IR 05000245/1990016
| ML20059N973 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1990 |
| From: | Dexter T, Keimig R, King E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059N970 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-90-16, 50-336-90-17, 50-423-90-16, NUDOCS 9010240222 | |
| Download: ML20059N973 (10) | |
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50-245/90-~16t 50-336/90-17-
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Report No'.
50-423/90-16 (
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50-336.
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f-Docket No. 50-423-fO OPR-211 OPR-65-l
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i License.No. NPF-49
' Licensee: Northeast N'uclear Energy Company.
P. O. Box 270
.x Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
f Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear-Power Station. Units 1, 2, and 3
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- i-Inspection At:. Waterford, Connecticut
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. Inspection' Conducted:
August 27-31,-1990
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. Inspectors: dM f
a /3/po T. W.10exter, P @ ical Security Inspector
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' date E. B. K1ng, Physi Security inspector.
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lApprovedby:
reef AO-5- D
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if R. = Keimig,Mhief; feguards Section
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10ivision:of.Radiati
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' Routine Unannounced Physical' Security Inspection on
Inspection Summary:
. August 27-31,1990 (Report Nos. 50-245/90-16, 50-336/90-17, 50-423/90-16).
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- Areas / Inspected
- : Onsite follow-up of previously; identified-items'; Management.
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, Support,cSecurity Program Plans and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical
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? Barriers; Detection'and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital: Area Access j
Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and
' Communications; Power. Supply;- Testing, Maintenance and-' Compensatory Measures;.
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Security Training and Qualifications;.Licen'see actions on findings from the NRC's Regulatory Effectiveness Review; and Land ~ Vehicle Bomb Contingency
- Procedure verification.
Results:. An apparent-violation was identified in-the area of. Protected-Area
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. Access Control'of: Personnel.
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PDR ADOCK 05000245 i
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DETAILS.
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Key-Personnel Contacted-
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licensee and-Contractor Personnel
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S. Scace, Station Director, Northeast Utilities -
F. Ducimo, Station _ Site Services Director
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C. Clement, Station Director, Unit 3
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P. Weekley, Station Security Manager.-
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G. Hallberg, Manager,_ Nuclear Security Northeast Utilities l
E. Strom, Station Security I&C Supervisor
E. Burke, Station Security Shif t Supervisor j
-P. Anhalt, Station Security Supervisor, Operations M._ Gelinas, Station Security Supervisor, Administrative -
H. Haynes, Station Director, Unit Services
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L. Jones, District Manager, Burns International R. Bajorin, Security Chief, Burns International l[
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- U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
L. Kolonauski, Resident Inspector, Unit 3 j
The -above personnel were present at the exit interv_iew.
j 2.
0nsite Follow-up of 'Previously Identified Items
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.a.
(Closed) UNR 50-245/89-22-01; 50-336/89-21-01; and.50-423/89-22-01:
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The licensee was conducting perimeter intrusion detection system t
(PIDS) testing whjch, even though-it was being performed as-required
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in the Plan,. was not. ensuring the effectiveness of the detection
- system. During this inspection the.. inspectors determined that,
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effective testing.was being conducted by reviewing the_ revised _
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' licensee's station procedure No. SEP50858,-observing. actual testing
of-the PIDS, and interviewing I&C Security Technicians.
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(Open) IFI 50-245/89-22-01; 50-336/89-21-01;<and 50-423/89-22-01i
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Based on concerns. identified during' the.two previous physical
_ security inspections addressing =the marginal effectiveness of the
assessment. system,.the inspectors performed a review of_the system during day and nighttime conditions during' this inspection. The-review revealed-that corrective actions have'been initiated, but are-
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not complete.
The inspectors confirmed that compensatory measures
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were stil_l:in place to compensate for the deficiencies. - This item
'J will remain open and will be' reviewed during'. subsequent inspections.
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-(Open)1IFI_50-245/89-22-02; 50-336/89-21-02; and'50-423/89-22-02-During: the previous inspection,' the inspectors identified several-
. Vital Area (VA) barriers of marginal integrity. An inspection'of the identified barriers was conducted on August 29, 1990, and it was
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I determinedithat while a majority'of the barriers had been upgraded some work still remained. This item will remain open and will be
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' reviewed during subsequent inspections.
