found the information to be helpful for establishing a safety-conscious work environment and informing the staff of their opportunity to use the ECP if they have concem ___ .. .
i l
l l
The team also attended a session of the licensee's " Civil Treatment for Employees," and
" Partnership Beyond 2000" training for employees. The " Civil Treatment for Employees" training outlined a standard of behavior that should be followed in the work environment. The
" Partnership Beyond 2000" training covered fostering a workplace environment in which employees felt welcome to raise safety concerns and it included training on the ECP. The team found that the ECP training plan was not being followed during the ECP portion of this training session. The ECP training plan was developed by the ECP staff and NNECO Professional Development Group and was formally reviewed and approved for use during the employee and management training sessions. Rather than performing the training as specified in the training plan, the training was given in a seminar format by the Director of the ECP, The team
,
'
questioned the Director of the ECP regarding this discrepancy. He stated that the initial feedback they received on the first training sessions indicated that the training plan material was too detailed for a training session intended for all employees. Therefore, the Director of the ECP changed to a seminar format that he personally presented (he further stated that the l training plan will be changed to ensure it reflects the training actually given).
l The team also reviewed the licensee's revision to its Plant Access Training (PAT) that covers j the training on the ECP program. Specifically, Plant Access Training Manual Module 7, dated
.
l May 21,1997, which covers " Employee Concerns" was evaluated by the team. The team l
'
found the training generally acceptable. However, the team found two parts of the training information to be potentially misleading. On page 7-2, the model states: "There are many ways an individual can go about resolving their concem. All are acceptable and may be exercised at any time and in any order." Furthermore, page 7-2 lists contacting the ECP office as one of the options that are acceptable to use at any time. Thus, from the beginning of the ECP discussion it is made cler that employees may choose any method in any order for mising their concem. However, a the detailed discussion on the ECP found on page 7-4, it '
states, in part, that "The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) is a program for employees and contractors who are not able to successfully resolve a concem with their line management." It further states that "The ECP is responsible for assisting individuals in resolving concerns not adequately addressed by line management." Although these statements are true, they imply that ECP is only a secondary outlet for raising concems. This portion of the PAT training does not mention that the ECP may be used at any time. This may confuse employees about when ECP can be used. The licensee was informed by the team that the page 7-4 wording may lead employees to assume that ECP was only a secondary method for raising concern Additionally, on page 7-8 of the PAT, it states, in part ". . . If a request for an NRC inspection is made, the NRC will: ... Protect the complainant from being discharged by the licensee for filing the complaint." This is potentially misleading since the Department of Labor, not the NRC, provides the process for obtaining a personal remedy for discrimination for raising violations or safety concems to the NR Lessons Leamed Trainino i
To promulgate lessons leamed during the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, the licensee uses handouts titled " Briefing Sheet for First-Line Supervisors." The supervisors are expected to pass this information to their subordinates. The licensee has not developted plans regarding conducting periodic refresher training specifically for the SCW . _ _ _ - _ . - _ _ ___ __ . _ - _ -___-
Conclusions The licensee has made significant improvements in the training provided to its staff regarding the Safety Conscious Work Environment and the Employee Concerns Program. Generally, the team found that the licensee'r program provides accurate and meaningful training on SCWE and ECP. The licensee is also ensuring training records are kept to ensure the training is given
. to those that require it and soliciting and using feedback to determine the training's effectiveness. However, the team found the ECP PAT training material to have a potentially misleading discussion regarding when employees could use the ECP and overstated the NRC's ability to maintain the confidentiality of the concemed individua .6 ECP Position Descriptions 5 valuation Scone The Millstone Independent Review Group (MIRG) report on " Handling of Employee Concerns and Allegations at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1,2, and 3 From 1985 to Present" dated September 1996 stated that "a lack of appropriate performance measures has presented an obstacle to the resolution of problems . . . " The report further stated that "a lack of position descriptions for some employees and managers appeared to have left both groups uncertain about their duties, responsibilities, and authority." During this evaluation, the team reviewed the position descriptions (PDs) for personnel involved with the ECP, Nuclear Oversight required by Technical Specifications for the restart of Unit Observations and Findinas in January 1997, Millstone implemented a program to revise and develop, as necessary, PDs for those positions needed for the recovery effort. The PDs that existed were difficult to use, maintained in several formats, varied in length, did not always contain measurable performance criteria, and were not consistently used forjob postings. As a result, the PDs available before January 1997 were infrequently used by HR personnel and not used at all by the line organization. In many cases, individuals interviewed by the MIRG were not aware PDs existed for their position Since January 1997, more than 100 PDs have been developed. The PDs were written in two basic formats, one for the corporate officers that outline major responsibilities and one for the remainder of the personnel that describe accountabilities. Having a section of the PDs that outlined position accountabilities was important because one of the root causes identified by the MIRG involved a general lack of knowledge of individual accountabilit The new PDs were developed using information for similar positions from Florida Power and Light, Virginia Power, and PECO Energy. In this effort, once a PD was developed, meetings were conducted with managers and supervisors either in groups, one-to-one, or electronicall If the meeting was held electronically, the recipient was provided with instructions, guides, and a template to use during the review. After incorporating any comments, the final PDs were typically sent electronically for review, concurrence and further comment . When the user was satisfied with the PD, the PD was submitted to management, Director, and Vice President level
_ - - - - - - - - - - - -
.-
for approval. When approved, the new PD becomes the official PD for that position and is effective immediatel There were many positive aspects of the PD development process, including the following: The PDs were developed using information from several sources. Sources of h information include the line organization, position descriptions from other nuclear power plants, ANSI commitments from ANSI N18.1-1971," Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," and ANSI /ANS 3.1-1981, "American National Standard for Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," and Technical Specification . By June 30,1998, the plan is to have all positions on-site at Millstone covered by a new format PD. The team was informed that about 80 percent of the onsite positions had b PDs at the start of the PD development proces . The new PDs are being used for job postings. In the past, the supervisor responsible for the position developed a unique job posting. Standard PDs allow personnel to know and understand the job requirements and the skills and knowledge expected for that positio . All PDs, including those for exempt and non-exempt employees and for the corporate officers, contain accountabilities related to demonstration of a " strong commitment to handling employee concerns in a competent, respectful, and responsive manner" and a
" commitment to creating a work environment supportive of positive, honest, and open exchange of ideas." PDs developed for the ECP supervisors and staff are written to ensure that the ECP program can be carried out in an effective and accountable manne . PDs that are common to all three units, e.g., Operations Manager, Shift Manager, etc.,
are being developed once and then applied to all three units. This should reduce the potential for isolating each unit from the other units. Changes and modifications to this type of generic PD will require input from all three unit . The licensee planned to use the accountabilities in the PDs in future employee performance appraisal . The new PDs, as they are approved, are available using LINKS, Northeast Utilities'
computer-based goal setting and performance review syste During the evaluation of the ECP, Nuclear Oversight, and restart PDs, the team identified several position descriptions that did not contain accountabilities related to employee concerns and SCWE commensurate with the positions. These positions included Director, Regulatory Affairs, and Director, Nuclear Services. The team also identified several PDs that contained accountabilities that, as written, could be construed to be skill __ __
- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - _ __ __
,
.-
l l
l During the followup period onsite, the team was informed that, based on the comments in the l
preceding paragraph, the PDs were to be revised. PDs for all supervisors and managers would I
contain the additional statement " Resolves, fosters, and created a Safety Conscious Work Environment supportive of positive, honest, and open exchange of ideas and differing opinions." 4 i For other exempt (non-supervisory) and non-exempt PDs, the following accountability l statement will be added, " Demonstrated the willingness to report and contribute to the l resolution of employee concems and contribute to a Safety Conscious Work Environment
!
supportive of positive, honest, and open exchange of ideas and differing opinions."
