IR 05000245/1987025
| ML20236B652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1987 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B639 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-87-25, 50-336-87-19, NUDOCS 8710260283 | |
| Download: ML20236B652 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
I Report No.
50-245/87-25; 50-336/87-19 l
Docket No.
50-245; 50-336 License No.
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101-0270 l
Facility:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Dates:
8/18/87 - 9/25/87 l
l Inspectors:
Theodore A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector Eben L. Conner, Projects Engineer l
l Approved by:
N O &bI./', )F 16h5I87 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 18 Date I
Summary: Report 50-245/87-25 (9/9-25/87); 50-336/87-19 (8/18-9/25/87).
I Scope: Routine NRC resident (89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br />) and region-based (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) inspection of operational safety, previously identified items, an allegation, housekeep-ing, Unit 1 control room Halon testing, failure of a Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator to load, Unit 2 control rod Anomalies, n;aintenance, and periodic and special reports.
Results:
No violations or unacceptable conditions were identified.
The
l licensee's performance of Unit 1 Control Room Halon testing was assessed as j
excellent.
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s TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.
Persons Contacted...........................................
2.
Summary of Facility Activities............................
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3.
Daily Operational Safety Veri fication.........................
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items................
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5.
Unit 1 Activities
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a.
Follow-up on Disorientation of Fuel Assembly.............
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b.
Control Room Halon Suppression System..................
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Non-Destructive Testing Vendor Qualification Review.....
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Alleged Improperly Installed Conduit Hanger (RI-86-A-0066)...
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Unit 2 Activities a
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Reactor Trip - September 2, 1987......
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EOF Diesel Generator Water Pump Failure................
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Housekeeping Review - Unit 2...........
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Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator to Load - Unit 2........
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Control Rod Anomalies - Unit 2................................
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Maintenance - Unit 2.........................
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Review of Periodic and Special Reports..................
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13. Management Exit Meeting........
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Mr. S. Scace, Station Superintendent Mr. J. Keenan, Unit'2 Superintendent Mr. H. Haynes, Station Services Superintendent i
Mr. J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent The inspector also contacted other licensee employees, including members of the Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Instrumentation and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering and Security Departments.
2.
Summary of Facility Activities - (Units 1 & 2)
Unit I remained at 100% during the report period (9/9 to 9/25).
Unit 2'
remained at 100% until 9/2, at which time a Reactor Trip followed.a Steam
Generator No. 1 Low Water Level Trip caused'by a' faulty feedwater
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regulating valve.
Repairs were made.
The plant was returned to 100%
power and remained there for the rest of the report period.
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3.
Daily Operational Safety Verification The inspector routinely observed plant operation during daily regular and off-hour tours of the following areas:
Control Room Intake Structure Auxiliary Building Vital and 4160V Switchgear Room Spent Fuel Building Site Fence Line Turbine Building Off-Site Emergency Facility Railroad Access (SFB)
Yard Areas During this report period, the inspector observed operator response to the plant trip, recovery actions, and plant startup.
No deficiencies were observed.
Control room manning and operator responses to alarms were observed and found to meet regulatory requirements.
It was noted that a minimum number of annunciator windows displayed alarm. conditions.
In addition, two backshift inspections were performed and the operators were found alert and attentive to control room conditions j
Posting and control of high radiation areas were inspected and found acceptable.
The 480V and 4160V switchgear rooms were found to be clean j
and free of extraneous material.
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Control Room backpanel inspection and site fenceline tours found no deficiencies. The inspector had no further questions in this are v s
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Licensee Actions on' Previously Identified ~ Items j
(Closed) Inspector Follow-Item (50-336/84-2'l-02) Survey data taken on f
l liners stored-underwater was not convertcd to dose rates in air.
The Radiological Assessment Branch (RAB) calculated the dose' rates in air!
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based on a methodology used to. determine doses'.for'thelin-core detector
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L shipping liner.-. The inspector's review of data'showed that the results.
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' compared satisfactorily-with similar calculations.
Thisiitem is closed;;
L (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-245/84-15-03 and 50-336/84-15-04).
Justification of the use of offsite auditors in place of independent-
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firms for Facility Fire. protection Progress.
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The licensee's response (AV4244) describeditheir history of_ audit development under Technical Specification 6.5.4.8'.e.,in~ relation to:.
. Sample Technical Specifications.
In addition, a listing _was-'provided of
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additional' audits _ performed;.in~ the' area of Facility' Fire Protection by; independent au(itors. Additional: review of. audits'were performed} during therecentApppndixRAuditsforbothunits.lTheinspectorfoundthat the offsite at;dit' function meets.NRC requirements.