13.
Management Support, Security Program Plans, and Audits
. Management Support - Management Support for the licensee's physical.
a.
_ security program was determined to'be adequate by the inspectors.
This determination was based upon the-inspectors' reviews of various
~ aspects of the licensee's program during this-inspection,.as documented herein.
b.
Security Program Plans - The inspectors verified that changes to the licensee's Security, Contingency,,and Guard Training and-Qualification Plans, as implemented, did not decrease the
- effectiveness of the respective plans, and had been submitted in accordance with NRC requirements. No deficiencies were noted, c.
Audits'- The inspectors reviewed the 1989 and 1990 annual security audit reports and verified that the audits had been conducted in,
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accordance with'the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the P_lan).
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The audits were'very comprehensive in scope with the results'
reported'to_the appropriate levels of management.
The inspectors'
review included the security organization's' responses to the 1989 audit. findings and the corrective actions taken to remedy adverse findings. 'No deficiencies were noted.
The' responses to the 1990-audit had not yet been developed. These will be reviewed during a
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subsequent inspection.
4.
Protected and, Vital Area Physical-Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids
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Protected Area Barriers - The inspectors. conducted a ' physical inspection of.the Protected Area (PA) barriers on August 27, 1990.
' The. inspectors determined, by observation, - that -the' barriers were
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installed and maintained as described in the Plan,
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Protected Area Detection Aids - The inspectors observed the~'PA perimeter detection aids on August 28,-1990, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.
The inspectors, accompanied by a licensee representative,-observed forty-sixiattempts by a security officer to defeat the Intrusion
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Detection. System (IDS) at various locations'around the perimeter of'
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the. plant that resulted in only one' undetected intrusion. The licensee'immediately corrected this deficiency. The acquisition of I&C. personnel, who are. dedicated to maintaining the. security systems, has enhanced the effectiveness of the IDS and this was' evident by_the
' testing'results observed by the inspectors.
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Isolation Zones. The inspectors verified that isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both-sides-of the PA barrier.
d; Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting The inspectors.
conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on August,8,'L1990.
The inspectors determined,.by observation, that'
4r the station's lighting system was very effective.
No deficiencies at were noted.
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Assessment Aids - The inspectors observed the PA perimeter assessment aids:and determined that they were installed, maintained,'and operated as committed to in the Plan and that appropriate compensatory measures were in place. As indicated in Section 2.b., of this report, it is-evident that the licensee is taking positive steps to.
correct the problems associated with the assessment system. The-inspectors found that some deficiencies had already been corrected, and corrections to the remaining, were underway.
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' Vital Area Barriers-- The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of several VA barriers during the period of August 27-31, 1990. The inspectors determined by observation that the-VA barriers were generally installed and maintained as described in the Plan.
However, based;upon the previous inspection findings,'also addressed in Section '2.c. of this report, specific VA barriers were inspected to assess the licensee's progress on the VA barrier upgrades.
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inspectors found that work remained on several barriers but'most had been upgraded. This will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
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Vital Area Detection Aids The inspectors observed the VA detection aids and determined that they were installed, maintained and.
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operated as committed to=in:the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
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Protected and Vital Area Access Control of1 personnel, Packages-
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and Vehicles a.
Personnel Access Control
- The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive.
controls over' personnel access to the PA and VAs. This-determination was based on the following:
1) ~ The inspectors verified,'by observation, that personnel are properly _ identified, and authorization is checked. prior to issuance of badges and key-cards. No discrepancies were.noted.
2)
The inspectors verified that the~ licensee has a program to confirm the trustworthiness and reliability of employees _and contractor personnel.
No discrepancies were noted.
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Th'e' inspectors verified that the licensee takes precautions to ensure that an unauthorized name cannot be added to.the access list by having a member of management review the' list every 31
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days. No discrepancies were noted.-
4)-
The inspectors verified that the licensee has a search program, as committed to in the Plan, for firearms, explosives,=
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. incendiary devices and other unauthorized material.. The t
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inspectors observed plant personnel and visitor access processing several times during the inspection'and interviewed.