Conclusion
! The position descriptions reviewed are uniform in format, contain similarly phrased performance requirements, and contain measurable performance requirements. The position descriptions reviewed each contain measurable criteria for employee concerns and a safety-conscious work j environment. The position descriptions reviewed should make it possible for employees to
! judge their own performance against measurable, known standards and to compare their individual performance to the performance of their peers in similar position .7 ECP/SCWE Metrics and Trendina
,
Evaluation Scoon The team reviewed, evaluated, and compared the Millstone 3 performance indicators related to l the ECP and the SCWE for the periods ending November 21,1997, December 5,1997, j January 2,1998, and January 9,1998.
L Observations and Findinas l
l The Millstone 3 Performance Indicator Report (M3PI) is intended to track and trend the '
readiness of the Millstone station and Millstone 3 to restart. Data tracked includes information j related to common restart readiness indications, operations indicators, maintenance indicators, '
corrective actions, engineering indicators, and safety-conscious Work Environment indicator Interviews with personnel responsible for developing and distributing the M3P1 stated one difficulty associated with the M3P1 is the manner in which to present the information. This is especially true when there is a change in the data being tracked. For example in the November 21 M3PI, the dsta tracked for the " Problem Area Action Plan Status" were the '
number of action plans still to be developed and the number of action plans in place in the .
December 5 M3PI, the data tracked for the " Problem Area Action Plan Status" were the number l
of open focus areas. The change in the data being tracked was a result of the experience of l plant personnel in developing action plans. They felt that the total number of open focus areas was a better indicator than the number of action plans needing developmen During interviews, the team was informed that the M3PI data are available to all onsite personnel. Although the same information is provided, it is possible to customize the material to fit the needs of the audience. This helps to ensure that the data being reviewed are pertinent and not confusing to the audienc __ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
l The team noted during the review of the M3P1 that, in spite of apparent major increases and decreases in the data, the trend of the data was in the appropriate directions. In most cases, the trend is in the downward, or improving, directio During the review of the four packages, the team noticed that while the data changed every week (or a note was provided as to the currency of the data), the Analysis / Action section of the reports did not always change and at times had little connection with the data. This was !
especially noticeable in the chart titled " Corrective Action Program issue Management Condition Report Corrective Action Status, MP2." Between the December 5,1997, report and l the January 2,1998, report, the axis, and the data displayed, was changed from January - July l l to July - June. Unfortunately, the Analysis / Action was not changed at the same time and still notes that "Jan/Feb overdue corrective action information not available." It should be noted that the Analysis / Action for this chart was changed in the January 9,1998 report.
l Conclusions The Millstone 3 Performance Indicator Reports present data in an informative, concise, to the point manner. The reports are used by management to trend attributes identified as being crucial to restart. The reports are felt by management to be useful tools for tracking and l trending restart information and data, as well as data and information related to the ECP and i the SCWE. Based on the review of the reports, it appears that the ECP program at Millstone Nuclear Power Station is more effective now, in 1998, than it was in 1996, when the Millstone Independent Review Group (MIRG) report on " Handling of Employee Concems and Allegations
!
at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1,2, and 3 From 1985 to Present" was released. If the trends in the reports continue, the ECP will continue to improv .8 ECP Interfaces Evaluation Scone The team evaluated the interface between the HR and ECP organizations against the criteria in IP 40001 and the applicable portions of the licensee's Comprehensive Plan. The team reviewed the applicable organization charts, and the ECP and HR protocol document, and interviewed individuals from the ECP, hrs, and Contract Administration to evaluate this are Observations and Findinos The licensee's Comprehensive Plan states:
2.3 Organizational, Policy and Procedure Changes NNECO intends to assign a senior HR individual to be matrixed to the President and CEO, Nuclear, who will be responsible for human resource matters at the nuclear facilitie NNECO intends to perform a review and modification of HR procedures, performance review processes, and the supervisory selection process to ensure that successful
'
addressing of employee concerns and handling dissenting / differing opinions are viewed
)
_ _ - _ _ __ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
f as positive supervisory attributes that gain positive recognition. Protocol, expectations
,
NNECO intends to recognize individuals bringing fonward significant nuclear safety l issues and other enhancements, not limited to technical domains.
!
The team verified that a senior HR manager was matrixed into the Millstone onsite organization and was interfacing with the ECP and line management on a frequent basis.
l The team reviewed the licensee's revised staffing procedures and verified that they ensure that l successfully addressing employee concerns and handling dissenting and differing opinions are l viewed as positive supervisory attributes.
l l The team also reviewed the licensee's initiative for recognizing individuals that bring forward l significant nuclear safety issues and other enhancements. The licensee promulgated this
'
initiative in an August 5,1997, memorandum from the CEO to the Nuclear Leadership. This memorandum encourages timely verba! feedback to recognize individuals who identify
-
problems or help resolve the problems. The Nmorandum also allows for other more substantial types of recognition as the local line management considers appropriate. The team noted that two individuals were publicly recognized for identifying the potential for contamination in recently dredged sludge.
!
The team separately interviewed the ECP Enhancement Program Project Manager and the HR Director and Managing Partner to assess the working relationship between ECP and HR. Both i managers believed the relationship between these two groups has recently improved greatly.
! As part of this relationship, HR assigned two individuals to work on the ECP staff. The HR and I ECP staffs have participated in joint meetings. The two organizations also have developed a formal protocol signed by the Director, ECP and Vice President - HR. The protocol provides a l'
formalized process to be used to handle employee concerns referred to the HR organization by the EC The team also interviewed the Director, Contracts and Project Management, and the Manager, i Contracts, about their organization. They stated that any discipline to contractors is done j mainly by the contractors' organization. Because of the recent problems that occurred in the '
motor-operated valves (MOV) organization, the licensee has taken a number of corrective
'
actions to ensure adverse actions are not the result of protected activities. The licensee has instructed the contractors that formal discipline must be reviewed by the Executive Review Board to ensure it is not the result of harassment, intimidation, discrimination or retaliatio They ir;terface regularly with ECP regarding cases involving contractors. They also wrote a new procedure, " Procurement and Administration of Contractor Services, OA 13," to improve
, the overall management of contractors. The contractor closeout checklist also offers'an ECP
!
session for those contract employees leaving Millstone. The responsibility for ensuring this closeout checklist is completed is with the contracto The team also interviewed the HR Recovery Officer about his role. He stated he was required by the CEO to provide guidance for HR-related issues for a 3-to-5-month oeriod, ending in February 1998. The team was informed recently that the Vice President - Human Services has ,
___ - _ _____ - _ _ _ _ __ _ _
!
l
l
'
taken over those responsibilities. He stated that the day-to-day management of the on-site HR staff is performed by the HR Director and Managing Business Partner. His major focus is on
'
three areas (1) improving consistency of HR policy implementation at the Millstone site; (2)
developing a leadership and team building training program for all Millstone employees; and (3)
developing a strategic work force plan.
- Conclusions l
The team concluded the interface between the ECP and HR organizations has greatly improved over that noted by the MIRG. The team determined that the licensee's initiative for recognizing individuals for bringing up concerns provided positive encouragement for identifying potential j safety issues.
l ECP Exit interviews l
Evaluation Scooe The team evaluated the licensee's process for giving employees and contractors an opportunity to participate in an exit interview with the ECP at the time of detachment from NNECO.