This item'is closed.
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[ Closed) Inspector Follow' Item (50-336/86-12-01) Dosimetry discrepancy'
l Investigation Report Generation, The time requirement for generation of dosimetry discrepancy investigation-
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reports was not identified (Procedure 941/2941/3941)..The' licensee added'
a time framt that states that investigation should be completed within 90-
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Procedure 941/2941/3941 paragraph 6.4 reflects this change. This'
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item is cined.
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5.l Unit 1 Activities a.
Disorientation of Fuel Assembly
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a Inspection Report 50-245/87-12, paragraph 5, discussed the previous disorientation of Fuel Assembly LY2729.in core location ~43-18, in regard to cycle specific effects and the revisions to Procedure l.
RE-1077, Rev. 5 " Reactor Core Verification."
The resident inspectors reviewed the videotaped "as-loaded"' current
reactor core and compared findings.to the " General. Electric Core
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Map."
The videotaped markings observed matched the. core map.
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A second viewing also identified all. fuel bundle or.ientations to be correct.
Procedure data sheet RE Form'1077-1 was properly annotated,_
verifying the as-loaded positions.
No discrepancies,were identified.
l The inspector had no'further questions-.
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b.
Control Room Halon Supression System The licensee has installed an. automatic " Total Flooding" Halon 1301 fire suppression system in the Main Control Room to satisfy Section-III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. As part of this modification, the existing. ionization smoke detectors were replaced by a two zone ' smoke detection system consisting of 14 ionization detectors for one. zone and 14 photoelectric detectors for the:other zone.
The detection
. systems will be used for automatic Halon discharge in the event of'
fire.
Technical Specifications have been submitted addressing actuation time for the automatic. system and surveillance of the l
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detectors.
Control Room Halon-Functional Test T87-1-13 was per-
formed prior to plant startup to determine Halon. concentration.
l This test was observed by the resident inspector.
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Preparations Prior-to Test The inspector observed or' verified.the following items before the test:
Cleanliness of the control room.
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Availability of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
(Although this item was not required for life support, the licensee required SCBA use during the test.)
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Placement of Halon piping nozzles.
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That Halon gas detector sampling hoses were at. required levels (17 inches, 36 inches, and 94 inches) above the l
control room floor; two sampling sets were in place leading to two gas analyzers.
Calibration of analyzers with certified gas samples.
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Portable gas detectors were available to monitor control room boundaries for Halon leakage paths.
Halon flasks (3) were properly charged.
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Damper positions in the control room were reviewed-for
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No discrepancies were identified.
2.
Observations of Test Performance The system test engineer and the shift supervisor conducted a l
crew briefing outlining how the test would be conducted and what to expect.
Personnel who were to remain in the control room donned a Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and the control room was otherwise evacuated.
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i Upon disctu;e of the Halon, control room visibility dropped to'
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about threa feet. -The operators manned the control boards.
No abnormal parameters were noted.
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Results The inspector reviewed the a'nalyzer results imme'iately after
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The results indicated a concentration of 7% Halon, decaying to 6% over a ten-minute period. That met acceptance
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was performed. One channel did not. respond to the test gas
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mixture (three channels on one analyzer were satisfactory and
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two channels were satisfactory on ~the second analyzer).
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Conclusion The licensee demonstrated an ~ acceptable Halon system in:the Control Room.
Testing was' conducted with good communication and with control room professionalism evident.
The inspector found the testing excellent and had no further questions.
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Non-Destructive Testing Vendor Qualification Review
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The licensee used an outside non-destructive testing organization to verify. qualification of system piping repairs and new piping installations.
The inspector reviewed the. vendor personnel records to verify that the two individuals used on site met the criteria of.SNT-TC-1A.
Both individuals were qualified as Level II for Visual Testing (VT),
Radiographic Testing (RT), Magnetic Particle Testing (MT), 'and Liquid Penetrant Testing (PT).
Examination records included certification of examination scores by the American Welding Society.
In addition, review of the Material License (06-20755-01) for the use l
of an Iridium-192 and two Cobalt-60 sources for industrial radiography -
was conducted with acceptable results.
Storage of the sources was proper and in acceptable locations.
Surveys indicated no exposed sources.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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Allegation of Improperly Installed Conduit Hanger (RI-86-A-0066)
On June 12, 1987, the resident inspector's office was visited by a l
tradesman and a union official to present an allegation that there were
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improperly installed hangers on conduits encasing electric cabling.
The alleger could not identify the conduits of concern.
Based on a review of the job assignments during his employment at the Millstone site, it was concluded that the concern was for six new supports and associated'
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l hangers for electrical conduit for the Unit 1/2 electrical backfeed
modification.