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' members of the security force and the' licensee's security staff regarding-personnel access procedures.
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On August ~28, 1990 at approximately 7:00 a.m., the inspectors
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observed several individuals enter the access facility carrying j
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cups of coffee and soda. While processing for entry into the a
protected area (PA); some officers had the individuals remove ~ tSe -
d lid on the. containers, others: shook the containers, and, in one
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case-no action to inspect the container would have-taken place,.
Lif.the inspector had not intervened.
In addition,. the inspec tors had to intervene:to ensure.that a package.that was not processed
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through the metal detecto'r was inspected by'the' security officer.
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' Based upon these observations, the inspectors determined that
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there was a lack of consistency by security _ personnel in i
searching hand carried packages.
This was brought to the.
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attention of the licensee and corrective action was immediately-
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-implemented. This action consisted of reinstructing all access i
control 1of ficers to physically inspect all' hand-carried items-that are not passed through the x ray equipment prior to entering the.PA.
This issue will be reviewed during subsequent
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inspections.
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h-On the morning of August 28, 1990, the1 inspectors requested the.
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licensee to. test the explosive and metal. detectors. The test j
n revealed that three out of four explosive detectors'did not meet
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The licensee immediately-took the ~ equip-j
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ment'out of service and instituted appropriate compensatory-
measures. The test-failures-were attributed to an expired test'-
H sample.
The licensee took immediate corrective action by i
notifying the manufacturer and acquiring new test samples.
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THIS PARAGRAPH COEAINS SAFEGUARDS
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IWORMAll0N AND 13 NOT FOR PUBilC.
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Tills PARA 8RAPH CONTAINS SAFEGilABS
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lHf9tl4All0N AND 13 NOT FOR Ptl8LIC
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The inspectors determined that.the licensees. failure to comply-
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with the personnel: access: control provisions-in--the NRC-approved l
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Plan-is an:. apparent violation of NRC. requirements-..
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(V10 50-245/90-16-01, 50-336/90-17-01, 50-423/90-16-01)'.<
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k, Package Access Control-
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Inconsistencies identified in the-licensee's package access
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control.' procedure ire discussed in paragraph 5.a.4=of;this!
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report. While 'the' licensee:took-immediate action to correct the inconsistencies, this area will-be reviewed during.subse-quent inspections.
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' Vehicle Access Control'
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s The~ inspectors determined that the licensee. properly. controls that vehicles are -properly processed The~ inspectors verified vehicle access to' and within the PA.
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prior to entering the PA.
's The' process was consistent with commitments in the Plan.
The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan.. This determination was made by observir.g vehic'e processing and search, inspection of. vehicle logs, and by interviewing members of the security force and licensee's security staff about vehicle processing and search procedures.
'No discrepancies were noted.
6.
Alarm Station and Communications
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The inspectors observed the operations of the'CAS and SAS and determined-that'they were' maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were-interviewed by the/ inspectors and found.to be
- knowledgeable of.their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors
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l iii xverified that the CAS and SAS did not contain any operationa act v t es
- that would' interfere with the assessment and. response functions.
No discrepancies were noted.
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The: inspectors also reviewed the testing procedures for all. communications
' capabilities in both the CAS and the SAS with:the operators and reviewed the testing records'for the communication channels'.
All'were found to be as -committed to.in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.
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The inspectors verified that there are several: systems-(batteries, dedicated diesel generator within a VA and plant on-site.AC: power) that-
. provide backup power to.the security systems. The inspectors reviewed
the test t.nd maintenance records and procedures for these systems and
"found that they were' consistent with the Plan.
No discrepancies were
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Thetinspectors.also-verified that the vital area door access control
system will-permit emergency ingress and egress when the system's normal.
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i power is lost'
No discrepancies were noted.
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' 8.t ETesting, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures
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The, inspectors reviewed testing and maintenance records and confirmed thst the records = committed to in the Plan were ;on file and readily.