! Observations and Findinas in accordance with the Employee Concerns Program Manual (ECPM), Revision 2, all NNECO employees assigned to NNECO Nuclear shall either be given an opportunity to participate in an
, exit interview with the ECP or be given a letter requesting any concems the individual may have l at the time of detachment from NNECO. Contractors have the option to participate in an ECP l exit interview.
l The requirements in the ECPM for conducting an exit interview are brief, informing the individual about the ECP exit process, and interviewing the individual if he or she acknowledges a concem. The ECPM includes an interview guideline that can be used during an exit interview to ensure that concems are fully documented. If the individual states that they do not have a l
concem, the individual is advised that he or she may contact the ECP in the future to discuss a concern. Exiting employees and contractors are provided an ECP Concern initiation Form and a business reply envelope. If an exiting employee fails to appear for an exit interview, ECP will send a letter to the individual requesting any concerns that the irdividual may have. All exit interviews are logge One recommendation that was made by LHC in this area was to require contractors to receive an exit interview. The licensee committed that all exiting contractors will be asked by their employers to sign a form stating that they were afforded an opportunity to have an exit interview with the ECP, that they have no concems, and that they were given a phone number for the ECP in case they recollect a concern after having left the sit Conclusions The team convuded that the exit interview process has improved and provided an adequate means to obt u employee input upon their detachment from NNEC .10 Self-Assessments
,
- Evaluation Scope l The team evaluated the licensee's monitoring and auditing of the ECP organization by intemal and extemal organizations. The team interviewed appropriate personnel, and reviewed several assessment reports and applicable procedure Observations and Findinos The licensee implements its assessment program by Nuclear Group Procedure (NGP) 2.38,
- * Nuclear Assessment Program." This procedure estat^s expectations for the nuclear assessment program philosophy, structure, and proces . inere are three main types of assessments used by the licensee: self-assessments, independent intemal assessments, and external assessments. 'A self-assessment is conducted by individuals within the department or i organization. An independent intemal assessment is conducted by an organization such as l Nuclear Oversight or the ECOP. An extemal assessment is conducted by INPO or the NRC; in the case of Millstone, LHC would be considered an external assessment organization.
l To implement the nuclear assessment program at Millstone, NGP 2.38 provides guidance to l develop lower tier procedures that are used to conduct assessments. NGP 2.38 allows l departments or organizations the flexibility to choose different self-assessment procedures in order to use a variety of techniques for different circumstances. The ECP Organization chose Nuclear Oversight Department Quality Procedure (NOQP) 1.05, "Self-Assessment Process," to
, perform its latest self-assessments. This lower tier procedure was written for the Nuclear l Oversight department to provide guidance for the scheduling, preparation, performance, and
!
reporting of Nuclear Oversight Department self-assessments. The procedure is well written and
! provides more than enough guidance for the ECP organization to perform an effective self-l- assessment. Completed self-assessment reports are provided to ECP managers, the Vice President (VP) of Operations who also serves as the SCWE Sponsor, and the ECO Important findings and conclusions from these reports are disseminated to the ECP staff either through required reading files, training or group discussions.
l The team reviewed the first self-assessment report by the ECP organization,97-EC-1, l " Progress Against Comprehensive Plan implementation," dated June 10,1997. The ECP l organization used NOQP 3.06, "Self-Assessment Process," the predecessor to NOQP 1.05, to perform the self-assessment. The purpose of 97-EC-1 was to evaluate the progress made towards implementing the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan, which was designed to improve the ECP. The report discussed areas of success, es well as areas requiring
'
improvement. The team found the report to be rather brief, but interviews revealed the self-assessment to be adequately critical. However, the team noted that deficiencies identified with case files were not specifically identified in the report, nor was a corrective action plan
w______________ _ -_____ ___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
developed. Other corrective actions were not entered into a formal tracking system, but were being followed informall The team reviewed self-assessment 97-EC-3, * Comprehensive Plan Action item Documentation Files," dated November 21,1997. NOQP 3.06 was also used to perform this self-assessment of the quality and completeness of action item closure files for the Comprehensive Plan. This self-assessment found that out of 128 closed action item files reviewed,6 files needed to be reopened for additional action, and 9 in files the controlling Comprehensive Plan action item needed to be revised to better reflect actions taken. The body of this , report was also brief, but corrective actions were tracked by reopening action item files, and by writing A/R-9702325 The team reviewed self-assessment 97-EC-7, "ECP Implementation Effectiveness," dated December 5,1997. NOQP 1.05 was used to perform this self-assessment of selected Comprehensive Plan items, licensee commitments in response to LHC recommendations, ECP staff and HR staff working relationship improvements, and actions taken to address previous ECP self-assessments. The team found this self-assessment report to be more detailed, discussing strengths, weaknesses, findings and significant deficiencies, and observations. The team roted a repeat of an area requiring improvement (ECP office space and working environ nent) from self-assessment 97-EC-1. The repeated observation may have occurred becauso corrective actions from the first self-assessment were not formally tracked for completion. The team found tracking of corrective actions in 97-EC-7 to be improved over the first two self-assessment reports in that the Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS)
was used to track weaknesses and observations to ensure completion. No significant deficiencies (a program element that could result in significant consequences) were noted in the repor The team reviewed self-assessment 97-EC-4, *ECP Corrective Action Implementation," dated December 10,1997. This self-assessment did not identify any significant deficiencies, but noted that there was no guidance on tracking corrective actions are tracked to completion, what steps are taken when corrective actions become overdue, and no plan for evaluating the effectiveness of corrective actions. The self-assessment found that in all files reviewed, investigative findings were properly translated into corrective actions, corrective actions were being tracked, and corrective actions were verified complete before file closure. The team found this report to be well writte The team reviewed self-assessment 97-EC-2, "ECP Concern Case Files," dated December 12, 1997. The purpose of this self-assessment was to determine the extent of case file deficiencies identified by self-assessment 97-1, evaluate case file deficiencies identified by LHC, develop and implement a corrective action plan, and assess the current status of the case files after completion of corrective actions. When ECP management was presented with the results of this self-assessment, a corrective action plan was developed and subsequently complete The team found the report to be well written, and corrective actions were adequately resolved.
The team requested internalindependent assessments of the ECP organization that might have been done by the Quality Assurance organization, Nuclear Safety Assessment Board, or an ad-
_ _ _ _ _
- - _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _
l hoc committee. There were no recent assessments available for review. Intemal independent assessments conducted by the ECOP are discussed in Section 5.1 The team reviewed extemal assessments of the ECP organization done by LHC. LHC generally reported its findings and assessment recommendations during public meeting presentations to the NNECO and the NRC. The meetings occurred on May 13, June 3, July 22, September 24, and November 13,1997. These findings and recommendations for improvement are being tracked by LHC and by NNECO. LHC also reported periodically on its !
assessment of the ECP program to the NRC during Commission meetings, the last being held I on December 12,1997. At that meeting, LHC concluded that it did not consider the j effectiveness of the ECP program to be satisfactory principally because of limited data that l identify relatively high percentage of workers (about 30 percent) who had used the program had
'
indicated they would not use it again. LHC did not understand the reasons for this and, therefore, conservatively rated the program unsatisfactory. LHC informed the Commission that except for that issue, it would have rated the ECP program satisfactory. Subsequent assessments by LHC concluded that this issue was resolved based on favorable results of more complete dat Conclusions
,
'
The team concluded that ECP self-assessments were adequately self-critical. The latest self-assessment reports were improved as compared to the first several reports. The licensee was adequately tracking most of its self-assessment corrective actions. The December 1997, external assessment of the ECP organization by LHC was generally positive. The ECP would have been rated satisfactory except for indications of poor satisfaction with users of the program. The licensee's tracking of LHC's recommendations was initially slow but now is satisfactory. Self-assessment and extemal assessment findings and recommendations were appropriately disseminated to plant management and staf .0 Emolovee Concerns Oversicht Pane!
The Employee Concems Oversight Panel (ECOP)is composed of a diverse group of Millstone empicyees ranging from non-exempt workers to exempt managers. The ECOP monitors the Millstone Station employee workplace environment and provides independent oversight and assessment of the ECP organizatio Evaluation Scone The team evaluated the effectiveness of the ECOP by interviewing appropriate licensee personnel, by reviewing the ECOP charter and implementing procedures, and by reviewing ECOP assessments of the ECP organizatio Observations and Findinas ECOP is composed of a diverse group of Millstone employees including non-exempt workers and exempt managers. ECOP monitors the Millstone workplace environment and provides independent oversight and assessment of the ECP organization. It is composed of a
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ - - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ . .
Chairperson, three non-exempt employees, two exempt non-supervisory employees, two exempt supervisory employees, and two consultants. There is also a group of attemates that can sit on the ECOP under certain circumstances, as set forth in the charter. Although ECOP began its duties in mid-1997, most people involved at that time were serving on a part-time basis, which made it difficult for ECOP to perform meaningful activities. A sufficient level of dedicated full-time employees was not achieved until October 1997, when the ECOP began to function full I The team determined that ECOP was sufficiently independent from the ECP organization that it was chartered to oversee. The ECOP Chairperson, who is responsible for the day-to-day functions of ECOP, reports to the President and CEO-Nuclear. Reports, surveys, and
,
assessments generated by ECOP reach high levels of management within the licensee's '
,
organization, such as the President and CEO-Nuclear, ECP Director, VP of Nuclear Oversight, l l Nuclear Committee to the Board of Trustees, Nuclear Committee Advisory Team and VP I Operations who is also the SCWE Sponso The team reviewed the ECOP charter and implementation procedures. The charter was clear i and concise, and described the responsibilities, panel composition, meetings, self-l assessments, qualifications and training, ECOP activities, and reports. The ECOP implements its charter through the use of the Protocol Set (implementation procedures). The Protocol Set contained sufficient information and covered a wide range of areas to enable the ECOP to carry l out its chartered functions. The Protocol Set covered oversight and assessment of the ECP, l review of HIRD cases, workplace environment assessment, third party reviews, employee termination reviews, meeting protocol, self-assessments, responding to concerned individuals, verification and validation of Comprehensive Plan action items, and assessment of the HR ;
organizatio j l
The team noted that the ECOP generally conducts its day-to-day business in accordance with
,
the Protocol Set. An exception was ECOP-05, " Employee Termination Review." After the l
issuance of the ECOP-05 in August 1997, an Executive Review Board (ERB) was formed in October 1997, and was tasked with a function similar to one assigned to the ECOP; i.e., to review any significant personnel action at Millstone before the action is taken to ensure that it is proper and prudent, and not the result of harassment, intimidation, discrimination, or retaliatio As described in the ERB charter, the ECOP Chairperson is to serve as an ex officio member.
l At the time of the evaluation, there were conflicts between the ERB charter and the ECOP-05.
l
'
The ECOP Chairperson stated that the ECOP-05 would most likely require a revision to reflect the ECOP's new role with the ER The charter states that the ECOP members will receive training and complete training i
requirements in order to meet certain qualifications. The team obtained the ECOP Skills and Training Plan to determine what core skills were required of ECOP members. The ECOP Administrator determines which training requirements are applicable to each ECOP panelis The core skills are " Legal issues," " Investigation Skills - Interviewing," and the "ECP Process."
l In addition to the core skills, the ECOP skills and training plan lists advanced skills that may be required of some of the panelists; as determined by the ECOP Administrator. The advanced skills are (1) nuclear acclimatization, (2) investigation skills - root cause, (3) communicating with regulators, (4) report ability and operability, (5) p?nt systems, (6) presentation skills, (7) habits
i L________________._.__.___________ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
of highly effective people, (8) teamwork, (9) self-assessment, (10) corrective action processes, (11) professional dissent, and (12) conflict management. The team concluded that the training was appropriate for the type of oversight work the ECOP panelists perfor The team attended several ECOP daily meetings and one working meeting. The purpose of the l
daily meetings was to allow the ECOP members to informally meet as a group to discuss daily I activities, to keep the group informed as to what activities members were currently following, I and to discuss items of interest. The meetings were brief but Informative. The working meeting attended by the team was held instead of a formal ECOP meeting because a quorum could not be reached, as required by the ECOP-06, " Meeting Protocol." Much of the meeting focused on j preparations for assembly and issuance of ECOP's fourth quarter report. No formal ECOP '
meetings were held during the team's onsite evaluation phase. However, the team reviewed formal meeting agendas and minutes. Generally, the meeting minutes met the requirements of ECOP-06 that important commitments and recommendations be documente The team identified some documentation weaknesses in ECOP's activities. The team noted the varying quality of the meeting minutes. Some minutes were extremely brief, did not describe the panel's discussions, and did not report the conclusions of the discussions. There were
,
instances in which some agenda topics for a meeting were not subsequently documented in the
!
'
approved and issued minutes; and some minutes contained administrative errors, such as incorrect times and dates. While these errors by themselves may not be reflective of the ECOP's overall performance, they indicated some sloppiness and inattention to detail.
l One of the more significant products produced by the ECOP is its quarterly report, the first of
' which was issued for the third quarter of 1997. One of the purposes of the report is to qualitatively assess the four major attributes of Millstone's SCWE as either " satisfactory",
"needs improvement", or " unsatisfactory." The four attributes are (1) Employee Willingness to Raise Concems; (2) Concems are Effectively Handled by Management; (3) ECP Effectiveness; and (4) Focus Area Recognition and Resolution. Included with the report are the ECOP's bases for the ratings and any recommendations for improvement.
l In accordance with procedure ECOP-06, " Meeting Protocol", issues will generally be decided by l a consensus of the panel (consensus is not defined), and when a consensus cannot be l reached, the decisions will require a positive vote from at least a three-quarters majority of the panel. If the panelis unable to reach a consensus or a three-quarters majority, a representative of each of the d;ffering opinions writes an opinion that becomes a part of the meeting minutes. The team observed that this protocol was not always followed. In some cases, differing opinions were not written, and in others, less than a three-quarters majority of the Panel approved a decision.
l An important function of the ECOP is to try to identify instances of HIRD, to review the l workplace for chilling effect, and to identify and report " focus areas." The ECOP's method early detection of potential conflicts is the use of the ECOP surveys routinely given to various work groups at Millstone. The responses gathered are trended and tracked and feedback is provided to the surveyed groups quickly. The team reviewed survey results from the third-quarter survey (the first one completed by ECOP) and some preliminary raw data from the i
fourth quarter survey. About 320 workers answered the surveys and a preliminary evaluation indicated there was not much difference in the results. Of particular importance is a series of
i I
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _____-__ - -_ ___ _-__- _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
nine questions that the ECOP believed strongly relate to the SCWE at Millstone. Some of the questions are: "it is easy for me to approach my supervisor to discuss whatever is on my mind";
"if I heard of a nuclear safety concern issue, I would bring it to the attention of my immediate
!
supervisor"; and "my management encourages me to bring up concems." Over 92 percent of the workers agreed with those statement The ECOP organization is also chartered to overseeing and assessing the ECP. The ECOP 4 organization uses ECOP-01, " Oversight and Assessment of the ECP," to monitor and assess
.
ECP activities. The team reviewed several assessments of the ECP, including: " Review of the l
ECP Manual and NGP 2.15 - Guidelines for the Handling of Employee Concems," "ECP Focus
!