The alleger had worked on this modification onsite.
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l On June 17, the licensee examined the six conduit supports and' identified no discrepancies.
The hangers that support the_ conduit and the conduits were scheduled to be fireproofed.
The. conduit had been previously com-pleted in 1983 and was supported by suspended tie rods.
This conduit was now to be incorporated into a 10 FFR 50, Appendix R modification that electrically ties Unit 1 and Unit 2 together to support equipment on a complete loss of power to either unit.
Appendix k requires a three-hour fire barrier for conduit supports.
That increases loading on the supports.
Six new supports were installed to support the added loading.
All six supports (C 51A, 52A, 53A, 54A, SSA and 56A) were fabricated offsite and installed by welding to existing support columns. On June 22, the inspector walked down the system, prior to fireprcofing.
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supports had been painted, limiting visual examination.
Nonetheless, I
the welds appeared to meet required installation tolerances.
The inspector examined the conduits and no indentations or crushing were observed.
This addressed the concern expressed by the alleger.
The straps that tie the conduit to the supports are standard 5" pipe straps (Part No. 2.558-50),3" pipe straps (Part No. P-1119), and 5" split Pipe straps (Part No. 11:3); all were manufactured by Unistruct.
The inspector noted that the bolts used to tie down one conduit pipe strap were bottoming out due to longer than necessary bolts.
In addition, the strap length to the support varied from 0 to 3/8".
These two items were discussed with licensee management and corrected.
They did not, however, relate to the allegation or cause support inadequacy.
No inadequacies were observed.
Inspector review did not substantiate the allegation.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
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Unit 2 Activities a.
Reactor Trip - September 2, 1987 On September 2, at 8:15 pm, a reactor trip occurred due to low level in the No. 1 Steam Generator.
The immediate cause was closure of the No. 1 Feedwater Regulating Valve, which also failed to respond to the operator's manual electrical signal.
All systems responded satisfactorily to the trip and the unit was placed in hot standby.
Investigation of the Event The No.1 Feedwater Regulating valve was opened and the valve stem and plug were found to have separated.
Normal assembly should have included placing the threaded stem into the valve plug and then-placing a "C" pin to prevent rotation between the valve stem and valve plug.
This'"C" pin was missing, All threads on the stem and plug were galled and flattened.
The inspectors witnessed the disassembly and reassembly, and reviewed the vendor drawings and l
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. manual. 'The "C": pin is not'. included in the. assembly chapter of'the:
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New "C" pins were examined in the. parts-warehouse:
and exhibited spring tension.
Thus,.upon insertion, these:pinsc
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would axert a restraining force between.the'plugland stem. A "C"'
pin was used during. reassembly.
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To prevent recurrence,'the licensee plans.to revise'the assembly-drawings'and: update-the assembly procedures.
The. inspector had not further questions in this area.
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- Emergency Opera _ ting' Facility Diesel Generator Water Puma Failure -
On September 18, 1987 the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF)-
Emergency. Diesel-.-Generator-(EDG) water pump f ailed during the weekly'.
The NRC inspector-observed the test.
'The first indication of water ~ pump failu're'was a' shutdown of-the'EOFL EDG on'"High Temperature.". Licensee investigation-revealed.a broken belt on the water pump.
This pump;is driven byitwo. belts-.New belts.
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were procured from the warehouse and installed..Uponfrestart of the E0F EDG to continue the operational test,'one new belt broke and the other burned quite badly.
The EDG.was secured immediately;
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Licensee investigation found that the! belt-driven water' pump.had
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seized. A replacement water pump.was: purchased.from Cummins Diesel ~
Engine. The water pump, a new fan, and new water pump belts were installed and the EOF EDG was then retested successfully.
Tne licensee discussed pump. lubrication with.the vendor. Additional lubrication requirements were identified and implemented. ~(See -
l Detail.11a of this report.) The inspector had no.further.questi.ons.
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Unit 2 Housekeeping Review On August 18, a tour o.f Unit 2 was conducted by'the NRC. Regional
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Administrator and Unit 2 Superintendent, accompanied byz the Resident Inspectors.
Unit'2. specific: findings and resolutions are discussed:below.
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Potential For a Loss of Operability of the;"A" Containment Spray-L pump Due to a. Missing Nut on the Suction Flange
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i The. licensee replaced the missing nut immediately and tightened; the flange.
The Stress Analysis Engineering (SAE). group reviewed the seismic qualification of this. raised face flange.with one: nut missing. -Based on this' calculation _-(79-176-911GPfdated:8/19/87),
the~as-found joint (eleven balts in place instead o.f the requiredi twelve) was found adequate to withstand faulted condition design loads.
