ML20245A678
| ML20245A678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1989 |
| From: | Chaudhary S, Mcbrearty R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245A656 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-89-11, GL-88-01, GL-88-1, NUDOCS 8906220116 | |
| Download: ML20245A678 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000245/1989011
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'U.'S.' NUCLEAR _ REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I-
Report No. 50-245/89-11
Docket No. 50-245'
License No. DPR-21
Category i
Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ~
P. O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
. Facility'Name: . Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1_
Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut
Inspection Conducted: May 1-5, 1989
Inspectors: hh h*
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R. A. McBrearty, Reactd Engineer
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Approved by:
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S. K. Chauanar,v, Cinef, Materials and
Processess Section, EB, DRS
Inspection ' Summa ry: Routine Unannounced Inspection on May 1-5, 1989
(Report No. 50-245/89-11)
Areas Inspected: The . inspection consisted of observations, review of data,
licensee.'s response to Generic Letter 88-01, NDE procedures, engineering
-support, QA involvement, and personnel qualification / certification records in
the area of _ inservice inspection.
Results: The inspector concluded that the licensee's activities complied with
applicable requirements. The licensee's response to GL 88-01 was timely, and
addressed the areas required by the Generic Letter.
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Details
1.0 Persons Contacted
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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- T. Davis, Inservice Inspection Technician
- J. Leason, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
S. Sikorski, NDE Level III
- J. Stetz, Unit i Superintendent
- R. Voger, Engineering Supervisor
- R. West, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
The'Hartfor'd Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company
R. Zoner, ANI/ANII
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. Kolonauski, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting.
2.0 Scope of Inspection
Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant
Components, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code establishes rules
for the examination, testing and inspection of components and systems in
a nuclear power plant.Section XI mandates that the plant owner develop
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a program which will demonstrate conformance to Code requirements, and
that the licensee perform inservice inspections (ISI) to comply with
those requirements and prop, ram.
Ultrasonic examination for the detection
of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in stainless steel
piping systems in BWR plants is mandated by an augmented examination
progrcm based on NUREG-0313, Revision 2, and Generic Letter 88-01.
The following areas were selected for inspection:
Implementation of nondestructive examination (NDE) procedures
Observations of work in progress
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Persor.nel . qualification /certificatica records
Licensee response to Generic Letter 88-01
NDE data
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Engineering support of ISI
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3.0 Review of NDE Implementing Procedures (73052)
Inservice inspection at Millstone Unit 1 is routinely performed in
accordance_with the licensee's procedures. Vendor NDE technicians are
provided training on'each procedure which they will be required to
implement; and,.in' addition, each individual is required to pass a
practical examination administered by.the licensee prior to performing
examinations at the site.
.During the. current refueling outage the work _ load was divided among four.
vendors such that IGSCC examinations were performed by General-Electric
Company and EBASCO,. reactor vessel nozzle examinations were performed by
Southwest Research Institute, and reactor vessel welds (flange ligament
areas, shell to flange, circumferential and longitudinal welds) were
examined by TTI, a Swedish company, and Westinghouse /Dynacon using UDRPS.
The following vendor procedures were selected for inspection to ascertain
compliance with ASME Code and regulatory requirements and' technical
adequacy for their intended use:
SWRI-NDT-600-11, Revision 47, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of
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Vessel-to-Nozzle Inner Radius Section"
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SWRI-NDT-706-6, Revision 33, " Mechanized Ultrasonic Outside Surface
Examination of Ferritic Vessels Greater Than 2.0 Inches In Thickness"
Westinghouse NSD/Dynacon Document #ITI-ISI-89-1/89-T-1040,
" Examination Plan For Millstone, Unit .1"
The above listed procedures were reviewed and approved by the licensee
and were incorporated into the licensee's program for use at Millstone.
No violations were identified.
Conclusion
The vendor procedures complied with applicable code and regulatory
requirements and were technically adeqtate for their intended use.
Additionally, licensee control of the program is maintained by its
requirement for Level III review and approval of the procedures.
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4.0 Observations of Work in Progress (73753)
The video tapes of the visual examination of the "A"
and "C" core spray
spargers and the "A" supply piping, and the ultrasonic examination of RPV
stud No. S-2-57 were observed by the inspector to ascertain compliance
with code and regulatory requirements.
The visual examinations were performed by CTS Company personnel using
remote, underwater video cameras.
Examination results were reco.*ded on
video tape and are intended to serve as a permanent record of the
examinations.
The licensee will install all new RPV studs during the current outage and
the ultrasonic examinations are intended to comply with the preservice
inspection requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section XI.