Grr 'los Summary," and ECP Review - Third Quarter." The team found the reports to be of
) 90. . quality, containing various recommendations to improve the areas audite The team also reviewed reports prepared by the ECOP for two potential retaliation and chilling j ef' . ' 1 vents. The " Training Discipline Assessment Report" and the "MOV Discipline )
Asassment Report" contained several good recommendations to senior plant management.
i During discc lons with ECOP personnel, the team noted that the ECOP, being newly formed, l
did not bocc. : involved in investigating the training and MOV issues until well after their occurrence. .ne protocol between various groups investigating those events, such as HR, the ECP, the SCWE, and the ECOP had not been worked out, and the ECOP was not fully recognized by these other organization :
The team reviewed the ECOP's mechanism to track findings and recommendations from their
>
reports and assessments. The ECOP Chairman stated that use of the AITTS would not be appropriate since some actions could be of a confidential nature. Therefore, the ECOP uses its own database to track findings and recommendations. The team obtained a copy of the ;
database and found findings and recommendations assigned to responsible individuals, with !
appropriate due dates. Most of the actions were being completed prior to their due date l The ECOP Prctocol Set (ECOP-07, "Self-Assessment") requires self-assessments to be done during formal ECOP meetings to identify strengths and weaknesses, and on a periodic basis to
,
'
determine how effectively the ECOP is fulfilling its mission. A formal self-assessment had just been completed by one of the ECOP's contractors. However, the report was not yet complete or available to be reviewed by the tea Conclusions The ECOP is an independent, diverse, group of site employees that reports to President and CEO - Nuclear. The ECOP charter is clear and concise and the Protocol Set is used to carry out the ECOP's functions. Based on a number of individuals assigned to ECOP at the time of the evaluation, the ECOP appears overtaxed to perform all the activities denoted in its Protocol
'
Set. Although the ECOP was slow to develop, it now appears to be functioning effectively, particularly in its function of assessing ECP activities and surveys of workers. The ECOP function did not appear to be widely understood by site personnel and ECOP was often confused with the ECP organization. Some documentation weaknesses were noted in ECOP products (meeting minutes and the third quarter report).
t
!
L - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ Safetv-Conscious Work Environrnent
, Evaluation Scoon I
in September 1996, the NRC Millstone Independent Review Group (MIRG) issued a report which concluded that in general, an unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not welcome or promete a questioning attitude, had existed at Millstone for at least several years. This poor work environment resulted in repeated instances of discrimination and ineffective handling of employen concems. The team evaluated the licensee's actions to improve the SCWE. Assessment of the licensee's actions with respect to the MIRG identified seven principal root causes of continued employee concem problems at
- Millstone presented in the attachment to this repor Observations and Findinas ~
l Many of the observations and findings presented in the above sections on the ECP and the ECOP apply to the SCWE. In particular, Section 5.5, "ECP/SCWE Training and Qualifications,"
and Section 5.7, "ECP/SCWE Metrics and Trending," contain discussions directly applicable to SCWE. The team had the following SCWE observation SCWE Staffino and Organizational Suocort
, Until about November-December 1997, staffing and organizational support for SCWE appeared l weak. There was no formal organization and vacancies related to SCWE activities werit unfilled. There appeared to be little or no central organizational focus, and staff personnel did not appear to be held accountable for their SCWE activities. NNECO appeared to have had implemented several major program activities to improve performance in this area and had appointed the Recovery Officer for Unit 3 as the Executive Sponsor for the program, but there was no " umbrella" group to coordinate the program The team observed, however, that as of the time of the first week of the evaluation (December 8-12,1997), there was evidance of more focused attention to SCWE activitie The former Recovery Officer for Unit 3 had been promoted on December 1,1997, to a new l
'
position, Vice President for Operations, in which he was assigned operational control for all 3 units while still maintaining executive sponsorship for SCWE activities. A formal SCWE organization was established and specific responsibilities for personnel in the organization were delineated. All open vacancies in the SCWE organization were filled. Further, the ECP
, organization was directed to report to the Vice President for Operations rather than to the Vice l President of Nuclear Oversight. The Vice President for Operations met daily with managers
'
from the SCWE organization to assure that they were meeting their goals and responsibilitie The team attended one such meeting in which the Vice President for Operations directed that NNECO respond to LHC recommendations within 30 days of NNECO receiving the recommendations. This was a significant step forwerd because in the past there had been examples of responses taking 3 months and longer. Also, the entire SCWE staff began to meet !
twice weekly to discuss issues and schedules. A new Comprehensive Plan was published that captured all of the several SCWE programs into one document and included major milestones
1 l
l
- _ _ . _-_ __ -__- _ ___- _ - -_-__ . -
for each listed task. These were all indications of increased organizational support for SCWE activitie Manaaement Leadershio Survev and Communications Trainina In November 1997 the site conducted another leadership survey (the third in a series, the others having been done in November 1996 and June 1997). The surveys are meant to try to capture staff sentiment on the performance of site leaders (first-line supervisors and above)
with respect to SCWE and the ability of the leaders to communicate with their staffs. In general, the results continue to show improvement. For example, from a total of 2597 responses (1756 employees and 841 contractors), the raw scores improved from 4.71 in November 1996, to 5.70 in June 1997, to 5.80 in November 1997. The raw scores are based on a numerical rating system. Employees were asked to rate a leader either ineffective,-
somewhat effective, effective, very effective, or extraordinary, with a corresponding numerical rating from 1 (ineffective) to 8 (extraordinary). If a supervisor or manager is rated less than 4 (effective), senior management uses that information to identify that group as a potential focus area and takes corrective action such as initiating a program to help the supervisor or manager to improve.
l The team observed a 3-hour SCWE training session for managers and supervisors. Of l
particular note was a brief presentation that informed the attendees that in order to be a good l leader, they must be able to communicate with their staffs and this included being able to listen.
The instructor elaborated on this and said that the first thing they should do when meeting with i
'
their staffs is to turn off pagers, telephones, and any other distractions so they can concentrate on what is being said. The team directly observed occasions during the week where the meetings were interrupted by communication device Identification and Resolution of Focus (oroblem) Areas '
l As part of its SCWE, the licensee had set up a program to identify and resolve focus areas (formerly called problem areas), which it defined as areas of personnelinteraction where an i SCWE was challenged or did not exist. The object was to identify these areas before they erupted into organizational crise The team reviewed the Problem Areas Plan which describes the standards, expectations, and course of action to address focus areas. This plan calls for specific action plans to be
- developed for each focus area. The team interviewed the lead employee for the identification
- and resolution of focus areas. The team also reviewed the action plans used to resolve focus areas.
L The team found that the licensee had made considerable progress in the identifying of focus areas, development of actions plans, and plan implementatio The team found some weaknesses in the action plans used for resolution of focus area Specifically, the team found weaknesses in the program with respect to (1) prioritizing focus areas by significance, (2) high-level management review and attention, both in the development and implementation of the action plans, (3) assurance that the scope of its action plan is
l
adequate and addresses all possible organizational areas, (4) consistency and quality amongst the action plans, (5) setting and scheduling milestones, (6) developing the basis for closing the action plans as complete, (7) evaluating the effectiveness of meeting goals and objectives of each action plan, and (8) identifying action plans as confidential and follow procedures for confidentiality, as is done with other documents dealing with personnel actions.
I SCWE Lona-Ranoe Plan The team found that the licensee had not sufficiently developed plans for long-range actions to enhance and maintain an SCWE. Specifically, processes for maintaining the ECP and SCWE infrastructure, monitoring performance, (including recognizing program degradations), and phasing out oversight organizations were not addressed in licensee planning documentation.
l The team was concerned that NNECO did not appear to be focusing sufficient attention on
!