The plant engineering staff. also verified-the-leak tightness of the flange in the as-found condition with' satisfactory'results.
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In addition, the inspector reexamined the flange to verify leak tightness and nut replacement.
Review of the history file forl22 previous work orders did not identify removal of this flange for maintenance.
The licensee stated that a walkdown of safety-related flanges in the safeguards room did not identify any additional missing nuts.
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The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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Pipe Caps and Unidentified Cable All pipe caps were in place, including pipe caps on suppression chambers of the charging pump suction line.
During an inspector tour, an unidentified cable was observed in the
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"C" charging pump room.
The license's immediate action was to
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identify the cable (as a' power source for a baron addition pump removed in 1984), remove the power source permanently, review-l drawings, and designate the cable as a spare.
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Discrepancies and Work Orders Under Which the Inspector Confirmed Corrective Action to Have Been Since Completed or Initiated.
COMPONENT PROBLEM WORK ORDER (S)
DEBRIS IN CABLE None, but debris was cleaned.
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SPREADING ROOM up.
2390A DEBRIS EAST OF M2-87-09274 CHP AREA 2390A MISSING PIPE M2-87-09252 CAPS P43A MISSING NUT ON M2-87-09228 SUCTION FLANGE
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P41A SUCTION FLANGE M2-87-09258 LEAK j
2-SI-656 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09259 2-SI-657 GASKET LEAK M2-87-09471
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2-SI-074 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09270-2-CH-335 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09473 2-CH-332 PACKINGLEhK M2-87-09476 I
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2-CH-3S9 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09260
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P18A Ft.EXIGLASS COVER M2-87-09271-
BROKEN 2-SW-178B PACKING GLAND.
M2-87-09477 MISSING a
P4 LAGGING'ON TOP OF WORK ORDER INITIATED i
PUMP BEARING FOR OUTAGE REPAIR l
RBCCW HX PAINTED LIMIT M2-87-09457, M2-87-09469.
VALVES SWITCH ARMS 13 PAIRS OF-LIMIT SWITCHES WERE CLEANED & TESTED-SATISFACTORILY.
l C678/P-39 DAMAGED CABLE FROM M2-87-09269-JUNCTION BOX j
2-CH-504 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09478
J PIB BROKEN CONDUIT ON TR #26M2124436 CONTROL CABLE 2304A DAMAGED LAGGING M2-87-09348 ON LAGGING LIST l
2390A DEBRIS IN FLOOR M2-87-09249 AWAITING DRAINS NEW FLOOR DRAIN SCREEN 2-CH-326 LEAKAGE FROM VLV M2-87-09212 2-CH-326 PACKING LEAK M2-87-09212 2-RB-308 LEAKING VALVE M2-87-06931 WRITTEN TO REPAIR l
Four identified body-to-bo'inet leaks and packing leaks were placed on the containment spray headtir outage list.
The licensee directed plant operators to, during their normal rounds, be more observant of leaks and document them to the shif t supervisor for
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resolution.
The inspector had no further concerns on these repairs or. outage items, which will be reexamined incident to routine housekeeping inspections.
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' Figilure of Energency DieMGeneralbr]i(EC64}"A" to Load ~(Unit!2)'
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y -On August 40196&'following normal Presientive' Maintenance, EDG "A"i failed /
to build up % iormal voltage f_ollowingia; remote-(from the:ControlrRoom) %
start.c A few minutes later,;aycond _ start:washttempted with!the.same
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results.
Thh diesel came'up tofspeed,lbut:theSgenera_ tor.v'oltage!came;pp?
to only abo L' half of. normal L The licensee caYled inl a,PMductio'n: Test'
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-(PT) enginu foriassistance prior to anotherjstart; On the WWdistart,;
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the EDG loaded normally;ti OKV. 4t' wastoperatediat normale load for over '
'two. hours'; do abnorrilitylwas otiserved.
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TheinspectorwitthsedthethN;d,successfuNstart. "the PO Q ineerghsd9
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s inspected cQt' acts hnside therelay cabinets.and'installeJ ;s'ord monitdr-l
d ing equiphent A Upthing..ouOof-the: ordinary wasl observed.' JTheLinspec{arv attepdd a POR.Npeating"the Elt de).