These examinations.are performed by EBASCO, the licensee's
ISI vendor.
No violations were identified.
Conclusion
The video tapes representing the visual examination results were of
excellent quality and provided for an intelligible evaluation and disposi-
tion of examination results. Code and regulai.ory requirements were complied-
with regarding the examination area and the examination resolution, which
was adequate to display a 0.001 inch diameter wire.
The ultrasonic examination of RPV stud S2-57 complied with Code,
regulatory, and procedural requirements.
Indications resulting from
geometric reflectors were recorded as required by code, and the the
technicians showed a good understanding of the examination requirements
and the examination equipment. Additionally, the examination personnel
were certified to the proper level of avalification in accordance with
SNT-TC-1A, the governing document.
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Personnel Qualification / Certification . Records (73753)
Qualification / certification records of vendor NDE personnel were selected
for inspection to ascertain that those personnel were qualified to perform
their assigned duties.
Records uf G.E., SWRI and EBASCO NDE technicians
were included in the inspection sample and were examined with regard to
applicable SNT-TC-1A requirements, and EPRI training and certification for
the detection and sizing of intergranular stress corrosion cracking
(IGSCC).
No violations were identified.
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Conclusion
Vendor inspection personnel at Millstone Unit I were certified to the
appropriate level of qualification in accordance with their employer's
program for the qualification and certification of NDE personnel.
Personnel who performed examinations for the detection of IGSCC were
listed on the latest EPRI registry of personnel qualified for the detec-
tion and sizing of IGSCC. The licensee verified the qualification of
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vendor personnel prior to their performing work at Millstone.
Licensee
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oversight of vendor performance was enhanced by its system which requires
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its Level III to verify, by re-examination, reported indications.
This
was an additional evidence of licensee control of the ISI program.
6.0 Nondestructive Examination Data Review (73755)
Inservice inspection NDE data were selected for inspection to ascertain
that ASME Code and regulatory requirements were complied with regarding
recording of results, evaluation and disposition of findings, and
completeness of the data.
Data representing ultrasonic examination of
the following welds were selected for inspection.
CUAJ-5, RWCU system 8" diameter pipe to valve weld
CUAJ-1, RWCU system 8" diameter weldolet to pipe weld
CUAJ-4, RWCU system 8" diameter elbow to pipe weld
CUBJ-18, RWCU system 8" diameter pipe to penetration weld
CRDF-1-NZ, CRD system nozzle to cap weld
- CSAF-1-NZ/SE core spray system safe end to nozzle weld
CSAC-1-SE, core spray system safe end to nozzle weld
The above sample included welds in the IGSCC augmented program and welds
which were part of the Mechanical Stress Improvement Program (MSIP).
The
strrss improved welds were ultrasonically examined before and af ter applica-
tion of the trestment.
No significant changes were noted.
Indications
wh'ch were detected prior to the treatment were found to be unchanged after
th. applied treattent.
Si ,nificant indications which were detected in the reactor water cleanup
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system were properly i ecorded. Unresolved indication and nonconformance
reports (UIR/NCR) were issued as appropriate.
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The evaluation of' examination results obtained from weld CUAJ-5-
-identified a rejectable. condition indicative of IGSCC and the engineering
disposition required repair. The licensee chose to perform the repair
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. using the weld overlay method, and the work was'in progress at the time
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the inspector. left the site.
Engineering' support was requested via the VIR and NCR. The evaluation,.
disposition and: corrective action provided by.the. Responsible Engineer
was, in each instance, appropriate to the reported condition, and was
technically adequate to return the component to an acceptable condition.
- No_ violations were identified.
Conclusion
Inservice-inspection data confirm that associated examinations complied
with ISI program requirements.
Examination results were properly
recorded and the disposition'of those results was based on reexaminations,
data plots, and technically correct engineering evaluations.
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The in progress weld' overlay repair complied with regulatory requirements
regarding-liquid penetrant examination and determination of.the ferrite
number to' assure the acceptability of the completed overlay.
The documentation associated with each weld contained the appropriate
information to assess the quality and acceptability of the weld, and
complied with' applicable code and regulatory requirements.
'7.0
Licensee Response to Generic' Letter (GL) 88-01
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking near weldments in BWR piping has
been occurring for almost 20 years.
Early cases were in relatively small-
diameter piping.
In early 1982, cracking was identified in large
diameter piping in a recirculation system of an operating BWR plant in.
this country.
Since then,. extensive inspection programs have been
-conducted in BWR piping. systems which have resulted in the detection.of
significant numbers of cracked weldments in almost all operating BWRs.