'
plans for maintaining a SCWE following the restart of a Millstone unit. Although informal plans had been made, there was no formal action documented. Subsequent to the onsite evaluation, in February 1998, NNECO met with the Commission and discussed its documer,t * Progress Toward Restart Readiness and Long Term Improvement at Millstone Station." The plan
,
identified key performance indicators and self-assessment activities that would be used to l continue monitoring performance at Millstone. It organized the plan into five strategic areas:
- Safety; Operating Excellence; Work Environment; Organization Effectiveness; and External
! Relations. The SCWE is one of three subsections of Work Environment. However, the plan was not complete. Under the section called " Improvement Plans," which contained the five strategic areas, only a draft SCWE improvement plan was included and there were no elements I for monitoring and maintaining an SCWE. Subsequent to the evaluation, NNECO on March 31,1998, submitted to the NRC additional information on its plans for organizational
, support for a SCWE following restart of a Millstone uni Executive Review Board Activities in the summer and fall of 1997, there were instances at Millstone that involved disciplinary actions against NNECO employees and contractors that caused, or threatened to cause, chilling effects because of the way they were handled. A contributing factor to the potential chilling effect of these disciplinary actions was that decisions had not had appropriate management review before the actions were taken. In response to these events, Millstone formed the ERB, which reviews proposed disciplinary actions against NNECO employees and contractor The ERB finalized its charter on December 16,1997. The four board members were the Vice President of Operations; the Director, HR; the Manager of Contracts; and the issue Manager for the SCWE. Ex officio members were the Chairman of the ECOP; a representative of the SCWE group; and a representative of Legal. Guests, investigators, and support personnel
- attend ERB meetings.
l
!
The ERB reviews the proposed personnel actions before it is taken whenever line management believes there is a need to take a personnel action involving a company or contractor
i l
employee. The primary consideration of the ERB is whether the proposed action could involve the potential for discrimination in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.7, in particular:
.
whether the employee to be affected has engaged in protected activity, either before or concurrent with the proposed action
.
whether the proposed action is in retaliation for any activity or creates an appearance of retaliation
=
consistency and appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action
-
present and potential chilling effect impact of the proposed action To assist the ERB in its deliberations, two Millstone procedures were developed: OA-15,
" Progressive Corrective Discipline Guidelines for Nuclear Management," Revision O, which was effective January 19,1998, and OA-13, " Procurement and Administration of Contractor Services," Revision 1, effective January 30,199 OA-13 included an SCWENendor out-processing checklist that an exiting contractor is requested to sign. The checklist includes three statements: (1) that the contractor had been afforded the opportunity to have an exit interview with ECP; (2) that he did not have knowledge of any undocumented deficiencies or concems; and (3) that he had been provided with a phone number and address to provide any additional information that is recollected after leaving Millstone. The procedure required that the ERB be notified before any formal disciplinary action was taken against any contractor employee. All contractors onsite had been notified by NNECO of this requiremen The team observed an ERB meeting and determined that the meeting format allowed to ERB to accomplish the goals and objectives as intende The team noted that the ERB charter and process did not include reviews of significant personnel actions that were non-disciplinary. In one case, while the team was onsite a significant personnel action was taken regarding reassignment of a supervisor with a potential chilling effect on employees in his organization. Involvement by the ERB in this action may have resulted in a more appropriate handling of the issu NNECO Resoonse to Personnel Action Incidents Since the summer of 1997, there have been several high visibility incidents at Millstone station involving the SCWE, the ECP, and potential HIRD issues. In July 1997, there was an event involving licensee disciplinary actions against present and former training department staf Those disciplinary actions resulted in allegations of discrimination and chilling effect on other members of the work force. In July - August 1997, another event occurred involving personnel actions taken against two contractors working in the motor-operator valve (MOV) depadmen Those personnel actions were subsequently considered inappropriate and remedial actions were taken by NNECO. The actions also had implications of potential chilling effect onsite workers. In a third incident, which occurred while the team was onsite, a manager in the
_ _ _ _ _ _
F maintenance department was removed from his position and transferred to another departmen This event resulted in concerns raised by those working for the supervisor regarding the appropriateness of this actio i While each of these incidents resulted due to deficiencies in licensee processes or lack of management sensitivity to personnel actions taken (e.g., potential for chilling effect), NNECO took deliberate and prompt actions associated with resolving issues raised by each of the incidents. The two incidents'that occurred in late summer of 1997, led to SCWE program adjustments and enhancements. Once the potentially chilling effect of the incidents was recognized, actions were taken to assess and allay those concems. With respect to disciplina y actions, NNECO took steps, including the formation of the ERB, to provide additional measures to assess potential discrimination and its chilling effects. Licensee actions to recognize and more proactively address emerging issues was demonstrated in NNECO's initial response to the third incident discussed above. The team considers that each of the incidents show l managements willingness to admit to mistakes or problems in their processes and a willingness j
'
to take prompt actions to address the cause. The team also considers that measures taken by the licensee, including SCWE training and formation of the ERB, should serve to avoid better handle developing personnel actions, such as the two incidents that occurred in the late
,
summer of 1997.
i l Closure of NNECO resoonse to Notice of Violation 96-59-13 l
- in a June 4,1996, letter, the NRC sent a Notice of Violation (NOV) to and imposed a civil
'
penalty of $100,000 on, NNECO for violation of 10 CFR 50.7(a) for discrimination against a contractor, a senior radiological technician, who had engaged in protected activities (raising safety concerns). By a July 2,1996, letter, NNECO forwarded a partial response to the NO By an October 25,1996, letter, NNECO forwarded its final response to the violation, citing two corrective actions. The first was to reach a settlement with the contractor employee. The second was to take measures to improve the handling of employee concems and the overall
- employee concems environment. As referenced in the MIRG report, these initial efforts proved
! to be ineffective and resulted in the NRC issuing an Order on October 24,1996, that required, l before the start of any of the Millstone units, NNECO to prepare and implement a comprehensive plan for reviewing and dispositioning safety issues raised by its employees, and ensuring that employees who raise safety concems could do so without fear of retaliation. The Order indicated that the comprehensive plan shall also address past performance failures (as outlined in the seven root causes identified in the MIRG report that was included with the Order)
and include an independent third-party to oversee implementation. In January 1997, NNECO submitted its comprehensive plan to the NRC. On December 11,1997, NNECO superseded the Employee Concems Comprehensive Plan with a " Comprehensive Plan for Establishing a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) at Millstone Station" an integrated effort to re-i establish SCWE and address the seven root causes of the MIRG report. The issues raised in l the violation are being addressed with actions, underway or planned, in regard to establishing l an SCWE at Millstone. Actions taken by NNECO to implement the comprehensive plan j acceptably address the corrective actions associated with this violation, l l
Site Resoonse to LHC Recommendations During a meeting with the executive sponsor of the SCWE organization and some of his staff on December 11,1997, NNECO staff was instructed that they could be accountable for responding
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _________
to LHC recommendations in 30 days. If an extemal commitment such as this is missed, a Condition Report is to be issued which then goes for resolution to the person who was responsible for missing the deadline. This action was taken to improve NNECO's responsiveness to recommendations made by LHC. NNECO is responsible for responding to each of the recommendations made by LHC on the implementation of NNECO's program The team reviewed a sample of NNECO's responses and determined they appropriately addressed the issues. However, the team determined that NNECO was slow in responding to LHC recommendation The team also discussed tracking of LHC recommendations with a member of the SCWE staff who was recently given responsibility for this issue. The individual stated that the LHC recommendations were being tracked via the Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) and that each item had its own unique tracking number. He noted that verbal commitments made during meetings with LHC and NRC were also included in the tracking system. The system includes the responsible person for closing the issue and its due date. He stated that as the due date approaches and the issue is not closed that he notifies the l responsible person of the impending due date. Because this tracking system is new, the team was not able to evaluate its effectiveness.
j Nuclear Oversicht The team conducted a limited evaluation of parts of the Nuclear Oversight program. They met j with the " Lead Person" from the Performance Evaluation (PE) group, who recently was also l
'
given the responsibility for evaluating the SCWE. The Lead Person described the Nuclear Oversight Restart Verification Program (NORVP) and the Oversight Evaluation Reports (OERs)
process. OERs are generated by Nuclear Oversight personnel who observe meetings and activities. The OER is basically a score card for the meeting. Each " Lead Person" is responsible for generating evaluation criteria for his or her area of responsibility which are then used to grade the observations. These grades are then averaged and are used to develop bar l graphs that are generated biweekly and discussed with the Vice President for Nuclear Oversight. The graphs are used as indicators for the readings of the area being assessed to support plant startup.
i
'
The OERs also contain positive and negative observations made by the observer and are given withic 9 %y or two to the observed work group as feedback. The Lead Person said the OERs are genmaily well received by the work groups which used them to improve their performance.
l The team attended a routine Nuclear Oversight weekly meeting. This was recently initiated by the three Directors in Nuclear Oversight to review issues, schedules, and other items of mutual j interest, and to better integrate their efforts and cooperate better as a team. In the past, there l was a tendency for the groups to work more independently of each other. As an example of l cooperation, the group discusses upcoming team evaluations and uses the meeting to assign
- perscnnel to support each other's efforts. This is a positive indication of improvement for l
SCWE and attitudes at Millston ;
I
,
A Nuclear Oversight presentation to the Nuclear Safety Assessment Board (NSAB) was !
observed and interviews were held with several Nuclear Oversight staff. Ths Nuclear Oversight NSAB presentation included positive findings regarding improvement in the Unit 3 operating
l l
!