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wes Yh2us' sed..JQ licenseeMN,eo $xTh_is event,Jalong witp othWriissues,1 s
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. survejilance testtng to ern e operability.9"ase'the frequericy of tEDGL"A'F 41ncr
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test.Ms performed satisfac'thrily: WAugustiS. Subsequent satisfactory E
Mtarts were made on. August 'd1',.13,:18 Andieptember 1. L Spatial Linstru-f ^
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mUtatio1formonitoringthperformance, these surve4 7ances,: havh 6 il
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not provided any infortnation' as to the ca$onlAf the failupe to'
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Basedonreviewofdatafrom.'thevaDoe.eighihote.starits,[the,' licensee
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has not identified the :cause of the ipident;Q Operators :are : aware 'of-this incident and are stagionedgt loyal'stavilons.during EDG'startups.
Considering the :stresskJWrf aseidtarts, the six successive successful
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tests, the indeterniinate ndd?e oNth'e cause of theWecedingitwo
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, consecutive failures to reich 'operatin;ivoltage,- and the 2 absence of l
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/ identification of similar previous'probie p'c,o.the-inspector concluded-
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that licensee actionsLwere appropriate and ncurred that.EDG "A" is" operable.
Subsgquent-regular ECG' surveillance examined incident to routine pl' ant inspection {f;willL nowever, be
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10. f_ontrol Rod Anomalies - (Unit 2)
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During this reporting period, center codch rod ((CEA #1) dropped into,
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T a the core on two;oacasions.
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N _On Auguk 30, *be,/d Element Assembly (CEA) #1 dropped;to the bo L
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ofthefrbh Ueind. repositioned during :a power decrease for q[
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hedtw hain ramp de'al replaceinent.- ~The investi_gative test me'asure-JJ J
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merdjndicated that all' CEA #13arameters' were within' toleranceL L
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The'liippowePswitchwasremoveoland : the.CEA' gri ppers :were ? ey e rc i sVd* H
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for.five minutes.
The lift power switch wasereinstalled andTthe;CEAD e s
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L was recovered and' operated properly. LThe suspected' event-cause was at
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l r icMag lower gripper switch.
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September'16-Event >
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. On September 16,; at:11:04Jpm,0CEA' #1-dropped intolthe = core while.
being moved._ Povar was decreased below' 70L The 11ft' cot ' ooweri l
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switch and timer modular were.replac'e'd.1 Thelinspectorsfoulo l]
licens'e rod recovery procedu'res adequate.
e The' licensee.has7 riot ditirmined th'e exact failure mechanism and-isi
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lstill investigating these. rod drops.
The inspector;.wil11 follow.
j subsequent performanc'e of CEA'#1?and the licensee'sifollowup?
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- Maintenance - (Unit 2)-
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. Unit.2 maintenance observed includeci the following:
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' Emergency Offsit'e FacilityL(E0F) Diesel Generator During routine: surveillance, th6" EOF. Diesel Generator broke a drive-
belt'to the dies ~el circulating water pump. '(See DetailL7b"of this:
repo rt'. ) New belts were installed'and.also5brokel, Examination.
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determined that_the circulating water pimp ha'd' seized; ;The' pump l
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was replaced and the_ diesel tested satisfactorily.-
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The inspector examine'd' the. failed pumps and bearing housing in the l
maintenance shop and found'a plugged casing port near the bearing.-
l The licensee had believed the failed pump was self-lubricating.
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An inquiry to.the 'vendorEdetermined that_ a bearing' grease fitting should have been' installed, and lubrication of.-the_ pump _ bearing
should have been accomplished annually.
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The-licensee had never lubricat'ed the bearing that'faile'.'
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d lubrication fitting was installed and.the replacement.. bearing was lubricated.
The inspector had no further questions _on this item.
1 b.
Main Circulating Water (MCW) Pump "B" Failure During normal operator rounds of.the intake structure, a? sight glass on the MCW pump was indicating an. oscillation'between high and low levels oil levels.
The: pump was-secured.
Vibration test's l
were performed and found. unacceptable.
The pump was: removed and'
l disassembled. A twisted shaft was'found and; replaced.
The'cause-
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-of the failure appears to be mussel growth in the' discharge piping
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causing excessive discharge _ pressures. -Upon' return:of'the' pump to-operations, additional survei11anceLon' discharge pressur~ eland motor j'
ampere monitoring were in place.
T.he.' inspector _ will review:the ~
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. licensee's program to restrict mussel growth in subsequent" l
inspections.
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'12 12.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports i
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted were reviewed. This
~l review verified that the reported information was valid and included.the I
NRC required data; that test results and supporting information'were
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consistent with design predictions and performance specifications;.and
that planned corrective-actions were adequate for resolution of the j
problem.
The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information
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should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following report was reviewed:
Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report 87-08 for operations from August 1-31, 1987.
The inspector noted no deficiencies.
13. Management Meetings a
At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings.
No proprietary information was identified as being in the inspection coverage.
No written material was provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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