Substantia 1' efforts in resaarch and development by the BWR Owners Group
for IGSCC, related' work by vendors and consulting firms, and confirmatory
research sponsored by the NRC have permitted the development of revised
staff positions regarding the IGSCC problems.
The technical bases for these positions are detailed in NUREG-0313,
Revision 2, " Technical Report on Material Selection and Guidelines for
BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping." NUREG-0313, Revision 2 describes
the technical ~ bases for the staff positions on materials, processes, and
primary coolant chemistry to minimize and control IGSCC problems.
Inspection schedules and inspection sample sizes are based on the
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susceptibility of weldme.nts to initiation and propagation of IGSCC.
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Inspection schedules are' comparable to those specified in Section XI of
the ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel code in cases where the piping
material.is IGSCC resistant.
'Th'is. Generic Letter applies to all 'BWR piping made of austenitic
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stainless steel that is four inches or larger in nominal diameter and
'contains reactor cnolant at a temperature above 200 F during power
. operation,:regardless of Code classification.
It.also applies to reactor vessel attachments and appurtenances such
as jet pump instrumentation penetration assemblies and head spray and
vent components.
Licensees are requested to respond to the GL within 180
. days of the receipt of the letter. The GL provides a list of specific
items which should'be included by licensees to constitute an acceptable
response to the GL.
The licensee's response to the GL dated July 27, 1988, was reviewed by
the inspector to ascertain that applicable systems were identified, welds
were categorized and inspection schedules were established in accordance
with Table-1:of NUREG-0313, Revision 2.
The licensee. responded to the GL within the allotted time, and the
response addressed the five areas listed by the Generic Letter.
The-licensee has applied the Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP)
to 22 nozzle safe-end welds with Inconel 182 weld butter. Those welds
that_were not ultrasonically examined to the upgraded 1985 EPRI NDE
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Center Qualification Program were examined prior to the application of
MSIP.
In addition to the above, the licensee has installed an acoustic local
leak detection system on the X-168 Core Spray piping penetration (an
IGSCC Category G weld as defined by NUREG-0313, Revision.2). The system
will be used to collect. background noise level data during Cycle 13.
The decision for further use of the system will-be based on licensee
evaluation.of those data.
The licensee has completed a preimplementation test of hydrogen water
chemistry (HWC) and the results are being evaluated to determine whether
HWC will be implemented at Millstone Unit 1.
No violations were identified.
Conclusion
The licensee has responded to the GL within the allotted time and has
committed to meet the staff's position on IGSCC as defined by NUREG-0313,
Revision 2.
The installation on the X-16B Core Spray piping penetration
fulfills the licensee's commitment as stated ire their response to the GL,
and is a positive step to assure the integrity of the associated
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Category G weld. The application of MSIP to 22 welds fulfills a second
licensee commitment stated in their response, and the post-MSIP ultrasonic
examination further assures the integrity of those welds.
8.0 Quality Assurance Involvement in ISI Activities (73051)
The licensee contracted Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) to perform
NDE during the 1989 refueling outage at Millstone Unit 1.
That vendor-
has not participated in activities at Millstone since the preservice
examinations were performed prior to the facility going operational.
Licensee Quality Assurance Audit No. A04040 was conducted on
November 1-3, 1988 at the SWRI facility at San Antonio, Texas to assess
the SWRI capability to perform NDE at Millstone, and to place SWRI on the
licensee's Approved Suppliers list.
The report of QA Audit No. A04040 was selected for inspection to
ascertain that SWRI was considered an approved supplier, and that the
audit was performed in accordance with the licensee's program.
The audit at San Antonio was performed by a qualified licensee auditor,
who examined the vendor's implementation of its QA Manual with respect to
10 CFR 50, Appendix B and ANSI N45.2. Audit Report No. A04040 documented
the audit results and the audit plan verified that the areas audited were
appropriate to make the determination regarding the SWRI capability as a
vendor of ISI services.
Surveillance of SWRI onsite activities was performed by a member of the
licensee's Nuclear Engineering and Operations staff, and it was verified
that NDE procedures were complied with, vendor personnel were qualified to
perform their assigned duties, and examination results were properly
documented.
No violations were identified.
Conclusion
Audit A04040 was performed in accordance with the licensee's program, and
the areas audited confirmed that SWRI was qualified as a vendor of ISI
services.
Licensee onsite surveillance further confirmed compliance with
applicable licensee, Code and regulatory requirements.
9,0 Exit Meeting
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on May 5, 1989. The inspector
summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
At no time during the inspection was written material provided by
the inspector to the licensee.
The licensee did not indicate that
proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspection.
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