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _
l crew's performance and readiness for restart. The interviews indicated a general view that the
,
safety culture at Millstone station had improved considerably and that the Nuclear Oversight l
! organization was functioning more effectivel l l
Conclusions ,
i Based on the team's obserystions, it appeared that NNECO had improved its SCWE program considerably since the shutdown of the Millstone units. The team compared its findings with the four success criteria used by the licensee to assess the SCWE. With respect to the first criterion, employee willingness to raise concerns, the team did not receive information from anyone who would hesitate to raise concerns. Furthermore, some of the persons interviewed l said they knew of no one else who would hesitate. This finding is consistent with LHC's l statement in a meeting with the Commission on December 12,1997, that "while there continue l to be some problems areas at Millstone, we believe that this attribute has improved and workers at Millstone are willing to raise safety concerns via one of the available mechanisms."
l The team did not evaluate the second success criterion that concems the effectively resolved I by line management. This criterion is related to NNECO's corrective action programs and will be evaluated during the NRC IP 40500 team inspection. LHC, however, evaluated the l corrective action program and informed the Commission during the December 12 meeting that I in its opinion, NNECO "had established an excellent corrective action program which is being i aggressively implemented."
Conclusions for the third criterion, ECP effectiveness, are presented in Section 5.0 of this repor With regard to the forth criterion, problem area recognition and resolution, the team believed that NNECO made considerable progress this area, especially in dealing with potential harassment, intimidation, retaliation, and discrimination (HIRD). The formation of the Executive Review Board to review proposed disciplinary actions against NNECO employees and contractors before they are taken was a significant positive step. The demonstrated willingness of ERB to quickly reinstate personnel who were determined to be unjustly removed from their positions and its willingness to discipline those responsible for such actions, were laudabl SCWE program efforts to use leadership surveys and surveys by intemal organizations such as the ECOP to identify focus areas were also considered a positive step. Furthermore, senior management's willingness to admit mistakes as were evidenced by recent past incidents, and listen to workers was seen as greatly improve In summary, NNECO has made significant strides in improving the SCWE at Millstone.
!
l
l
- _ ___-__ __ _ _ _
l l
Millstone Independent Review Grouo (MIRG) Root Cause Evaluation !
l The seven problem areas or root cause determinations that had been made by the MIRG in their report were reevaluated and with respect to the team's conclusions. In general, as discussed below, the evaluation team believes that Millstone has made significant progress in resolving the root cause problems identified by the MIR . Ineffective Problem Resolution and Performance Measures The MIRG identified this as a major problem area, with no one in supervision or management being readily willing to assume responsibiMy for problem resolution. Performance measures were nearly non-existent, with most employees not even having position descriptions in place that defined their individual or supervisory responsibilities. Clearly, improvement has been made in this are The safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) training appears to be of an excellent quality and having a positive effect on the managers and supervisors. The supervisory training sessions that were observed by the evaluation team were very thorough. The initial test and
! case studies given to all participants were very complicated and sophisticated, in the 'eam's l
view. The nuances of harassment and intimidation contained in these exercises required a fairly advanced knowledge of the subject area to solve the case studies or answer the questions. The participants did show this level of expertise. There was wide-spread class participation both in response to the preliminary test and in the small-group case study discussions. Almost all members of the class participated in offering their opinions on problem resolution in the harassment and intimidation area The training classes also stressed the responsibility of the supervisors and managers to guarantee an SCWE to be willing to listen to the suggestions, complaints, or concerns of their employees, cnd to treat them in a courteous, professional manner. The supervisors and managers present during the observed training appeared very enthusiastic and supportive of I
the SCWE progra The team also obsarved several sessions of the " Civil Treatment for Employees, Partnership Beyond 2000 and ECF training sessions, designed for all non-supervisory or managerial employees. Again, the training was viewed as being very effective in ericouraging employees i to bring forth their safety concerns with the full expectation that they would be weli treated for doing so. The employees were to:d that they are the first line of resolution for solving safety problems and that they should take their responsibility seriously. Class discussion indicated that the employees felt strongly that any concerns they raised would be dealt with quickly and politely by managers. The employees also indicated that they did not believe management would have dealt this way with their concems in the recent past. The employees gave management high marks in this are The ECP program has developed qualitative measures for gauging the organization's
'
effectiveness. Odring each observed ECP staff meeting discussions were held concerning the performance measures of the staff, and the progress being made on effectively closing case Attachment l
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .___ _ ___
_ - _ _ _ _ _ ___-_____
Potential problems that might hinder performance on ECP cases were also discussed during the moming triage or stand-up ECP staff meetings. The team believes that while all performance goals have not yet been met, significant progress has been made in this are . Insensitivity to Employee Needs The SCWE training stressed how importance it was that managers and supervisors be a sensitive to the needs of the employees. The employees wore told that they should expect civil treatment and respect from their management when they raise safety concems in the
" Partnership Beyond 2000" training. While the team was onsite, an incident occurred in which two technicians sampled sludge being removed from the bay for radioactivity on their own initiative. The sludge was to be transported to the Waterford town dump. The testing detected low levels of radioactivity and necessitated a cessation of the sludge removal.' Although the licensee has stated that the levels of detected radiation pose no danger to anyone, the licensee suspended the shipments to the dump, pending a decision as to what course of action should be followed. The two technicians received company recognition and got their pictures taken with the President and CEO-Nuclear for fostering an SCWE. This example indicated a changed environment for employees raising safety concems. The team does not believe that an award would have been given for this type of safety concern at Millstone a year or two ag The ECP organization also appears to be more sensitive to employee needs than it was during the MIRG review. The team observed several morning " standup" meetings of the ECP organization and felt that the meetings were well organized and well run. These meetings, as well as several observed ECP staff meetings conducted by the Director of the ECP, stressed the '
need for promptness, confidential handling of employee concems and professional treatment of ,
concernees. The team also favorably noted that with each closure letter, the ECP organization j provides feedback forms requesting comments regarding the concernee's satisfaction with the ECP process. However, the team further noted that it found no completed feedback forms in the reviewed case files.
i The ECP Director does possess the authority to bypass levels of management, as necessary, to j ensure that his views are heard at the proper level of management. The Director has, on one !