- available for NRC review.
The security organization has'its own dedicated
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instrumentation andzcontrols (I&C) technicians.who. maintain and test the'
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. security equipment. A review of repatr records by the inspectors indicated that maintenance and testing is being accomplished'in a timely
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manner. No deficiencies were noted.
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.'he' inspectors also reviewed the licensee's' use of compensatory measures l
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and' determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies
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were noted.
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. Security Training and Oualification program
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.The inspectors. randomly. selected and reviewed the training and qualifica-
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tion' records for. ten security ~of ficers (50s).' Physical qualifications and q
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firearms qualifications records were inspected. These records'were for i
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armed guards, watchmen and supervisory personnel.. The inspectors deter-
mined that the reovired training had been conducted in accordance with the
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security program plans and that it was properly documented.
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they possessed 'the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties.' ' The interview results indicated that the-S0s, in ~
J general ~, were knowledgeable of their job requirements.
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On August 28,-1990, the inspectors had the opportunity to observe a
scheduled range requalification course of fire.
The range instructor.was
knowledgeable of his' duties and responsibilities, and effectively'
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controlled all range activities.
During the shotgun. course of fire,.the!
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. inspectors noted that some of-the 50s appeared to be somewhat unfamiliar
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- weapons. The licensee agreed-to conduct loading practice, using dummy:
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rounds, to improve their expertise.
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i The licensee's contract security force consists of approximately 205 S0s
and supervisory personnel.
The inspectors verified that the armed-response force' meets the commitments in the Plan and' that there is always
'one full-time member offthe security organization onsite who has the
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authority to direct: security activities.
I 10.
Licensee Action on Findings from the NRC's Regulatory I
Effectiveness Review (RER)
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' On ' June 7-15,1988,.the NRC conducted a Regulatory Ef fectiveness Review
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(RER) at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3.
The ER R
identified thirteen inadequacies in the' licensee security program.
In addition, eight safeguards program concerns were identified. NRC Inspection Report No, 50-245/89-22, 50-336/89-21, and 50-423/89-21.
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documented the satisfactory resolution of'seven'of the: items identified in the.RER-report.
During this inspection' the ' following. items -(RER-
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Report' paragraphs. 2.2.3,2.3.2,2.3,4) were ' reviewed, i
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RER Finding 2.2.3 i
LiHIS PARABRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS IHiOPJdAll0H AND l$ NOT FOR PUBLIC
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N THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAIN$ SAFESUAtt$
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i The NRC considers this RER item (2.2.3) to be resolved.
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RER Findin'a 2.3.2 i
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lack of Stress Firing q,
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Licensee Action:
During this' inspection' the' inspectors. reviewed the stress fire course with the licensee. The course was described by the
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-contract range officer and the inspectors verified, by a review of-
- training records, that all armed security of ficers are required to-participate in: stress firing as a requalification requirement.
'The NRC considers this RER item (2.3.2) to be resolved.
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RER Finding 2.3.4 THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARBS IWiORMAil0N AND l$ NOT FOR PWLIC-DISCLOSURE, IT IS-INTENilHALLY LEFTBLAU.
y The' NRC considers this RER item -(2.3.4) to be resolved.
The remaining items -(RER Report paragraphs 2.2.6, 2.2.7,.
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-2.2.8,2.2.9,2.3.1,2.2.11,2.2.12,2'2.13,2.3.6,2.3.7,2.3.8)
X will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
11.
Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure Verification The inspectors conducted:a review of the' licensee's' Land Vehicle. Bomb'
Contingency Procedure. The licensee's-procedure details short-term e
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. actions that'could:beltaken to protect.against attempted radiological-
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sabotagel using a land' vehicle bomb if such a threat were to materialize-.
The proce' dure appeared adequate for its-intended purpose..No discrepan..
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12-1 Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives identified in Para' graph.1 at the conclusion of the inspection on August 31, 1990.
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that time, the' purpose and scope _of the inspection were reviewed, the findings presented and commitments made by the licensee's representatives
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~during the inspection were confirmed,
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