!
occasion, used this authority to reverse what he felt was an incorrect personnel decision. The l previous ECP Director did not appear to have this level of authority or support from senior level i management. The level of management support for the current ECP Director enables him to be ;
more fully responsive to employee need l l
In addition, the team found that cooperation between the ECP staff and the HR Department had l improved since the MIRG review. HR has assigned two individuals to work on the ECP staff, and I
both organizations have participated in joint meetings, which should improve communications and the day-to-day working relationships between these two groups. That improvement should translate into better support for employees who are in contact with these two organization . Reluctance to Admit Mistakes The team observed several training sessions involving the entire staff of the Nuclear Oversight l
group, including managers and supervisors. The training appears to be excellent, with much focus on the necessity for managers to "do the right thing" and admit to mistakes when they are
!
made. As anecdotal evidence of this changed attitude, a very good example for the entire site was set by the President and CEO-Nuclear, when he admitted personal responsibility for the mishandling of the "MOV case" recently, and apologized publicly for the mistakes that were made. This apology received local press coverage and the team believes sets the stage for other managers to be more willing to admit to mistakes, when they are mad The ECOP was not involved in overseeing of two very important and controversial personnel actions at Millstone in the recent past. These were the MOV case and the Training group discipline case. Management did not seek advice or guidance from the ECOP, as the panel's charter requires. This lack of consultation was blamed on the fact that the ECOP was still being developed and was not yet fully functioning. Management has admitted that it erred in bypassing the ECOP. The ECOP now appears to be fully functioning and is involved in advising management on controversial decisions. The ECOP appears to be working better, albeit not perfectly, l
The training that the team observed featured complicated and sophisticated case studies on HIRD, and the supervisors and managers present seemed to grasp the nuances of these case During the training, the presenters stressed the importance of managerial ownership of problems and the importance of admitting to mistakes when they are made.
!
4. Inappropriate Management Style and Support for Concerned Employees The SCWE training in this area was excellent. The managers were told repeatedly that it was i their responsibility to provide support for employees who were involved with raising safety l concerns. The class discussions seemed to indicate that the managers understood their role and responsibilities in this area. The evaluation team also witnessed a case study training session conducted by the ECP Director for the ECP staff. This case study involved a very complicated work stoppage case, in which two disagreeing parties stopped work on the f.ame job, for
personnel safety concerns. The ECP director did an excellent job of presenting this case, highlighting the fact that a three day leave from the work site, with pay, to one of the parties involved in this work stoppage, was still an example of inappropriate management action towards an employee who had raised safety concems. There was a very good discussion of this case by the ECP staff members presen !
The evaluation team observed several sessions of the training for employees entitled, !
" Partnership Beyond 2000, and Civil Treatment for Employees, and the ECP Program". This is a
.
full-day course that will be presented to all employees. The observed sessions were very well conducted. The employees appeared to be interested in the subject matter, and the instructors stressed the requirement that managers treat employees with respect when the employees raised safety concems. The employee comments indicated that they felt that the climate at Millstone today encourages the raising of concems and that all concems are dealt with fairly and reasonably promptl The ECOP, after a somewhat slow start in getting organized, now appears to be a viable advocate for employees who raise safety concems. The team reviewed the ECOP employee surveys and found them to be extremely thorough. The goal of ECOP is to eventually survey all site employees. They have extensively surveyed about 700 employees to date. The survey results are used by ECOP to assist in identifying problem area managers or work areas that do
not foster an SCWE. These surveys are also helpfulin allowing employees take part of the decision-making process for improving the working climate. The ECOP still has more work to do to become a more forceful presence on the Millstone site, but improvements have been made, it appeared to the team that the ECP program has made considerable progress in providing support to concemed employees. The ECP was, generally, correctly characterizing the employees' concems and was attempting to keep in frequent and timely contact with alleger The ECP staff is enough to handle the case load, and the staff members appear to be well trained and motivated and enthusiastic about servicing to the concemees.
l 5. Poor Communications and Teamwork l
l The training sessions observed by the evaluation team strongly stressed the concept of l teamwork and the need for strengthened communications between managers and employees.
l The training highlighted the need for managers to support employees who were involved in l raising safety concerns. The staff of the ECP has been greatly expanded in the last year, with the new employees being very professional and seemingly experienced in the area of employee '
concems. The ECP Director appears to the team to have grown immensely in the year that he has been in this position. In staff meetings and the case study training that the team observed, he did an were excellent job of stressing the importance of working as a team and ,
communicating with employees through the ECP proces !
The evaluation team also had discussions with managers responsible for employee communications and reviewed a year's worth (January 97-January 98) of company communications documents. During that 12-month period, the various written communications !
documents issued by the company, either to all employees or to managers, centained many articles pertaining to the SCWE at Millstone. The total number of articles in all of these publications, by subject area, is as follows: ECP-22; SCWE Initiatives-50; Problem Areas-2; Differing Professional Opinions-1; Employee Recognition-28; ECOP-3; and Management Admissions of Mistakes-11. Clearly, the information is being distributed by managemen There are still, however, some pockets of employee resistance to and disbelief in these messages. V!hile the communications environment between management and the erroloyees has improved markedly over the last year or two, there is still work to be done. The team also has a concem that intra-management communications still need to be improved, as evidenced by the misunderstanding of the potential reaction of employees to reassignment of a supervisor as discussed earlier. Senior management assured the team that they made the decision believing that the first line supervisor who was to be reassigned was fully in agreement with this, decision, which he clearly was not. This information was provided to senior management by mid-level management, who clearly did not communicate well either to the first-first line manager or to senior managemen The MIRG found that employee distrust of the HR group was very h;gh. The evaluation team found that improvements had been made, but that more work needed to be done to fully restore ,
the employees' confidence in this organization. Some of the noted improvements were better communication between HR and the ECP, as evidenced by the assignment of HR employees to the ECP staff and joint staff meetings between these two organizations, in addition, team discussions with members of the ECOP organization led to the finding that these ECOP members felt that HR was now taking a much less legalistic approach in its dealings with concemed individuals. Since this extremely legalistic approach to dealings with concerned
. . - - - - _ --.-
.------ _--- .-_ _---- _ --- _ _ - _ .
employees was a major problem during the MIRG review, this finding was very encouraging to the evaluation tea . Lack of Accountability l
The SCWE, the staff training, and the " Partnership Beyond 2000" training observed by the j evaluation team clearly stressed the importance of ownership and accountability by both
! managers and each employee. The class discussions observed by the team members also l seemed to indicate an in-depth understanding of the importance of this area. The SCWE team I meetings chaired by Mike Brothers also stressed the importance of this item and his expectations for his staff to be actively involved in getting this message out to the work forc It appears that position descriptions are now very widely in use at Millstone, which is a change from the situation found by the MIRG. The position descriptions for all employees stress the responsibility to bring forth safety concems. The managerial position descriptions assign responsibility for problem resolution to each manager and supervisor. This is a strong improvement on the MIRG findings. Accountability must start at the top of an organization, and the recent examples of Bruce Kenyon taking responsibility for the mistakes made in the handling of the MOV case, and his willingness to re-examine the training cases at the suggestion of former NRC Chairman Carr, and management's decision to reverse the reassignment decision of the supervisor that became highly controversial, are good examples of such accountability starting at the top of the organizatio The ECOP is also making progress in this area. Their employee surveys are being used to
- solicit and gauge employee input, and are useful in identifying potential management trouble spots. Such identification increases the accountability of managers and supervisors, because managers identified as problem manager must undergo retraining or risk being reassigned or i removed from his/her position, if their performance does not improv . Ineffective ECP Implementation There has been much improvement noted in this area by the team members. The once under-supported ECP staff has grown in numbers to where the staff is adequate to handled the j volume of cases that are being filed. Senior managsment repeatedly stated that if the ECP '
needed more staff to meet the increased workload, such support would be provided. The ECP staff appeared to the team to be highly professional, discreet, and dedicated to its mission. The Director, ECP, having been relieved of some of his nonessential peripheral duties over the last few months, now appears to be providing the ECP staff with the necessary guidance, supervision, and leadership that the program requires. The ongoing case study / discussion training observed by the team was excellent. The case tracking and trending analysis being performed by the ECP staff is very thorough and professional. The moming standup and triage meetings are very well run and managed. Management stresses to the staff that additional !
resources will be provided if needed. Position descriptions are in place for all members of the l ECP staff, so that each staff member understands their duties and responsibilitie .
l ;